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THE PAPERS included in this volume were prepared for the eighth meeting of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life, which was held at The American Philosophical Society on September 7, 8, 9 and 10, 1947. Each paper represents only the opinion of the individual author.

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LEARNING AND WORLD PEACE

Eighth Symposium

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Preface



These papers were prepared for and discussed at the Eighth Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, held in Philadelphia in September, 1947.

In their invitation the program committee asked for contributions on the subject "How can scholarship contribute to the relief of international tensions?" They stated that

This problem will be approached from different perspectives. Some may describe what they are doing through their specific disciplines to prevent world disunity, misunderstanding, and possible conflict. Some will describe how their special disciplines, by their very nature, make for the easing of tensions, among individuals, among groups, among peoples. Some may indicate how their disciplines can shed light on the problem of human relations in our time.

The following series of questions have occurred to some of us with regard to the general problem

1. Philosophy
 - A. Is present-day philosophy making for greater or lesser understanding among men?
 - B. If the first, how is it achieving its goal?
 - C. If the latter, how can that condition be remedied?
 - D. If some philosophies are making for greater understanding, and others are not, what is the explanation of this phenomenon?
2. Art
 - A. Are the modern tendencies in art making for greater or lesser national sanity and international cooperation?
 - B. If the former, what can be done to stimulate them further?
 - C. If the latter, what can be done to alter the situation?
3. Music
 - A. Are there any indications that music being international, intercultural, is advancing causes of mutual understanding?
 - B. Is the tendency of modern music toward greater or lesser national sanity and international cooperation?

- C. Which trends in music point in one direction, and which in the other?
- 4. Letters
 - A Is modern literature making for increased or diminished national sanity and international cooperation?
 - B If there are various tendencies, can they be identified, and if so, can the positive ones be encouraged and can the negative ones be discouraged?
- 5. Natural Science
 - A What elements in modern science are making for national sanity and international cooperation?
 - B Can science be more useful as a means for the attainment of this goal?
 - C Are the methods of science of value toward the attainment of this goal?
 - D Is the spread of emphasis on science assisting in the attainment of this goal?
- 6. Sociology and Kindred Sciences
 - A Has recent progress in social scientific theory shed any light on the problems of national sanity and international cooperation? If so, what? Is there any consensus on the subject?
 - B Which social sciences are especially important in the attainment of new insights in this matter?
 - C How can social science be utilized to further the trends toward national sanity and international cooperation?
 - D Does social science itself need to be further developed in order that it may contribute toward this goal? If so, what areas show most promise?
- 7. Psychology
 - A Are the advances being made in psychology of use in the development of national sanity and international cooperation? If so, how can they be implemented?
 - B Is sufficient known about individual and social psychology to affect our policies in regard to national and international affairs?
- 8. Economics
 - A Does present economic theory shed any light on the prospects of increased national sanity and international cooperation?
 - B Can the economic forces making for and against these goals be identified? If so, can the favorable ones be encouraged, and the unfavorable ones be discouraged? If so, how?

- 9 Commerce, Industry, and Labor
 - A Are the trends in commerce, industry and labor today making for greater or lesser national sanity and international cooperation?
 - B If the former, what specific trends can be identified, as leading to the desired goals? How can they be stimulated?
 - C If the latter, what specific trends can be identified as harmful, and how can they be impeded?
- 10 Law, Government, and Administration
 - A Have law, government, and administration any suggestions to make regarding the promotion of national sanity and international cooperation? Is there anything to be learned in this regard from the experience of large business houses or labor unions or other institutions?
 - B Are the tendencies in government today making for greater or lesser national sanity and international cooperation? (This question refers not to specific administration, but to the trends of development within the state, which are independent of the particular party in power)
- 11 UNESCO
 - A What is it UNESCO can do or promote which will establish a cultural climate suitable to sustain harmonious international relations, which will link peoples together in a common effort of advancing democratic ideals and freedoms, and which will provide a sufficient common denominator of social purpose and ethical values to enable the rule of law to be established as a foundation for permanent peace and security?
 - B What might be individual contributions to that end?
- 12 Education
 - A Is American education today making for national sanity and international cooperation? If so, how can this tendency be stimulated? If not, how can the present condition be changed?
 - B Are there any specific tendencies in modern education, here or abroad, which are making for the attainment of the goal, or preventing its attainment?
 - C Is there a distinction to be made between elementary, secondary, and higher education in this regard?
- 13 Mass Education and Communication of Ideas
 - A What trends in mass education and the communication of ideas (radio, press, movies, book-publishing, magazine publication, public relations, advertising) are making for the attainment of

national sanity and international cooperation? What elements are working in the opposite direction? How can the former be stimulated, and the latter be retarded?

- B Is the advancement of instruments of mass education itself making for national sanity and international cooperation? If so, how? If not, why not, and what can be done about it?

14 Religion

- A What are the various religious institutions (Catholic, Greek-Orthodox, Hindu, Jewish, Protestant, Russian-Orthodox, etc.) doing to promote national sanity and international cooperation?

- B What does religion, as interpreted in specific denominations do to attain this goal?

- C What tendencies toward national sanity and international cooperation are being especially stressed by religious leadership?

The whole subject has immediate practical implications which are readily perceivable. A member of our own government, for instance, has specifically requested that the Conference consider the implications for UNESCO, in the hope that our members might help by suggesting proposals that might be urged for its consideration and also by indicating what their individual contributions might be.

The oral proceedings of the sessions were recorded, and although it has not been possible thus far to arrange for their publication, the stenotype report is available to qualified students at the Conference offices.

Owing to their diversity in subject matter and approach, these papers follow no uniform pattern or procedure. Further, a major change in Conference technique begun in the Sixth Symposium, *Approaches to Group Understanding*, has been followed in the present volume. The invitation for the Eighth Conference, concluded with the following

Thus the editors will use each paper as a basis for a chapter, not necessarily following its original form in every detail. No substantial changes are contemplated, but rather editing in the sense of clarifying the relationship between the various chapters that will make up the volume. Each author will, of course, be free to use his paper in its original form elsewhere, indicating the purpose for which it was prepared.

The papers in this volume were edited in accordance with this plan, and the comments edited and placed as footnotes (alphabetical series)

to the relevant parts of the texts. In the table of contents the folio number indicates only the first comment by that author in the chapter concerned. A number of the comments which were very helpful in preparation for the September sessions but which did not add appreciably to the written record, have been omitted from the book for the sake of brevity.

A paper entitled "Personal Security and Peace of Mind" by Mr. Malcolm Ross was circulated with the others for study before September, 1947. In view of the fact that it formed a chapter in *All Manner of Men*, which was published prior to the present book, Mr. Ross's paper has here been omitted.

This year the editors of the symposium have sought a greater measure of integration through the use of cross references. Editorial notes are indicated by brackets.

Following the decision taken at the Seventh Conference in 1946, efforts were made to create interdisciplinary seminars at various centers of learning. At least two such groups met with considerable regularity in New York, and Appendix I reports on the art group. It is hoped that these seminars composed of scholars of different backgrounds, will in the course of time have significant contributions to make to the annual meetings of the Conference. The efforts to create a seminar between theoreticians on human affairs and men of practical responsibility in business and government, have resulted in several conferences and one group meeting in New York which is to be followed by others early in the autumn of 1948.

Skiping a year, the group that met at Amherst in 1944 and at Lake Mohonk in 1946, again assembled there in June, 1948, for discussion of a number of suggestions that had been submitted to the Council of the Conference of which Doctor Harlow Shapley has served as chairman. The Council will meet again for further discussion in the autumn of 1948. Other proposals and criticisms of the activities of the Conference generally will be welcome.

The editors express their deep gratitude to all who participated in the Conference program, to those who attended the sessions, to the authors of comments, and above all to the original writers, whose work formed the basis of the Conference meetings and of this volume. In particular, they record their indebtedness to the officers of the American Philosophical Society and its secretary, Miss Julia A. Noonan, who made

possible the meetings at the building of the Society in Philadelphia. They again wish to thank Miss Jessica Feingold for her indispensable help in every phase of the Conference program. They wish to thank Mr. Roger L. Shinn, who was entrusted with the task of preparing the papers and comments for this edition.

As noted in its previous publications, the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion does not regard itself as a permanent institution, but as existing from year to year, so long as those who participate in it believe it worthwhile to renew their meetings. The membership of the Conference, the participants of the meetings of 1947, and the authors of papers and comments are listed on page 662 ff.

At the close of the Eighth Conference, a meeting of the members was held, and the following Board of Directors was elected:

William F. Albright	Richard P. McKeon
Van Wyck Brooks	John C. Murray, S. J.
Lyman Bryson	John U. Nel
W. G. Constable	F. S. C. Northrop
Henry S. Dennison	Harry A. Overstreet
Louis Finkelstein	Wilhelm Pauck
Lawrence K. Frank	Anton C. Pegis
Philipp Frank	Gerald B. Phelan
Theodore M. Greene	Roy W. Sellars
C. P. Haskins	Harlow Shapley
Robert J. Havighurst	George N. Shuster
Charles W. Hendel	Donald C. Stone
F. Ernest Johnson	George F. Thomas
Harold D. Lasswell	Harold C. Urey
David E. Lilienthal	Gerald G. Walsh, S. J.
Alain L. Locke	Luther A. Weigle
Robert H. Lowie	M. L. Wilson
R. M. MacIver	Louis Wirth

Doctor Louis Finkelstein was re-elected President of the Conference; Professor Robert H. Lowie, Professor Roy W. Sellars, and Doctor George N. Shuster were elected Vice-Presidents, Doctor Lyman Bryson was re-elected Secretary-Treasurer, and Miss Jessica Feingold, Assistant Secretary-Treasurer.

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CHAPTER I

How Can Scholarship Contribute to the Relief of International Tensions?

By HERMAN FINER

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The Promotion of National Sanity and International Cooperation

SCHOLARSHIP MAY CONTRIBUTE toward the relief of international tensions by *clarifying* elementary questions, but the answers may not be pleasant, since they may require painful duties. It is not every difficulty that can be overcome by talking. The crucial questions will be answered mainly with the assistance of History, that is, by generalizations from the recorded behavior of men over a long past during which they have been forced to face a variety of problems. The compulsion derives from a changing environment and a changing composition of minds. But "other" social sciences contribute, for the process of history is broken down sometimes to deal with small parts of it—eras or stages. The truth is here sought dynamically over a period of years or decades or centuries. Or it may be pursued anthropologically, that is, by the intensive study of some primitive community at a special stage. Or the sociologist may undertake the intensive study of what is hardly more than a single moment in a single aspect of a single community.

The methods assist each other. For example, one of the most important problems today is the origin of the State. Its particular significance is to throw light on the institution of sufficient government in the world as a whole to prevent war and establish justice. For this purpose, at least three approaches are essential, three that braid into one: the historic constitutional, the anthropological, and the psychological. The first seeks to determine the conditions of the formation of authority over wider groups and wider territories by the careful scanning of the process, stage by stage.

But a point comes where the documents and the speculations cannot carry us altogether back into the State of Nature, and even the twilight fails us. Then it is necessary to speculate on the basis of the anthropologist's knowledge of today's very different and apparently primitive communities. Even this is not enough. It is essential to speculate beyond the record on the origins of faith, divinity, attachment to society, the holy, and the myth making propensities of the human mind. The three approaches together can offer considerable clarity on the nature of statehood, or nationality and nationalism. But though it is unavoidable to utilize the findings, since action is imposed on statesmen (and in democratic communities on all who are citizens), there is a twilight zone in all three approaches, and their combination still leaves much in the dark, where obscurity is the mother of political error.

The Problems

The specific questions of this Conference require inquiries into six problems, to which I proceed to suggest answers.

1. How is "tension" to be defined?^a

The question asked in the *Program* of those concerned with law, government, and administration, is whether their studies have "any suggestions to make regarding the promotion of national sanity and international cooperation." The gravamen of the question lies in the nature of "tension" and "sanity."

I presume that "national sanity" is related to "international tensions." If there were no tension between nations now, and if none were likely, then we would not need to be interested in national sanity within the

^aComment by Rudolf Allers.

The word "tension" is one of the more unfortunate, but probably an unavoidable metaphor. Its physical character is misleading. If it corresponds to a certain extent to some inner experience, it becomes ambiguous when used in reference to other conditions. As a name for a mental state, it indicates a situation in which man envisions two incompatible future events. Either it is apprehension of something unpleasant, together with the idea of incapability to meet the event, or it is the pursuit of two goals, one of which often is not even perfectly conscious. If the notion of tension is to have any definite sense when applied to group relations, it cannot signify anything else than the pursuit of divergent goals: self-preservation on one part and threat on the other, defense and propagation of one political theory opposing that of the other, competition for goods of which each part desires to grasp as much as possible, and so forth. The problem of tension then becomes that of ends [Cf. Chapter VI by Quincy Wright, and comment thereto by Robert C. Angell.]

context of the present inquiry. However peculiar the *mores*, the ways of life of the various national societies, then "sanity" would be only an object of domestic speculation.

Sanity, with reference to a relationship of tension, then would mean, that, however different or alike the state of mind of the various nations, the relationship of temper between them is not so belligerent as to lead to war, or the expectation of and preparation for war.¹

Now, in *international* tensions it may not be possible to deal with spiritual and psychological excess in the *exact degree* that would reduce the temper precisely, and no more than necessary. For example, the present exercise in the restoration of Germany and Japan to international sanity may require measures far more comprehensive, far clumsier, far more wasteful, and perhaps even destructive, than the social scientist would recommend or like, simply because social science may be clumsy in its conclusions, and the machinery of effectuation is unwieldy. Will they be peaceful if they are maneuvered into being Soviet Communist, or Democratic Socialist, or Democratic Capitalist? And each of these three prescriptions hides a multitude of differentia. Each raises, at once, the issue, whether peace is worth having at the price the national way of life (the national "sanity") must pay to secure that peace. A nation might

¹Comment by Rudolf Allers.

It is questionable whether the notion of "national sanity" make sense. Applying any term in a field different from that to which the term originally belongs, has always its difficulties and dangers. Many will claim that some nation is not behaving in a "sane" manner, but the psychiatrist will be unable to discover traces of mental disturbance in the individual who constitute this nation. Who, then, lacks sanity? The nation? But the nation has neither brain nor mind; it cannot be the victim of an "organic" disease and it cannot be afflicted by "functional" troubles.

Furthermore, by what standard is "national sanity" to be judged? It is very difficult to give a satisfactory definition of "mental health" even when referring to an individual. We usually call one mentally sound when he proves able to "adjust," to remain reasonably free from inner conflicts, and to build up a moderately successful existence. Whether these criteria are sufficient, is not a question to be raised here. But can we use the same criteria when talking of a people? What does it mean, in this case, to "adjust," or to be successful? It is conceivable that a people be successful, at least for some time, by ways which other peoples will consider unsound. A people, moreover, may fail to "adjust," and sometimes need not do so, because it may create its own conditions of existence, as, for instance, by subjecting other nations to its rule and will. But the defeated nations will not feel that the victor is particularly sound.

Back of the notion of "national sanity" there seems to be an idea which has little to do with sanity as medicine or psychiatry use the term. Any nation, apparently, is considered sound whose behavior, political, commercial, and so on, conforms to certain standard of what may be called, since there is no better name, international morals. But this notion, too, has its difficulties. Morality is not less primarily of the individual than sanity.

reject the prescription for sanity, thus implied; some deliberately have; some may be right to do so. *Cumspice!*

It cannot be ignored by the alienist that some states of mind must be locked up. A candid social scientist may even have to speculate on the incarceration of the internationally insane, in the sense above defined: or the international equivalent, permanent encirclement, or even the destruction of a group of national leaders who are peculiarly self-willed.

The international law of our time, having been shaped in the seventeenth century, assumes the right of existence and independent development of each national society. But it provides also a number of recognized devices for restoring "sanity" should national liberty be so self-regarding as to produce tensions intolerable to other nations. Such devices are Retorsions; Non-performance; Non-intercourse; the Display of Force; Reprisals; Pacific Blockade and Occupation, Punitive Expeditions; and War. Non-recognition has also been used to attempt to bring another nation to sobriety. Or a force in the hands of a single nation, for example, the British Navy in the hands of the governing class of nineteenth century Britain, can be used to set a standard of sanity and maintain it by a memory or a suggestion of the imminence of its use. The analogies in interindividual behavior or intergroup tensions may be easily drawn. The exodus from tension as organized by international law has, however, the demerit that it is not in the name of a universal standard supported by the loyalty of all peoples. The standard of sanity is set by each nation for itself.

Little is to be learned from relationships of groups or individuals within the confines of each nation of direct application to the relationship between nations. Individuals and groups exercise within the same state all the varieties of persuasion and coercion, *except that they may not use arms*. What is of crucial importance is their differences from the relationship between nations.

For individuals and groups in modern states possess two characteristics which not only relieve their tensions, but also prevent them from arising to a dangerous point. The first is, that they have lived, and learned to live under the rule of a common superior. Their freedom to become tense has been limited *ab initio*. They know no feasible social alternative to this subordination they must respect. And the common superior gives them values and services. Their power to coerce others is limited. Their power to develop fully as they wish is restricted. They cannot become

insane, in the estimation of the common superior, without being harshly treated, up to the point, it may be, of lifelong imprisonment or execution. All the techniques of coercion they may have learned—locking men out of factories, dismissing men from employment, refusing to employ them, using factory police with weapons, or, putting up picket lines, denying employment to fellow workers who do not belong to the union, exacting contributions to the union on pain of getting no job, and all the rest—all these are exercised under a common superior. In a national society there is much voluntary and uncontrolled and undirected activity; but if it becomes obnoxious, that is, if it seriously troubles the peace of the entire social order, the common superior will restrain the individual's power to act. The continuity, the omnipresence, and the imminence of the common superior tame the individuals and the groups inside the society.

The second characteristic that reduces tension in national units is the high degree of common morality within each separate community. It may seem strange to declare this in a revolutionary era. Many states are deeply riven by conflict regarding the proper principles of government, economic reward and duty, and the general destiny of mankind. In some countries, the tensions approximate to those which have been endemic in international relations. But in many countries, in more than not, for most people, a common acceptance of common ideas of their fair place in the community, prevails. Limits are generally acknowledged beyond which they *ought not* to transgress in pressing their claims, whether this is the claim of a church, a business, a newspaper, a school of thought, an experimental community, a university, an organization of workers, or even a political party. They recognize the rights of the "community." It is not pretended that all men equally share this acknowledgment; nor that there is not something uncertain and contingent about the acknowledgment, nor that it is explicit, nor that it is not under strain. That it can be changed by open discussion, and perhaps the making of new law, through accepted, or at any rate, effective institutions of authority, is a decisive factor in the reduction of tensions. If one has not justice now, but is not denied the assurance of it perhaps some day, then tension is relieved.

Hence, some tension in society is always present, and must be expected. It can only be avoided if men die out. For every man is a ball of explosive energies, whether static in defense of his own, or expanding in quest of his own. In a nation, as between nations, we are doomed to

tensions because we are promised life. On the whole, and in the long run, government maximizes all life though it diminishes some expressions of it. And it is at once limited and maximized, in the name of the community or the nation. Is humanity likely to be the moderator of life energy and life giver in this sense as between nations?

UNESCO came into existence to introduce by persuasion an acceptance by the people of all nations of a common morality, of a loyalty to human beings wherever they may be, or of their long term and common interests. The essence of its teaching is the principle of settlement of disputes by means other than the use of force. Instrumental thereto is the principle "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small." All this would still leave a place for tension, anger, disappointment, and disapproval as the nations severally made progress in their own way. But the supreme purpose of UNESCO is to open the frontiers of the mind across the frontiers of territory.

If UNESCO's purpose indicates the nature of tolerable tension and one way of overcoming group insanity, so does the life of political parties in the individual countries where those parties are free. Political parties are separated by more or less serious differences of outlook. Some, indeed, altogether deny the validity of the basic principle of the system of government, its outlawing of violence and rule by a self-perpetuating minority party. Political parties cause each other the most poignant griefs; their policies, their programs, their personalities, their views of human nature—all these arouse fears and hatred of the most intense sort. It is known also that if one party gets into office it may be for many years, and that during that period the minority must submit to the majority, to the extent that the majority wishes.

Yet there are mitigating factors which reduce interparty tension. Fundamentals are accepted; men may pass from one party to another, there is a basic homogeneity of civic characters. In democratic states, although the parties differ in policy, often very markedly, they inhabit one territory, their members can move from places they do not like to others which are more congenial politically or economically (this has its limits). *Above all they operate under the fundamental that association is voluntary*, that such voluntary associations may freely pursue political objectives for the *pro tem* capture of state authority, that the minority will acquiesce therein, that *the way will be open, with its armor of civil*

liberties, for the minority to persuade the people that the majority ought to be turned out of office, and that the policy of the majority ought to be tempered by the present arguments of the minority. This is the fundamental that must be accepted if the democratic system is to work. And in many countries it does work, and progress is made by all, despite the fact that great storms of anger are aroused in the course of the conflict.

In the center is the fact that parties are voluntary associations, open both ways: open to receive members at the wish of the members, and open for members to leave and join any other, or none, or form a new one, without any penalty. This is a tremendous advance in human organization and the human social mind. It accepts the tenet of social change and the majority rule method of effectuating it. In other words, a final absolute creed is not accepted as the criterion of social life; the democratic creed is that no such an absolute and final one exists. Fluidity of loyalty, and, therefore, a moderation of temper or tenseness result. In Soviet Communism and in Italian Fascism an absolute final creed of man's destiny and worth, and therefore of duty, was maintained by philosophy and by force. The national unit of society in international relations is in some respects like the dictatorial party within a nation: both are systems of loyalty, closed to non-believers, hostile to strangers, and admitting of no free movement in and out. Political tensions are possible in democratic countries because the party frontiers are "open." Parties interpenetrate each other: their arguments and appeals occur in a single territorial forum which is open to counter argument. Acceptance of the principle of democracy, that is, the need to appeal to the people for legitimacy of rule, limits the degeneration of truth and argument which might otherwise occur. In the relationship between nations all the clarifying merit of such a free system of political mobility, and the spontaneous fellowship that comes of voluntary seeking out of those most like oneself, are absent—hence the degree of tension has no regulator.^d

^cComment by Robert H. Howe

Altogether, I am not very happy about the concept of democracy as used by Professor Tinner and by other participants in Conferences past and present. The conflict between absolute principles of ethics and democratic points of view, if that phrase designates minority convictions, seems to me one of the most vital for our Conferences to thrash out.

^dComment by Thomas D. Eliot

I like the recognition that tensions are normal, inevitable, stimulative—up to a critical point. Also the point that, *within* a nation citizens can change their partisan allegiance freely. Only creation of a form and procedure for *world citizenship* through the United

Finally, there is much if not complete homogeneity within a nation. Nations are homogeneous, with small exception, in language, history, literary tradition, political customs, social manners, appearance. This is partly the result of representative institutions, and it is certainly a mighty aid to the operation of democratic government. It is well known that heterogeneity in the factors mentioned causes a sense of alienation and fear, may lead to ridicule, and may originate, or exacerbate, aversions. When men of the same nation convene for long periods of time on the floor of the same representative assembly, then, though they are of different parties, they treat each other as persons, and a process of assimilation and concession and easing of tensions proceeds.¹

Thus, it has been suggested that tension cannot be entirely dispelled while men remain alive, but that there are institutions and ideas which can mitigate the tensions so that men remain creative while their destructiveness is reduced; but it is problematical whether such arrangements can operate fruitfully as between nations.²

2 What degree of tension prevails?

Our problem lies in the field of the degree of tension. It is clear from events since 1914, that there may be such a degree of tension between nations, that no solution is available by conference, by understanding, by meeting of minds, by concessions. In such a case, international injustice will prevail, while the strong dominate their neighbors, or set up world encircling systems of rule. But such an arrangement is relatively unstable, as injustice will obsess all parties, and produce anxiety, fear, and either revolt or war.

Tension may cause such an aggravation of fears that VIOLENCE is the only way out. The degree of tension is a problem then of the acuteness of moral differences. But the degree of tension is also a problem in TIME. Time has a dual aspect (1) is the tension likely to abate, and

Nations can produce analogous mobility on a planetary level: a world citizen could also be *interpatriotic*, taking sides with one or another nation discriminately on successive issues without having to be expatriated and naturalized, each time he shifts his partisanship.
 *Comment by Robert C. Angell

This is a brilliant paper. Doctor Finer has convinced me that there is less analogy between the accommodation of peoples in American cities and the accommodation of nations than I have said that there is in my own paper. [See Chapter VIII]

¹Cf. Herman Finer, *Theory and Practice of Modern Government*, The Methuen Press, London, 1932, Volume I, Chapter XVI and Volume II, Chapter XVIII.

(2) how long is the period given us to find and effect a peaceful solution? Violence will be considered if differences are very acute, if the differences are durable; and if time severely presses, for fear that lack of an anticipatory policy may produce an outbreak by one of the parties concerned. If it is likely that tensions will never abate, then permanent institutions to deal continuously with them must be established. If conflict is intermittent because tensions vary in their intensity, content, and cause—still, permanent institutions may be essential, for the consequences of such a conflict may be so materially and morally shocking that even the intervals of national lassitude and composure must be tidied over by world institutions.

As for the problem of the Time in which a solution must be found, the history of social adjustment of very diverse kinds teaches how oppressive is a short period for thought and adjustment, how panic may be increased by the belief that within a short time a solution must be found. It may stimulate ideas, but as often it seems rather to produce desperation. This is the case with the international control of atomic energy. A considerable increase in international tension has occurred since the first bomb was dropped. There are other reasons also which account for this; but this is a major factor. There is no certainty that if the bombs were distributed the tension would decrease—it would probably increase severely. Nor can we now believe that the destruction of the bombs would ease tensions. For the basic truth producing tension in this regard is that it is known that the bomb can be made.

3. Between whom, specifically, is tension observable, and is the tension, therefore, of a special character?

It seems to me of minor value to consider the easing of tensions in general. It is essential in all cases of tension—thus, psychiatry, personnel management problems, political party disciplines, and industrial relations—that it be made clear *who* are the unlike, or “insane” entities, and what is the nature and degree of their tension.

In our own time many international tensions exist, but only one is intractable by means inside the United Nations. Tension between colonial peoples and their imperial rulers is being met by a relaxation or total withdrawal of imperial rule. Tension between raw material economies and economies of investment and exploitation is in the process of improvement by the principle of the Open Door to all competitors, and in

ternational loans and technical assistance. Communal conflict, as between Hindus and Mohammedans in free India, may be solved only by partition. The common education of thousands of Indians in British principles of government, especially tolerance and impartiality, and consciousness of long term good, may avert centuries of bloodshed for the sake of Mahomet or Buddha (what irony of history!) In Northwestern Europe and even in the Mediterranean, in the United States of America, Canada, the British Dominions, even the Latin American lands, the tensions are contained—prudence and common values out of Christianity, and a long history together, combine to abate tensions and to make war look ridiculous as well as hideous. Even their economists are bonds of union between them.

The chief tension of our time arises out of nationalism; but it is one particular example of it that acutely presents the issue. It is the tension between the Soviet Union and the Western nations. At basis it is a tension between different economic systems and ideologies which support the political system within which the economic institutions function. If the conflict were only between a planned economy and unplanned ones elsewhere, there is no reason to suppose that it would ever need rise to the point of war.

I am at considerable pains to deny differences of economic systems *per se* as causes of international conflict. For to begin with, it is easily demonstrable that the differences are differences of degree. The Soviet Union is not completely planned, not completely an example of equality of compensation, the United States of America is not an example of a completely *laissez faire* system with the reign of inequality. Each has merits appreciated by the other side and each has demerits which cause the other country to be so happy in the belief that its rival cannot last forever, that the tension is slackened.¹ And beyond that, there are all degrees of intermediate stages between the economies of the respective nations. Differences of degree are not differences which usually cause irresolvable tensions—differences of kind are another matter.

The essential cause of tension is not economic, but political. It is the difference between a despotism (Soviet Russia) and democracy (the Western powers). The tension arises from the fact that each hates the

¹Comment by Thomas D. Eliot.

I question this sentence, doubting that international "*Schadenfreude*" is sufficient to relax tensions.

other, though the democratic hates the despotic less than the Soviet rulers hate the democratic nations.^a Both have reasons for their hatred. The Soviet rulers hate the Western world because this world has practiced imperial domination; because it tolerates class differences of opportunity, reward, work, and social recognition; and because in some places racial discrimination and even downright brutality prevail. They also hate the Western world because it has shown hostility, at times to the point of waging war on Russia, and, it is alleged, often of plotting with internal enemies to overthrow the regime. The Soviet rulers must find it very difficult to distinguish between hostility to their own personal power and hostility to the social principles which they profess. The distinction is particularly difficult, as their leader Stalin has on at least two occasions openly declared that the principles of Marxism are outmoded, and it may be therefore inferred that he interprets as it suits his own whim. The rulers believe, or affect to believe, and they teach their people, that democracy is a sham, and its leaders oppressors and charlatans.

On the other hand, the Western powers know well that much of the agitation about imperialism is unjustified—much is exaggerated in ignorance, much deliberately. They see the incompetence and ineffectiveness of the Soviet rulers' plans. But above all they see despotism. The Soviet rulers' conduct of government happens to be a complete repudiation—complete to metaphysics—of the democratic system of government, liberties, and beliefs. This is a vital difference in kind. There is another count of the greatest importance. The despotic system does not admit communication freely to its people, nor can foreign countries discover the course of policy of its neighbor. The maximum evil can be suspected, and the foreign secretaries of the powers cannot take a risk of relying on time to bring amelioration—for their peoples would not forgive them if they made a mistake.

One other factor is of the highest relevance. So far as we are able to judge from the history of nations, the democratic form is more likely, in the long run, than a despotism to make for a diminution of tension. A democracy is a divided unit of government, for its very principle is a divided state of mind.^b Its freedom of dissent permits a drag on the

^aComment by Robert H. Towne

A reader of the daily press is likely to doubt whether there is more hatred for Western culture in Russia than *vice versa*.

^bComment by Ralph T. Howelling

With the present necessity for Democracy to defend itself, it seems to me important to

caprice of government; its voluntary association for electoral and educative purposes supplies a brake on governmental decision and precipitancy, its openness of opinion and debate opens wide the way for the ventilation of the point of view of other nations in the forum of the nation. These safety valves do not exist in a dictatorial system. It may be that specific dictators are not walllike. And yet again, it may be that specific dictators may really entertain principles of national and world activity, which may cause such a missionary expansiveness, or even such a missionary defensiveness, as to set up tensions intolerable to their neighbors, and to maintain them in a state of "insanity" which they not only enjoy and indulge, but employ for further self-elation and survival. They are not compelled to offer illumination to the leaders of other nations, and in the darkness fear mounts.

Now no groups within a nation are so unlike in outlook and interests, therefore, as the Soviet Union and the Western democracies.¹ That individuals *within* a nation may be as unlike and even more so—to the

make clear that "a divided state of mind" is one of the important conditions of progress and that Democracy is the only policy under which "a divided state of mind" can be harmonized. Cultivated differentiation in ideas is essential in bringing superior ideas to light and has been the source of Western progress. It is the only condition in which there can be freedom of research. Science is really the child of democracy and has the opportunity to relieve tensions by the widest international cooperation in scientific knowledge. This interchange is made easier by traditions already established.

¹Comment by Rudolf Allers

Mr. Finer rightly says that the essential cause of tensions is a political cause. But the tension between Russia and the Western powers goes back farther than to the antagonism of Soviet despotism and Western democracy. It is sufficient to read, *e.g.*, Dostoevski, to realize that long before the West was thoroughly democratic and the East bolshevistic, there existed a deep distrust on the part of the Russian mind against Western influence and ideas. One ought neither to forget that "panslavistic" expansionism antedates modern Russia. It seems to me an oversimplification (though even simplified the question is sufficiently complicated) if one views this West-East tension only as one between democracy and totalitarianism, just as it was such a simplification to view the conflict with Germany as one of democracy and totalitarianism. The many references to the politics of Germany long before there existed any Hitlerian ideas ought to have warned against this view.

In other words, the problem must be envisioned as one of "national character," as well as of international politics. This is not quite the same thing as nationalism. Even though the single nations have, in virtue of their histories, their peculiarities, there are some which are closer to one another than others. Closeness, in this sense, does not mean simply that they pertain to the same wider circle of historical relations. Russia stems in her civilization also from the ancient Mediterranean world, she was a Christian country, she was influenced by Byzantium, and so forth. But it is quite possible that the inner closeness be greater between the Christian Occident and China than between the former and today's Russia.

point where they may be called "insane"—matters little. For, whatever their idiosyncrasies (or their genius, which is an alternative form of expression), the concerted power of normal society is sufficient to cope with their insanity.

4 How far distant from each other are the fomenters of tension?

Unfortunately, the fomenters of tension are on each other's doorsteps. All nations are today bound together by land, sea, and air, and the communications in the ether. If it were possible to quarantine any excessively unlike nation, by ramparts, or chasms, or Maginot walls, then the tensions would be lessened, though the insanity would still have play. The world could be as tranquil as a stockbroker in his club, because the mad economist next door is planning blue prints in the secluded garden of a lunatic asylum.

The world is physically inseverable. Weapons are drastic, distances are short. There is pressure of time, lest accident produce an unplanned and unprepared for outbreak. None of these factors seems capable of relief. Statesmen, or peoples, think in terms of the time when the ravages of war are repaired, when fear, exhaustion, and prudence are all diminished, and when the new industrial, research, and technological plans are fulfilled.

This national tension, and the Soviet-Western tension chiefly, is the tension of the twentieth century, and it is the only one that needs the most urgent attention. But, as at present diagnosable, it is not to be solved by any of the techniques by which the life-tensions of societies *within* the nations have been appeased and governed.

5 What peculiar impetus infuses the tension of our time?

Nationalism?¹

The phenomenon of nationalism is *in general* argument from the analogy of other groupings fails at the vital point. A nation is the largest social grouping within the world today bearing the supremacy of power over all its citizens, and enjoying the steadiest assurance of loyalty and obedience. It is the largest group which can effectively ordain and expect self-sacrifice. Each nationality has a long history—a history of differentiation from other nationalities. If the essence of nationalism is sought in

¹Comment by Thomas D. F. Her

This section is cognate to my own paper—and I have cited it there [cf. Chapter XVII].

the briefest compass² then it lies in Grace and Place. By Grace I mean, the sense of justification of one's life: that one's actions and thoughts are favored by God, that one's person is merging in an entity which confers immortality. Men yearn for these values, and cannot live without them. Even if we reduced men's hopes to a level where they were content merely with their daily bread, this resurgent craving after something more than bread would emerge again. It happens at this historical juncture that the yearning for value, for praise, for approval, for Grace, is fixed in the Locality, the Place. We have reached so far and only so far in the human quest for homefulness. Psychologists and anthropologists are in a position to testify how strong and undefeated are the yearnings for attachment to family and place. They can say how the ideas of the divine, the holy, the group authority, justice, self-sacrifice, and recognition of individual worth, are all rooted in this local community. In the end, nationalism is a way of life, and though some of its blossoms may be barrels of gasoline, its roots are in an amalgam of elementary psychological and physical needs. The color, the feeling, the value, the appreciation, the texture of this corporate personality are *local*, and cannot be otherwise in the present state of personal immobility, of *Ausassigkeit*, and the relative feebleness of the appeals to loyalty coming over the relatively weak media of communication from the rest of the wide and distant world.

At this dreadful juncture in the world's history, the world has traveled only so far in providing the locale of Grace. This is the problem to be solved, and chiefly for the Western powers and Soviet Russia.

6a What therapy relieves tension?

Two chief ways of overcoming tension exist: one is the reduction by persuasion, the other is reduction by main force. It is possible that the present tension is not reducible except by the latter method, even though force is not actually used, but is merely kept in being as a threat.

In the category of Persuasion we encounter the appeal to Humanity, to Prudence, to Economic Prosperity. Much is to be hoped for in the appeal to Humanity, the idea that all men are equally worthy. Whatever is said in derogation of the effect of the Judaic-Christian creed in the

²Cf Herman Finer, *America's Destiny*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1947, Chapter 5.

Western world, it is indubitable that the world would be far worse off without its influence. Over a large part of the world this influence relieves national tensions for it has made its way into the constitution and the laws, and crude as it may be, into social behavior. But the tension of our time emanates from the denial of the principle of the dignity and equality of man as a determinant of his political life.¹ This today has come to mean almost the whole of his life, so much has society come to mean to the individual. There is an undeniable cleavage between the Humanity of the West and the Humanity of Soviet Russia. Neither will yield to find a common ground for their different persuasions. And, in truth, the Soviet rulers' principles and despotic practices are grave retrogressions.

The principles of Humanity may be taught by the United Nations and through its auxiliary organs, if that organization can be long enough maintained without degenerating into an arena. If the dissensions were not so grave, and the time available were long, then we might expect that which has hitherto occurred in political representative assemblies where parties face each other: they would fraternize. But let it be noticed that this requires what internationally does not exist: the ability of the different contestants to pass over into the camp of the other side at their own will. Nations regard those who pass over, or wish to, as traitors. Whereas the United States of America and the other nations at least allow almost unfettered emigration, the fascist countries did not, and the Soviet Union does not now. Even so, so long as the United Nations debates, a body of principle is enunciated which one day may be important as a network to hold the world together in a state of easy tension.

By Prudence, I mean an influential recognition of the stupidity and pain of losses incurred in war. This might constantly be brought home to all people, everywhere. It is no use reducing the tension in one country when the tension in another is left rampant, he who desists takes risks from him who insists. This implies exact statistics of the facts of loss.

¹Comment by Raliph T. Flewelling

I should like to see this idea expanded, for perhaps if more were done to establish the general recognition of a philosophy of the intrinsic worth of every man, it might establish a smaller cleavage over the "method" by which it can be brought about. Russian philosophy is self-contradictory in this: that while aiming to serve the highest welfare of every citizen it overlooks the inalienable relation of the highest good to the existence of personal freedom. Only as the person enjoys the widest possible liberty consistent with the common welfare can he make his most valuable contribution to the true

and their significance, put in the most graphic terms. But as all negotiation teaches, free and universal communication among the principals, that is *the people*, is a *sine qua non*.

Economic Prosperity is a form of Prudence. It is essential to forestall the desperation that comes when men and their families have no livelihood, and not only lose their goods, and starve, and see their children starve, but also suffer disillusion and personal mis-esteem. Such desperation may cause men to accept the leadership of adventurers and so lead to national insanity of such a kind as to increase the fears of other nations.

As the operation of both political party life and industrial relations show, the giving of some economic security and hope to people may win friends for the benefactor nations. International institutions are already involved in this work. But individual countries with great economic prosperity must do more, even if only for their own sake. For no nation is big enough today to be able to carry out its functions in the world balance of power without allies.

Yet it is essential that not too great a weight be put on the importance of Economic Prosperity. One might conceivably arouse such anticipations that they would be hard to satisfy. It is far better to be economically moderate, while the rest of the persuasion is concerned with Humanity, and above all, the value of civil liberties for the well being of man.

My own view is that these elements of Persuasion are powerful, but not powerful enough.¹ The degree of the tension between the two princi-

¹Comment by Rudolf Allers

I am afraid that the appeal to persuasion will not be too effective. The arguments put forth by Mr. Finer have a certain meaningfulness within the Western frame of reference. They did not, *docente experientia*, mean much to the rulers of nationalistic Germany. They mean perhaps even less to those of Russia. There is one element which renders all such considerations ineffective: the eschatological outlook which the Nazi mentality presented and which today seems a basic trait in Russia. If you believe in the millennium, no sacrifice, be it of blood or material goods, is too great. These undoubtedly well devised measures might win back to the Western sphere of influence those who now, under political and economic pressure, see their interest in a close association with Russia. Whether any such measure will have a notable influence on the eschatological creed of the Russians, is questionable. But we should, of course, do all we can, even if the chances of a thorough success be slender.

But I think that to the measures listed by Mr. Finer one more should be added. It is, indeed, possible that tensions be diminished and even made to disappear by what for brevity's sake, one may call "conversion." But masses are not converted without great suffering and catastrophic events. If we believe, as we do and must, in the superiority of the Western ideas, then we must do all to keep them alive in the Western world. More important than to "persuade" those who believe differently seems to be that the unde-

pal dissentients is too great for the assurance of peace forever. It is not the province of the writer of a scientific paper to attempt to foresee accidents. I refer to the kind of accidents which might convert the Soviet Union into a government with a democratically elected and electorally responsible executive and parliament. I have to assume that this will not happen peacefully, and I judge by the speeches and actions of the present rulers of the Soviet Union.

Now, the whole world might be intimidated into the surrender of national principles and ways of life by Fear. A force from outside each nation might be so overwhelming, in contemplation, that many of the dearest desires of men might be put away. Some nations have been known to surrender their democratic ways, because a neighbor disposes of overwhelming strength. Is there anything in the world which might make all men in all nations feel a common acquiescence in face of a common fear? I cannot see such a force at present. War, so far, has proved of no avail in preventing the repetition of itself more destructively.

Furthermore, men collectively desire material and spiritual goods which make them adamant to fear, even actual fear in the midst of battle and bombing, and even terrible torture. Moreover, some governments have an interest different from that of their people. The kind of preventive fear I have in mind is a fear that must affect all universally. But atomic warfare and the threat of bacterial warfare do not seem to daunt the mind of the nations. The strangest phenomenon of our times is surely the light acceptance of these menaces. Threats can be so shocking as to be unbelievable.

The only way that remains is the combined use of force, or the threat of force in certain circumstances. Where a group of rulers, or a whole nation, place their own power above humane principle, it may be possible to avert their aggressions by offering them a clear, imminent and overwhelming threat to *all* their power if they dare to take their actions.

We are forced to the conclusion that one of the ways of reducing tension among the nations, one of the ways to restore sanity, is the threat of force. Is not national society a clear exemplification of this principle? We ought not to be misled by peace in our own national societies into the belief that force is not constantly operative therein.

standing, the appreciation, and the effectiveness in private and public life of the great role of the West be preserved and strengthened in the Occidental world.

6b What can the Therapy do for our time?

I offer with diffidence some principles of national therapy, designed to induce more sanity in governments and peoples, and to reduce international tensions

a. Offer the maximum amount of aid from the richer to the poorer nations on political terms.

b. Enter into the maximum number of economic arrangements across national boundaries, so that the value of other nations may be brought home continuously to the peoples who thereby benefit

c. Maximize all cultural displays and exchanges—of art, science, and scholarship.

d. Maximize the number of personal and professional exchanges to the extent of hundreds of thousands per year. If the people of the world were nomadic there would be no nationalism. It will not necessarily happen that these exchangees will become the political leaders and teachers of their own country—but as the experience of the I.L.O. and the United Nations and the history of the twenty interwar years of peace organization show, many of them will be so.

e. Encourage the Voice of Each Nation to speak out over the radio to all other nations. If it were possible it would be desirable to present millions of radio sets to the poorer countries. If their governments did not consider this to be subversive, and punish the recipients, as the law of at least one country makes certain, a way would be found to men's hearts that would make their own governments less bold, and perhaps less capricious.

f. Keep the United Nations in being and in continual argument. If necessary drag, yes, even drag, all international conditions *before* it for debate, and introduce international issues, like the position of Indians in South Africa, or the position of the Baltic peoples or Poland within the Soviet orbit, for ventilation. Often the cure for tension is more tension, so that the heart may be "unpacked with words," and so that the defaulter may be subject to social shaming.

g. Let the most powerful nations build up their defenses, and their offensive forces in readiness for misbehavior of an extreme kind by their neighbors. Let them not think of using this power until they have gone even beyond the point of endurance and concession, of loving kindness and mercy. But, seeing that the world is still a world of nations with-

out government, with neither common superior nor a common morality, and that time may not allow of the effective creation of the latter, let them be ready under the dictation of a principle of justice to reduce the insane to sanity by force, if alas, this should be unavoidable. They must remember that all the modern states we know came into existence in this way by an act of force of longer or shorter duration by the majority or minority, which learned that tensions could only be relieved in the area of a single government by shock treatment. This means a single body, not unrepresentative in the end, with preponderant force, which by its bearing and humanity can offer all contestants security and tranquillity in their spiritual and material pursuits, as indeed, the modern sovereignties offered tranquillity of worship to all creeds, to come and go as they liked, to take the work they could do and could get, to enjoy its fruits. This is the actual history of government in a single nation."

h. There are some values we must remain "insane" about, whatever the consequences, whatever the tension. We are all compelled to choose some spiritual basis on which to found our lives and to support those of our neighbors. The principle for me is the one which, with all the imperfections of its doctrine and the failures of its operative machinery, offers the maximum uncoerced opportunity to pursue the Truth and the development of Personality—the democratic system. This is the best and the most viable that man has yet conceived. It should be preserved, whatever the tension.

^mComment by Robert H. Lowie

Professor Finner argues correctly, I think, that modern states have come into existence by an act of force. Could it not be argued by such governments as the present Russian one that it, too, will not be "unrepresentative in the end" — that it represents merely a transitional type of administration?

Comment by Gottfried Salomon Delaton

If we remember the way in which "all modern states came into existence" the problem seems to be: when is Russia coming of age? Politics as a question of timing would then have to wait for the limitation of the revolutionary expansion. Who sets the limits? This is in our time a question of higher authority. When the territorial boundaries are upset by a new nomadic expansion and a world power of Asiatic dimensions has a monopoly of terror exercised against the *status quo*, only an alliance of all so-called peace-loving nations can defend the norms and forms of cultural society. No upstartment of the "Savtham" (Savannah) of Mediterranean and Atlantic traditions and no economic reasons of cheap business with the enemy will create something like a Pax Britannica.

CHAPTER II

Tomorrow's Businessman: Profits or Power

By ELI GINZBERG

Associate Professor of Economics, Columbia University



NEXT YEAR MARKS the centenary of the Communist Manifesto (1848), that short essay which contains most of Marx's prophecies in stark and unembellished prose. He was writing for the masses, not for academics, and he avoided superfluous metaphysics and esoteric economics. Hence there is little room to argue about what he really meant. All who can read can follow.

The imminence of the anniversary makes it particularly appropriate to review in the light of history his major thesis—the inevitable collapse of capitalism. In most of the world, capitalism is dying or dead. Nor is there much ground for anticipating that it will be resurrected. Apparently Marx was right even though his timing was a bit off; he did not anticipate that capitalism's senescence would be so prolonged.

But the prophecy that capitalism would die was not the heart of Marx's message. A simple man can venture the guess that what is, will not forever remain. Marx analyzed the bases of contemporary capitalism and deduced therefrom that the system was doomed. He argued that a competitive economy, based on private property and free labor, could only develop into an extreme form of monopoly, and in the process destroy the profitability of capital and the employability of large sectors of the laboring population. The death knell would sound when all industry was under monopoly control, when millions of laborers were on the scrap heap of unemployment. At that moment it would be logical and inevitable for the expropriated, by a revolutionary act, to establish socialism.

In all but a few countries capitalism is dying or dead. Did it die as Marx foretold? Hardly. Capitalism succumbed to war, to the national-

istic frenzies that engulfed the world twice within a single generation. And this nationalism, which has proved its virility all too well, Marx disdained as an impotent anachronism of a precapitalistic era.

The orthodox will rise to a man and protest for, to their lights, the two wars were an inevitable outgrowth of the contradictions inherent in industrial capitalism. But they must recognize one simple fact: Communist Russia and capitalist America were allies!

What is meant by the statement that capitalism is dying or dead? The essence of nineteenth century capitalism was the large scope for private initiative in business affairs. The game provided great incentives. Moreover, except for prohibitions against murder and outright theft, the players were unhampered. The incentives have been greatly reduced, the rules radically altered. Today a Britisher who earns a sizeable income works three out of every five days for his government. If he dies and leaves a sizeable estate, his children are lucky if they receive a few hundred pounds a year. No parent can any longer insure for his children a life of ease. Capitalism, at least as Marx knew it, is no more.

The skeptic may admit that all this is true for England, perhaps even for the rest of Europe, but he will contend that it does not apply to the United States. Have we not just reached the highest level of national income in our entire history?

Despite the obvious strength of American capitalism, it may be well to review what has transpired if only to gain a little perspective. Let us contrast 1948 with 1848.

The problem of incentives is complicated, for it goes beyond the simple question of the average rate of return on invested capital. Today taxes exercise a crucial influence on incentives. He who desires to invest knows that if he is lucky, much of his gains will go to the government, if he loses he can secure some tax compensation. The day of rapid accumulation is over.

There are also the new rules. A man can raise capital only within the limits prescribed by law and administrative agencies. If in the oil, coal, or milk industry, his every move will have to take account of detailed regulations. How different in 1848 when taxes were insignificant and government was conspicuous by the extent to which it sought to assist business!

Equally significant have been the changes on the labor front. Even a half century ago, industry was in a strategic position. Men had to work

in order to live, by and large on industry's terms. True, these terms were affected by the underlying relations between the numbers of workers and industry's need for them, but within wide limits, industry was able to dictate. Assuredly the individual worker had no redress.

Today industry operates in the shadow of powerful unions. The day of very large profits is over. Labor, on the lookout for its share, cannot be denied. Not is its influence limited solely to wages, it also exercises great power over production. No longer can management make a unilateral decision to install a new machine. Whether the investment will pay, and to what extent, will depend to a very large degree on the attitude of labor. No sane management will proceed until it has taken labor into its confidence.

There was a time not so long ago when the captain of industry had to concern himself only with his product and its price. If his wares were good and cheap, the public would not inquire into the circumstances of their manufacture. It was interested in results, not in explanations. To a large extent that is true today but with a difference. Most consumers are members of the laboring class. In addition, there are many other consumers who possess latent hostility to business. If they sense that their values are being flagrantly violated by industry, these groups will fight. No longer can a businessman adopt the attitude of "the public be damned."

No longer sovereign in his own realm, the businessman is even less powerful in the world outside. Marx made a poor guess when he postulated that those few capitalists who survived the test of the market place would grow in power until there was none left to challenge them.

These changes must affect the operations of the capitalistic system. It is contended by some that these restrictions on the businessman's scope for action have reacted adversely on the progress of the economy. Nor can this evaluation be brushed aside by pointing to the very high level of national income in the United States, for those who believe that the restrictions have been deleterious will insist that the progress has been considerably less than could have been made in the absence of the onerous restrictions. Their attitude can be summarized by saying that economic progress depends on new investment and businessmen will not invest except under conditions that are not harassing.

The fact that high profits must now be shared with the government, the fact that businessmen today are forced to take account of a host

of pressures from government, from labor, and the public—these facts of lowered incentives and greater controls may contain the explanation of why investment funds frequently go begging, why it happens that businessmen, whose *raison d'être* is the making of money, act as if they have lost interest in the game.

But this explanation is not self-evident. In the early days of industrial capitalism, Adam Smith pointed out that the rate of profit had to be studied in relation to the general security of property—the rate being highest where security is lowest. He further suggested that custom played a large role. Businessmen will not become distressed at conditions that have long prevailed, the familiar is seldom shocking. If Smith is right, the nub of the incentive problem is not the rate of profit but rather the radical changes in the rate during the past few years and the simultaneous increase in the insecurity of property.

As far as the change in the rate is concerned the facts are few and simple. Since the early 1930s, governmental action has kept the interest rates about fifty per cent below their previous level. At the same time governmental action has increased taxes radically, especially in the higher brackets.

But time passes and "the good old days" become increasingly dim. Most men, especially most businessmen, prefer to live in the present and the future, not in the past. However, at the very time that their accustomed scale of earnings is being whittled away, the general political scene has darkened, adding materially to the insecurity of property. Threat of war, war, loss of privileged position, threat of revolution, revolution—these past decades have been a period of intense turmoil. Each upheaval brought in its wake restrictions and confiscations that deprived owners of untold billions. Adjustment under these conditions is far from simple.

But business had even more to cope with. The political turmoil, together with the search for equity which lies deep in our tradition, have led to the enactment of an increasing number of regulations aimed at controlling the excrescences of business. Every type of economic organization—even capitalism in its heyday—is forced to operate within a set of laws and customs which place some limitations on the actions of businessmen.

Businessmen have been considerably upset these past years because the freedom that was theirs has been constantly reduced by new and con-

fining regulations. Much of the energy that businessmen of an earlier generation devoted to the search for new profits has been spent in struggles to recapture their lost rights. Moreover, the new system of regulation has operated to heighten uncertainty. A man thinks twice before venturing forth into uncharted territory, he may prefer to wait and see whether another pioneer can get through.

So we see that even in the United States, much has transpired these past decades to alter the environment in which the economy operates. There is no easy way to assess the full impress of the changes that have taken place in the sphere of incentives, in regulations, or in the relations of business to the public. There are those who hold that the basic tenets of capitalism have been so seriously breached that it is delusional to think that capitalism still lives. There are others who insist that nothing startling has occurred; the old conflicts between capitalists and laborers have not been altered, surely not eradicated. Finally there are those who fail to see the necessity of wringing an answer from history, whether the changes have been superficial or fundamental.

These conflicting approaches have one point in common. Without exception, they focus on the environment in which capitalism operates. This environment is important; it should be studied, but there is more to the problem. Capitalism has an inner as well as an outer life.

Marx suggested that the key to capitalism lay in its internal development. His specific hunches may have been faulty. Large scale production does not necessarily result in lower costs; competition does not always result in a fight to the finish—it frequently leads to an alliance among competitors against consumers, labor, or the government. But although Marx overstated the trend toward corporate aggrandizement, he was on the right track. Where he erred—if the word *can* is appropriate in the case of a man who failed to see clearly the adult characteristics of a still unborn child—was in postulating a substantial identity of behavior between small and large scale enterprises. These two differ so fundamentally that it is questionable whether one can reach an intelligent appraisal of the state and prospects of capitalism until one has analyzed the *modus vivendi* of large scale enterprise.

The entrepreneur of yesterday was intimately and directly responsible for all major operations—production, selling, labor, finance. Every advance redounded to his own advantage, for he was both owner and manager. He had to answer to no one but himself, with the possible

exception of his banker, for rare indeed was the man who could operate without financial assistance. To get ahead, he had to get the jump on his competitors, either by discovering how to produce more cheaply, sell more attractively, or finance himself at a lower cost. His margins were narrow, the struggle for survival was intense. He could prosper only by keeping out front. There was much support for Adam Smith's observation that the efforts of individuals to improve themselves inevitably resulted in the improvement of society.

What do we know about the large corporation today? First, its very size affords it protection if not security. Its immediate competitors are few in number and more likely than not it has been able to work out understandings with them. The law assists by granting it exclusive patent rights. Over the years it has been able to put aside out of earnings sufficient to keep itself largely independent of the banks. If it needs additional capital, it can go directly to the public. Not the least of its strength comes from its alliances. Of course competition remains. No unit is so powerful as to be totally immune to the threat, if not to the existence, of competition.

But the large concern operates within comfortable margins. In good years the productive capacity of industry is usually inadequate to meet the full demand; a large firm can scarcely fail to make a sizeable profit. And in bad years, it can draw on its reserves to ease the shock. In the absence of traumatic circumstances—a revolutionary change in technology, a corrupt management, an uncompromised struggle with labor, a radical shift in consumer's tastes—survival no longer poses a problem. This fact, if it be a fact, has great significance, especially when one considers it in relation to the structure of management.

One aspect of the changing position of entrepreneurship has not gone unnoticed. In their study of *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*, Berle and Means called attention to the bifurcation in the modern corporation between owners and managers, whose interests are not necessarily identical. They also emphasized that the strategic power rested in most cases with the managers. It may be preferable to distinguish not two but three levels of corporate control—owners, top management, and executives—for there is frequently almost as wide a gulf between top management and executives as between top management and owners.

In the absence of proved fraud or demonstrable inefficiency, the actions of top management cannot be challenged. Top management must give

the owners a sufficiently large part of total profits when profits are earned—else they may seek a new management. Not that owners can necessarily succeed in such an effort under current conditions of widespread dispersion of shareholdings. However, top management has discovered the advantages of a “live and let live” policy. It can secure for itself continuing immunity from interference as long as it is willing to act reasonably and grant the owners an acceptable rate of return. As long as the economy is prosperous the large corporation with its manifold advantages is seldom hard pressed to earn a respectable profit. Since owners are sensible people, they do not expect to receive income when the economy is depressed and most other corporations are losing money.

Able to meet without undue effort its major responsibility of placating the owners, top management need not concern itself unduly with detailed operations once it has taken care to find competent executives. Its principal concern is external relations, alliances with other large units, and public relations. Even its crucial functions of deciding upon the timing, amount, and type of new investment, are largely influenced by external pressures—its estimate of the public’s receptiveness to a new capital issue, its estimate of the advice proffered by its financial allies, and its evaluation of general economic and political trends.

Top management is usually characterized by a high degree of stability. Once elected, the key officials are secure until retirement age. Since top management always includes more than one individual, differences can always be found, for if they do not exist, they will be created in the inevitable struggle for power that is the essence of group life. This fact is noteworthy if only by contrast with the entrepreneur of yesterday whose leadership was absolute.

Below top management are the executives, each one of whom operates in a specialized orbit, be it production, sales, research, personnel. Specialization is the keynote. Many secure their first job on the basis of prior specialization in school, at least those who do not owe their positions to nepotism. The young executive can get ahead if he is able to match the prevailing level of competence; he may get ahead more quickly if he demonstrates unusual capacities. It should be noted that among the most valuable of all capacities is a “sense for organization,” an instinctive appreciation of where power lies, and of how one must cater to its possessors. Luck plays a part, for the most calculating behavior of the ambitious

can be put to naught by an unexpected turn of fortune in the upper realm

The young man who finds a berth in a large scale enterprise usually has his eye set on the long run. Every year that he remains he has a larger stake in seeing until retirement. If he competes for the first prize—a position in top management—or if he aims lower—a good pension at retirement—his path lies through the labyrinth of organizational politics.

Without developing this approach any further, it appears that the pronounced concern of most students of contemporary capitalism with the changes in the external environment—the decline in the rate of profit and the increase in the scope of regulatory mechanisms—appears if not unwarranted at least exaggerated. The future potentialities of the system may depend more on internal alterations. As far as “big business”—the dominant characteristic of our economy—is concerned, much more attention should be devoted to analyzing the structure and functioning of management.

The contrast with yesterday is marked. Both top management and the executive group are interested in the first instance in the maintenance of their position, secondly in advancement. Such considerations are primarily matters of organizational maneuvering, only secondarily of business competence. There was a time not so long ago when the only security of an entrepreneur was in successful change. But the strength of large organizations lies in continuity and stability.

The rationale of capitalism used to be predicated on the fact that as entrepreneurs strove to improve themselves, they inevitably contributed to the public welfare. Their road to success lay in developing cheaper and better methods of production and distribution. Today there is surely no close correlation between the pulling and hauling that goes on among the leaders of a large corporation and the public welfare. The best man does not always win. In fact we no longer possess adequate criteria for judging who is best.

Marx exaggerated when he propounded the thesis that all matters of consequence derived from the relations between the owners of the means of production and the rest of society. It nevertheless posed a problem of great moment both for the material and the emotional well being of society. It is almost a hundred years since he put his hunches on paper.

We now know that many were wrong, that others were only half truths
But we know little more

We prattle and we preach about the differences between capitalism and communism, between liberty and serfdom Our instincts may be good. Our knowledge surely is not. Unless we believe that we can be saved by faith alone, time is running out in which to increase our knowledge But we must increase our knowledge unless we want to fall into the trap of our adversaries and base our strength on our prejudices.

CHAPTER III

Religion and the Goals of a Statesman's Peace Policy

By ROBERT A. GRAHAM, S.J.

Contributing editor, "America"



IN DISCUSSING CURRENT legal, governmental, and administrative practices which, applied on a world scale, might contribute to reducing international tension, the program and strategy of our own State Department in leading American public opinion away from isolationism offers a rich source of investigation. One of the significant devices employed during the San Francisco Conference of 1945, was the system of "consultants" through which representatives of national organizations were given an opportunity to express their views on the United Nations embryonic Charter. In this paper, I limit myself to the part played by religious groups and to the possible significance of their role for a future of reduced world tensions.

One should perhaps first ask whether procedures, practices, and methods are in themselves sufficient to bring about a general reduction of tensions, at home or abroad. I wonder, for example, how much meaning the "democratic process" would have if there existed no "democratic ideals"? Of what value are such formulas as "freedom of information," "secret ballot," "open covenants openly arrived at," unless these open the door to the larger concepts of truth and goodness and the dignity of the human person? Is it true that the deep problems that convulse the world can be eliminated through the simple transference of techniques? It would appear that current practices in government can contribute to diminishing world tensions only in so far as they carry over into the world scene the vision and purposefulness that make them successful at home.

A precedent of the State Department program was its opening of the door to forces hitherto never welcomed. As soon as the draft proposals were made public at Dumbarton Oaks on October 9, 1944, the general public was invited to offer its criticisms. Reporting on this phase of the debate, Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., said, "It is doubtful whether the democratic process has ever before been applied so broadly and so directly to a developing problem in the field of international relations." Among those who took up the challenge were spokesmen for Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish bodies. As the opening of the Conference drew near, the representatives of national voluntary associations were organized into a semi-official body of "consultants." These were invited to San Francisco and were kept in close contact with the entire progress of negotiations. Cynics will say that this was an ingenious way of chloroforming potential political opposition to ratification in the Senate. It may be debated whether the State Department wanted these national groups at hand in order to "tell them" or to "be told." Officially at least, Secretary Stettinius reported that this system of consultation was not only "an innovation in the conduct of international affairs by this government, but also, as events proved, an important contribution to the Conference itself."

It is relevant to note that a great share of credit goes to this body of consultants for the all important provisions on human rights and fundamental freedoms by which the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were considerably strengthened. In this issue, according to the Secretary of State, the United States delegation was "effectively and strongly supported by its group of advisers and consultants."

Presumably from the viewpoint of the men in Washington, the consultants representing religious organizations were just more pressure groups indistinguishable, let us say, from the United States Chamber of Commerce or the National League of Women Voters. The National Catholic Welfare Conference, the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, or the American Jewish Committee were not religious, as such. But by their origin and support they had their foundation in religious ideals. And to that extent, regardless of their setup or mode of operation, they were spokesmen for concepts that throw important light on the meaning and course of public policy. The action of the State Department was an implied admission that the religious forces of this coun-

ity had something to say about international peace in a recognized forum

This decision to accord religious groups a voice in the formulation of policy is of special significance considering the peculiar position that religion and the forces of religion have previously occupied in international politics. Ostensibly the San Francisco Conference was an occasion for mobilizing all the forces of mankind to serve the one cause of peace. The breadth of outlook of the final draft of the Charter is in striking contrast to the narrow political vision evidenced in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Article 1, which expresses the purposes of the new Organization, looks into every avenue of human enterprise for help in relieving the causes of world conflict. While the traditional emphasis is given to political and legal principles, a new importance is conceded to economic, financial, social, cultural, and humanitarian elements. Later on in the Charter, education and world health get their meed of attention. Out of these many interests have sprung the well known specialized agencies, —UNESCO, WHO, the Bank and Fund, and others. It was obvious that the Charter Fathers did not want any stone left unturned in their unrelenting quest for peace.

Only one area of human activity was left unmentioned, that of religion. The omission is startling and out of tune with the otherwise universalist approach of the Charter. Was it because religion had nothing significant to contribute to world peace? Was it because of an inherent hostility to religion on the part of the delegates and their governments? Was it because religious concepts could not be fitted into any practical program? Religion is certainly at least as relevant to world peace as currency stabilization, student exchanges, or the exploration of the upper Amazon by an international team of scientists. What record of achievement could culture or education offer that religion could not? No one arose in plenary session at San Francisco to declare that "religion has failed" and should be disregarded. Such an assertion would hardly have been consistent with the fact that mankind was at that moment trying to reconstruct a world in which politics, economics, culture, and everything else had equally failed.

Among the delegations at San Francisco various considerations may have been operating. Perhaps some old school diplomats of the continental mode of thinking were frankly inimical to the thought of listening

to the voice of religion in such an international program. Or perhaps a considerable body of delegates would have humbly acknowledged that it was not their prerogative to assign religion its place in a campaign for world peace.

It is not necessary to read the collective mind of the Charter Fathers, if such existed, to conclude that the omission of religion was not motivated primarily by any dynamic antireligious philosophy. When every human resource in the four corners of the globe was being mobilized to build a new structure of peace, it is unconceivable that the deepest and most ancient force of all should be deliberately repudiated. Certainly the attitudes of the several United Nations during the war itself would hardly support such an interpretation. The piteous pleadings of hard-pressed governments during the darkest days of the war betrayed their momentary realization that human society is sustained by the resources of religion. If Britain was able to stand it alone in 1940, a large share of credit ought to be given to the appeal of BBC which presented the war as essentially a struggle for all that Christianity stood for. Even Soviet Russia found it necessary to give the religious motive full play when the Nazis were closing in on Moscow. The men in the Kremlin made peace with the Patriarch and ostentatiously praised the popes who took their place in the Red Army, conspicuous with the traditional unshorn hair of Orthodox priests. No one would suspect the Soviets of undue friendliness to the Vatican. Yet when Hitler, attacking the USSR, called his assault a Holy War, Radio Moscow replied that there could be no Holy War without the blessing of the Holy Father, who had given no such blessing.

Such wartime episodes need not be interpreted as indicating abiding appreciation of religion. But they are unwilling testimony to the role and power of religious motivations. A national catastrophe revealed to those who hold the reins of power the ultimate foundations on which society rested. Unfortunately the vision was fleeting and we do not yet know how profoundly governments have been affected by their experience in the hour of gloom.

In the United States we have fortunately not inherited the continental tradition of the past century which considered the state necessarily "atheist." We did not need a catastrophe to remind us that religious ideals are basic in our national life. Thus the action of the State Department in

consulting representatives of religious organizations, among others, in the formulation of a developing foreign policy excited no comment.

Today this system is still continued at Lake Success, unfortunately, however, not under the broader auspices of the United Nations itself. While religion has been given some opportunity to shed its light upon the course of our policymakers at home, it has yet to find even partial scope in the international organization. Is it too much to say that international tensions will remain strained until the insights of men of faith are given a better play in world politics?^a

^aComment by Karl W. Deutsch.

Two broad groups of questions seem likely to arise in connection with any such proposal. First of all, what grounds are there to hope that the voice of the world's religious organizations will be more than mere repetition of the arguments of their respective governments? What circumstances have changed since the First World War, when Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox, and Jewish religious leaders in the various belligerent countries urged their followers to support the national war efforts, sometimes even blessing their arms, even when the policies so supported clearly implied the killing of their co-religionists in other countries? What have the world's churches learned, that may enable them now to aid mankind to transcend and resolve its current conflicts—rather than merely to deepen and embitter these clashes? I believe that hopeful answers can be given to these questions, but that we have to turn for them to the leaders of religion.

The second question is this: How clearly do we realize that among the world's population today the Christians form but a *minority*? Do we clearly realize, that in saying that the future peace must be built on Christian principles, we are also saying that it must likewise be built on Moslem, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian, Shintoist, or philosophical positivist or materialist principles, or must it *least not* be wholly incompatible with them? Ought we not to make it clear that the minimum principles of a just peace are Christian, *but that they are not a monopoly of Christianity*, but rather, being based on human sympathy and reason, are accessible to adherents of all religions as well as of all this worldly philosophies which do not exclude these basic elements?

CHAPTER IV

The Necessity of Morally Dynamic Government for the Achievement of National Harmony and International Cooperation

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THE AIM OF THIS PAPER IS to suggest how the ethical characteristics of government policies and the spirit in which they are administered may determine whether harmony at home and good will abroad can be secured. I am not thinking of the substantive policies which government pursues—political, economic, social—but rather of the ethical values underlying such policies and the moral behavior of officials in putting them into effect.

Morally Dynamic Values

I start with the assumption that the goal of man is to fulfil his individual possibilities for intellectual and spiritual life and to achieve brotherhood in his human relationships. It is my view that he succeeds in so far as he moves to successively higher levels of harmonious corporate relationships in which love is the cementing ingredient.

Man has found in the light of experience, as well as in the teachings of those who have, in a unique way, sought and found the purposes and spirit of God as they bear on human relationships, that there are certain laws of life—moral or natural laws—which are written into the nature of the universe. Self-centeredness, hate, prejudice, dishonesty, arrogance,

and other destructive manifestations of human nature lead to individual and corporate irrationality, to injustice, bloodshed, and to the loss of all worthwhile values of life. In the same way, tolerance, unselfishness, integrity, and love produce balanced and effective persons and societies.

If brotherhood based upon love is the objective which we should all seek in organized life, then must we not incorporate into governmental policies and administration, and instill in the men who shape and carry out these policies those elements which produce brotherhood? Conversely, must we not purge governmental administration in so far as possible of friction-producing factors?

Moral Foundation of United States Democracy

The United States was founded on certain fundamental concepts of the nature of man and God—concepts which have a direct bearing upon man's political, social, and spiritual possibilities. These conceptions are written into the covenants of our early settlers, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, into our laws and our judicial decisions. They have been at the heart of the principal pronouncements of our statesmen since the days of the Founding Fathers.

The ideology of the Continental Congress, which was destined to forge both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, was summed up in 1774 with this pronouncement of the delegates:

We are resolved and do resolve, that it is an indispensable duty which we owe to God, our Country, ourselves and posterity, by all lawful ways and means in our power to maintain, defend, and preserve those civil and religious rights and liberties for which many of our fathers fought, bled and died, and to hand them down entire to future generations.

This noble view led quite naturally to these four distinct but interrelated concepts in the Declaration of Independence:

We hold these truths to be self-evident

1. That all men are created equal,
2. That they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights,
3. That among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;
4. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

In this declaration are summed up the most challenging and encouraging ideas of all time. Our Founding Fathers and the statesmen of later years who have helped make this country great, not only subscribed to these ideas, but they also in a remarkable way incorporated them into their individual and collective behavior. They sought purposes beyond man's material and social well being. They looked for something beyond man's reason to aid them in achieving freedom, equality, and spiritual development.

Washington defined this something beyond man's reason in his Farewell Address in this manner :

Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotism, who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of men and citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to respect and to cherish them . . . Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure—reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in the exclusion of religious principle.

The mind and spirit of Lincoln, like that of Washington, was saturated with the same values—brotherhood, justice, fair dealing, honesty, reverence. Moreover, it would never have occurred to Lincoln that these virtues might be divorced from government any more than that he could personally follow any other scale of values. A fundamental tenet in his political philosophy was the accountability of the nation to Almighty God.

President Wilson, speaking of the rights of men, women, and children, said in his first inaugural address that the firm basis of government is justice:

Justice and only justice shall always be our motto. The feelings with which we face this new age of right and opportunity sweep across our heart strings like some air out of God's own presence, where justice and mercy are reconciled, and the Judge and the brothers are one.

Democracy in the United Nations

In distinctive ways the conceptions of life suggested in these brief recollections underlie all democratic institutions and all striving for true free-

dom. We often recognize the merit of democratic values, even though we ignore their basis.

The United Nations is a case in point. Its Charter fails to recognize that mankind is subject to any higher authority than its own purposes. However, the Charter refers to desirable conditions of life that rest upon the concepts of man as a spiritual and moral being in a spiritual and moral universe. For example, the Charter reaffirms.

Faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small

The signatory powers also declare in the Charter that they will "practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors." References are made in the Charter to "justice," "respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all," and "self-determination for peoples."

It is difficult to reconcile these sentiments with the absence of any recognition that there may be some higher authority and destiny for man than the particular measures sponsored by individual delegates. Tensions, frictions, and suspicion have always thrived where man has tended to think of himself as God. When he does so he always acts like the devil. That is the way he seems to be acting with especial success today.

In considering the causes of stalemate in the United Nations, we may well reflect with sobering thought on Franklin's words to George Washington after four weeks of failure in reaching agreement on any issue in the Constitutional Convention.

I have lived, sir, a long time, and the longer I live, the more convincing proofs I see of this truth, that God governs in the affairs of men and I also believe that, without his concurring aid, we shall succeed in this political building no better than the builders of Babel, we shall be divided by our partial, local interests, our projects will be confounded and mankind may hereafter, from this unfortunate instance, despair of establishing government by human wisdom, and leave it to chance, war, and conquest. I therefore beg leave to move that henceforth prayers, imploring the assistance of Heaven and its blessing on our deliberations, be held in this assembly every morning.

Forces Which Undermine Democratic Action

As though turning our backs on what we know is true, we deal increasingly with these fundamental aspects of life on an abstract basis. Political and administrative leaders discuss very little today the fundamental moral aspects of the policies which are pursued, and they approach such questions with reticence, if at all, in their discussions with representatives of other nations. Public expressions increasingly stem from the divisive principle of self-interest. There is little common facing up to the purposes which God has for man. In political and governmental circles, as well as in other areas of our national life, we too often consider truth and honesty as having only relative values.

While in a democracy we operate on the principle of government by law, government, of course, is conducted by men. The self-seeking, dishonest, dissipated citizen, politician, or administrator will produce government of the same quality. That community or nation which is torn by groups seeking to gain the greatest advantage for their particular following, regardless of the public interest as a whole, will falter in times of stress. Democracy cannot long endure where its moral foundation has been corrupted.

Democratic government requires honesty in the actions of those who institute governments—the citizens—as well as their public officials. Indeed honesty in one group cannot exist long in its absence in the other. Such honesty prospers under two conditions: (1) when the material necessities of life are reasonably available, and (2) when people are conditioned to honesty as a principle of life and feel that penalties inevitably result from any other course.

The world today is marked by stress and recurrent crises. The dislocations in the wake of the war, the millions of uprooted people, and the woeful lack of elementary necessities of life for a large proportion of the world's population, place great obstacles in the way of harmony and integrity in public affairs. The combination of economic distress and social disintegration in many countries seems to be more than their spiritual and moral fibre can stand.

As an aside, I would like to observe that the way in which the people and officials of Britain are facing up to their plight is an outstanding exception to the general rule today. The explanation in my view is the solid moral and spiritual foundations of the British people. These words

of John Bright, middle nineteenth century political reformer, might have been said by Walpole, Fox, Gray, Peel, or scores of others of more recent times

I believe there is no permanent greatness to a nation except it be based upon morality. I do not care for military greatness or military renown. Palaces, baronial castles, great halls, stately mansions, do not make a nation. The nation in every country dwells in the cottage, and unless the light of your constitution can shine there, unless the beauty of your legislation and the excellence of your statesmanship are impressed there on the feelings and conditions of the people, rely upon it, you have yet to learn the duties of government.

May I ask you to believe, as I do most devoutly believe, that the moral law was not written for men alone in their individual character, but it was written as well for nations, and for nations great as this of which we are citizens.

In the wake of the world's worst war politicians and administrators appear to resign themselves especially to the currency of the market place. Increasingly in both domestic and foreign relations "we do in Rome as the Romans do." I believe that public officials as a group are far more devoted to social purposes and are less materialistic than most other groups in the population. The point is that among officials a predilection to flattery, passion for publicity, or inclination to personal success is particularly serious, because it destroys perspective and sterilizes their usefulness as leaders.

Social and economic measures increasingly have become ends in themselves. The result is to place greater and greater reliance upon political and economic systems as the answer to our problems. We forget that it is people who make up the world and who serve and are served, and that their spirit, their quality, their convictions, their scale of ethical values are what determine social progress or regression.

One French writer, in analyzing the decay of society between the two world wars, brands the failure of politicians and administrators to provide morally dynamic leadership as "Treason!"

Regaining a Firm Foundation

In the face of undermining influences we need to remind ourselves -- and this is especially applicable to all engaged in government administra-

tion—that actions and attitudes on the lowest day to day scale reflect and determine the broadest realities. This is an imperfect world, but the smallest element of high purpose—even in carrying out a distasteful job—can have almost infinite ramifications for good.

It is imperative, therefore, that we realize how ethical values and moral standards can be applied with real effect to current problems of public policy. In this regard I should like to cite four rather diverse illustrations.

Illustration 1 Confusion of Ideological Issues

The first example is the frequent failure of the United States to express and interpret adequately abroad the ideas or values for which we stand and which are now being fought over in nearly every land. The July 1, 1947, statement of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, referring to the problems of relations between the United States and Russia, says:

We believe that one cause of this increased tension, and a cause which it lies within our power to control, is failure to demonstrate that the American people stand for a basic moral and political principle and not merely for self-interest. The critical and supreme political issue of today is that of the free society *versus* the police state. It is not the economic issue of communism *versus* capitalism or the issue of state socialism *versus* free enterprise. As to such matters, it is normal that there should be diversity and experimentation in the world. By a free society we mean a society in which human beings, in voluntary cooperation, may choose and change their way of life and in which force is outlawed as a means to suppress or eliminate spiritual, intellectual and political differences between individuals and those exercising the police power. The police state denies such rights. In the Soviet Union such denial is sought to be justified by Marxian communism.

In standing for the moral principles of democracy, must we not demonstrate that we act further than for self-interest? We have done little to meet the Russian ideological warfare with ammunition of like, but more potent, character. We cannot buy democracy in Europe alone with loans, relief, or economic recovery any more than character can be bought in the market place. Such aid to destitute countries is essential today. It is in the method of offering the aid, the total context in which it is offered, and the manner in which it is administered, that the public official can make his impression for good.

Illustration 2 Moral Character a Requisite for Administrative Work

An administrator through the influence of his personality and behavior may engender teamwork, high purpose, and *esprit de corps* in an organization

A major problem of any organized effort is to get the persons who comprise the organization to work together in harmony. The administrator is always confronted with the need of offsetting the perversity of human nature and the disintegrating effect of the assertion of individual desires, as he tries to establish cooperative effort.

The great challenge to an administrator is to provide such leadership as will produce spontaneous and cooperative effort. The value of skillful administrative techniques will be offset if the administrator himself is not respected by his subordinates. Any study of the effectiveness of governmental administrators in a democracy will reveal that they will not secure the true respect of their employees or of the citizens served, if moral integrity is lacking.

Moreover, they must possess ideals and purposes adequate to cope with powerful forces which make for friction within their organizations and which seek to corrupt them from without. The scale of values which governs the life of the administrator must reflect the moral requisites that God has established as the basis for human brotherhood. If an administrator tries to live by any other scale of values, he inevitably becomes defeated, full of inner conflicts, fears, and frustrations, and he messes up his relationships, official as well as personal. That this is the inevitable result can be amply demonstrated by psychological and sociological analysis, as well as philosophical speculation.

Illustration 3. United States Occupation Program in Germany and Japan

In Germany and Japan we encounter what might be called an acute case of "mass irrationality." The absence of adequate moral leadership and stabilizing cultural and religious forces resulted in a perverted and egocentric society which became socially destructive, internally and externally.

Under the surrender terms, the Allies became the custodians of the German and Japanese people and of their destiny. The peace of the

world, as well as the requisites of sound human relationships, requires that this custodianship be undertaken in a manner which will enable these nations to become acceptable members of the family of nations. Obviously, reparations and demilitarization, while necessary, will not accomplish this—nor can the introduction of economic, political, and relief programs do so, important as these are.

Germany and Japan can become peace loving and emotionally competent nations only when enough of their citizens and leaders have developed a philosophy and mode of life which will support community and rational life of an orderly character. Priority number one of our occupation administrators should therefore be to search out and nurture all evidences of moral and spiritual awakening. All policies and programs should be constantly reviewed from the standpoint of appraising the extent to which they foster in the German and Japanese people higher levels of behavior, brotherhood, and moral purpose. The "methods" used should likewise be geared to strengthening these desired responses. All educational efforts, plans for social reform, youth movements, churches, publications, and other programs and facilities aimed at creating a new spirit and change of heart should be encouraged. Such a program dynamically executed would also have a most constructive impact on the attitudes of people in this country.

Illustration 4: Behavior of Delegates at Conferences

I have noticed many times how an arrogant, intolerant, insincere, and dissolute delegate engenders friction and dissension in an international conference. When a delegate speaks one is prone to read into his behavior the character of his country. No matter how noble the purposes of his country, a delegate of this type will betray them, even though carrying out instructions to the letter. If people back home could have a close view of some of their delegates in action, they would be in for a shock.

On the other hand, a delegate who tries to see the point of view of the others, who seeks the "right answer" rather than to impose his answer upon the meeting, and who is fair minded, friendly, idealistic, and humble in his approach, can electrify the whole gathering with his spirit and produce an environment in which agreement can be achieved. Fortunate is the country which has selected this type of representative. Such representatives are effective not only in advancing the aims of their country, but they also lift the horizons and tone of the meetings in which

they participate. They provide an indispensable but unfortunately all too lacking ingredient in international conferences, namely, moral leadership.

The Potentiality of Dynamic Leadership

The need of the hour is for political and administrative leaders who give more than lip service to the idea of democracy and brotherhood. We must find leaders who have woven moral considerations into their individual lives in all aspects.

The personality of the administrator, in his work at home and in his negotiations abroad, becomes a symbol of the purposes which his governmental agency or his country is pursuing. But more than this, his participation in the continuous process of policy formulation and execution enables him to have great influence on both objectives and means of effecting them. We live in a world full of socially destructive forces, and it requires a tremendous amount of moral conviction and purpose on the part of public officials and citizens to cope with them.

We should not be pessimistic over the possibility of dynamic moral leadership emerging even out of an immoral cultural and political environment. History is studded with innumerable examples of how one leader, or a small group, possessed of a dynamic idea which appealed to man's mind and conscience, can transform the political, social, or moral values of whole communities and nations.

Just as a few initial German and Japanese leaders, consumed with evil purpose, could, for example, carry their nations almost in a frenzy to the depths of human degradation and bestiality, so, too, a few leaders in these and other countries, who see the possibilities of man living according to a reverse scale of values, can lead their fellow citizens toward higher levels of human behavior. Change in the mind and spirit of people throughout the world is possible of achievement if the United States and other democratic countries recognize their real responsibilities.

Too often constructive leadership is crucified by those who should be expected to befriend it. Jealousy and self-righteousness are not the sins of the depraved. Our avowed public policy should at least be to nurture and encourage moral leadership whenever it emerges, at home or abroad. In Germany, in Greece, in China, in any other country, the leaders whom we should assist need the stimulus and encouragement of knowing that

there are others like themselves, not only within but outside their countries, who are deeply concerned with the democratic way of life and with achieving brotherhood.

If the United States officials and those in other countries should approach their responsibilities in this spirit, a revolutionary change would take place in government affairs, both internally and abroad

CHAPTER V

International Tensions as Objects of Social Investigation

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BEFORE WE OFFER OUR answer to the question, "How can scholarship contribute to the relief of international tensions?" it seems appropriate to attempt a statement of what the principal international tensions are and how the various branches of science and scholarship view these tensions. It is particularly appropriate to discuss the subject at the present time because the world is—to indulge in understatement—disillusioned and frightened because the expected relief from international tension which it was felt the end of the war would bring, has not materialized. The impression is widespread that instead of being lessened international tensions have been intensified. It is encouraging to note that the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization is contemplating a project on the analysis and reduction of tensions affecting international understanding.

The word "tension" itself requires some clarification. As the term is used to refer to the relations between nation states, it may designate conflicts ranging all the way from latent antagonisms to open warfare, from lack of understanding or misunderstanding on particular issues to pervading antagonisms involving the entire economic and political and social system, from transitory antagonisms to chronic conflicts, from differences in point of view and interest, as exhibited by the diplomatic representatives of the various states, to the deepseated and continuing prejudices and hostility between peoples.

The contribution to the lessening and management of international tensions might be made on various levels.

(1) The discovery of scientific knowledge about these tensions and about the mechanisms through which they might be minimized or resolved

(2) The dissemination of the knowledge thus obtained.

(3) The translation of this knowledge into specific programs of action

There are certain unstated assumptions with which we start. One of these is our belief that science and scholarship can make a contribution to one or more of these phases. Another is that special contributions can be made by the different disciplines and that not all of science and scholarship is equally relevant to all aspects of international tensions. A third assumption probably is that the contributions that each can make will be enhanced by discussion of these problems among us.

The Nature of International Tensions^a

International tensions are strained relations between nation states involving misunderstandings, conflicting interests, or overt hostility. Failure to resolve these tensions may lead to war or may hinder the chances to develop constructively the maximum potentialities for satisfaction of the nations and peoples concerned.

International tensions should not be confused with differences in objective situations or conditions of existence between nations. They refer, rather, to social psychological conditions, *i.e.*, to the states of mind and attitudes of people. There may be different rates of reproduction of population, differences in resources, wealth, income, standard of living, race, religion, language, political and economic organization, and moral, ethical, and religious values. But these conditions occasion international tensions only if they are defined by individuals or groups as deviations from some accepted norm or expectation. Diverse peoples with diverse cultures, and widely differing social and economic systems, have often lived together in peace. This has been possible either because these peoples had no contact with one another, or else have come to regard the existing conditions as unalterable or normal. Only when the actual conditions are felt to be contrary to ideal or desirable conditions in accordance with some norm of justice, fairness, equality, or other right and claim, do they provide the basis for tension. It is only when existing con-

^a[Cf. the discussion of this issue in Chapter I by Herman Finer, and the comment thereto by Rudolf Allers.]

ditions are no longer regarded as inevitable and when the impulse to change them is felt, that they develop into tensions. Indeed, it is not even necessary for actual disparities to be present, for people can imagine what actually does not exist and can act upon the imagined situation as if it were real. History furnishes many cases of national oppression psychoses or inferiority complexes to support this assertion.

To the extent that the various parts of the world are being knitted into closer unity through more intimate and frequent contact and to the extent that people of diverse cultures and status the world over come to be affected by the same ideas and ideals, it becomes more and more probable that differences in conditions of existence will be translated into interests and claims and will become the basis of international tensions. It is part of the price that we pay for democracy, freedom of expression, and the emergence of one world.

The crucial questions concerning the nature and varieties of international tensions may be succinctly stated in the following terms: Who is tense about what, toward whom, and in what ways? From these central questions certain other subsidiary questions may be derived, the answers to which should help to clarify many crucial issues now confronting us.

The Bearers of International Tensions

The first question obviously is "Who is tense?"

It should not be assumed that the division of the world into nation states automatically leads to international tensions. We have learned to be skeptical of statements purporting to portray in undifferentiated form the mind, the mood, the morals, or the character of nations. Granting, of course, that there are broad and often deep-seated differences in the culture and behavior of members of different national groups as a result of their different historical development and conditions of existence, yet it is important to note that the differences within modern national states are sometimes greater than the differences between such groups. It becomes necessary, therefore, to ask who the specific bearers of the tensions are. At least three possibilities exist:

(1) We may infer the existence of tensions from the behavior of the official spokesmen of the nations concerned, *i.e.*, the power holders or their representatives, such as diplomats.

(2) We may arrive at the judgment that tensions exist on the basis of

the attitudes and behavior of specific groups within respective countries

(3) We may infer the existence of tensions on the basis of mass opinions, attitudes, and behavior of considerable numbers of people of the countries concerned

Just as we often suspect that the ruling groups of some country other than our own do not truly represent the people of that country, so also in our own country the official policy may be at variance with the popular will. Many instances have accumulated in recent years of attempts to appeal directly to the people of another nation over the heads of their rulers. Thus the Japanese governing group before the war had counted upon a greater cleavage between the people of the United States and their government than actually was the case. It would be interesting to examine the effect of the "Voice of America" as it speaks to the Russian people directly. As mass media of communication operate increasingly on an international scale, peoples are increasingly enabled to speak to peoples. There is no assurance, however, that those who actually do the speaking truly represent the people's voice. Nor is there any assurance that the audience in the receiving country is free to listen to the voice of other peoples.

When today we hear the oft repeated phrase, "If we only knew what the Russian people think of the policies of their government," we find an instance of what is more or less universally suspected—of course, more so of autocracies than of democratic regimes—that there may be serious discrepancies between the power holders and their spokesmen on the one hand and the general population on the other hand. Similarly, there is no assurance of unanimity among the power holders themselves as the diverse pressures of conflicting lobbying groups in connection with international aviation or oil policies, for instance, will amply demonstrate. The tension between the Russian bloc and the American bloc within the United Nations and outside could be better understood, if we knew more definitely who is in each bloc and what divergent interests motivate adherence to each. There comes a time, of course, when tensions mount to a point where, whether or not the masses of the people, or even the important interest groups within the country, share the attitude of the power holders, they must accede to the power holders' policy on pain of severe sanctions.

Moreover, international tensions cannot be completely divorced from internal tensions within countries. Not merely do these internal tensions

furnish the life blood of domestic politics, but they not infrequently underlie the orientation of the country to other countries. The old maxim, "when you are weak at home, start a foreign war," has many historical precedents to support it. It is fair to assume that a country whose people are relatively free from anxieties will have less occasion to invent either domestic or foreign scapegoats than a nation whose people are suffering from real or fancied frustrations.

International Tensions and Conflicts of Interest

Having ascertained the bearers of international tensions, it is important to raise the relevant questions concerning the factors that motivate these tensions. There are as many factors as there are real or imagined interests and frustrated satisfactions which are or can be interpreted to be remediable through a change in the existing relations between states. Differences in resources may lead the people or governors of a poor country to be belligerent toward a rich country. Disparities in ratio of population to inhabitable area and natural resources may lead to population pressure, and tend to make a national policy of free migration, colonization, and expansion acceptable even at the risk of war. Unequal rates of technological development and great disparities in national wealth and productivity may be presented either to the power groups or to the peoples of disadvantaged countries as a legitimate basis for enhancing their standard of living at the expense of more fortunately situated countries.

Great disparities in military power or potential may lead to grave anxieties, manifesting themselves in armaments races, which, in turn, may threaten the standard of living of the people thus burdened to a point of desperation. Disadvantageous conditions of international trade and commerce and finance imposed upon certain countries may lead to aggressive countermeasures which will in turn accentuate pre-existing tensions. The monopolization by any country or group of countries of any scarce values is likely to give impetus to latent tensions.

We cannot afford to overlook the many intangible values that can become the basis of international rivalry and conflict, such as the factors associated with nationalism itself, the pursuit of national honor and power, and the belief in a national mission or destiny.

Equally important may be the real or alleged clash of economic po-

litical, or social systems. The identification of leaders and people with national images which are incompatible with the images of other nations, is widely believed to furnish the foundation for international prejudices and hostilities. Religious wars have been among the bloodiest. While it is unlikely in this more or less secularized world that they will be repeated, their place may be taken by ideological wars, such as those between capitalism and socialism, between democracy and dictatorship, or even between alignments of the world along racial and broad cultural divisions. The inevitability of the triumph of one or another ideology or social system and the possibility of the peaceful coexistence of a variety of such systems and ideologies in a very much shrunken world, certainly poses one of the crucial problems of our time.

Whatever may be the initial bases of prejudices and hostilities, there is ample evidence to show that in the dynamics of the international conflict the original source of frustration may be forgotten or may become associated with any number of other sources of anxiety and hostility. What may start out as a general feeling of insecurity and frustration may, in the advanced stages of conflict, acquire a definition in terms of quite other grievances and be expressed in international policies only remotely connected with the actual situation. Indeed, it has been said by students of war that very minor tensions may linger and gather force until they end in major conflagrations. It has also been observed that major issues become factors of international tension only if in their unfolding they affect the power relations between nations.

There have been many grave international conflicts that have not led to war. Witness the passivity of the major powers in the face of the rearmament of Germany by the Nazis, their march into the Rhineland and their conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia. It was not until their march into Poland and Denmark that Britain and France regarded the tension as sufficiently grave to resort to war, and even after the conquest of Poland, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and France, the United States refrained from military intervention.

Thus it is not so much the tensions themselves, however profound and intense, as the general international atmosphere in which the tensions arise and must be managed, that determines the resort to war. Anxieties and deprivations, however trivial, may be nurtured into formidable grievances through artificial manipulation of the opinion making industries or through manufactured "incidents."

Manifestations of International Tensions

The third and last set of questions to be considered here is the forms in which tensions are manifested. International tensions may express themselves by various forms of behavior, ranging from prejudices, avoidance, anxiety, and conflict between individuals or groups as members of national communities, to national policies and organized collective behavior of nation states toward one another in diplomacy, alignments with other states, or threats of and indulgence in actual warfare.

It should be possible to ascertain the various stages of developing tension by examination not merely of the incidents that are selected to become issues for diplomatic negotiation, but also of the various channels through which domestic opinion and world opinion are being influenced. Among the questions to which scholars and scientists have sought answers are the following: How tense must a people be to go to war with another people? What indication can we get from state documents, from military and political measures, from the utterances and the behavior of power groups, from the press and the radio and the movies, from popular literature, from what is taught in the schools and preached from the pulpits and discussed in the public forums, from the rumors and clichés that are spread among the people generally, as to the state of tension between various countries? Are the tensions between nations reciprocal or are they unilateral? It may be quite possible that the issues that seem important to the government, the power groups, or the people of one country seem relatively unimportant to their adversaries. It should be possible to measure both the intensity and the direction of these tensions by means which have already proved useful in other types of investigation. Here lies a great opportunity for social psychologists.

The Positive Role of Tensions

It should not be supposed that international tensions are themselves an evil any more than interpersonal tensions are always necessarily bad. Tensions produce, under appropriate circumstances, a striving for a better adjustment and thus lead to personal and social development. Most of us would not want to live in a world completely devoid of international tensions, because such a world would of necessity be a world of

utterly static. Such a world might seek war as one way of relieving sheer boredom

International rivalry may be regarded as one of the ways in which the so-called backward parts of the world have acquired the appetite and the means for lifting themselves. We must expect, with the increasing integration of the world, to meet the claims of the disadvantaged peoples who are aspiring to rise to the level of the powerful and the prosperous and the free with greater resourcefulness than in the past. There are signs, such as those that have recently come from our own island possessions and from India, that these tensions can be resolved peacefully

The widely held faith, especially among scholars and educators, that lack of understanding between peoples lies at the root of international conflict, is not always justified. Correlatively, the almost universal belief that better understanding would prevent the development of tensions or ease those that exist, may also be questioned. In retrospect it can be affirmed that the less we knew about the Nazis, the better we got along with them. Intensive contact between peoples on a universal scale may be expected to create both more understanding as well as more misunderstanding. There is a great difference between identical interests and reciprocal interests. People with identical interests may join in a common fight against a common enemy who is blocking the realization of these interests, but they may also fight one another for the same reason. The realization of mutual benefits based upon different interests may be a greater source of harmonious relations between states than the pursuit of identical objectives

One of the hopes of international organization lies in the prospect that the United Nations may serve each member nation to fulfil its own interests more effectively, as long as they are compatible with the interests of all the others, and that in case of a clash of interests all the member states will have a continually increasing common stake in the effective functioning of an international authority which, in the course of time, will induce them to surrender a sufficient amount of national sovereignty to make an international regime of law a reality

We might as well reconcile ourselves to the fact that as long as there are national states there will be international conflict. We still have conflicts between the states of our Union, but since the Civil War they have either not been of such an acute nature as to lead to war or we have developed the machinery to deal with them peacefully, and have such trans-

cent interests and faith in national unity as to consider war out of the question.

With an emerging international organization as yet admittedly in a feeble state, the danger arises that we may become impatient because the United Nations has not solved the important conflicts between the major powers. If they can continue to engage in a day to day discussion, even on minor issues, and arrive at some compromises, the road may be left open for the settlement of more serious issues. Much will depend upon the creation of world public opinion and on the power relations between the two major constellations. At least we have the satisfaction that the contending parties have not permanently walked out.

We will not have less tensions but more tensions as the various parts of the world come into ever closer relationship with one another, and the supreme problems are: Can these tensions be mitigated or resolved without resort to war, and can they be turned into constructive purposes for realizing the universal hopes of man for a free, peaceful, prosperous, and just world society?

CHAPTER VI

Measurement of Variations in International Tensions

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The Meaning of Tension

ACCORDING TO THE Standard dictionary, the word "tension" means in ordinary usage the act of stretching or the condition of being stretched, and in mechanics, stress caused by pulling, or the condition of a body when acted on by such stress. In physics, the word has acquired a more generalized meaning, as the constrained condition in the particles of bodies arising from the action of antagonistic forces in which they tend to return to their former condition (elastic force), or the condition producing an electric current of high electromotive force (difference of potential). The term also has the psychological and sociological significance of mental strain or any strained relations, as between governments.

Clearly, this Conference devoted to the contribution which scholarship may make to the relief of international tensions is using the word in the latter sense. We are thinking of tensions in a human population, a population which includes more than one nation.

Can such tensions be measured?

Analogy of Social to Physical Tension

In physics, an increase of tension up to a certain point increases available energy. The bow under severe tension or the current in a high tension wire can be utilized for human purposes. There is, however, a threshold beyond which tension cannot increase. The bow breaks, the wire melts.

As in electrical systems, it seems that three elements can be distinguished in social systems. Up to a point, the amount of *social tension* measures the quantity of *social energy* available, but beyond that point the *social structure* breaks in war or revolution. These three elements, social tension, social energy, and social structure, may be related to one another as are the three elements in an electrical system. The amount of current (amperes) varies directly as the difference of potential (volts) and inversely as the resistance of the conductor (ohms) ($C = \frac{P}{R}$). Social energy may increase with increases of social tension and with decreases in the rigidity of the social structure. Inflexible social structures which offer great resistance to change reduce social energy and may break down with sudden violence as tensions become great. Social tensions may be expected to increase as social energy increases and as social structures become more rigid.

Conditions which foster high social tensions and a social structure sufficiently flexible to adapt itself to change are favorable to great social energy and to expanding individual opportunity and human welfare. There is a limit, however, to the amount of tension which any social structure can absorb. Rising social tensions approaching the tolerance point of the existing social structure give warning of impending violence. High tension is, therefore, a condition which characterizes the rise of civilization and also precedes the outbreak of violence. A stable and progressive society requires tensions that are high but not too high, and institutions sufficiently firm to channel social energy, but not too rigid.

It is not likely that social tensions, social energy, and the resistance of social institutions can ever be measured with the precision of electrical potential, current, and the resistance of electrical conductors, but rough measurements may be possible.

Social energy may be measured by the efficiency of a group's economy. Continuous increases of population and wealth manifest social energy. Such a condition can exist only with continuous improvement in the utilization of resources, which implies inventiveness, technological skill, and probably the preservation of many centers of initiative and experiment.

Social resistance may be measured by the rigidity of the group's polity. Polity refers to the means by which a group channels the activities of its members to preserve the group's solidarity and achieve its common ob-

jectives. These means include the organization of authority and the maintenance of law and custom. The group's polity becomes rigid as its political organization becomes administratively centralized and the influence of the play of politics among individual or sub-group initiatives diminishes and its customs and laws become pervasive and unchangeable. These two factors—centralization and custom—may move in opposite directions. Thus, the modern totalitarian states, with extraordinary administrative centralization, have been able to preserve some social energy because they have succeeded in greatly reducing the influence of custom. Among the democracies, the role of custom and common law is greater, but administrative centralization is checked by legislative activity influenced by party politics, and by constitutional recognitions of local autonomies and civil liberties.

Measurement of Social Tension

Social tensions may be measured by certain statistical indices manifesting social unrest, such as the frequency of litigations, strikes, violence, or other forms of conflict, or manifesting psychic abnormality, such as the frequency of neuroses, suicides, or crimes of violence. More accurate measurements might be possible through analysis of the records of the mass media of opinion—the press, the radio, and the movies. Intensity of *public opinion* can be measured by use of such records and may indicate the general tension level of the group. More refined measurements can be made of *private attitudes*. These are the psychological phenomena of which opinions purport to be, but sometimes are not, the public expression. Attitude scales have been devised which can be applied to exhibit not only the *direction* but also the *intensity* of attitudes concerning given symbols or policies. Such data permit also determination of the *trends*, the degree of *continuity*, and the degree of *homogeneity* of the attitudes in a group.

Causes of Social Tension

These indices of social tensions may, however, be superficial. The intensity of opinions and attitudes may not be adequate expressions of social tension, and the frequency of conflict, violence, or neuroses may be influenced by factors other than social tension. A theory of the causes

of social tension may contribute to the development of better criteria of measurement

Let us consider four suggested causes of social tension.

(1) Opinions may become out of harmony with conditions because of the rapid change of conditions through invention or contact with other groups. Adaptation of opinion to such changes may be difficult because of the tendency of men to retain the opinions formulated in youth. Thus, in a group which is inventive or communicating widely, a lag often occurs between opinions stemming from the past and conditions of the present, giving rise to social tensions.

(2) Public opinion may be out of harmony with private attitudes, partly because the attitudes of some members of the group may more readily adapt to changing conditions than those of others, and partly because propaganda may induce widespread verbal acceptance of novel ideas and policies, imperfectly integrated with the individual's thought. For many people, reflective thinking is painful. Opinions inconsistent with basic attitudes may long remain together in the same mind without the inconsistency being noticed. It is probable that if individuals are continually expressing opinions in which they do not really believe, and if the society is acting in accordance with public opinions which the prevailing attitudes no longer endorse, there will be social tension.

(3) Opinion itself may contain inconsistent elements. The politicians may give assurance to all their constituents that their wishes will be achieved, without pausing to consider the incompatibility of some of these wishes with others. Opinions consistent with ancestral customs and beliefs may also linger and be imperfectly accommodated to current experience. Opinions based upon rational expectations of the future may be verbally merged with opinions based upon wishful thinking. With the limited capacity of social science to predict, impossible wishes and rational expectations are often hard to distinguish. Few can say that any wish, given time, is completely incapable of realization, and no one can say that any expectation of a somewhat distant future, however reasonable, will actually be realized. Difficult as inconsistencies in public opinion may be to detect, their existence is probably a cause of social tension.

(4) The inconsistency of prevailing opinions with contemporary conditions and with private attitudes, and the inconsistencies of the elements of a prevailing opinion with one another cannot be forever hidden. Semantic, pragmatic, and syntactic errors in accepted doctrine will eventu-

ally come to light. Individuals who observe these inconsistencies tend to develop sub-groups or parties about particular opinions. Every public which has an opinion, therefore, tends to break up into sub-publics with different opinions, and these sub-publics tend to organize and to come into competition or conflict with one another. The inconsistencies always to be found in the public opinion of a large group tend to be manifested by the conflict of parties, each striving to make its opinion more internally consistent, more widely accepted, and more realized in practice.

While the effort to achieve consistency tends toward a multiplication of parties, the effort to realize opinions in practice tends toward a union of parties and a building of new publics from elements of many previously distinct publics. Such an effort toward union inevitably arouses opposition, and the result is a tendency toward polarization of opinions. All persons and parties in any of the groups in contact with one another tend to be attracted toward one pole or the other.

Either extreme diversity or complete polarization of opinion tends to produce high tension, often resulting, in the one case, in an anarchy of each against all, and in the other in a war of half the world against the other half. Between these extremes, tension may vary in accord with the relation between the psychological, technological, and other distances between the sub-groups.

The political, economic, social, and cultural circumstances causing fluctuations in public opinion are the stuff of history. They cannot be examined here, but it is believed that the fluctuations themselves can be roughly measured, and such measurements may indicate the rise and fall of social tensions.

If opinions can be measured, social scientists may be able to estimate the degree in which they distort the reality of social conditions. If attitudes can be measured, psychometrists may be able to estimate the degree of their divergence from prevailing opinions. If public opinion can be described, logicians may be able to ascertain the meaning of its elements and estimate the degree of their internal inconsistencies. If the constellation of sub-groups and the degree of their polarization can be ascertained, political scientists may be able to ascertain the probability of conflict. The sum of these factors may provide an index of social tension.

In this connection, it is to be observed that the complete disintegration of public opinion, characterized by panic during which each individual acts for self-preservation, is seldom far removed from the complete in-

tegration of public opinion by a dictator, usually through displacement of fears and hates upon an external enemy. Social disorganization is often the prelude to a war of aggression, and failure of the latter may precipitate a reversion to social disorganization. Moderate tensions resulting from the controlled competition and controversy of many overlapping groups, all of whose members hold some opinions in common, are more consistent with stability and progress than are extremes of social integration or social disintegration.¹

Intergroup Distances and Tension

This analysis has dealt with the state of tension within a group. Applied to international affairs, the world's population is considered a group and the nations are considered sub-groups whose opinions tend to polarize today with the United States and the Soviet Union at the poles. In view of the firm social structure of the nations and the weak social structure of the United Nations, it might seem more realistic to treat the nations as groups and to examine the tensions *between* nations or groups of nations. International tensions might be measured by estimating the technological, strategic, psychological, social, and other distances between nations or groups of nations. Today the distance between the United States pole and the Soviet pole might be usefully measured.

From this mode of analysis, it appears that intergroup tensions tend to increase if the material contacts between the groups increase without integration of their institutions, or if their institutions and opinions diverge without diminution of their material contacts.² The analysis of the different types of distances between nations and the relations of changes in these distances to one another has been elaborated into a complex formula for estimating the probability of war.³

Not only may this method throw light on the tensions between nations, but it may also throw light on the tensions in the family of nations as a whole. The nineteenth century was remarkable for the increase of material contact between peoples in all parts of the world and for the development of material interdependence. At times this development was paralleled by a tendency toward institutional and ideological accom-

¹Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1912, pp. 1103 ff.

²*Ibid.*, p. 1111.

³*Ibid.*, pp. 1276 ff, 1181 ff.

modations. Whenever the latter process lagged behind the former, high tensions arose. During the 1930s governments were divided in opinion as to whether tensions could best be reduced by diminishing material contacts through isolationist policies or by increasing political and cultural accommodations through cooperative institutions.⁴ At present the United States seems to be convinced of the latter and the Soviet Union of the former.

When the social structure of sub-groups, such as nations, organize the sub-groups so distinctively that the super-group, which includes them all, has no public opinion or social structure, the analysis of distances between groups appears to be the more useful method for measuring tension, but as the distances between all groups diminish and the super-group develops an organization and a public opinion, the analysis of the tensions within that group appears to be the more useful method.⁵ The latter method is more general since it includes as a special case the situation when sub-groups dominate over the super-group and the public opinion of the latter approaches zero. Exclusive use of the analysis by distances, on the other hand, ignores the existence of a super-group. It assumes that world relations are exclusively international relations, an assumption which has never been entirely true and has become less true with the progress of mass communication, rapid transport, and military technology. With the general diminution of distances between nations, with the development of the United Nations, and with the beginnings of a world public opinion, the more general method of analysis seems the more useful and has been emphasized in this study.

Social Tension and Progress

What conditions of social tension, social energy, and social organization make for progress? This question moves outside the realm of measurement and analysis into that of evaluation. If progress is regarded as movement toward the realization of social ideals, it cannot be discussed without reference to a value system. The variations in religion demonstrate the extreme divergencies of social ideals compatible with human nature. While all men have much in common, they have been able to give their allegiance to the most diverse Utopias. Men have striven for

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 1115

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 1492

a society in which everyone would have freedom to formulate his own wishes and power to achieve them, thus facilitating the activity and self-realization of every type of human being. Men have also accepted the goal of a society in which everyone would be schooled by custom and self-discipline to suppress every wish and to renounce every achievement, thus losing human individuality in a Nirvana of contemplative passivity. The first group, who praise activity, characteristic of the West, can move toward their goal only if social energy and social tensions are high and social institutions offer no more resistance to change than is necessary for the maintenance of order. On the other hand, the devotees of passivity, characteristic of the East, can approach their goal only if social entropy is at a maximum. They seek to minimize social energy and social tensions and to rigidify social institutions by customs able to resist change and to prevent initiative. It is doubtful whether either of these two extremes can ever be realized, and most societies set for themselves goals which compromise activity and passivity. There are elements of passivity in Christian civilizations as there are of activity in Buddhist civilizations.

Scholarship may contribute to the relief of international tensions by measuring them, analyzing their relationship to other elements of the world community, and disclosing their significance in promoting or retarding the realization of particular values. Whether and in what degree we want to relieve international tensions and how we should go about it depends on the magnitude of the prevailing tensions, their surrounding conditions, and the values we believe in. Scholarship, by emphasizing these relativities and illuminating these relationships, may aid men of affairs to create a more peaceful world, if that is what everyone wants.¹⁰

¹⁰Comment by Thomas D. Horton

I enjoyed the paper immensely. I note repeatedly points at which the studies of physiologic, personal, and social tensions by Edward Kempf, M.D., and by Lawrence K. Frank are highly relevant and would prove interesting parallel reading for social scientists.

Comment by Robert C. Angell

Doctor Wright's stimulating paper illustrates, in my opinion, the dangers of unlogical thinking. It seems to me that the analogy between electrical and social tensions is unsound. It is clear in his four causes of tension that the difference of potential is thought to be somewhere in the field of *opinion*. The energies that he evoked must therefore be energies that go into solving of these problems. But Doctor Wright's formula assumes that *all* social energy is in the formula and he specifically mentions the efficiency of a group's economy as a measure of social energy. When we stop to think how much energy goes into making a living, it is folly to assume that the total social energy will vary directly with the demands raised by differences of opinion. Take the American pioneer communities. They worked very hard and made a decent living for themselves, yet there were very few social tensions.

within them in Doctor Wright's sense. Again, are we to assume that as social energy decreased with the advent of the depression in 1929, social tensions decreased? This was certainly not the case, yet there was no sudden increase in the rigidity of our policy that might have offset the increased tensions. What might be said is that the growth of tension increased the energy going into public discussions. This is true, and it reveals the real source of difficulty with the electrical analogy. The electrical circuit does not have to expend energy making a living as we poor mortals do.

[Cf. Chapter I by Herman Finer, and comment thereto by Rudolf Allers.]

Professor Wright's reply

Analogy always implies similarity only in certain respects. What are the respects, if any, in which electrical and social tensions resemble each other? Certainly not in the causes of such tensions. I suggested that there might be an analogy in the relation of tension in both cases to resistance and to energy. Doctor Angell combats even this by suggesting that an assumed decrease of social energy in the United States in 1929 was not accompanied by a decrease of social tensions. I am not sure of these facts. There were fewer strikes and political controversies were less acrid in the early days of the New Deal than in the Hoover period. It may be that social rigidities increased during the Hoover period and that the greater flexibility of the New Deal permitted tensions to decrease. We need more accurate measurements of social tensions, social energies, and social resistance before we can either prove or disprove the hypothesis.

The relationship of these factors is, however, quite distinct from the causes of each. Even if the hypothesis is correct, social tensions are not in any but a formal sense caused by social resistance and social energy. The formula only means that if tensions increase, there will be changes in social energy and social resistance tending to increase in the former and decrease in the latter. I do not therefore understand the statement "Doctor Wright's formula assumes that *all* energy is in the formula." Many factors influence the amount of social energy. The formula merely asserts that these factors influence social resistance and social tensions or both.

On another point, I think social energy should include only energy available for group activities. If all individual energy is absorbed by making a living, as with producers, it seems to me there is little social energy.

Perhaps I might suggest as a result of reading Doctor Angell's paper [Cf. Chapter VIII] that we do differ upon the moral content of the term, tension. His analogy of tension to disease implies that social tensions are always bad. My analogy on the other hand makes the word tension morally neutral. It seems to me that too much or too little tension may be bad, but the right amount is good. I think this concept has the advantage that it avoids Utopian efforts to eliminate all tensions and suggests that there is a relationship of some tension to social progress, at least as the West understands the term.

I should not let this go, however, without saying how much I liked many points made in Doctor Angell's paper, particularly the identification of the demographic, technological, and ideological sources of social tension.

CHAPTER VII

The Value of Freedom: Some Long Range Implications for the Social Sciences

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THE WORLD TODAY is divided by the rivalry between major ideological and economic systems, all of which profess attachment to the value of freedom. Clearly, the word "freedom" does not mean the same thing for everyone who uses it. But the situation suggests that today there may well be a common desire among people everywhere, which is somehow symbolized by some common value of "freedom," and to which competing leaders and ideologies find it at least expedient to appeal. Could a more generally valid concept of freedom be developed from such an assumption? Could a more general yardstick be found to judge disputed professions and policies for their real contribution, if any, to mankind's search for greater freedom in this world?

Freedom as a Range of Choices

Let us try a tentative definition of "freedom." Generally, a "value" implies a subjective reaction by an individual to an objective state of affairs, a feeling of value about something else which is valued. For the purposes of this inquiry, let us measure a man's "freedom" by *the amount of choices between actions actually available to and recognized by that man*. All choices are choices between operations, including physical and mental operations as well as the operation of relative non-interference or passivity. No total passivity, of course, is possible, while life remains

FIRST of all, this definition assumes that there are actual opportunities for choice, that the course of external affairs can be significantly modified by acts originating in human consciousness and human will. We assume, on the basis of such evidence as our scientists have, that the universe *leaves at least some degree, however small, of freedom in every natural process of which we know*. There is some reason to think that these degrees of freedom are greater in the process of biological evolution which has been described as working with less than complete mechanical necessity¹ and still greater in all those processes characterized by the intervention of conscious thought. This last assumption of some significant degree of human "*free will*," however limited by other factors, has long been asserted by the religions of Christianity and Judaism. Today complete determinism is no longer asserted by any strong school of thought. Against such broad consent, the old definition of freedom as simply "*recognized necessity*" becomes merely an assertion that the limits of each choice must be recognized, if the free choice within these limits is to be made with full effectiveness.

The concept of "actually available choices" involves four broad groups of conditions, all of which seem indispensable to freedom of action:

1. *Social Permission* to act ("Absence of Restraint"—e.g., flying must be permitted by the community).
2. *Objective Opportunities* to act ("Presence of Opportunity"—e.g., there must be a usable airplane).
3. *Personal Capabilities* to act (e.g., I must be able to pilot the plane, know how to operate the controls, and I must be sufficiently free from previous internal compulsions, such as starvation, hunger, overwhelming passion, so as to remain capable of choosing).
4. *Subjective Recognition* of these choices as available (e.g., I must realize that this chance is available to me, I must not erroneously think that the plane is out of order, or that the doctor has forbidden me to fly).

The absence of restraint, either by law or by cultural *mores*, has long been stressed in the Western liberal tradition. Presence of opportunity has been emphasized more recently by liberal and socialist thinkers, from T. H. Greene to Sidney Webb and the American New Dealers. "Capacity to act" has been used as a one-sided definition of freedom by Hegel

¹Cf. Julian S. Huxley, *Evolution—The Modern Synthesis*, George Allen and Unwin, London, Harper, New York, 1942, pp. 575-76.

and as an added appeal for the "Doctrine of Fascism" by Benito Mussolini. Despite the variety of uses to which these concepts have been put, they all refer to matters of fact which can largely be verified and measured by ordinary fact finding methods, at least in what concerns the amount of actually available choices to an individual at any one short time.

The Factor of Time

The picture becomes somewhat different when we extend our concept of an *amount* of choices beyond such a short period of time. For example, according to a well known anthropologist, young adults, under the patterns of Japanese culture, have fewer opportunities for choice, but old adults have in certain respects more freedom than their respective contemporaries in the West.²

Generally, one of the most important considerations about any proposed specific course of action will be whether this action will prove a kind of "one way road" cutting down subsequent choices, or whether it will lead to broader opportunities for choices in the future. Still more generally, length of life, chances for future growth in opportunities or capabilities, are also additional values in the pursuit of freedom. They may have to be discounted by factors of risk corresponding to the probability or uncertainty of their attainment. On the other hand, the frequent and habitual exercise of deliberate free choice may in itself develop capabilities conducive to more probable survival.

The Individual's Decision about Time

The amount of choices to a man may therefore depend on the extent to which he happens to consider successive opportunities for choice as "contemporary," as available to himself.

The individual may choose to count the amount of his choices even beyond his personal life. He may extend his sense of personal identification to his children, or his more remote descendants, or his social group, or to mankind as a whole, or even, beyond mankind, to some aspect of the universe, as he may conceive it in terms of religion or philosophy. In

²Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, 1917.

that event, he may refer to himself future opportunities which will actually accrue only to his children or posterity. If he so acts, he may gain a greater sense of personal freedom than he could ever have derived from the mere sum of direct choices open to him during his lifetime. He may find that this extension of his personality provides him with an indirect alternative against the fact of death, and so win, against this last contingency, a sense of freedom unavailable to him in any other way. And this attitude may be strengthened by the practical experience that habitual identification with the interests of posterity may prove, in fact, conducive to greater statistical chances of survival and freedom for all members of the group, leaving each man a chance to benefit from the selflessness of his ancestors, as his posterity will have a chance to benefit from his.

Our attempt to find a factual and measurable concept of freedom has now led us to suspect that there may be an ethical, philosophical, or religious element implied in any factual definition of freedom. The lives of philosophers like Spinoza or Kant, as well as those of many saints of many religions, may suggest that at least some men seem to have gained a broader sense of freedom by extending their identification to something far beyond themselves.

Growth in Our Subjective Sense of Freedom

The operations between which we choose may be divided into provisionally external and provisionally internal operations. The former consist mainly in external courses of action, but they cannot but become linked with internal, mental operations. The latter consist mainly in internal, mental acts, but they deal with symbols derived directly or indirectly from external events, and they lead sooner or later back into actions or omissions in the external world. There is, then, a subjective element in freedom, first in the notion of "self" to which we refer the available choices, and secondly, in the concept of each of the possible operations between which we choose.

Could these subjective elements offer a basis for a whole series of short cuts through which our sense of freedom might be increased through subjective, mental operations, without any significant change in our material surroundings?

Freedom from Internal Compulsions

Our subjective "sense of freedom" is based on capabilities and identification. We can increase, first of all, our capabilities for choice by reducing our internal compulsions. It is of these compulsions that we speak when we refer to a man as a "slave of his passions" or of his habits. It is greater freedom from these compulsions that philosophers and saints have sought. Such a rearrangement of an individual's scale of values and personality structure is perhaps indicated by such words as "detachment" and "disinterestedness," and the suggestion of greater freedom of mind which they carry.

Extending Our Identification

We may further increase our sense of available choices between at least subjective moods by extending our identification, our "empathy," to a wide range of other subjects. Much of the subjective sense of freedom of some artists, poets, and thinkers may have its root in such an empathy, possibly in combination with a differentiation of personality extending their range of possible emotional or intellectual experiences, so as to furnish a wider base for free choice between them, unless offset, however, by greater inner compulsions. Where this occurs, as it may have in the case of Goethe, we find suggestions of an unusual sense of freedom at times in conflict with suggestions of being "possessed" by overwhelming inner drives. But where these inner drives are brought under control, the "demon" seems subdued and a detached "Olympian" sense of freedom appears as the outcome.

How Far Can Subjective Short Cuts Lead?

The traces of this search for freedom through internal changes of the human personality extend through many centuries. Its results have greatly enriched the world's artistic and spiritual tradition. It has seemed to avoid much conflict between men and men, men and institutions.

But in the end this seeming short cut has proved a blind alley in those cultures that sought in it the only or the main approach to freedom. It could not increase the choices of external action actually available. It did permit the more effective scrutiny of such choices as there were, and per-

haps a fuller bringing out of the intellectual or emotional implications of each of them. Not by accident have regimes and cultures of rigid order or of oppression so often been accompanied by the flourishing of mysticism or scholastic ingenuity. The resulting situation seems comparable to the more and more careful extraction of the last bits of ore from an increasingly exhausted vein, without any serious prospecting for new deposits. Our minds cannot work indefinitely without the vital food of experiences from the external world from which our mental symbols are derived, nor can the new combinations and trains of thought be developed indefinitely without new confrontations with outside reality. No sense of freedom has ever been maintained indefinitely for large numbers of human beings if all their external experiences increasingly contradicted it.

Even exceptional individuals can follow the subjective path only within limits. They can gain some greater internal development and freedom while most of their fellows remain unfree, warped, or stunted. But men's minds have some interdependence by their nature: to feast while our fellows are starving may still our hunger, but it is more than likely to warp our own personality.

Freedom Through Education—and Its Limits

For centuries, and particularly since the eighteenth century, the answer to the problem of freedom has been sought in that peculiar combination of external and internal operations known as *education*. Let men deliberately develop their personalities and sense of freedom *through utilizing the external service and facilities of education*, the schools, universities, museums, theatres, galleries of art—as well as any religious institutions in their educational aspects. But if these services are to be effectively accessible to the bulk of the people, their facilities must be vastly multiplied. If they are to be improved in quality, any such improvement involves again the expenditure of mental and physical labor. If large numbers of people are to benefit from education, they must be able to afford to divert time and effort from more materially productive pursuits. In practice, there is no people in the world today that has more than a small fraction of the facilities required for such an undertaking. To invite under these conditions the population to seek freedom in

effective mass education, may mean merely to invite them to compete against each other for access to inadequate facilities

Further, to educate people without changing the conditions of life which condemn most adults to lead narrow and, as it were, "uneducated" lives, means merely to educate young men for disappointment—a point made long ago in Professor Sorokin's study of *Social Mobility* and subsequently confirmed by the experiences of educated but unemployed or misemployed young men from Germany to India and South America. The result has been resentment against an education creating capabilities without opportunities for their exercise, and intensified effort, individual or organized, to gain such material opportunities, either by taking them away from others, or by reorganizing the community so as to widen the supply of opportunities as a whole. In either case, what started out as the partially internal operation of education, ended up as intensified pressure for external opportunities.

Material Elements: Power as a Part of Freedom

We have been driven back to the objective element in freedom—freedom as the *scope of action*, in Hegel's words, as "the capacity to act." Freedom under this aspect seems to merge with knowledge and power, and in this context, "knowledge is power."

We find a more objective, more measurable index for this freedom in a concept borrowed from modern biologists: the greater independence of and control over the environment, which in the view of Mr. Julian Huxley may provisionally be taken as the criterion of measurable biological progress on this planet.¹

To be sure, Mr. Huxley insists

True human progress consists in increases of aesthetic, intellectual, and spiritual experience and satisfaction.

Of course, increase of control and of independence is necessary for the increase of these spiritual satisfactions, but the more or less measurable and objective control over and independence of external environment are now merely subsidiary mechanisms serving as the material basis for the human type of progress.²

¹Huxley, *op. cit.*, p. 562

²*Ibid.*, pp. 575-576

But our brief survey of the internal subjective approaches to freedom has left us with the impression that at this particular stage in human history it is still the tragic shortage of material facilities which constitutes the most critical "bottleneck" in mankind's search for greater freedom for all.

What Kind of Power?

Facilities and opportunities are functions of power, be it power over nature or power over men. The obvious short cut among these two, power over men, has proved a blind alley in the past and seems likely to prove even more of a blind alley in the future.⁵ We are left to pin our hopes to the pursuit of power over nature, the open frontier of pure and applied science and productive human cooperation.

Predictability as Basis of Freedom and Power

The conquest of nature has thus far always required—and may long continue to require—the increasingly vast and dependable cooperation of men. As a minimum of *regularity and predictability* in nature is the indispensable condition for the possibility of any deliberate action in general, so a minimum of predictability in human relations is the indispensable condition for any deliberate or concerted action in society. The greater the scope of human undertakings, the greater the need for human dependability—a need which will long continue to grow in the future.

Law, Coercion or Dependability

Sometimes this dependability has been identified with law. Hegel, saw in law and the state the indispensable foundations of freedom. But law and the State in this sense are devices of enforcement, not guarantees of dependability. A law may be frequently enforced, but not enough often to be dependable, e.g., Prohibition in the United States, or it may have been regularly enforced in the past without being dependable for the future, e.g., the laws of the Bourbon Monarchy in France in 1788, one year before the French Revolution. There are other relationships today

⁵Cf. this author's discussion in *Conflicts of Power in Modern Culture*, Seventh Symposium, Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, New York, 1947.

which cannot be enforced but on which most men depend with confidence, such as the faithfulness of their wives or husbands, or the love of their children. We each rely on our marriage, to the extent that we do rely on it, to some degree because of the non-violent sanctions of our community's morality, and to a more important degree because of our knowledge of the persons and relationships involved—because a centuries long process of trial and error has made continued marriage voluntarily acceptable and desirable. There seems thus to be at least some evidence that patterns of dependability can be evolving and flexible, that, if man's near future may be one of increasing organization, it may yet be organization for freedom.

Freedom in Society: the Free Trade Experiment

In the short run, pragmatic balances will have to be struck between temporarily conflicting claims of dependability and flexibility in social organization. Could today's conflicting ideologies perhaps be received in this context as different short cuts to a common goal of freedom, perceived more or less dimly? Or could it be thought that an underlying logic of events—"leading the willing, dragging the reluctant"—might be pressing in that direction?

Certainly the great nineteenth century experiment of Free Trade could be viewed as an attempted short cut to the solution of the problem of freedom and dependable order in an expanding industrial society. The automatic operation of the market did prove, in the short run, more dependable and flexible, and hence more conducive to the growth of freedom than what had gone before. But the record seems clear that in the long run Free Trade did not fulfil the great hopes placed in it. Suffice it to say that what emerged was a market mechanism neither dependable enough to prevent shattering depressions nor flexible enough to meet the needs of underprivileged, or undeveloped, regions, groups, or peoples. The automatic competition of markets has largely ceased to be the main effective regulator in human affairs.

The Problem of Collectivism

The acceptance of the market has been replaced, in some parts of the world, by another hoped for short cut: far-reaching collectivism. Plan-

ning of most of community life has been carried out by a central authority, having gained more or less wide popular support but making its crucial decisions within a relatively small group of persons, to be accepted by the rest of the people, often with little scope for popular criticism, initiative, or organized dissent, except in secondary matters. But this path, too, has not provided that automatic attainment of freedom that some of its followers hoped for.

Even in making the most favorable assumptions, there remains the crucial problem whether long acceptance of collectivist discipline may not engender *habits* of authority among leaders and of blind conformity among the led, which may leave both unable to meet new, unforeseen situations and so may reduce their whole community's long run chances for survival.

One answer to this question was given in the case of the total mobilization carried out by the fascist governments of Germany, Italy, and Japan, for the purposes of conquest, looting, and forcible exploitation. It was accompanied by official doctrines rejecting individualism forever, as unsuited to the alleged permanent characteristics of human nature which led Hitler to prophesy a Nazi Reich lasting for at least one thousand years, or Mussolini to affirm "the eternal, immutable, and beneficial inequality of man." In the details of daily practice, the "leadership principle," the fascists' stress on "hierarchy," and the famous slogans, "Believe, Obey, Fight," and "Mussolini is always right," were drummed into the heads of adults and children. Fascist collectivism was characterized by robbery, as its main aim, and tyranny in every major detail, as its method. No forces making for freedom could flourish under it.

Other types of collectivist control of national efforts and resources may give rise to contradictory trends within their domestic evolution, which may well clash in the future. How such an internal clash of tendencies would end, none can say today with certainty. Perhaps the presence or absence of further successful democratic developments of civil liberties and economic prosperity in the Western countries may have a far-reaching influence over the outcome.

One major factor in the outcome may well be the participants' awareness of this long run problem of collectivism. Blind acceptance of centralized planning may not only warp the personality structure of individuals, but may also have serious consequences for the physical shaping of the social economy. These material features might then be so

developed as to minimize the amount of opportunities for individual choice and thus increase the rigidity of the community

Is Centralization Inevitable Everywhere?

This brief discussion of collectivism may suggest some major points useful in weighing the long run prospects of freedom in Eastern Europe, in the gradual democratic socialism of many West European countries, in the government regulated individualism of the American New Deal, and in the future development of large scale private enterprise.

In viewing these so different patterns we have to weigh the view that increasing centralization of economic control is inevitable and that we have to rely mainly on ethics and on civil liberties to offset this universal trend.

with the general advance in the use of machines and technical processes, an advance which is affecting practically every portion of the globe, there is an increasing and inevitable compulsion toward greater centralization of managerial and control functions in economic life. That centralization may take various forms. In some countries, such as our own, it may lead to greater concentration of managerial power primarily in private hands. In other countries concentration may take place primarily in government or in semi-governmental authorities . . . But the concentration is taking place everywhere, in one form or another¹

There may be much to be said for this view, but must we really accept the prospect as inevitable? Three broad dangers of centralization seem worth watching in all modern social and economic patterns

1. Automatic acceptance of increasing centralization of economic decisions may lead to a shrinking of individual opportunities for choice.

2. Such blind acceptance may lead to a loss of individual habits of initiative, originality, and adaptability to new situations, and so reduce the community's long run chances for survival.

3. Centralization may direct the capital investments of the community into a single ever more rigid pattern, leaving its resources ill developed for meeting unforeseen contingencies.

¹George F. Kennan, "American Capitalist Democracy in a Collectivist Environment," Address before the Williams College Spring Conference Board, Williamstown, Massachusetts, May 2, 1947, mimeographed by Williams College, p. 2, *et passim*.

If we keep these dangers in mind, what changes might become necessary in providing for political and economic freedom in the future?

Choices between Different Ranges of Freedom

A concept of freedom that is to be used for long range development should fulfil certain basic conditions. It should apply to *individuals*, and to growing numbers of them. It should be concerned with the *widening* of individual *choices in all directions*, despite the frequent practical need to sacrifice temporarily a smaller range of choices in one direction, in order to gain a larger range of new choices in another.

For a simple example, a man afoot has a wide range of choices as to direction and time of walking, but only a very narrow choice of speeds or of distances which he might cover in a given time. When this man takes a train or bus, he gains a much wider choice of speeds and distances, but has to accept a narrower choice of times and directions. But when this man finally acquires a private car, he may choose not only from a range of speeds and distances, but as well from a range of starting times and directions.

The point is that historical advances in the growth of human powers have often involved a temporary sacrifice of certain ranges of freedom as a price for an increase of freedom in other directions, and that there is no guarantee that further advances in power will automatically restore the balance. (In our example, future research might have concentrated on ever bigger and faster long distance trains, with no provision for more individual modes of rapid traveling.) Long range growth of freedom will require, as a deliberate consideration, the balancing out of every one-sided temporary development through development of wider ranges of choice in all directions.

Pluralism and Intensity of Effort

Many of the new ranges of human choice have become available only through more elaborate cooperation of individuals in groups—tribes, peoples, industries, schools, classes, national economics, governments, and the like. There are now—and there may be still more so in the future—important ranges of choices which are available to the individual only

indirectly, through his choice of affiliation with one or another social group

The policy making it easy for a man to belong effectively to many different groups at the same time is known as *Pluralism*. However, Pluralism is not always practicable; some group experiments may require an intensity of effort and a depth of commitment which may tend to override, at least temporarily, some or even most of the other loyalties which Pluralism ordinarily includes. Examples for such extreme commitments—and the creative results to which some of them have led—abound in the history of art, politics, and religion.

If we cannot, then, exclude even very far-reaching commitments requiring conceivably an individual's entire energy, we can at least try to preserve freedom by insisting that a man's commitment to one particular policy wherever possible *should not destroy irretrievably other men's chances to choose a different course*. In practice this may mean a deliberate preference for policies which tend to *preserve a broad range of alternative patterns, groups, or institutions*, so as to preserve some substantial freedom of choice between them and to provide some chance to reconsider and retrace even major steps.

In practice, the question how many alternative facilities and group patterns society should preserve, may be closely linked to the question just what society can afford at that particular time. Cortez may have had to burn his ships behind him in order to steel his wavering handful of men for the conquest of Mexico. Had he come with an army, he might have been able to afford more generous provisions for a possible change of plans.

If the long range freedom that society should provide is so closely bound to what it can afford, what would be the first practical applications to political and economic decisions, if the steady extension of freedom were made a major consideration of policy?

Some Yardsticks in Allocating Efforts and Resources

The first material need for a continued growth of freedom would be a *continued advance toward abundance in productive equipment and resources*. This would also have to aim at creating generous *reserve capacities* in power, fuel, materials, equipment, and the like, so as to permit

wide variations between peak loads and average utilization of facilities—a fact recently illustrated by the need for increased government controls in Britain to enforce staggered work hours, so as to equalize peak loads on power stations. Increase in equipment would have to occur in *all* relevant directions, to avoid bottlenecks reducing the range of individual choices in wider fields.

The terms “increase” and “abundance” are, of course, relative. Most obviously, they are relative to the *growth of population*—the range of choices depends on the average *per capita* amount of equipment and facilities. With the threatening shade of the Reverend Robert Malthus in the background, we might conclude that we could increase the proportion of facilities to people either by slowing down the growth of population or by speeding up the growth of equipment and productive knowledge. Quite apart from the factors which have tended to slow down population growth wherever living standards have risen to a “middle class” level,⁷ there seems to be no good reason why the growth of productive equipment and knowledge, if as a major aim of policy, should not continue to keep ahead of any probable growth of population.

If we find that people have tended to produce more than they consumed, that their productive powers may be temporarily frustrated, but that in the long run human beings represent the most adaptable, the most flexible, and the most innovating and creative of productive factors, then we may well conclude that for long periods to come a continued increase in the number of human individuals may be a source of greater welfare and freedom to each of them, provided only that we continue to provide them with a growing range of facilities to exercise their powers.

The Value of Freedom as a Possible Consideration in Research and Design

This means for the long run a *deliberate priority* in the allocation of resources to *basic investments*, and in particular to those lines of scientific

⁷The bottleneck today seems to be not food, but personal relationships and education. Let us assume that two college educated parents in the United States could afford to feed on starches ten children, but provide a vitamin rich diet only for eight, good clothing only for six, have close personal relationships with four, and afford a college education for two—would it be surprising to find that the number of children in most such families varied between two and four?

research which promise a chance to break eventually those bottlenecks of scarcity which now stand between mankind and relative abundance. Such lines of potential "abundance research" would seem to include today first of all the search for *new sources of energy and food*, such as intensive large scale research in the productive utilization of nuclear energy and solar energy. As to food, beyond possible future gains from applied biology, a major target may well become the accomplishment of food synthesis and photosynthesis so as to permit men eventually to parallel on an industrial scale some of the basic processes that occur in plants and mosses, adding the vast resources of sunlight and of the earth's atmosphere and minerals to the potential sources of human food supply.

In the field of manufacturing, the deliberate promotion of relative abundance might require special emphasis on all processes increasing directly or indirectly the physical productivity of human labor, including such key facilities as assembly lines, the machine tool industries, and automatic control processes, electronic or other in nature.

Generally, the long run promotion of abundance might require deliberate large scale support for a *broad* development of scientific research, "pure" as well as "applied." In the long run, the point may lie in the broadness of the effort, since it is impossible to foretell in advance which new discovery will open up which new insights or new possibilities of application. Short run compromises may have to be made in the allocation of limited scientific personnel and equipment to temporarily critical tasks. But it should never be forgotten that much of the centralized direction of scientific effort is at best a compromise with poverty and runs the ever present risk of losing or postponing new insights or discoveries of greater importance than those which it endeavors to accelerate. Once the efficiencies of coordination and large scale effort are given their due, it may yet appear that freedom to follow the logic of scientific theories and facts, as well as the highest abilities and interests of individuals, may have a major productive value—as well as a human value—of their own.

Decentralization Substitutes and Alternative Supplies of Skill

The second and perhaps crucial basic need in the promotion of freedom would be for deliberate *decentralization* of locations of new investments and new industrial and administrative centers, so as to permit

wider ranges of choice in drawing upon their services, as well as lessened dependence on any one center

The third line of approach might be that of vigorous development of potential *substitutes* for many of today's basic goods and services. Such substitutes—of which the fixation of nitrogen from air or the synthesis of rubber from petroleum are past examples—would again tend to lessen specific situations of dependence and extend the range of human choices

As a fourth approach, a *multiplication of regional opportunities for different social and economic group patterns*, and the maintenance of peaceful relations between them, might go far in preserving some measure of freedom to choose the economic or ideological pattern of a given society, as well as to preserve alternative patterns. Here again, the actual degree of freedom of choice will be limited by practical considerations, but the preservation of regional opportunities for alternative group patterns and for *new experiments*, may well prevent such freedom from becoming entirely submerged.

In the fifth place, the long range growth of freedom may require a continued widening of *opportunities for individuals to acquire higher skills, including the skills of management*, and thus a lessening of the dependence of any community on the limited number of individuals who possess these "bottleneck skills" at any particular time. The degree to which any community succeeds in developing its basic educational facilities *so as to overcome any significant scarcity of skilled specialists and managers* may well prove a fair measure of the degree to which it has succeeded in *reducing any actual or potential monopolistic power of these skill groups* and so strengthening the freedom of the bulk of its members

Any techniques tending to reduce the need for centralized decisions, to simplify the operations of management, or to eliminate direct management in any particular situation—such as the various card files, switchboards, I.B.M. machines, automatic control equipment, down to the replacement of a skilled traffic policeman by a clover leaf crossing—all these devices could be used as auxiliary instruments in this growth of freedom.

Balance between Contributions and Expectations

As a sixth and last of these broad considerations, let us suggest the problem of *balance in the supply and demand of personal services*. Most material goods can be multiplied by an increase in industrial resources, but the specific demand for individual human services can for the most part only be supplied by another human being. If under our concept of freedom most individuals should choose to demand greatly extended personal services, the community might prove unable to supply these demands, *even after a great increase in its industrial facilities*. This problem has a good deal of practical significance: we find precisely in the large cities and among the educated classes of the most advanced industrial countries an urgent and ever growing demand for extensive personal services as regards the supervision of children; care for the aged, the sick, and the mentally ill, aids in housework; facilities for travel, hotels, etc. All these demands imply a shift of jobs, previously done by large numbers of overworked members of families, to institutions and services outside the family. If and when the current middle class level of incomes and habits should spread to the entire population, continuous major maladjustments in many of these institutionalized services may result, unless deliberate attention is directed in advance toward these facilities.

Some Current Cases

If all these six groups of considerations are taken together, can we use them perhaps as a yardstick to evaluate today specific courses of action in the current international or domestic policy of states?

Briefly, it is suggested that these considerations can be so applied. In evaluating, to choose a recent example, the recent British proposal to permit at this time (summer, 1947) nationalization of the coal mines in the Ruhr, should we not weigh, in addition to considerations of immediate efficiency, the possible widening of choices for the people of Western Europe, by making available to them a working example of the British blend of the Western traditions of individual liberties with some moderate degree of nationalization, as long proposed by democratic sections of the Western European labor movement?

Or, in weighing the French government's request to transfer a larger

part of steel making capacity from Germany, should we not weigh—in addition to considerations of transport costs, investment needs, and administrative convenience—also the possible gain to freedom and stability for all of Europe which might result from more even distribution of steel making capacity among Germany and the more stable democracies of France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg?

Or finally, in rejoicing in the increase in material welfare in the United States as against, say, even twenty years ago, should we not recognize, cherish, and defend as separate and important values the wider spread of opportunities and the real growth of fundamental democratic liberties since 1927? And could we not continue to ask systematically of every proposal of new policy or every claim of past performance: "Just what are its implications, on its record, in terms of wider choices for the mass of individuals?"

If freedom does not grow, it may well dwindle. If we become more able to measure the extent and direction of its growth, we may become more able to keep it growing.

CHAPTER VIII

Approaching International Tensions Through Research on the Integration of Cities

By ROBERT C. ANGELL

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THE SOCIOLOGIST is not often consulted on problems involving the relations among nations. These are thought to be subjects for the economist and the political scientist. Because sociologists have been intent upon developing a true science, they have focused upon the structure and processes of integrated wholes—either communities or societies. Since thus far in the world's history societies have been no greater than national in scope, sociology has not concerned itself much with broader relationships. In their studies of societies, however, the sociologists have developed lines of research of probable importance to those attempting to foster a world society. It is time that we came forward and made our contribution, however meager.

International tensions are indicative of an inadequate moral order. Knowledge may be applied in terms of prevention and of cure. Prevention of international tensions requires the ability to predict where and when they will arise, to know what kinds of situations produce them. For cure, on the other hand, the social scientist has to know how to adjust the forces and pressures in a situation so as to ease the tension. In either effort social scientists will have to work together in teams. The contribution of the sociologist to this joint effort will probably be greater in the second case than the first. This is because tensions develop out of specialized clashes of interest, usually involving either economic or power relations, but once the tension is fully felt the antagonism permeates every aspect of the relations between the two countries, so that the cure involves the

accommodation of whole societies rather than merely their economic and political programs

There seem to be three causes of international tensions upon which the sociologist may claim to have expert knowledge (1) demographic changes, (2) technological changes, and (3) the clash of value systems. Students of population are in an excellent position to predict in what parts of the globe population will tend to outrun resources, whither streams of migration will tend to flow, and where, therefore, the areas of probable tension will be. Students of social trends can forecast the probable effects of new technological developments upon international relations. Students of values and ideologies can estimate the likelihood of friction when two cultures come in contact for the first time and can specify rather precisely the aspects that will prove incompatible. In all three of these types of situations the main task of the sociologist is to warn of the probability of tension. He may also be able to suggest means of forestalling the predicted chain of events, but it is almost certain that the policies adopted by those in a position to control matters will be dictated by so many extra-sociological considerations as to make his contribution in this respect a minor one.

Even more challenging to the sociologist is the task of developing a sound body of theory of a world society. Such a theoretical scheme would indicate where the fundamental weaknesses in present international relations lie, it would point the way to the alleviation of tensions. The objection may be made that a theory of world order can be formulated only after long experience with a successful world society. In an absolute sense this is probably true, but there is certainly hope that we can approach such a formulation by piecing together in a creative fashion what we already know and what we can soon find out.

What is the use of finding out how different cultures might be accommodated when the carriers of those cultures show no desire to reach an accommodation? The answer is twofold. First, it is desirable to have this knowledge over against the day when the leading nations of the world change their attitude. Second, the knowledge will be of value in cementing areas of the world together even though it will not be used immediately to bridge the gap between Russia and the Anglo-American powers.

Of the three broad approaches to a theory of world order that I will consider, the first is through the study of the contemporary world situation. This approach has the advantage of setting the problem in the

precise terms in which it has to be solved, but the disadvantage that we have had only two years of experience with our postwar world. Two complementary lines of research seem promising. One would involve the intensive study of orientations of national cultures. We might then know exactly which elements in them were conflicting and this would give a basis for intelligent attempts at reorientation. Doctor Helmut G. Callis has recently suggested that this should be done in the following three stages: (1) the examination of the ideology and social structure of individual nations, (2) the comparative study of nations in the six great cultural regions of the world; and (3) the comparative study of these cultural regions themselves.¹

The other line of research I would suggest is the study of developing world loyalty. Already the process which must ultimately unite the world has begun, and it seems eminently worthwhile to discover what conditions foster the growth of this attitude of world allegiance.

A second approach to a theory is through scientific abstraction. In the present relations among nations there are many elements, each of which can be abstracted for controlled study. Each social science discipline can deal with those appropriate to it. It has been suggested, for instance, that the various cultures of the world might be studied to determine how frustrating they are to the children who grow up in them. Another line of research might be concerned with the process by which loyalties to smaller groups can be made to give way to loyalties to larger ones. This happens every day in all kinds of social situations, but we do not know whether the transition is made more readily through a process of detachment from the smaller group or through a process in which the character of the smaller group is changed so that it supports the larger. A third illustration would be the study of processes of communication. We usually assume that communication leads to greater understanding among nations, but it is obvious that some types of radio program, moving picture, and newspaper article have the opposite effect.

The third approach, and the one that I am particularly interested in, is one by analogy. Mankind has never faced exactly the same problem that we face today, but it has faced many situations that are quite similar, and has solved some of them successfully. On the international level there have been occasions in the past when peoples, formerly at odds with one

¹"The Sociology of International Relations," *American Sociological Review*, vii, pp. 323-334.

another, have learned to get along together. The improvement of relations among the Scandinavian countries, the development of the Anglo-French alliance in the nineteenth century, the dramatic betterment of feeling between Greece and Turkey after 1923, possibly the history of the Swiss Confederation, would be instances worth study. Perhaps anthropologists could come to our aid here, since the great number of preliterate groups in the world will have made this process more frequent among them than among civilized nations. Although at first sight federations might seem to be the best cases for analysis, only a few of them represent the coming together of peoples of great cultural diversity. That is the problem with which the world is faced today, and our analogues must have met it successfully.

Another type of accommodation that should prove suggestive for a theory of international order is afforded by the adjustment to one another of different cultural groups in a particular area. Hawaii immediately comes to mind as the most striking instance. Studies have already been made of this phenomenon and research is continuing there under the auspices of the University of Hawaii.

At the present time (summer, 1947) I am engaged in a program of research which would fall under the same general head. In the Northern cities of the United States great numbers of foreign born whites and Negroes have been thrown together with the native whites in a brief span of time. Whatever adjustment has been achieved among these groups has been on a relatively democratic basis. Despite the occurrence of race riots in a few cities, I think it can be said that, if there is social integration in these urban centers, it is on the basis of a common respect for the American way of life, not on the basis of fear. Hence it is the kind of integration—really moral integration—that is required in the international sphere. It must be granted that the accommodation of cultures in our cities presents only a very rough analogy to what must be achieved among national cultures in the world. It is obvious, for instance, that, because the migrants have come into our cities from outside, they have adapted themselves to an existing cultural framework, whereas the world problem calls for the accommodation of different nationalities to a framework new to all of them. However, I feel that the analogy is close enough to warrant study.

A preliminary study, finished in 1941, attempted to validate the concept of a moral order as applied to cities, to test the adequacy of certain indexes

for measuring it, and to discover something about causes.² Following the war, I took up the thread of this research again. A study was undertaken of all American cities of more than one hundred thousand population, with the aims of checking the previous findings on a larger sample and of following down some of the causal clues previously turned up. Though there is no point in going into the detailed results already published,³ it is necessary to give the principal findings in order to understand the phase of the research now in process.

The index of social integration finally determined upon was composed of two elements—a crime index taken negatively and a welfare effort index taken positively. The former was in turn a summation of rates for murder and non-negligent manslaughter, robbery, and burglary, weighted in accordance with the square roots of their frequencies; the welfare effort index took into account the degree to which the Community Chest campaign achieved its goal, the proportion of the families in the community that gave to it, and the sacrifice involved as measured by the ratio of the amount raised to retail sales in the city. In computing the integration index the crime scores were weighted twice as heavily as the welfare effort scores because there was evidence that they were a more reliable indication of the degree of moral order.

The factors that seemed to be most closely related to social integration in a causal manner were the degree of homogeneity or heterogeneity of the population in terms of race and national origins, and the mobility of the population in terms of in and out migration over a five year period. The scores on these two variables were computed from figures in the 1940 Census. Heterogeneity correlated with social integration —.59, and mobility correlated with it —.49. Their multiple correlation with integration was —.79. This means that five eighths of the variance in integration among the cities studied was accounted for by these two causal factors.

Ten cities had to be eliminated from the ninety-two with a population of more than one hundred thousand because of inadequate data. A more important reason for elimination was the requirement that the cities must be rather clearly isolated from outside influences. I therefore

²"The Social Integration of Selected American Cities," *American Journal of Sociology*, LVIII, pp. 575-592.

³"The Social Integration of American Cities of More than 100,000 Population," *American Sociological Review*, XII, pp. 335-342.

eliminated all cities that were satellites of larger metropolitan centers or that had twins or very large satellites in their own metropolitan districts. This cut out thirty-nine more cities, and reduced my total to forty-three. Since this is a small sample on which to base broad generalizations, an attempt was made to obtain verification of my findings from the cities between fifty thousand and one hundred thousand. Unfortunately the Census did not gather mobility data for cities of less than one hundred thousand in 1940, so that the only checks I could make were such as were possible with the crime, welfare effort, and population composition series. After eliminating seventy-five of these smaller cities because of inadequate data or lack of "independence," thirty-two cities yielded a correlation of crime with welfare effort of $-.32$. This is to be compared with $-.43$ for the larger cities. The correlation between heterogeneity and integration was found to be $-.50$ for the smaller, as compared with $-.59$ for the larger, cities. These figures represent fairly good confirmation of the validity of the original findings.

Having discovered that two factors, population mobility and population heterogeneity, are responsible for five eighths of the variance in social integration, it seemed highly desirable to discover other causal factors. Since the attempt had already been made to accomplish this through available statistical series, it was decided that field investigations in the cities themselves would have to be undertaken. The expense of this procedure made it imperative to select a small number of cities in such a way that they would constitute a crucial "experiment." This selection has been made by discovering which cities diverge in their integration scores furthest from what would be predicted in terms of their population mobility and population heterogeneity. Presumably in these cities other factors are having their maximum effect. Two cities that are much better integrated than would be expected from their mobility and heterogeneity and two cities much less well integrated have been chosen. These will constitute two matched pairs, since all four of them are reasonably close together in their predicted integration scores, though the members of each pair diverge widely in their actual integration scores.

At the present time these four cities are being studied through the facilities of the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. Our hypothesis is that leadership and the activities of organizations will prove to be significant factors in causing differentials.

As a preliminary to the investigation of these causes, we are checking

the validity of the integration score of each city by determining the attitudes of a random sample of the population toward the community, their knowledge of the community and its history, and their opinions about its integration. We are stressing the degree of harmony among religious, nationality, and racial groups. This should give us a good check on the validity of measuring social integration through crime and welfare effort statistics, since cleavages between groups, a factor of undoubted importance for integration, are reflected only indirectly in these statistics.

To determine whether leadership is a significant cause of differences in integration among cities we are first obtaining a panel of twenty-five leaders in the following manner. The occupants of four positions are regarded *ex officio* as leaders: the mayor, the president of the city council, the superintendent of schools, and the chairman of the Community Chest board. The other twenty-one leaders are chosen on the basis of the frequency with which they are named as community leaders by the random sample of the population interviewed.

The characteristics of the leaders, the processes of their leadership, and its relative success are being ascertained through interviews both with the random sample and the leaders themselves. In the case of the leaders, thorough data are being obtained on their social backgrounds, their philosophies, their activities, and the groups with which they are identified.

The importance for integration of the activities of organizations is a problem that we are also approaching through the random sample and the leaders. In each instance we are asking a battery of questions concerning the programs of the schools, the city government, the social agencies, the newspapers, and the service clubs. As in the study of leadership, we are attempting to determine to what extent these organizations are making the members of the community civic minded and are getting action to solve community problems.

In conclusion, it should be emphasized again that there are many differences between the situation of racial and nationality groups in one of our Northern cities and the situation of nations in the contemporary world.¹ But there is at least one fundamental similarity. This is the clash of value systems. In these cities this clash has been accommodated, in

¹[Cf. the author's comment on the discussion of this issue by Herman Finer, Chapter I, note c.]

some cases more successfully, in others less, but in all cases with a minimum of fear and coercion. If we can find out what have been the factors that have made possible the more successful accommodations, we may have gained one grain of knowledge that will be pertinent to the improvement of international policies^b

^bComment by Quincy Wright

I like many points made in this paper, particularly the identification of the demographic, technological, and ideological sources of social tension. I thought the study of cities especially suggestive. The conclusions check with my findings as to the great significance of mobility and other factors bringing previously isolated groups together among the causes of primitive warfare.

CHAPTER IX

Parochialism and Historical Instruction

By ROBERT H. LOWIE

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THE MUTUAL DISTRUST and hatred of peoples who at one time or another have been embroiled in armed conflict by their rulers is a familiar phenomenon. Demonstrably even the intellectual élite is not immune to such emotions. The great surgeon Theodor Billroth, exulting in German victories during the Franco-Prussian War, wrote to a colleague in 1871: "How you can deny the hatred of the French in Germany, I cannot comprehend. Have you never in your youth again and again heard from your grandparents how this bestial people drained our land to exhaustion? Was not your childish imagination filled—as in my and my wife's family—with scenes of atrocity and brutality executed by the French among us? . . . Did you not in games with other boys beat up the French and swear eternal revenge and destruction? . . . In Pomerania and the Mark Brandenburg I can assure you that we were quite systematically educated to hate the French . . . We try to educate my daughters, too, in hatred of the French and in German fanaticism."¹

The bad taste these sentiments leave in one's mouth is only slightly tempered by Billroth's assurance that, as a physician, he had done his duty during the war irrespective of nationality and that he could grow very fond of individual Frenchmen. Nevertheless, in the light of Germany's past, avowed fanaticism, deplore it as we may, is at least psychologically intelligible. More puzzling and disheartening are the animosities and suspicions that divide groups of identical stock, of the same cultural background, the same religion, closely related speech.

During a brief trip through Sweden and Norway in 1924 and in subsequent contacts with Scandinavians, I was powerfully impressed by the intense separatism of these thoroughly civilized Northerners. An em-

¹Theodor Billroth, *Briefe*, Hannover and Leipzig, 1896, p. 114.

nent Swedish scholar, though full of praise for the cultural achievement of Norwegians, wondered that so stupid a people could have produced so many men distinguished in the arts and literature. In Oslo a colleague was so wrought up over the infamy of Denmark in the dispute over Greenland that it was difficult to lure him into a professional discussion. All over the country the language conflict between the West and the East was obtruded on the innocent tourist. A gleam of ecstasy came over a young traveler's face as she spoke of the principal champion of *lands-mål*, the synthetic rural tongue competing with the *riksmål* of Ibsen and Bjornson, with its residue of Danish. Parliament had already decreed the change of the capital's name from "Christiania" to "Oslo"; a proposal—later dropped—was in the air to rechristen Trondhjem "Nidaros." These historic designations were emblems of former thralldom to Denmark. It was the same psychology that made Magyars rename the Transylvanian town Hermannstadt "Nagy Seben" and the Roumanians promptly disguise it as "Sibiu."

To the outsider all this seems strange. But such matters cannot be understood on rational grounds. As William James once wisely remarked, history is made up of people's insisting that the difference between tweedledum and tweedledee is all important. The marvelously illuminating works by Blegen and Stephenson² only accentuate the impressions gained through personal contact. Even on American soil Danes, Norwegians, and Swedes were unable to collaborate in so harmless an enterprise as a glee club in church activities. "It does not seem to lie in the plan of the universe for Danes and Swedes to work together," Stephenson remarks.

Actually these are understatements. Norwegian immigrants, natives of the same valley, would sail together and remain united in the same settlement. Though the several rural dialects were mutually intelligible, "the dialect of another valley . . . marked a person off as not, in an intimate sense, belonging to one's own people." As the immigrants wrote letters to the Norse fatherland, it came to be said that their relatives got to know more about Minnesota than about their countrymen in the next valley.

²Theodore C. Blegen, *Norwegian Migration to America: The American Transition*, Norwegian-American Historical Association, Northfield, Minnesota, 1910. George M. Stephenson, *The Religious Aspects of Swedish Immigration, a Study of Immigrant Churches*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1932.

Parallel observations hold for other nationalities. Indeed the notorious splitting up of Italians into lesser speech and cultural groups gave rise to the term, *campanilismo*—parochialism that bars fellow-feeling beyond the reach of the village church bell. In New Haven a Paleman will rather call on a fellow Paleman five blocks away than step across the hall to exchange a few words with a Siennese.¹

It is hardly necessary to speak of German particularism beyond mentioning one fact not generally known. After the Franco-Prussian War, Prussia deemed it wise to maintain legations at the courts of the federated states, as though she were dealing with foreign nations, and the observations of her representatives at Munich, such as Count Monts or Prince Philip Eulenburg-Heitfeld, indicate that there, at least, the policy was amply justified.

Finally, there is the case of Yugoslavia, where the conflict of Croats and Serbs is only the most conspicuous example of internecine strife.² In her bigotedly partisan, yet in some ways superbly revealing book,³ Miss Rebecca West gives a graphic and wholly convincing picture of relevant attitudes.

In every single instance cited there is no basic racial cleavage. As for language, Serb and Croatian are said to be virtually indistinguishable. Even in Italy the considerable differentiation cannot disguise the fact that all the dialects and languages are closely related variants of a Romance tongue. In Scandinavia, Professor Birket-Smith of Copenhagen is able to lecture to Swedish students in his native language with no greater concession than substituting Swedish for Danish numerals. Though my extremely meager smattering of Norwegian helped little in Norway, where everyone at once answered my questions in English or German, it aided me several times in Sweden, where in 1924 at all events the natives seemed either less polyglot or more bashful.

If, then, neither racial nor linguistic affinity precludes violent disunion, the outlook for a liberal humanitarianism would seem gloomy indeed. Fortunately there is another side to the picture. Reversing our approach, let us inquire whether racial, linguistic, and cultural diversity may not

¹Phyllis H. Williams, *South Italian Folkways in Europe and America*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1938.

²Cf. Đinko Tomasev, "Nationality Problems and Partisan Yugoslavia," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, VI, 1936, pp. 111-125.

³*Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*, The Viking Press, New York, 1933, pp. 83-84, 195.

be consistent with mutual understanding. An anthropologist, Doctor E. J. Lindgren, has discovered precisely such a case.⁶

In northwestern Manchuria the Reindeer Tungus, a hunting tribe whose members milk and ride reindeer, but own too few head to subsist on the products of their livestock, have been living in juxtaposition with Russian Cossacks for over sixty years. Relations between the two groups are amicable. There is mutual criticism, but it is discriminating and devoid of acrimony. The Cossacks laud the reindeer breeders' honesty—by implication superior to their own—and admire their neighbors' ability to learn Russian. They censure Tungus violence in a state of intoxication, a foible deplored by the Tungus themselves. "No instance was recorded of the use or threat of force in the relations between these communities." Murders have occurred within the two groups, but no Russian is known to have killed a Tungus or *vice versa*. What accounts for this unexpected harmony? In answering this question I shall closely follow Doctor Lindgren's analysis.

For one thing, there is no numerical preponderance of either group. In 1932, not quite one hundred and sixty Tungus were trading with some one hundred and fifty Cossacks. There have been no intermarriages except that a few Tungus adopted as children by Cossacks married Russian girls. The Cossacks have no racial prejudices, classifying all aliens wholly in cultural terms. The quite general knowledge of Russian among the Tungus facilitates communication when Cossack traders drive their horse sledges to the forest rendezvous, or when the Tungus pay a return visit to the farming Cossacks in the summertime. The intellectual gap is comparatively slight. In consequence, there has been no one-sided borrowing of cultural traits by the more primitive ethnic group, but rather an exchange.

Three factors mentioned by Doctor Lindgren seem especially noteworthy. Though in a sense competitors in the pursuit of squirrels and wapiti, the two ethnic units are not brought into economic conflict because their habitat provides an ample food supply. Neither claims the monopoly of a hunting territory. Secondly, trading relations obtain not between entire groups, but between one Tungus hunter and one Russian trader, though the latter may supply several Tungus "friends." This bond

⁶Ethel John Lindgren, "An Example of Culture Contact without Conflict," *American Anthropologist*, XL, 1938, pp. 605-621.

rests on mutual confidence and respect. The trader piques himself on his friend's woodcraft, the latter brags of the wealth and superior goods of his Cossack colony. Finally, "the Cossacks and Tungus have been quite untroubled by propagandists."

It is obvious—and Doctor Lindgren fully realizes it—that the phenomenon she reports is peculiar and, in some respects, unique. Notably, the preexisting mental set of the Cossacks is significant. Russia, we must recall, was for several hundred years largely under Mongol domination; miscegenation ensued, and its effects are still discernible. Accordingly, the racial type of the Tungus would not evoke revulsion on the part of the traders. We cannot assert dogmatically that they would remain equally unmoved in dealing with Australoid or Negro customers. Nevertheless, the indications are that for them race is a quite subordinate matter. Observations in Portuguese, French, and even Dutch colonies tend to support the interpretation that in ethnic relations the sense of racial diversity is not an inescapable constant. Emphasis upon it is culturally determined, hence eminently changeable. It is merely necessary to contrast the intusigent racialism of many Germans in recent decades with the attitude of their ancestors a hundred years ago. Alexander von Humboldt championed the unity of mankind. "*Indem wir die Einheit des Menschengeschlechtes behaupten*," he wrote in his most famous work, "*widerstehen wir auch jeder unersiehlichen Annahme von höheren und niederen Menschenrassen . . . Alle sind gleichmassig zur Freiheit bestimmt* . . ."⁷ That was the viewpoint of many intellectuals, witness the Germans who flocked to the Union cause in our Civil War.

To revert to the Manchurian case, we confront a paradox. A basic racial difference presents no obstacles to peaceful coresidence, whereas among Norse, Italian, German, Yugoslav compatriots, comparatively minute ticks of speech and behavior suffice to erect insurmountable barriers.

It seems to me that campanilismo is intelligible as a heritage from dim antiquity—from the era when the out group was always potentially hostile. In consequence, any symbol of membership in an alien body served as a danger signal, which it was a matter of life or death to recognize. A manifest racial peculiarity might be a token of danger, and again

⁷ Alexander von Humboldt, *Kosmos*, 1, Stuttgart, 1870, pp. 232, 313. The first volume of the original edition appeared in 1815, the fifth and last posthumously in 1862.

it might not. In particular circumstances the hair do might be more significant than the hair itself or the color of the skin. What counted was the sense of security or insecurity.

It is true that complicating factors turn up, e.g., cannibalism or the lust for revenge. Yet, by and large, savages completely at ease tend to treat the stranger as a fellow being. When enraged by stubborn resistance or their own losses, Plains Indians might massacre and torment defeated foemen, but they often married captive women without imposing disabilities on them and were likely to spare young boys. The Cheyenne reprobated the killing of an adopted alien no less than that of a full-blooded tribesman.⁸

The important point is that in conditions of safety the sense of a common humanity triumphs over campanilismo, in other words, *the alien individual is treated as an individual*. That is, of course, precisely what happens in Manchuria. But how could it happen there? Doctor Lindgren supplies the answer: there are no Russian or Tungus propagandists harping on group grievances. In modern civilization the Manchurian condition is reversed. The individual is *not* regarded as an individual, but as a symbol of sinister alien agencies.⁹ At an early period the child imbibes parental prejudices, and these are intensified or multiplied in school.

Two relevant experiences have left a deep impression on me. Forty years ago in Alberta, I happened upon the chapter devoted to the American Revolution in a Canadian history text. To my amazement I discovered that from the Canadian point of view the Tories had been the heroes of that struggle. Seven years later, shortly after the outbreak of World War I, a New Yorker of North Irish extraction at the American Museum of Natural History took me into his confidence. "They think I am pro-Ally," he said, "but I can't forget the War of 1812!"

I am not, of course, contending that all ills stem from iniquitous teach-

⁸Comment by David Bidney

As a distinguished anthropologist, Doctor Lowie is, of course, aware of the significance of "cultural patterns" in molding the character and personality of the individual members of a society and in determining national cultural traits. Yet, in his paper, Doctor Lowie stresses the necessity of regarding the individual "as an individual" rather than "as a symbol of sinister alien agencies." Are *all* socio-cultural interpretations of individual behavior to be avoided in the interests of "a common humanity," or, as seems more probable, is the point rather that one's social "stereotypes" are in constant need of revision in the light of new information and changing historical conditions?

⁹K. N. Llewellyn and E. Adamson Hoebel, *The Cheyenne Way*, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1941, p. 149

ing in elementary schools. But a goodly part of pertinent animosities—say, the profound dislike for the English on the part of many Americans of purely Anglo-Saxon descent—can surely be traced to that source.^b For some years Northern Europeans have recognized this factor as vital, and their efforts to cope with it are worthy of study and imitation.^c After prolonged negotiations delegates from Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland passed a memorable resolution. The several committees agreed that “all texts treating Northern history must be subjected to an expert scrutiny from all angles both in their own country and in the neighboring countries, in order to insure to the children instruction based on a quite correct enlightenment and true historical understanding.”

How did the Northern historians execute the task they set themselves? For our purposes samples of Danish and Norwegian scholars' criticism of each other's texts will suffice.

Norwegian textbook writers, sometimes in opposition to their compatriots among historical investigators, dwell on the discrimination suffered at the hands of Danish rulers. Thus, they cite the case of an early Danish king who in England rated one Dane's testimony higher than that of ten Normans. The Danish committee points out that such differentiation lacked a chauvinistic flavor: the conqueror of a foreign land naturally trusted, above all, his immediate compatriots to support his rule. Altogether a Danish monarch's aim to establish a strong central authority was not at all directed against Norway as such, but merely exemplified a contemporary European royal policy. Coming down to later times, the Danish scholars quote a Norse specialist to prove that in 1814 there were more Norse officials in Denmark than Danish born ones in Norway.

The Norwegian committee in turn feels that Danish (as well as Swedish) textbook writers tend to treat Norway as a stepchild. When their histories speak of the double kingdom united under the Danish

^bComment by Alexander H. Leighton.

^cThe point regarding education is exceedingly important in my experience. Having lived both in the north and the south of Iceland, I can readily recall many instances that tell the same story of prejudice being reinforced and systematized in books and inculcated with authority, and the emotional pressure of group sentiment at a receptive time in an individual's development.

Doctor Lowie does more than touch on a major problem; he also points out a model on the basis of which some steps can be taken toward a solution.

^dWilhelm Carlgren, *Nordens historia i nordiska skolor*, Stockholm, 1915, briefly summarizes the movement and its results.

ciown, they refer to it simply as Denmark. Hence the demand—in which the Danish committee concurs—that for the two periods in question the texts substitute the phrases “Denmark and Norway” and “Denmark-Norway.” Of at least equal importance is the frequent neglect of Norwegian rural social organization. For Norse farmers were freemen while their Danish brethren still remained in a state of serfdom. Indeed, the Norwegian model may well have served as an impetus to the ultimate emancipation of the Danish peasantry, hence on that score alone merits exposition.

The outsider cannot fail to recognize the basic fairness of the several collaborating committees. To add a noteworthy sample, the Norwegian historians express themselves thus on the breach with Sweden: “We gladly admit that many Norwegian books do not represent the union in a manner we consider correct.”

Scholarly efforts would, of course, have remained futile without some official backing. In 1938, the Norwegian committee which had served in the international deliberations described above was recognized as among the official authorities “to which questions concerning new historical texts are referred.” In Finland, Sweden, and Denmark the educational authorities informally consult the committees of their respective countries.^c

The improvement of historical texts could be made into an effective means towards bettering sectional as well as international relations. A glance at Hicks’ and Nevins-Commager’s histories of the United States suggests that two Northern textbooks present the period of “reconstruction” in a fashion that should not ruffle Southern sensibilities. I do not know whether comparably objective books are used in Southern schools. Could a congress of Northern and Southern scholars agree concerning basic issues as the Scandinavian committees seem to have agreed?

Equally vital, of course, is the problem of international relations. Is it wholly utopian to hope that a commission of British, Russian, and American scholars might unite on a formulation of historical facts? Here again something may be learned from the Scandinavians. Let us note the Danish comment on a vehement anti-Danish outburst in an Icelandic

^cComment by Thomas D. Eliot.

I would be glad to see even more credit given to the efforts and trend in Scandinavia toward increased common cultural congeniality, interaction, solidarity, etc., of which there is a persistent record during the past twenty-five years of the *American-Scandinavian Review*.

text "It would be desirable to soften the tone *even if the author were to maintain his point of view*" (my italics). A wise observation, for the manner of uttering a criticism may be more offensive than its substance.

Another point illustrated in the Scandinavian commentaries is the need for proper perspective. Statements that are wholly true in themselves may nevertheless distort the truth. It is quite proper to inveigh against Soviet intolerance of religion, but only if the reader learns what official religion meant to Russians under the Czars.

Campanilismo is too deeprooted to be eliminated by a revision of schoolbooks. There are many causes of insecurity in contemporary life, hence pressure groups and zealots can readily excite hostility against out groups in situations of mob excitement. People descend from the naive but sound Tungus-Cossack sense of a common humanity to the rationalizations of lake intellectuals, to the charlatanism of a Madison Grant and an Alfred Rosenberg.

But though parochial bigotry cannot be wiped out at once, we can curb it. Unfortunately the matter of historical texts is one that in our country is constantly liable to interference by mob rule.⁴ No one contends that the stresses and strains of a new suspension bridge should be computed by a majority vote. But on intricate questions of history, which the patient research of the most unbiased scholars is just barely capable of

⁴Comment by Robert W. Kung.

I remember Doctor R. A. Millikin reporting after the First World War that a committee of which he was a member made a serious effort to introduce in American history for public school use that would attempt in unprejudiced discussion of the background of the American Revolution, of the War of 1812, and of the Mexican War, only to be informed by publishers that scarcely a school board in the country would authorize its use.

Still, it seems to me that the problem which Doctor Lowie outlines is by no means a crucial problem from the standpoint of international relationships. The tensions most to be feared are not those whose origins are lost in animosity, but rather those which feed from day to day on unchanging and in some cases unchangeable situations. The centuries of antagonism between England and Russia do not trace back to some dim and remote discord, but represent in ever present realization of competitive interests in certain strategic waterways. Neither does Russia eye us with our approaches to Saudi Arabia because of any long smoldering cultural differences between the two nations, but because of the very real economic value of the oil reserves there and of the limited number of water and land routes over which the oil can be removed. We have but to watch the chasm as it widens day by day between our own country and Russia on between England and Russia, to appreciate the source of greatest jeopardy to peaceful relations. The type of tension Doctor Lowie discusses keeps the soil fallow for the quick maturing of the seeds of active discord, should occasion offer. But the dissipation of misunderstandings and imaginary differences between and among nations will not supply the world in adequate foundation for certain peace.

answering, the voice of uninformed ward heelers may prove decisive. Efforts to correct historical instruction must go hand in hand with efforts to ban "democracy" where its principles are inapplicable.^e

^eComment by David Bidney

Doctor Lowie neglects to examine the complementary aspect of democracy, namely, respect for individual differences and cultural diversity. Are the chances for the destruction of parochial bigotry any better in a democratic society than in some other type? Is there any inherent connection between democracy and liberalism and humanness or is that connection merely coincidental?

CHAPTER X

Understanding Communication ^a

By IRVING D. LORGE

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DURING THE RECENT WAR, much publicity was given to the remarkable linguistic achievements of thousands of United States soldiers. These specially selected men acquired speaking, listening, writing, and reading in a large array of languages, from French, German, Spanish, and Russian to Arabic, Thai, Bengali, and Kurdish. It is fairly obvious that the Army and Navy required the services of many men who would understand the communications of the people in the territories that were to be invaded or to be used as stations. If today, the Americans were to understand the communications in the Babel of tongues, there is little doubt that international tensions would be somewhat reduced. For it must be true that much of the conflict and frustration among peoples is aggravated by the failure to understand and appreciate mutual problems and aspirations.

The success of the handful of soldiers and of sailors, however, may make us over optimistic. Many people fail to understand even adequately communications in their own languages. For more than a generation, psychologists and educators have been conducting tests to determine what children (and adults) understand of the materials they read or listen to. One of the earliest studies was made by Doctor Edward L. Thorndike. He asked children to read a passage and then to answer certain questions about it. For instance, the following passage and questions were given to about two hundred children in the sixth grade of elementary school.¹

^a[Cf. Chapter XVIII by Ruth Strang.]

¹Thorndike, Edward L., "Reading as Reasoning: A Study of Mistakes in Paragraph Reading," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, VIII, June, 1917, pp. 323-332.

Read this and then write the answer to 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 Read it again as often as you need to

"In Franklin, attendance upon school is required of every child between the ages of seven and fourteen on every day when school is in session unless the child is so ill as to be unable to go to school, or some person in his house is ill with a contagious disease, or the roads are impassable"

- 1 What is the general topic of the paragraph?
- 2 On what day would a ten year old girl not be expected to attend school?
- 3 Between what years is attendance upon school compulsory in Franklin?
- 4 How many causes are stated which make absence excusable?
- 5 What kind of illness may permit a boy to stay away from school, even though he is not sick himself?
- 6 What condition in a pupil would justify his non-attendance?
- 7 At what age may a boy leave school to go to work in Franklin?

Among the answers for Question 1 were the following Franklin, Franklin attending school, school, very ill, a group of sentences, capital

Among the answers to the second question the wrong answers were again extremely variable, such as on her birthday, on every day, expected every day

The answers to the other questions showed a wide variety of wrong answers The wrong answers showed a lack of understanding of the intent of the question, or of the paragraph, or of both.

Some people may say that the range and variety of responses is characteristic of childhood, that adults would do better This is not so During the recent war, the army administered to a representative sampling of enlisted men a reading test that I constructed Each test consists of six passages on each of which five questions were asked Each passage was selected from a contemporary popular magazine or from a radio address The highest score that could be obtained was thirty In the sample of eight hundred and sixty-eight enlisted men, only sixty made a perfect score The range was from two questions correct to thirty questions correct Half of the men got twenty-four or fewer questions right

Doctor Thorndike's results and mine both suggest that the most important characteristic of understanding written communication is the wide range of individual differences in comprehension The range goes from complete misunderstanding to adequate comprehension

Children and adults who listen or read do not admit that they cannot understand the message. They react on the basis of whatever the message makes them believe they understand. The level of comprehension may be so low that they could not even be aware of their own errors and misinterpretations. How could they know that they gave the wrong meaning to a key word or an inadequate concept for a phrase? How can they know that they miss an important relationship word? or neglect the *no*, *not*, or *in* in the passage? Self-criticism of one's understanding is undoubtedly related to one's level of education and of intelligence. Understanding one's own language, whether written or spoken, will depend upon one's experiences, his purposes, his attitudes and appreciations, his background of knowledge, and his ability to recognize the rhetorical devices of the communicator.

Doctor Goldstein has made a study of the relationship of comprehension of spoken and written materials. The relationship is very high. The most intelligent understand spoken materials somewhat better than written. The difference between reading and listening comprehension becomes greater with each lower level of measured intelligence.

The generalization about the great range of individual differences in understanding comprehension can be made for children and adults, for spoken and printed materials, and for pictured and graphic materials. The variation of comprehension within one language suggests that there may be even greater variation among languages.

Within one language acquired within one culture, there is an expected similarity of reference for speaker and listener, for reader and writer. The objects referred to, the concepts developed, the ideas and attitudes appealed to, are part of a fairly common background of experience. The less universal the equivalence of reference between reader and writer the less certain the completeness of communication. Complete communication is a limit that is not fully realized.

Since individual differences in comprehension do exist, there are at least two possibilities for adjusting to them. First, training and education in listening and in reading may be given, and second, the difficulties in the spoken and the written text may be minimized. In the United States both approaches have been made.

What a person understands depends upon his general level of understanding and the difficulty of the text. Adequate measures of a person's understanding of written or spoken material can be made. The large

amount of literature on the measurement of comprehension demonstrates the wide variation among people. The inadequate comprehension is susceptible of some improvement by techniques which have been perfected by people interested in teaching of reading and of listening.

The other aspect of improving comprehension is by clarifying the text itself. Only recently has this aspect been given much attention. The difficulty of a text depends first on the range of vocabulary, second, on idea density within the passage and, third, on sentence structure. None of these factors, however, is nearly as important as the appeal the passage makes to the individual person, or structural lucidity, or thematic line developed within the passage.

Words are among the most important symbols around which the body of organized meanings is developed. The sheer number of different words a person understands, or better, the number of different meanings of different words he understands, provides an estimate of the value of that person's body of organized meanings. Conversely, any estimate of the range of words and of their meanings that any person is likely to meet in his experience helps the educator to gain some idea of the probable extent of common intellectual backgrounds, as well as to establish some goals for the development of them for all. The comprehension of written material and of speech depends largely on the vocabulary of the passage. I have shown² that the most important predictor of the average comprehension level of printed materials is the vocabulary load as represented by the relative number of different hard words in the passage. A hard word in this context is a word which was not in a list of easy words that were common to Thorndike's first thousand most frequent words and the Horn list of the first thousand most frequent words known by children entering the first grade.

In English materials, it has been found that the larger the proportion of Anglo-Saxon words, the simpler the passage, the larger the proportion of common words the easier the passage. Doctor Thorndike and I have made a count of the frequency of the occurrence of English words. We have counted approximately twenty-five million running words sampled from all kinds of literature. The five hundred words which occur with the greatest frequency include *a*, *about*, *above*, *across*, *add*, *after*, *again*, *against*, *an*, *all*, *almost*, *alone*, *along*, *also*, and so on. These

²Irving D. Loige, "Predicting Readability," *Teachers College Record*, XLV, March, 1944, pp. 404-419.

commonest five hundred words (and then variants such as adverbs, plurals, and verb forms) account for sixty-six per cent of all of the text in five high circulating magazines: *The Saturday Evening Post*, *Woman's Home Companion*, *Ladies' Home Journal*, *True Story*, and *The Reader's Digest*. The most frequent one thousand words would have accounted for approximately eighty-six per cent of the running words in those magazines. Whenever words outside of the commonest one thousand are used there is always the possibility that the person may not understand the specific meaning intended.

Basic English, for example, capitalizes, among other things, on the commoner words in English. Basic English is an auxiliary language based on eight hundred and fifty words. The idea of a small vocabulary has captured the imagination of many people seeing its value in international communication. The obstacle in Basic, however, is that the eight hundred and fifty words subsume more than fourteen thousand different meanings. People growing up in a common culture may be able to get from context the specific meaning of a word. People, however, brought up in an alien culture, using their own language, may have much more difficulty in understanding the various meanings of different words. The idea of using the commonest words of English to simplify communication is sound for English, and may be sound for auxiliary languages as well.

The vocabulary of English or American English is tremendous. In the words of Murray,² "The vast aggregate of words and phrases which constitute the vocabulary of English speaking men presents to the mind that endeavors to grasp it as a definite whole, the aspect of one of those nebulous masses familiar to the astronomer, in which a clear and unmistakable nucleus shades off on all sides, through zones of decreasing brightness, to a dim marginal film that seems to end nowhere but to lose itself imperceptibly in the surrounding darkness." The vast aggregate of English words and phrases now collected in unabridged dictionaries, however, does not include all the English words, nor does it include all meanings of English words. Special dictionaries of technical terms, special compilations of words, e.g., slang and vulgarisms, add to the tremendous stock of the language.

But even with knowledge of the frequency of the occurrence of lexical

²James A. H. Murray, Henry Bradley, W. A. Craigie, and C. A. Osmon, *The Oxford English Dictionary*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1933, p. xxvii.

units, additional knowledge is needed concerning the meanings that people have for words. Verbally, the child happy in the knowledge that he has learned about the "cross-eyed bear" in Sunday School may have acquired meanings which will hamper his understanding of the hymn's point about "the cross I'd bear." Or again, the pupil may be confused by the locution "to make game of" or "to stalk game." *Game* has a frequency that placed it in the commonest first thousand words, but *game* has at least fifteen different meanings: (1) amusement; (2) diversion, (3) a diversion of the nature of a contest; (4) such games played in ancient Greece and Rome, *e g*, Olympian Games, and by extension, the modern Olympic Games, (5) the proper method of play, (6) a proceeding, intrigue followed up like a game, (7) a person's policy, (8) a definite portion of play, (9) position or advantage in play, (10) the quarry, (11) the flesh of wild animals used as food, (12) spirited or plucky, (13) lame, (14) to play, sport, jest, or make sport of, (15) to gamble for a prize or wage. These meanings have occurred in the reading of some five million running words of printed materials.

Each meaning, although partly revealed by the context in which it occurs, may nevertheless cause confusion for the reader or the hearer. Obviously the probability of confusion is greatest when the background of the reader is poorest. Imagine a group of Mexican children in the first grade hearing the following words: can, chair, chin, circle, clap, color, come, and corner. The average teacher would assume that the words are of high frequency and hence easily understood. This, however, may not be true. Take, for instance, the word, circle, in the sentences: Draw a circle. Run around the circle. Make a circle. Join a circle of friends. Go to the circle of trees. Finish the circle. Or think of the possible confusion for an adult in such collocation as: a thick board, a frugal board, a card-board, board and lodging, passengers on board, to fall overboard, to sit on the council board, a board of school, the board of trade, and the like. Or look up in a good unabridged dictionary the range of meanings for *run* or *set* to get some fundamental notion of the range in multi-meaning words.

The next important source of passage difficulty is idea density. The greater the number of ideas the more difficult the text. I remember some years ago being told that in giving speeches it is important to limit oneself to one idea per fifteen minutes. The writer or speaker, too often, assumes that since he understands what he is saying so will his audience. He,

therefore, concentrates his ideas into a short space. Associated with the concentration of concepts is inevitable abstractness and sentence complexity.

Since vocabulary, idea density, sentence structure, and abstractness make for difficulty of text, adequate care for these may clarify the communication and reduce the gap between intended communication and actual understanding. Improvement in our international relations, therefore, will be dependent upon the degree of improvement our people can make in their reading and listening habits and also on the clarification and simplification of the materials to be read or listened to. Social psychologists and linguistic scientists will be concerned to extend techniques for understanding and for clarification of texts to our friends beyond our borders.

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CHAPTER XI

Theses on the Effects of Science, Particularly Social and Humanistic Sciences, Upon International Tensions and Solidarity

By PITIRIM A. SOROKIN

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I. *General Effects of Science and Technology*

DU TO A misuse and abuse of scientific discoveries and technological inventions, their total effects upon international tensions and solidarity have been mixed, in no way uniformly beneficial. In spite of an enormous increase of scientific discoveries and technological inventions after the thirteenth century on up to the present time, neither wars, nor civil wars and internal disturbances, nor other forms of intergroup and interindividual conflicts (crime, etc.) have shown a tendency to decrease. Among many detailed evidences the summary table on page 107 shows this ¹

These data show a steady increase of scientific discoveries and inventions, a similar increase of the institutions of higher learning followed by increase of general literacy. And yet, the indices of war do not show any steady trend of decrease. If anything, with a considerable fluctuation, they have tended to increase also, reaching an unprecedented height in the most scientific, most technological, and most schooled twentieth century. If the wars and revolutions between 1925 and 1947 were included, their indices would soar into the stratosphere, exceeding all the indices of war for all the preceding eight centuries taken together.

¹The data are taken from the volumes of my *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, from the official *Minerva*, Berlin, 1930. Cf. in the *Dynamics* for the details and methods of computation of these indices.

Centuries	Index of magnitude of war (measured by war casualty per million of Europe's population)	Index of magnitude of internal disturbances in Europe	Number of universities, colleges, and other institutions of higher learning	Number of scientific discoveries and inventions per century
XII	2 to 29	763	5	12
XIII	3 to 50	882	18	53
XIV	6 to 90	827	30	65
XV	8 to 110	748	57	127
XVI	14 to 160	509	98	429
XVII	45	605	129	691
XVIII	40	415	180	1574
XIX	17	766	603	8527
XX (1900-1925)	52	295	753	862 (for only 1900-1908)

Similar results are reached by a comparison of primitive tribes—the lower hunters and collectors of the gifts of nature—with the more “advanced” higher hunters, and the pastoral and agricultural tribes. With “advance of civilization and learning” neither the frequency of war nor the cruelty of treatment of the vanquished decreases.

A large body of additional evidence of various sorts supports the above conclusions. A series of statistical, observational, experimental, and semi-experimental studies shows (1) that with an increase of education, scientific discoveries, and inventions, crime has not decreased, that comparatively illiterate persons, groups, and nations are not more criminal than literate ones; that criminals are not less intelligent (in terms of schooling and various mental tests) than non-criminals, (2) that there is very remote relationship, if any, between education, IQ, school grades, and other forms of measured intelligence, on the one hand, and egoism or altruism, anti-social behavior or cooperative conduct, quarrelsomeness or friendliness, on the other.²

All this suggests that the widely accepted opinion that science, technology, and education invariably exert only moral, pacific, and socially ennobling effects is a sheer myth. Atomic bombs, means of bacteriological warfare, and other products of a misapplied science do not show any

²A vast body of such studies is summed up in my *Society, Culture, and Personality: Their Structure and Dynamics*, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1947.

pacifying, tension decreasing effects. A biblical myth pregnantly tells that at the dawn of history misused science ("the tree of knowledge") cost humanity its Garden of Eden. A similar misuse now threatens to destroy the very tree of human life.

The actual effects of science, technology, and education as they have existed up to the present time, are complex and work partly in favor of decrease, and partly in favor of increase of tensions. Only science and technology that are socially and ethically responsible, that refuse to serve the Mammon of Destruction, that are free from their misuse for anti-social and tension provoking purposes, can serve the cause of intergroup cooperation and solidarity. Unfortunately, this ethico-social duty is not realized, as yet, by many scientists and inventors. They eagerly participate in the discovery and invention of most destructive means of warfare.^a Therefore, the actual effects of science and technology remain mixed.

II General Effects of Some Social, Psychological, Humanistic Theories, Philosophies, and Ideologies

A. The same conclusion applies to philosophical, humanistic, and social disciplines taken in their totality. Here, as in the field of the natural and technological sciences, there is no certain way to measure which of the effects—positive or negative—has been predominant. Likewise, there is no certainty as to whether the net result of these disciplines has been constant or has varied from period to period.

B. Within this general statement it is possible, however, to indicate several forms of philosophies, and social and humanistic theories which have tangibly contributed to a reinforcement of interindividual, intergroup, and international tensions.

1. Philosophical, humanistic, and social ideologies of a strictly materialistic, sensately utilitarian, and hedonistic nature have contributed to the reinforcement of tensions, in various ways, through different causal routes. First, so far as their scale of all values and reality is only sensory,

^aComment by Harry B. Friedgood

I would question this seriously. Recent experience in this country, particularly among the atomic scientists, has been quite the opposite—they have indicated their vigorous opposition to the perverted use of their discoveries. Whatever "caginess" has existed appears to have been engendered by the dire necessity of contributing to the survival of this country and of Western civilization in general.

they have urged all to seek only sensory values and reality such as bodily health, wealth, material comfort, sensory pleasure, sensory power, fame, up to the maximum of sensual happiness. As the demand for such sensory values is far greater than the available supply, such ideologies stimulated and intensified an unlimited struggle for such values, which led to endless interindividual and intergroup classes, antagonisms, and tensions. Second, so far as these ideologies have explicitly glorified competition, rivalry, struggle for existence and for as big a share of sensory values as one can get, so far as they enthusiastically propagated this cult of competition and struggle as the main source of progress, invention, discovery, prosperity, and wellbeing, in so far they explicitly stimulated social tensions and antagonisms. Third, denying any absolute standard, all such ideologies have relativized all values to such an extent, that at the present time there is no norm binding upon all—Stalin and Churchill, Communist and Catholic, American Association of Manufacturers and CIO, rich and poor, atheist and believer. This excessive relativization obliterated the boundary line between right and wrong, the most atrocious murder and sublimest sacrifice. It has led to moral nihilism and social *anomie*, in which "anything is permissible if one can get away with it." In these conditions a rude force (assisted by fraud and hypocrisy) becomes inevitably the supreme arbiter of right and wrong and of behavior of persons and groups. The social universe, controlled mainly by force, is a universe of incessant and endless conflicts and warfare, not moderated by any absolute or universal standards. Hence an explosion of the superbestial (qualitatively) and endless (quantitatively) bloodsheds of our age. Fourth, to the same result these ideologies have contributed through their debunking and virulent repudiation of practically all ideologies, norms, values of a non-sensory or supersensory character. Depicting all religious beliefs as mere ignorance and superstition, declaring all ethical and legal norms as mere "derivation," "rationalization," "beautifying smoke screen" for the biological "id," "libido," "hunger," and other bodily needs, they deprived all such beliefs and norms of their halo, their sanctity, their prestige, and their controlling efficacy. Human beings and groups, not being controlled any more by these beliefs and norms from within, begin to be controlled naturally mainly by their biological drives, sensory appetites, and rude force. Such individuals and groups are doomed to live in the atmosphere of perpetual *bellum omnium contra omnes*. Finally, depicting man "

mere sensory "biological organism," "reflex mechanism," "electron-proton complex," "id," "libido," and so on, and denying to him anything supersensory, absolutely sacred, transcendental, these ideologies degraded man to the level of these "organisms," "mechanisms," and "complexes." Man began to behave and to be treated just as a mere mechanism, organism, and complex. Such a treatment of man by man has naturally led to an enormous multiplication of social tensions, atrocities, and bestialities.

The unique coldblooded extermination of millions of human beings in the Second World War; the contemporary armament race in invention of the Apocalyptic means of destruction; the very coldbloodedness of nations in their preparations to murder millions of innocent people in the next war, the very readiness to do that on the part of contemporary statesmen, politicians, military leaders, leaders of "public opinion," of even science, religion, the humanities, and business, all these "ugly facts" of an utter, almost unbelievable moral, social, and religious nihilism are, to a great extent, the children of these ideologies.

2 As concrete illustration, the following "modern" ideologies can be mentioned.^b

a) Social Darwinism. In so far as various social and humanistic ideologies justified the struggle for existence as the main factor of social and cultural evolution, as the main source of progress, as the main operating force in human interrelationships, and so on, such theories generated and facilitated social tensions.

b) Theories of Racial and Generally Somatic Inequality (A. Gobineau, H. S. Chamberlain, many extreme geneticists, eugenists, somatologists, biologists, psychologists, social scientists.) So far as they explicitly claim that the somatic factors are decisive in determining psychosocial

^bComment by F. Ernest Johnson

Professor Sorokin's deadly parallel between intellectual progress and the incidence of war during eight and a half centuries is devastating to all notions of *inevitable* cultural progress. His accompanying observations concerning the lack of a positive correlation between intelligence and humaneness are sober reminders of a fact that is often comfortably forgotten in academic circles. Yet Doctor Sorokin's argument will be found debatable by many readers at several points.

E.g., does not the use of the word ideology to denote an idea system occasion some confusion in view of the contemporary use of it in a quite different sense? (Cf. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*. When it is employed in this sense the causal sequence suggested by Doctor Sorokin between ideas and ways of life is reversed.) In any case it is questionable to assume that ideas have hands and feet, so to speak. We may regard them as the intellectual counterpart of dispositional urges and voluntary commitments. This is why heresy hunting is such a pointless enterprise.

characteristics, that by somatic constitution some persons and groups are destined to be "superior," that "the superior" persons or groups are entitled by "nature" or "will of God" to be masters, that all the progress is produced by the "superiors" while "the inferiors" should play and have played only a role of a "social and cultural manure," that "the superiors" are entitled to the incomparably greater share of all sensory values, and so on, in so far all such ideologies have served the cause of social conflicts. Recent use of such theories by Hitler and the Third Reich is only one of many factual examples of that. In a modified form similar theories of a "chosen people," of a "manifest destiny" of a nation, of a religious group graced by a monopolistically true religion, all other religions being wrong and their followers doomed to perdition, of a "chosen élite," be it a class, social stratum, or other group, all these and similar ideologies are also the breeders of social tensions, conflicts, and bloody strife.

c) Marxian and Other Ideologies of Materialistic, Economic, and Biological Interpretation of History and of Group Struggle. So far as such ideologies explicitly claim a philosophical (or dialectic) materialism; so far as they explicitly urge interindividual or interclass or international struggle for a maximal share of material values (including the values of sensate power, fame, physiological love, etc.), they openly function as instrumentalities of tensions and strife. The actual role of Marxian ideology in the civil—and then international wars—of Soviet Russia, is one of many examples.

d) Pseudo-Idealistic Ideologies of Various—Explicit and Implicit—Struggles for Sensate Values. Many political, ethical, legal, economic, even religious and artistic ideologies often have an idealistic, even religiously transcendental appearance, opposite to any materialism. However, in their practical program they recommend action aimed at an increase of the sensory, material share of values of the respective group, at the cost of other groups or persons. Their idealism (and even religiosity) is a mere smokescreen. When a religious creed demands for itself, in the name of God, full freedom and many material advantages, denying these to other creeds; when a political ideology of democracy demands, in the name of "freedom," "justice," "the will of the people," an extension of its imperialism; when a highly "idealistic" ideology of a business aristocracy or of a political party is used for justification of its material privileges, or for satisfaction of its unlimited lusts for power and wealth; all such ideologies are breeders of strife and tensions. Their

number and variety is enormous. They appear as a "scientific theory," "self-evident truth," or "God's revelation." Beginning with the theories of "economic man" and "unlimited and pure benefits of competition," and ending with the theories of "never erring, never wrong, never imperialistic democracy" (or autocracy, depending upon the taste of the ideologist), social and humanistic, historical and ethical "sciences" are packed with that kind of "scientific theories." The same is true of several religious and philosophical creeds. In their reality and in their actions they are sometimes even more materialistic than an open Marxian materialism.

e) Freudian and Similar Psychological Ideologies. In so far as these ideologies degrade man to a level of a mere "id"—a sort of bag filled by sex and instinct of death and destruction, in so far as they reduce man's "ego" and "superego" to a mere epiphenomenon whose functions consist mainly in repression of the vital lusts of the "id," and in causation of psychoneuroses, in so far as their therapy leads to submerging man to the level of "id" instead of elevating him to the heights of the rational, even a superrational man, in so far as many behavioristic theories propagate the views on man as a mere "mechanism" or "organism" (having supposedly no mind, no consciousness and conscience or "all this mind-stuff"), in so far as these ideologies (often fantasmagoric from a real scientific standpoint) have contributed their share to individual and group demoralization (especially in sex behavior), to mental disintegration, and to degradation of the values of motherhood, parenthood, religion, fine arts, ethics, law, and many social institutions. Through these and similar ways such ideologies led to an increase of strife between these loving "ids" and "mechanisms," carried on by their mere reflexes, instincts, and biological drives in their "commendable" efforts to free themselves from the stupid "repressions" of religious, ethical, social, and intellectual norms of "superego." Assuming persons and groups that it is normal for them to behave as "ids" and "mechanisms," these ideologies have contributed tangibly to the contemporary mental, moral, and social anarchy, to decline of the institutions of the family and sacred marriage; to juvenile delinquency; even to continuing increase of mental disorders.^e

^eComment by F. Ernest Johnson

While much can be said in criticism of those "depth" psychologists who became a bit inebriated on new concepts and worked them overtime, I think psychoanalysts may fairly hold that Doctor Sorokin has done less than justice to their theories. Also, philosophers may think that in his discussion of absolutism and relativism in value theory he should have

III Conclusion

In order for all sciences and ideologies to perform the functions of tension decreasing factors, they must undergo several changes. Science and technology must stop serving destructive purposes, they must abandon their position of being ethically and socially irresponsible. Concretely this means, among other things, that the responsible scientist and inventor is under a duty to refuse to work on any discovery or invention of a destructive kind. If he does not discharge the duty, then he is socially and morally, even legally, responsible for the murderous consequences. If we hold a careless driver responsible for running over a child, though the driver did not have any intention to kill the child, still more responsible is a scientist-inventor intentionally working on the means of destruction of human life and civilization. If his discovery-invention kills thousands of innocent persons, he is responsible for their death and mutilation, for the destruction of cities, crops, libraries, museums, up to the universities and laboratories. Such a mass murder and

distinguished between accepting absolutes as conceptual ultimates, and the attempt to comprehend them in "standards" to govern conduct in a changing world.

Comment by HARRY B. FRIEDGOOD

The very intensity of Professor Sorokin's attack on the Freudian dynamic concept of psychology, indicates how much importance he attaches to the target. He has formulated and summarized succinctly the charges that some have leveled against this "psychological ideology." It is difficult to understand how one can defend such a viewpoint in the face of the factual evidence. Far from "degrading man to the level of a mere id," the dynamic psychologist seeks to understand the basic personality structure of the individual for the purpose of bringing his chaotic, irrational behavior under the control of the ego and superego, psychological phenomena representing social control mechanisms without which man's behavior lacks rationale, and is antisocial. The ego and superego are certainly not regarded as mere epiphenomena. Far from advocating that individuals and groups behave as unethical, irresponsible, amoral, or immoral "ids," dynamic psychotherapy (*i.e.*, psychoanalysis) aims at the rehabilitation of social control mechanisms inherent in the normal function of the superego and ego. To state that the practice of dynamic psychology is wrecking the family institution, is contributing tangibly to contemporary mental, moral, and social anarchy, to juvenile delinquency and to increasing mental disorders, is to misunderstand completely the goal of modern psychiatry. It is the specifically avowed aim of psychoanalytic practice to reconstitute broken homes wherever the reality principle permits, to elevate the behavior of the individual, possibly for the first time in his life, to a socially acceptable moral and ethical plane, to combat juvenile delinquency by redirecting and redirecting the chaotic antisocial desires of the id-possessed boy and girl, and to bring order to the disordered psychological apparatus. Undoubtedly, there are areas of criticism of the Freudian thesis and practice in which one could join Professor Sorokin, but they could not possibly include the foregoing.

mass destruction can and should be laid down at the door of his laboratory. If there are many discoveries-inventions whose nature is not destructive *per se*, though they can eventually be used for destructive purposes, there are many explicitly destructive inventions-discoveries. These must be eliminated from the activities of the socially responsible scientist-inventor, from science and technology

Further, socially responsible science-technology must become aware of the fact that all the great values of human culture are not exhausted by the value of truth-knowledge and cognition; there are the values of Goodness and Beauty, as great as Truth, and as necessary for the creative existence of humanity. Even more, so far as science represents mainly the truth of our senses (assisted by mathematical and syllogistic reason), scientific truth is competent only in the field of the sensory, empirical aspect of the infinitely manifold reality. In regard to the non-empirical aspects of this infinite manifold, scientific methods and scientific truth are inadequate. Its fuller and more adequate cognition demands an organic cooperation of the truth of senses, of reason, and of supersensory and superlogical intuition, mutually supplementing and checking one another. This means that science must abandon its claim for a monopolistic possession of the whole truth and nothing but the truth, and must wholeheartedly enter the great team of three dimensional truth (of the senses, reason, and intuition) as an equal partner, but not a monopolistic owner.⁴

Such a shift of the position of science "automatically" makes it socially and morally responsible, stops its conflict with the truth of reason and intuition, unites science with philosophy and religion, ethics and the fine arts, so far as these seek indeed to discover, to unfold, and to realize the infinite manifold in all its main aspects and dimensions. The unification of these values and cognitions into one system stops the raging struggle between many "onesided truths" of science, philosophy, and religion, the fine arts and ethics. The contemporary incertitude gives place to a new age of certitude, and peace of mind of humanity. With these

⁴Comment by Alfred C. Lane

I would quite agree. Indeed I would say that the expression and understanding of truth is always individual and has some lack of precision, "we know in part." The role of the scientist, pragmatically, is to find what men shared, without assuming that we know all that future experience may make available for mankind of systematic, shareable knowledge of God.

many conflicts between "partial and impure values" tend to be eliminated and consequent social tensions decreased.^e

As to the philosophical, religious, social, and humanistic ideologies, they must free themselves from the above outlined poisons in order to become factors of solidarity and mutual help, instead of those of strife and tensions. Here, as in the case of the natural sciences and technology, such a transformation does not mean a sacrifice of truth to ethical considerations. On the contrary, tension provoking ideologies contain, at the best, only an element of truth enveloped in a great deal of falsity, even of a fantasmagoric error. Freeing themselves from their most strife provoking traits they approach nearer to a fuller truth. Otherwise, they are doomed to remain on the level of half truth, half falsity, generating forces of enmity and strife and serving neither the value of Truth nor those of Goodness and Beauty.^f

^eComment by F. Ernest Johnson

I wish that in our discussion of ways of "knowing" and channels to "truth" a qualitative distinction might be recognized between empirical data and rational inference on the one hand, and affirmations of faith, on the other. The "certitude" of faith is surely something of a very different order from certainty of knowledge.

^fComment by Swami Akhilananda

We can only congratulate Professor Sorokin for his splendid and illuminating analysis of modern tension in individual and collective life, and for his solution. Only one thing we would like to suggest: the solution set forth can be attained by the application of his principle in our individual lives. That is the very reason Swami Vivekananda, a modern spiritual leader of India, suggests that we need "man-making" religion today. When a man is integrated and his reason and emotions are unified, with consequent stabilization of his personality, then alone can he disseminate the higher values of life. Modern relativism certainly demoralized individuals and society, as contemporary history proves. So we feel that it is the higher phase of religion—mysticism—that makes man dynamic and powerful in order to be a true servant of humankind in society. Mysticism and altruism should go together today. The more we have persons of supersensuous realization in society, the greater will be the number of unified personalities. And those personalities with an altruistic attitude and appreciation can really remove tension from modern society.

CHAPTER XII

How Can Scholarship Contribute to the Relief of International Tensions: Use of the Material Scholarship Supplies

By GERALD B. PHELAN

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THE ROLE OF SCHOLARSHIP in promoting national sanity and international peace cannot of course extend to the practical adoption of measures calculated to achieve that end (that is the business of governments, statesmen, diplomats), but it can in many ways throw light upon the problems that demand solution and clarify the issues involved.

There is no need for me to suggest how much the social and political sciences can contribute toward a better knowledge and appreciation of the human factors in any solution of those problems. It is clear that one must bear in mind particular manners and customs, traditions and ways of life, forms of government and methods of administration, economic conditions, racial, religious, social, and political convictions, prejudices, and superstitions—our own included—when dealing with the practical adjustment of intranational and international differences. On all these matters the social and political sciences have much to teach. But I am not presently concerned to discuss that aspect of the question.

My concern is rather with the reasons why, in possession of all this information, one should decide that this procedure is to be adopted rather than that. For, as a matter of fact, there has never been a time when so much pertinent information has been available as in our generation, yet it would be difficult to find any period in history when international relations have been so bad as they have been for the past thirty-five years. Scholarship, knowledge, erudition, information—call it what you will—

cannot offer any reason for taking a stand on one side or the other of any question, let us say, for instance, totalitarianism (fascist, nazist, communist) or democracy; and if we can give no reason to justify our attitude and our actions except that we prefer democracy to totalitarianism and are strong enough to impose our preference upon others, then we are adopting the very stand which we are presumed to be combating, namely, that there is no reason or right but only force.

Since scholarship as such can provide no answer to a problem like this, we must look elsewhere for guidance in the use we make of the information which scholarship supplies. It is at this juncture that philosophy and theology, supported by history, can clarify the deeper issue of man's normal obligations and responsibilities, while religion can impose, not by force, but by conviction, the duty to observe them.

Concomitantly with the advance and increase of factual information and scientific investigation which has marked our era, there has been a weakening of philosophical reflection and theological thought together with a decided falling off of truly religious life. This country has been living for several generations on the capital of an inherited wisdom which our forefathers brought with them from their European homelands. It was the wisdom of a Christian civilization which has since been almost completely lost to more than one country of Europe and seriously weakened in many others. In America that wisdom has been partially obscured but still remains the unacknowledged guide of our life as a whole and the reason why we can live together in comparative peace. It is in a fuller and more profound cultivation of that wisdom that the fundamental reasons for the right conduct of nations as well as individual persons can be found and nowhere else. "*Non est in alio aliquo salus*" (*Acts* iv:12).

The spirit of that culture was dominated by a sense of man's dignity as the noblest of God's earthly creatures, called to be His Son in the Kingdom of God. Consequently the rights of the human person are, by natural law and by divine law, inviolable and any invasion of those rights is sinful. In a nation whose citizens have a profound conviction of these truths and a healthy fear and hatred of sin, there are to be found the seeds of sanity which give justifiable hope for a comparatively peaceful national life. It is because the vast majority of Americans still retain, however vaguely and perhaps unconsciously, a firm belief in these Christian verities that democracy can flourish here without being com-

pletely choked by the weeds of atheistic communism and agnostic liberalism

When we talk about the inalienable rights of every citizen, the four freedoms, equality before the law, inviolability of the human person, justice for all, good neighborship, and many other similar principles of our common life, we are, consciously or unconsciously, invoking the traditions of Christian culture which linger on even after Christian beliefs and Christian convictions have been dimmed or lost. These principles are among our most cherished possessions and there are few good Americans who do not feel themselves personally affronted and indignant when they find them flouted or flagrantly violated. They are not shibboleths, but can rapidly become such if the Christian thinking which nourishes them degenerates and vanishes into mere naturalism. The next step is to replace them by other principles more in harmony with the thought of the nation. We have witnessed the process at work first in Germany and now in Russia. Force replaces rights, slavery to the state replaces freedom of the citizen, and political expediency replaces justice. If we in this country lose the vitalizing force of sound Christian philosophy, theology, and religion, there is no doubt that the same can happen here. We cannot eat our cake and have it. Christian thought and conviction are required for Christian moral living both in the individual and in the nation, if one goes, the other will surely follow and we shall be left with nothing better than the Nazis and the Communists have upon which to base our national and international behavior.

It behooves us, therefore, to study the great abiding truths upon which these principles of national sanity and international peace ultimately rest, to reform our basically atheistic and naturalistic approach to the problems of philosophy, particularly ethics, and to take the practices of religious life, prayer, and the worship of God, more seriously. I am not preaching a sermon but stating facts. Whether we like it or not, whether we know it or not; (a) there *is* a God and He made the world and all that is in it, including us, (b) men are persons in virtue of their spiritual life, (c) the human race has fallen from its due estate through sin, (d) Christ has redeemed the world and restored to men the power to live in peace upon this earth and in an eternity of peace in Heaven. These are some of the great truths that underlie the moral responsibilities which are essential to the preservation of decent relations among men, and which find

expression in our declarations concerning freedom, equality, justice, and brotherly love. As someone has recently said, "If our great hope is that the Russian people are not really 'dialectical materialists' at heart, Stalin's great hope must be that we are not nearly so Christian as we claim."

You will tell me that I am dogmatic. I admit the charge before you make it. I feel that it is quite fitting to be dogmatic about dogmas. I want to be realistic and those great truths are very real, even though a great many people do not know it, and many others deny it. I have yet to hear any argument, which takes no account of those truths or consciously repudiates them, that would convince me that I should recognize the dignity of any human being or respect his freedom or deal justly by him. The threat of legal consequences or social ostracism might *constrain* me but it would not *convince* me. And, had I the power, as Hitler once had and Stalin now has, to determine the legal and social conditions to suit my own purposes, there would be nothing to constrain me and I should still be unconvinced. In the conflict of ideologies it would be well for us to understand not only the totalitarian ideology which we oppose but also the democratic ideology which we espouse. Our philosophical and theological thinking needs to be enormously strengthened and deepened if we hope to realize what democracy implies and what tremendous responsibilities, both for thought and conduct, its adoption entails. The thinkers of Europe have realized for well over a generation the bankruptcy of the "classical" metaphysic of modern times (I mean the rationalism and idealism which stem from Descartes, Kant, and Hegel), and those for whom the Nietzschean dictum "God is dead!" states a fact, are tearing their hearts out in an agony of existentialism whose issue is, on their own recognizance, despair, futility, and frustration. For the serious thinker today, since Bergson gave the *coup-de-grâce* to Positivistic Empiricism, there are but three philosophical alternatives: Marxism, Existentialism, and Christian philosophy.

We are plagued with a host of pseudo-philosophies and pseudo-theologies in this country—theologies and philosophies which are "old hat" to Europe which has tried them all and found them wanting. What a responsible English writer has said about American books on economic theory (I do not presume to say whether he was right on economic theory), can certainly be said about American philosophy. The gentleman in question stated that the economic theorizing he read in the best

American writing gave him the definite impression of "*déjà vu*." We have been through all that, he said, and our experience has found it worthless.

I know I am saying things offensive to many of my colleagues in this Conference. But things are too serious right now to give too much importance to the effects of what one says on the sensibilities of one's friends. I have been deeply offended by many of the papers in this Conference during the past five or six years, but I have regarded the statements as the honest expression of what their authors thought. I now claim similar consideration. What I have said issues from my own personal conviction and, I may add, that of a very large section of the American people. But that does not matter. What is of paramount importance is whether or not the people of this nation can be made to see that it is true. If they can, there is hope, thank God! If not, I can see nothing but the continued conflict of "power politics" in which the rewards go to the "strong," not the "right."^a

Meanwhile, our task is to alleviate as best we can the tensions which give rise to conflict. Intransigent when it is a question of truth and error, we must be tolerant toward men. Tolerance is not a matter of the intellect but of the will, its real name is fraternal charity, the love of one's neighbor for the love of God. We can agree to differ and still cooperate in maintaining those human values upon which civilization is built and in endeavoring to share them with other nations, as General MacArthur is doing in Japan with no mean measure of success. I can conceive of no way in which philosophy and theology can contribute to the promotion

^aComment by Alexander H. Leighton

Speaking as a social scientist, I am not one of those who may be offended by this paper. It strikes me as forthright and to the point.

What it does for me is to raise a host of questions. Without disputing the verities in which the author believes, and without gainsaying the probability that if everyone had similar ideas there would be no international tension, I wonder how such a state of common belief can be achieved? What is to be done when there are Moslems, Buddhists, and thousands of other groups who hold to different verities with equal conviction and honesty? The same, of course, applies to the set of beliefs called Communism. There are millions of people who, however misguided they may appear to others, are sincere and devoted to their communistic ideas.

For any group, including Christians, to say that they have the real truth and that peace lies in all others agreeing with them, is certainly not new. The evidence of history seems to be that greater rather than less conflict springs from such views. Can Christians bring some better solution to this problem? With due respect to our own beliefs, can we practice the golden rule not only in material things, but also in things intellectual and spiritual? This is not a rhetorical question.

of national sanity and the relief of international tensions except through a dogged devotion of right thinking and a profound respect for truth. Philosophers and theologians, however, can give their support to every healthy effort to promote peace within the nation and among the nations. And, among the practical suggestions made at this Conference for the accomplishment of that purpose, I know of none more promising than the eight points which Professor Herman Finer has listed under the heading, "The Therapy for our Times," in the last section of his excellent paper.^b

^b[Cf. Chapter I.]

CHAPTER XIII

Social Science, Some Requirements for Its Development and Use

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I

“SOCIAL SCIENCE” in this paper refers to the scientific study of human behavior, considered as characteristic both of groups of people and of relations between individuals. It includes ground covered by a number of disciplines such as cultural anthropology, sociology, psychology, and psychiatry.

The assumption is made that social science has shown its value and holds promise of future discoveries comparable with those already made in other fields where the scientific method has been intensively utilized over a relatively long period of time. It is further assumed that the need for these discoveries and their application to human welfare is urgent. The aim here will be to make some observations thought important for the development and use of social science.

II

Objectivity is a difficult requirement in all science, but it is particularly hard to achieve in social and psychological problems. Because the man or woman who analyzes human relations is a part of his society and culture, his explorations touch his own quick sources of confidence, doubt, fear, and aspiration, and his sense of values. Consequently, feelings and emotional convictions irrelevant for scientific purposes are ever liable to warp observation and interpretation. To this bias within the scientist are added the shifting pressures exerted by other members of society who favor,

ignore, or scorn his findings because of hopes, fears, and the habits of tradition

These chances for error are enhanced by the common lack of opportunity in studies of people for controlled experiment. Further, there are inducements to erect scaffolds of argument that mount brilliantly further and further from factual foundations, in the kind of rationalizing that has always been the enemy of scientific progress.

These difficulties should sober any offhand approach in social science, but they warrant neither despair nor rejection of its results. In spite of the obstacles, progress has been made. The difficulties are matters to be taken into account and mitigated through awareness, and not allowed to slip from attention because they are commonplace. He who works in the science of human relations must strive vigilantly to keep his own emotions and sentiments in their places and to prevent conclusions which leap beyond disciplined observation and systematic thinking.

III

The next problem is the moral responsibility of the social scientist. One hears at times not a little hostility expressed against the social scientist due to the fear that he is "amoral" and may allow himself to be a tool in the hands of "conscienceless manipulators."

There is little possibility of overestimating the danger of misuse, but it can easily be given harmful distortion and narrowed emphasis. It is not a problem of social science or of science alone, for, as noted by Francis Bacon (when modern science was beginning), "The same may be said of all earthly goods; of wit, courage, strength, beauty, wealth, light itself, and the rest." All knowledge and power, all human organization, whether courts of justice, churches, or any other, can be misused. Among men there are good and evil tendencies regarding the welfare of their kind. Through history, each advance in knowledge, in control of nature, and in more effective organization of society, has brought a corresponding threat of disaster. The recent developments in physics and biology starkly diagram this fact and leave us on the edge of both new life and indescribable suffering.

In this setting the social scientist, like the physician, has responsibility for directing his work to the welfare of mankind, but he cannot fulfil it unless society, of which he is a part, understands and supports him in the

effort. Responsibility for what the social scientist does is shared by those who employ him in government, industry, labor, universities, and foundations, by journalists, educators, and religious leaders, who criticize and interpret his work; and by the public, whose opinion, right or wrong, has power. This understanding and support has to be positive, constructive, and forward looking. It must show what to do as well as what not to do; and it must be based on some knowledge of what social science is.

Some people have suggested that a distinction should be made between "applied" social science and "pure" social science, with the idea of fostering the latter while prohibiting the former because of the dangers of manipulation. This, however, is not practicable. There are essential observations and experiences regarding the nature of man and society that can be had only in application. The applied field bears approximately the same relationship to pure research that the medical clinic bears to the medical research laboratory. Interaction between research and practice is essential for the progress of both. Moreover, there can be no more moral argument for restricting the benefits of social science than for keeping public health and sanitation from cities and factories.

The necessary safeguard is that social science be available to all groups that have need of it no matter which side of any particular social or political issue they may occupy. This involves keeping knowledge of the methods and discoveries circulating and within the reach of all—that is to say, maintaining the freedom of science.

IV

Equally important is the problem of keeping social science operating as a science. Those who stress the moral responsibility of the scientist frequently complain about his lack of moral indignation. But the maintenance of objectivity is a foundation without which other considerations can matter little. When a scientist ceases to be a scientist, he ceases to produce in the field of his competence and is in this respect lost as a contributor toward solving society's urgent problems. Worse than this, he may, due to the prestige of science, become a false prophet and take followers astray. Bad results come not only from evil design, but also from error.

The dangers of destroying science must be matched with the dangers of misusing science. Many who are working devotedly toward a better-

ment of human affairs are not aware of this and say to the scientist, in effect, "Come over on our side and help with your science in the good fight, but leave behind you the viewpoint upon which all science depends."

This will not do. Science demands allegiance and imposes a discipline. In medicine, clinical observations, whether for therapy or research, are not matters to be influenced by the patient's hopes and fears, by the moral judgments of society, or by the physician's own desires. Experience has made it evident that when personal or popular wishes influence findings and judgment, medical skill deteriorates. A man has or has not syphilis according to what can be observed and tested, regardless of his social position. The children of a slum area have or do not have ticks according to examination, and not according to anyone's desire to start or prevent a slum clearance project.

The medical clinic presents a good paradigm of a set of scientific values which extend the concept of objectivity and which may be called *functional*. Emotions are played down and the need to unravel the relationships of things and events to each other is stressed. Germs are not regarded as objects of fear and hate, but as elements in a process—a process which if understood may be altered. The retention of this attitude is not easy, since the scene of the struggle between health and illness, between life and death, is always real and suffering persons. However, those who do most for the sick are those who subordinate their normal human emotions and sympathies to the functional view.

In psychiatry one moves into the field of interpersonal relations and hence into social science, but the clinical, functional approach is no less necessary. It is, however, more difficult, for in psychiatry the factors significant in a patient's illness are the loves, hates, hopes, and fears, the interpersonal relations, the conflicts, the ambivalences, and the beliefs in values which in some degree make up the life of everybody. The physician has to deal in ideas and behavior which may set going strong appeals or revulsions in his own web of feeling regarding the desirable and the intolerable. Nevertheless, the questions are, as Adolf Meyer has said: What works, what doesn't work so well, and what doesn't work at all? What are the causal factors? What can be done about it? rather than simply: Who is right and who is wrong?

Such an approach to the problem of mental illness is very different from the one that was common in Western civilization and in other areas

for many centuries. The insane were regarded as possessed of a devil, with numerous additional religious and moral assumptions which resulted in rituals, beatings, and tortures. As medicine developed along with other sciences, doctors began to look on the behavior of the insane more and more from a scientific point of view and to drop from their thinking not only the idea of lurking devils, but also "wilfulness," "stubbornness," and "own fault." Inmates became patients.^a

At first, medical conceptions of insanity ran to organic causes and investigation discovered these in many types of illness as, for example, paresis. There still remained patients, however, especially among those not ill enough for hospitalization, in whom no organic disorder could be found, and this blank wall drew attention to their behavior as related to their experiences from infancy onward, their current life situation, and the nature of their instinctual and emotional urges. The ideal was developed that the patient was not properly a focus for anger or fear, nor on the other hand one whose ideas should be uncritically espoused, but was both a person and phenomenon to be understood.

The picture of Pinel striking the chains off the inmates of the Salpêtrière—copies of which so often hang in the offices of mental hospitals—symbolizes the introduction of humane treatment. It might also be said to symbolize a removal of the restrictions imposed by traditional prejudice and to mark the introduction of inquiry. The major advances in the treatment of nervous and mental disease from which millions have benefited have occurred since that time.

In our present day thinking about the motives of human groups—as in labor relations, race relations, international relations—we are still,

^aComment by Gerald B. Phelan

I suggest that "wilfulness," "stubbornness," and "own fault" are human failings, human facts which social scientists may recognize in the sane and insane alike. They should not be dropped from scientific thinking. Inmates may become patients without ceasing to be human. I would agree—and perhaps this is what Doctor Leighton intended to say—that to regard the illness of those poor unfortunates as moral fault is quite unscientific (although, as every psychiatrist knows, moral delinquency not infrequently lies at the origin of mental abnormalities, and rectification of moral attitudes and habits plays an important role in mental therapy). With regard to lurking devils, the scientist is obliged by his calling to seek only natural causes; he would be thoroughly unscientific should he invoke such preternatural agencies as devils to explain the facts. There may be some facts of phenomena, however, which the scientist cannot explain. Science does not warrant his saying that they are not caused by preternatural agencies. He may not believe in such agencies. But as Doctor Leighton aptly says, he must beware of allowing his beliefs (and I may add, disbeliefs) from functioning as scientific evidence. The devil would be delighted if he could persuade all men that he did not exist.

except for a narrow littoral, in the Dark Ages, seeing everywhere possession by devils. It is the social scientist's business to see as few devils as possible and in their place dynamically related forces.

V

An example may serve to illustrate what has been said. Years ago in certain parts of this country it was the policy of the United States Biological Survey to exterminate all wild life said to be harmful to agriculture, an action which was fought with vigor by conservationists.

It was the opinion of most scientists that the practices of the Biological Survey ignored the realities of ecological balance in nature, and harmed both ranch land and wild life. Numbers of scientists, however, made their living as employees of the Government, either with the Survey or with some related department. Many of these refused to yield to the pressure that they should find "facts" to justify the current policy. Some, however, did give in, with or without the self-deception so easy when one's own aspirations are involved, and in so doing they lapsed from the role of scientist. They forged the name of their profession on testimony to aid a special interest that was nourished on the political influence of farmers and ranchers who had indiscriminate feelings against all "vermin."

The natural scientists in universities and museums for the most part lent active support to the conservationists. They supplied information and suggested workable plans which gave consideration to the ranchers as well as to preservation of wild life. Some conservationists, however, were not satisfied with this. They pressed the scientists for dramatic exaggerations, for suppression of facts regarding damage actually done by some kinds of wild animals, for "proof" that no kind of predatory animal or rodent control was necessary. Some of the scientists (again with or without self-deception) went along with these conservationists. Regardless of motive, they committed forgery just as certainly as did those employed by the Biological Survey, and like them lost much of their capacity to function as scientists. The best scientists, however, remained meticulous about the truth and did not permit their sympathies to make a difference at any point where the scientific process itself was involved. In the long run it was they who made the most substantial and lasting contributions to knowledge.

The conclusion to be drawn is not a condemnation of those who fight for causes with all the energy and imagination they command, but rather an insistence that those trying to accomplish social reform should learn how to work with science rather than try to make propagandists out of the scientists^b

VI

The points made thus far emphasize the need for ordering the relationship of non-scientific values with the scientific, otherwise, emotional, moral, religious, and esthetic sources of human development can be harmed by pseudo-science, while science is destroyed by the introduction of assumptions that are not part of it

The formula for ordering these values is easily stated and may be compressed into two sentences *Within an area marked off for scientific investigation, the values of science alone control each step in the process toward conclusions and in the conclusions themselves Moral and social values enter at three contiguous points, the selection of the problem to be investigated, the limitation of the human and other materials that may be used, and the determination of what shall be done with the results*

The medical clinic may be cited again as an example of a situation in which through years the relationship between moral values and scientific values has been shaped effectively in daily practice. The primary aim is the welfare of the patients, a consideration which guides scientific inquiry, limits the materials used, and determines what shall be done with the results.

The social scientist also has to mark off carefully the boundaries of his problem and within these boundaries strive to maintain the concepts, values, and methods that are part of the scientific process Part of this

^bComment by Robert H. Lowie

I should like to add an opportune illustration A number of very well intentioned anthropologists at the present time are devoting themselves to propaganda tending to reduce interracial friction This is a laudable endeavor with which I am wholly in agreement Nevertheless I demur to the grounds which are sometimes alleged on behalf of their teaching It is not permissible for a scientist at the present time to declare that there are no racial differences It is proper to say that the evidence hitherto adduced to establish them is inadequate and in part quite unscientific This, however, does not warrant the contrary dogma that no racial differences exist We simply have not a sufficiency of information to make any such statement It in the future a refinement of psychological techniques should establish racial differences, such demonstration would react on the propaganda in question

is the previously mentioned *functional* point of view. This means treating the social forces under consideration not with heat and excitement but with the same interest that would be pertinent toward molecules and ions in physiology, animals and plants in forest ecology, hormones and organs in medicine, and human complexes and conflicts in psychiatry. This does not involve self-excommunication from all human feeling or carrying this attitude everywhere in life. Within the problem area, however, it does call for discipline and for an open, inquiring, non-assertive kind of mind, working with assumptions and hypotheses of varying degrees of reliability from the very tentative to the fairly well established, but avoiding creeds.

This applies to one's own favored ideas as well as to those which others may thrust upon him and urge him to adopt. He must be particularly wary of these non-scientific values with which he sympathizes most. All biases are poisonous to science, but the worst are those that appeal strongly to the scientist.

This course is not easy, but if there is another road to science, it has not yet been found.

CHAPTER XIV

The Duty of the Scientist Toward World Peace

By ROBERT W. KING

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THE UNITY OF WAR is rapidly giving way to the disunity of peace. The bonds of international allegiance forged to resist military aggression are disintegrating in the early years of victory. The reign of a common purpose to defeat a common enemy is all too quickly succumbing to myriad peacetime rivalries and competitive struggles.

Yet the greatest international task of all is scarcely begun, the task of uniting the world in a decision to make war as unlikely as is humanly possible. Some strong compulsion is needed to assure a continued unity of opinion which alone will support any effective advance toward the preservation of peace.

But, in addition to peacetime rivalries, another factor impedes our progress. Because of the esoteric science which war now involves, the tendency is to grant a hearing to the scientist alone. At a time when clear public conviction in all nations is of the utmost urgency, timidity and reticence overcome the public mind.

This state of indecisiveness the scientist should recognize and do what he can to dispel. In the present political emergency little that is of permanent value will be accomplished without the unmistakable pressure of popular demand.

It is none too early to clarify and simplify the scientific issues and I welcome the opportunity to make what contribution I can.

In the first place, I see no way in which a structure of world peace can be erected upon the supposition that scientists as a group will league together internationally and refuse to serve in war industries and war

projects. For one thing, essential knowledge of nuclear phenomena is already spread far beyond the truly scientific ranks. Far from there being any essential secrets concerning the atomic bomb, we must regard it as rapidly approaching the status of other armaments that have been employed in warfare and whose secrets have therefore been virtually disclosed.

But even though the know-how of the atomic bomb were to remain continuously the possession of a highly specialized group of scientists, it would still be unrealistic to base world peace upon the belief that the international ties of union within this group would prove stronger than the conflicting call of patriotism. No more expect such exalted action on the part of scientists than on the part of industrialists or holders of public office. Armaments are almost without exception accumulated on the plea of defense. No manipulation of public opinion is simpler than that aimed at convincing a people that they live in a designing world where the course of wisdom is to prepare to defend one's nation. And a nation's plea for aid from its scientists in preserving its state of preparedness will be quite irresistible.

Were it necessary to emphasize this point, I would that all might today visit any one of hundreds of academic and industrial laboratories (both at home and abroad) where, if they could penetrate the veil of secrecy, they would find significant military research in progress. Not only would they behold American scientists enthusiastically participating in projects based upon the conjectured requirements of a coming war, but here and there they would discover German scientists, brought to this country for the specific purpose of engaging in military research.

Therefore, let us write down essentially to zero the significance of the scientist's conscience in affecting the fulfilment of our purpose.

In the second place, it will not be realistic to base plans of world peace upon the notion that the atomic bomb or any other especially destructive weapon can be outlawed.

Outlawing is but a promise among nations, and no more valid than other international promises, the violations of which litter the pages of history. To be sure, the so-called Geneva conventions did, during the recent war, ostensibly act as a deterrent to the use of certain weapons, among them dum-dum bullets and poison gases. But it can be taken on good authority that something stronger than the Geneva conventions militated against the use of these particular weapons; namely, their in-

herent inefficiency. It was well understood that as a means of pressing attack from the air, high explosives and incendiaries are in general more formidable than gas. Quite consistent with this is the discovery made following VE Day that the Germans had made no preparations to use gas offensively although they had taken adequate defensive precautions. They clearly appreciated that to use it would have curtailed the effectiveness of their blitz of English cities.

It follows that the more destructive a weapon the more energetically its use in a war of survival is likely to be pushed. History shows conclusively that trust cannot be placed in protocols to outlaw highly effective weapons. Combatants will attempt to wreak such destruction upon one another as seems necessary to win the war, and will, if they can, resort to any weapon which contributes to this temporarily supreme aim.

We must take it for granted that if another world war were to break out (say, within five or ten years) both groups of adversaries would employ weapons *at least* as destructive as the atomic bomb. Hence, the prudent policy is to find some plan for reducing the chance of war to as near zero as is humanly possible.

This leads us to the matter of international inspection of atomic energy plants and processes. It is reasonably certain that this can be made effective during peace. However, should sources of atomic energy become widely available, the prospect is that a war would see most nations able to assemble a few atomic bombs rather quickly, while the larger nations might reasonably be expected to go into steady production. We find a dispassionate warning to this effect in the first report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council: "There is an intimate relation between the activities required for peaceful purposes and those leading to the production of atomic weapons; most of the stages which are needed for the former are also needed for the latter." Further, we should not overlook the possibility that airborne diseases and poisons may quite transcend atomic explosives in destructiveness and therefore in political significance.

Were a nation bent upon waging biological warfare, there is probably no form of international inspection which would be worth the paper and ink used to formalize it. Biological research and preparation need only the barest minimum of raw materials, a small personnel and very iso-

lated laboratories and plants. Detection, even in peacetime, would be virtually out of the question. In terms of biological warfare, there might be no way of preventing a silent and sinister Pearl Harbor on virtually a nationwide basis. Nor would there be any means of guaranteeing the exclusion of biological weapons, once war had gotten under way. If it develops, therefore, that a crippling disease or poison can be effectively broadcast in an enemy state, the atomic bomb is already well along toward being outmoded as the weapon especially to be feared.

In this connection the following, quoted from the memorandum "Scientific Information Transmitted to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission," is perhaps as specific as any statement can be at present.

It is important to note that, unlike the development of the atomic bomb and certain other secret weapons during the War, the development of agents for biological warfare is possible in many countries, large and small, without vast expenditures of money or the construction of huge production facilities. It is clear that the development of biological warfare could very well proceed in many countries, perhaps under the guise of legitimate medical or bacteriological research. Many plants designed and ostensibly built for industrial fermentation processes could be used for the mass production of pathogenic microorganisms or their poisonous products.

It is quite probable that research directed toward enhancing the virulence of pathogenic microorganisms would result in the production of varieties much more virulent than those now known. The use of varieties of pathogenic microorganisms of such unusually high virulence might well overpower the means of protection now believed adequate. In addition, there is the probability that a variety of a known pathogenic agent, antigenically different from those varieties normally encountered, might be selected or developed. If this were done, the presently known immunizing agent would be ineffective against the newly selected or developed variety.

In whatever deliberations thus take place concerning the implementation of a lasting peace in the world, the potentialities of biological warfare cannot safely be ignored.

The extent to which a war fought with modern mass destruction weapons is to be feared will chiefly be determined, of course, by the effectiveness of defensive measures. Defense presents two distinct problems. One is against an unexpected attack, such as Pearl Harbor. The

other is against continuing attack, once a state of war is known to exist. The conditions met in the two cases can be very different, however, in each instance the trend of science is to favor the aggressor.

Given modern means of attack from the air including improved V-2's, as well as rockets and airborne missiles of various types, a nation that would engage in a continuous alert covering all strategic areas in times of peace would almost certainly find the insurance so costly and so fraught with disturbance to established ways of life as to rule it out. Therefore, should secret arming prove to be possible in the future (with the traditional armies and navies this was never possible) the sudden type of onslaught becomes increasingly attractive to an attacker.

With the prospect so poor for direct countermeasures against secret arming and surprise attack, the chief deterrent against a nation pursuing this wanton course will lie in the measures of retaliation that can quickly be brought to bear upon her.

Yet the traditional procedure with respect to retaliation—that of each nation, large and small, arming individually for defense—now gives far less assurance than ever of being effective. In fact, a world in which even a few of the large nations are poised for instant retaliation—and therefore for instant attack—would represent a quite ridiculous degree of instability. The single alternative is a world police force well aimed to uphold the cause of the non-aggressors. It emerges as the best agency of retaliation and hence the best deterrent to international crime. It is likely to combine the greatest degree of formidability with the very much needed guarantee against accidental discharge.

In the case of prolonged attack it must be recognized that the more destructive each missile becomes, the greater the potential danger from failure to intercept even a small percentage of missiles. The destructive power of the atomic bomb being what it is, the potency of poisons, radioactive and biological, being what they threaten to be, the chances of satisfactorily surviving prolonged attack, even granted a mobilization of all defensive measures, are so poor as to make defense in a long war a highly unattractive gamble. Hence, the chance of a nation coping successfully with either a surprise or a prolonged attack can be written down to a very low order of attractiveness. This reduces the logic of future peace to a single proposition, namely, that by one or another political innovation hostilities must be made as unlikely as possible. Nations henceforth will court ruin, economically if not politically, should each

undertake to assure its own military protection. The essential condition of continued peace now takes the form of an overwhelming preponderance of force on the side of peace, and since this cannot be provided satisfactorily by each nation acting independently, we are left with the single solution of an international organization.

If the preponderance of force provided by this international organization is great enough, as well as sufficiently in evidence, the chance of its having to be employed at all in vanquishing an aggressor becomes quite small, for when opposed by such a formidable array, a nation, or specifically a national leadership, would scarcely be so foolhardy as to act on the notion that international crime pays.

So we are brought to conclude that mankind has emerged for all time from the era in which national defense could be viewed in terms of national preparedness. Henceforth, defense (meaning exclusively collective defense) can be approached only along political avenues. And the more threatening science makes the force which a would-be conqueror can wield, the greater of course must be the favorable balance of the counterforce if the aggressor is to be dissuaded from his plan.

If, as now seems disconcertingly likely, the United Nations issues from its formative period as a weakling among strong national powers, or if it sets up nothing more effective than a written agreement not to wage war or to employ weapons of mass destruction, we must expect that most peoples will ere long live in such an atmosphere of apprehension as has scarcely been experienced before.¹ In the face of all pervading dread of war, every limited peacetime safeguard will lose even its trifling normal power to reassure.

By reaching the conclusion that a world military force is now the only practicable form of protection, we have unfortunately merely shifted the basis of our dilemma, not simplified it. It is only too true that the tremendous military strength and unfailing readiness for swift retaliation with which the world military agency must be endowed will make the task of creating it an exceedingly ticklish one, as the thus far abortive efforts of the United Nations demonstrate. Indeed it needs only a moment's reflection to make it clear that it is one thing to postulate an all powerful international military agency and quite another to visualize

¹Since this was written, it has been announced from Lake Success that the Security Council will be so constituted as to be effective in restraining the lesser powers but will be impotent in the face of any one of the Big Five. This would seem to wrest from it all chance of its offering any degree of world security whatever.

the political mechanism to which it could safely be entrusted. For if the political control is not completely above temptation and corruption the contracting nations might, in the single stroke of giving it birth, place themselves under an unassailable world tyranny.

So let us, in the little time at our disposal, explore further the nature and *modus operandi* of this political agency.

As to how, in any crisis, the agency of law and order would operate, there appear to be two somewhat contrasting possibilities, though both lead to essentially the same climax.

Almost without exception, the decision to lead a nation into war irrespective of or in protest against a United Nations verdict would be a political decision made and executed by certain highly placed individuals in a national government. The initial act of the United Nations might therefore be to restrain this high political group. Were these recognized leaders to be restrained or dislodged from power, and perhaps imprisoned and tried, some delaying action, if not a total collapse of their plan would result. Had Hitler, for example, been removed from the German scene, say, at the time of his Austrian *putsch*, it is at least a fair assumption that the war would never have occurred.

But removal of a nation's leaders leaves a vacuum, and to fill it the supreme political power would have either to dictate the successor or, should constitutional processes exist within the offending state, to order that these be invoked. In both cases, this supreme power would effectively hold a life and death grip upon each national government. In a major crisis, whether the world power were to render ineffective the offending executive heads of a state, or to launch at once a full scale military offensive, it would necessarily be complete military master and hence political master of the outcome. The present status of Japan and Germany is no more helpless than would be that of any nation at the hands of the world government were the former to be deemed a transgressor.

There has, to be sure, been much vague talk of the nations of the world now being ready in heart and mind to part with a portion of their sovereignty in favor of such a world government and the collective action it would entail. But manifestly it is a Procrustes bed that cannot at once fit such extremes as Russia and the United States. Were they to become bedfellows there would, no doubt, be continuous fear on the part of each that the other was plotting to bring about its metamorphosis so as to bring its government into harmony with the other's accepted

standards. Yet it is nonetheless true that the greater the diversity among current political ideologies the greater the need of the kind of surveillance and control which a world government could provide.

The crux of the problem is quite obviously to insure that this superpower, if created, will never choose to violate its constitutionally granted authority, yet we see that this makes the problem as difficult as it is obvious. Considering the past reluctance of independent peoples to unite in forming a world police force, we appreciate that the urgency which is felt to underlie such a program must be well nigh irresistible. Indeed, collective security under a single police agency, if unwisely preached, might galvanize isolationism into vigorous life again. Only when the transcendently destructive powers which hang their ominous pall over the future, are widely and clearly appreciated, will the various peoples be prepared to shake off tradition to the extent of forsaking national sovereignty and competitive armament for collective security.

It is to the physical and biological scientists that the world must look for helpful and authoritative guidance in building up this conviction. As their coworkers in politics and statecraft seek political means to minimize the dangers of a world military authority, scientists must build up as nearly a universal belief as possible that the time is now at hand for mankind to understand that in the matter of security at least they must work together, not separately. This will involve a radically new outlook with respect to international relations.

CHAPTER XV

Science and Brotherly Love

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ALTHOUGH THE METAPHOR of the scientist in an ivory tower is of recent origin, the circumstances of its birth are already shrouded in mystery. This historic hiatus is due to the emotional miasma which surrounds it. The myth of the ivory tower was apparently invented by the dire need for a whipping post to which to chain culprit scientists whom their ebullient brethren, just emerging from the baptism of their conversion to social consciousness, wished to mock and castigate in public. And public chastisement of colleagues, like its complement of fasting, deivism, or confession, renders invaluable service to frustrated and restless souls.

It is part and parcel of the duplex folklore of science and rationalism that science, being new and true and international, definitely constitutes the happiest fairgrounds where men the world over can meet without prejudice and nonsense, behave as decent and honest men should or would, were it not for capitalism, faith, superstition, vested interests, nationalist propaganda, and other artificial and corrupting forces. Presumably we are all mere victims; the evil that engulfs us comes from without, from bad men and their even worse institutions. Abolish that evil and we will revert forthwith to our pristine decency and justice.

We need not go into the reasons why it is folly to assume in the light of modern knowledge that social difficulties and conflicts stem from criminal individuals and institutions. After all, their existence is an integral part of a culture, which is itself an expression of deep-seated human needs. True enough, most social institutions fail to gratify all facets of expectation, or clash, or compete with other wants or the stereotyped forms of their expression. Nevertheless, these inadequacies forestall the

lethargy and smugness of an immobile equilibrium; and painful and costly though they may be, they work ultimately for change and progress. Hence it is the subject, man, that stands in need of study, as do also the forces that make him behave as he does, both the visible and the subconscious ones. How is it possible to postulate sound laws of social development before the nature of man is even partly understood? And surely the modern sciences of man have demonstrated that these tasks are truly enormous and perplexing, and that the nineteenth century notions of man, generated by its characteristic rationalism and limited by the cultural matrix of the period, constitute as childish an approach to the problem as primitive man's attitudes toward medicine or the weather.

Let us then consider the specific points at issue. Are there elements in modern science which make for "national sanity and international cooperation"? Since it is modern science that is singled out, one may rightly ask how it differs from ancient or medieval science, and what precisely are the new elements in it which might be capable of achieving that which the sciences of the past could not.

Surely the differences between the sciences of diverse periods are a matter of degree rather than kind, and the glib statements in modern textbooks to the effect that the ancients failed to differentiate between fact and hypothesis, that they failed properly to verify their postulates, and that they displayed inadequate or no respect for quantitative measurements, should be taken with more than a grain of salt. The calendar, the procession of the equinoxes, the Ptolemaic theory, the epicycles of Eudoxus and Hipparchus, and the prediction of eclipses must necessarily have been products of considerable scientific observation and generalization. And verification or justification of hypotheses is as natural to man as their postulation. Moreover, choice between alternative theories is obligatory. Besides, what human being does not strive to present as much evidence in favor of his beliefs as can possibly be mustered? True enough, until about a century after Galileo most students of celestial phenomena were encumbered with astrological hypotheses which we regard today as preposterous, but their logic was perfectly sound and consistent within the framework of their overt or unconscious assumptions. It might even be advisable not to be too pontifical in stigmatizing their postulates. The alchemical principles of the unity of matter and transmutation of elements were classified as preposterous until recently, but after Rutherford's demonstration of the transformation of nitrogen into oxygen in

1919, this tune had to change. From raving madmen and charlatans the alchemists became "visionaries and fortune-tellers" on a par with Paracelsus and Democritus. The same may well prove to be true of the theories of the astrologers when more knowledge is accumulated concerning the influence of cosmic or stellar radiations on the nuclear states of earthly matter.

That due respect was paid to the quantitative aspects of primitive observation and thought is well known. Consider the quantitative fussiness of the prescriptions and recipes found in the Egyptian papyri, and the strict demands for accuracy in the performance of ritual everywhere. Most impressive of all are the compound medicines of the Middle Ages or antiquity. Every item had to be carefully weighed and measured, and carelessness was punished by annulment of the entire, sloppy effort.

Similar conclusions must be reached from an impartial study of the history of alchemy. The oft-reiterated claim that the alchemists were charlatans, out for gold and glory, is folly. The only possible justification of this superstition may be the fact that the age in which the alchemists were admitted possessed few if any outlets for romance, glorification of learning and wisdom, and therefore fell avidly upon alchemy and inflated the feats of the adepts to heroic dimensions. A fascinating mythology thus came into being which the soulless and superficial rationalism of the nineteenth century necessarily misconstrued and in consequence was obliged to ridicule.

The alchemists studied the nature of matter, the chemical properties of metals, oxides, solids, liquids, and gases in all their bewildering complexity. Despite the intrinsic difficulties of those incipient stages, they made amazing progress. Messing around as they did with mortars and alembics, with matrasses and aludels in their search for the elixir of life, the philosopher's stone, or the secrets of transmutation, they managed nonetheless to elucidate the properties of aqua regia, nitric, hydrochloric, sulphuric, and sulfurous acids, various alkali solutions and ammonia water, such elements as bismuth, antimony and arsenic, the compounds of zinc, the oxides, chlorides, and nitrates of several metals, the salts of iron, lead, ammonium, and sulphur, to mention only the better known heritage. In addition, great advances were achieved in distillation, precipitation, sublimation, calcination, crystallization, cupellation of gold and silver, preparation of elements and their compounds, many adroit chemical processes of industrial value, and numerous complex reactions.

Then faith was well expressed by one of their earliest Arab apostles, Rhazes "The secret art of chemistry (alchemy) is more possible than not. Her mysteries reveal themselves to those adepts who invest labor and tenacity, but what triumphs await those who succeed in lifting a corner of the veil hiding nature's mysteries!"

The alchemists were martyred in virtually every court of Europe. Wisely, but in vain, did Albertus Magnus lay down the famous eight commandments, the last of which read "He [the alchemist] must avoid having any relations with princes or sovereigns." The reason he stated as follows. "If you are unfortunate enough to be known to kings and princes you shall be pelted with their foolish questions, 'Well, Master, how goes the work? When do we see some good results?' In their impatience for results they will dub you cheat, good for nothing, etc., and be generally annoying and scornful. And if you are not lucky enough to obtain good results in the end, you will receive the full brunt of their fury. If contrariwise you succeed, they will keep you in permanent captivity to oblige you to work for their benefit." For the two hundred years or so in which the alchemists were at the peak of fashion, many of the most prominent were tortured and assassinated by kings.

It seems the alchemists were the first to postulate a consistent theory of evolution. The crude, primeval matter within the womb of the earth underwent internal changes in the course of time and was thereby transformed from base into noble metals. The energy for this transformation came from the radiations of the stars. All compounds found in the earth were arranged on a rising linear scale, in order of purity from the lowest, basest metal, which was lead, to the highest and noblest, gold. Clearly this scheme is much like that of the later zoologists who arranged the animal kingdom from protozoa to primates on a similar evolutionary scale.

It logically followed that the alchemists viewed all matter as one. This notion of the unity of matter was a Greek contribution while the wealth of practical knowledge with which they began was primarily a gift of Egypt. This concept of unity became a sacred, truly religious tenet, repeated prayerlike in all their letters and texts.

Living in an age of faith, the alchemists as a learned and intellectual group, were deeply religious. This also meant that they were socially conscious, since the relation of man to man is one of the cornerstones of religious thought. They desired to rid mankind of disease and physical misfortune. They believed that God represented everything that was noble

and laudable. Therefore, they concluded that any adept in the alchemical arts who succeeds in finding the stellar precipitate will be able, in addition to performing a transmutation, to cure the sick, and bring light to the stricken in mind. Just as many moderns believe that logic and reason have intrinsic rules of their own, independent of particular contents and methods, or values, so did the alchemists believe that power to achieve perfection was a thing in itself, to be applied with equal efficacy to base metals, mental disease, or physical deformity.

Similarly, the reason that every student of the skies was an astrologer was precisely because he permitted his concern for mankind to govern his interests in the celestial world. To illustrate this point let us consider the case of Tycho Brahe, the greatest observer of the skies prior to the coming of the telescope, an ingenious and accurate designer of instruments, dubbed by many the father of modern astronomy. Before the coming of Tycho, declares a great biographer of his, "no astronomer had yet made up his mind to take nothing for granted on the authority of the ancients, but to determine everything himself. Nobody had perceived that the answers to the many questions which were perplexing astronomers could only be given by the heavens, but that the answers could be forthcoming only if the heavens were properly interrogated by means of improved instruments capable of determining every astronomical quantity anew by systematic observations." Tycho was that man. "Not only did he defy Aristotle but he was even a martyr of science," since he was severely attacked for that very defiance.¹

Typical of his time, Tycho was a courageous defender of astrology, and a fairly prolific writer on the subject. In 1574, he was invited by the king of Denmark to lecture at the University of Copenhagen. In his first lecture he gave a historical survey of astronomy, geometry, and mathematics, but with this formality out of the way he sailed directly into the more attractive expanses of astrology. Anyone can study astronomy who happens to be gifted with a mathematical sense, but the real greatness of the science lies in its value to man and society, hence in its social implications. Understanding the bearing of celestial events on the fates of nations and individuals requires true learning, wisdom, and perspicacity. Tycho asserts that "we cannot deny the influence on the stars without disbelieving in the wisdom of God," as if unaware that the Church had been battling that science for eleven or twelve centuries. Even the pagan

¹ J. L. E. Dreyer, *Tycho Brahe*, Black, Edinburgh, 1890, p. 9

religion of Greece had opposed it on the same grounds as Christianity, namely, that it proclaimed man subject to the rule of stars and their orbits, thus denying his divine soul and free will. Tycho presents the usual arguments based on the influence of the sun, the effects of the moon on tides, weather, marine animals, mankind, disease, etc. Like Ptolemy fifteen centuries or so before him he cites the experiences of "sailors and cultivators." Observation, religion, science, human sympathy, and the diverse mores of the time, mingle freely and intimately in his discourse, much as we see them in the writings of all the scientists of the past.

The alchemical fraternity constituted one of the friendliest and most truly international organizations during the Middle Ages. No greater community of interests and no more genuine spirit of comradeship have prevailed anywhere since. Without the artificial shackles of discipline, without excommunication or witch trials for deviation, without the bickering that marks the various Socialist Internationals, sheer love of knowledge and a deep sense of brotherhood in its arduous pursuits created an atmosphere in which friction because of race, religion, nationality, or difference in viewpoint was unthinkable. In a culture literally saturated with provincial fears and prejudice, Christian, Jewish, and Arab alchemists traveled through Europe, North Africa, and Asia, protected, housed, and entertained by their colleagues. In an age of ghetto and castes, the court of Rudolph II teemed with Jewish alchemists.

Every hero of alchemy was a cosmopolitan figure. Whether the accounts are based on historical accuracy is of little importance, since what matters is what legend has made of their lives and deeds, hence what the people believed in and wanted to hear. Raymond Lull was a learned and pious man, high in the councils of sultans and kings. Legend had him go to North Africa to convert the heathen, probably because it had reveled in his having been a powerful sinner in his earlier court days. In Africa he was warmly greeted by admiring Arab savants and physicians, but after accepting with grace their homage and hospitality, Raymond proceeded to preach the gospel of Christ. He insulted the name of Mohammed in the market place and was arrested, tried as an infidel, and condemned to die. However, all the scholars of Arabia pleaded for clemency and he was pardoned with the caveat that he never set foot again on Mohammedan territory. He thereupon returned to Milan and continued his experimental studies in alchemy and medicine. Could this have happened in Nazi Germany, or in Soviet Russia and her spheres of

influence? There were no passports in those dark ages and no work permits, so Arnold worked and earned a livelihood in England, France, Italy, and the other countries he visited.

Nicholas Flamel wandered in many lands, studied with rabbis in Spain, and discoursed with alchemists wherever he went. Bernard of Treviso, or the Good Trevisan, visited laboratories "in Germany, England, France, Spain, Italy, Arabia, Egypt, and other lands," in the company of a retinue of scholars and hangers-on whom he supported out of the great wealth he inherited. The later apostles of alchemy, men like Trithemius, Denis Zacharie, John Dee, Sethonius Scotus also known as the Cosmopolite, Michael Sendivogius the Pole, famed for his mastery of dyeing, and the mysterious Lascaris, were all truly apostolic in their grandeur and passion for propagating the faith. As truly international as was Paul, the apostle of Christianity, they sojourned in homes of fellow scholars and adepts wherever they wandered; they disputed and experimented in all the lands and cities they visited and sought to convert the skeptics to the most wondrous mysteries of nature.

The alchemists and astrologers of the Middle Ages did not need the aid of international foundations or articles in scientific publications or commencement addresses to remind them that science was the heritage of the entire human race. It was not necessary to send students and scholars abroad so as to foster mutual understanding among peoples, which those measures seldom achieve anyhow. The internationalism of knowledge or science, like the fatherhood of God, was taken for granted. Italy was the seat of the great universities, and that was where everybody studied. Harvey, Vesalius, Copernicus, Roger Bacon, or Paracelsus were not national products or recluses.

And yet provincialism was never stronger and was never ceased. Intolerance may, perhaps, be estimated to have been weaker, judging by the record. For example, even the tragedy of witchcraft allegedly took only close to a million victims in about three and a half centuries of its violent eruption after the Crusades. How puny that figure looks by comparison with the cold blooded Nazi slaughter, or the millions of peasants, workers, and intellectuals liquidated in Soviet Russia during one five year plan alone! And the same holds true for the persecution of scientists. No scientists were really executed by the Catholic and Protestant zealots on scientific grounds. Neither Bruno nor Servetus, nor even Lavoisier was executed as a scientist. It was not until the coming of Com-

munism and later, Nazism, that ideology entered the laboratory. More scientists were executed in a single decade in atheist Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia than by the entire rest of the world prior to their existence. Hence it may very well be that the brotherhood of learning established by alchemy and astrology was of some help, and that some international bonds do palliate the human tendency toward intolerance.

Before we set out to discuss the role of modern science in the effort for "national sanity and international cooperation," we might examine the nature of the disruptive forces which we are seeking the aid of science to combat. Although the peoples of the democracies, in their hunger for peace and prosperity, dashed madly back to their tents and their pursuits of happiness as soon as the victorious termination of World War II was assured, the fact remains that a state of ideological warfare exists in the world today which will necessarily emerge sooner or later in the form of armed conflict. Upon a Europe which had only just begun to look forward to the promise of democracy, suffrage, education, and technological progress, there descended the philosophy of class struggle, of violence and revolution, which produced the unholy twins of Communism in Russia and Nazism in Germany, with Italian Fascism as a minor appendage. Man had known civil strife and rebellion before, but never mass murder so rigidly rationalized, sanctioned, and instigated as by these philosophies.

With Nazism gone as an embodied menace, let us see the state of the world today. After signing agreements and treaties, though admittedly of a preliminary nature, Soviet Russia has calmly but resolutely proceeded to annex, subjugate, or "influence" about twelve countries so far, with the end definitely far from sight. Aggression is again on the march, even more brazenly than in the days of Hitler, and employing identical methods of fantastic accusations, arrests, and executions. The same prisons are being used by equally ruthless officials, the prisoners themselves are more often than not the same, and so are in all probability the torture weapons. Moreover, it cannot be denied that in the eyes of Communism the American form of government and its elected representatives stand condemned as a terrorist gang, oppressing the workers and robbing other nations. Hence its overthrow and the extermination of its devotees are acts of loyalty and duty to humanity and justice.

And here we have in its fullest essence the very same tragedy that engulfed humanity only three hundred years ago, though of course in a

totally different cultural setting and on a smaller scale. But symptoms of human diseases necessarily vary with the culture of the period, while the disease itself may well remain the same. Witchcraft was a necessary consequence of the belief in magic, and its motivating force was the good of humanity and the glory of God. Surely there was a God Who stood for goodness and justice, and surely there was a devil who sought out agents whom he urged and taught or made unconsciously to undermine the work of the Lord and His servants. Those citizens who were dedicated to the good of mankind and whose souls yearned to serve their Creator were the ones found in the vanguard of the persecution. There were some whose character rebelled against the brutality, no matter how rationalized, but then there were also such people in Germany or Russia. They were the ones whom the presses of those countries denounced as liberal weaklings or capitalist stooges.

The believers in witchcraft were caught in a belief trap from which they could not possibly extricate themselves until a combination of forces permitted a certain degree of liberation. It is interesting that its grip loosened somewhat prior to the coming of science. What concerns us here however is that the emotional outlets of witchcraft and of Communism seem almost identical. Communism, too, has located the causes of all evil, namely, in the capitalist and his agents; eliminate them and the kingdom of God is secured. As with the witch hunters of the past, a cerebral diagnosis of a cause and elaboration of a scheme for a future society, based on no other test or evidence beyond rational manipulation, are considered fully adequate to justify the murder of millions of living human beings.

The only difference is that witchcraft was hatched in a religious atmosphere while Communism emerged in an age of science and natural law. Witchcraft drew its elaborate justification and its rationale from the science of the time, *i.e.*, magic, and its emotional defense from the lofty social and spiritual ideals of religion. Nazism drew its nurture from a frustrated nationalism, from pseudo-biologic rationalizations, from its Prussian heritage, from the fear of violent Communist threats and from a modified socialist philosophy of its own. Communism is the outgrowth of the pseudo-scientific concoction of Marxism, personal frustration, the Russian cultural heritage, the optimistic rationalism of the nineteenth century, spiced with a flaming idealism which is aided and abetted by

the numerous evils that still beset most of the young democracies, and mankind generally.

How can the method of science help us attain the twin goals of national sanity and international cooperation? Clearly the answer must be, in no way whatever. Do the government approved Russian scientists not partake of the refinements of the method of science, and were then German analogues ignorant of its mysteries? So long as reason is subservient to the soothing lure of a cathartic nostalgia suitable to individual or group frustrations or aggressions and reinforced by a projected but nonetheless real and potent love of nation or class, it is difficult to see how the methods of the natural sciences can be of any help. Experience seems to indicate that neither the method nor the content of science, nor the rate of its unfolding, can in any way influence man's liberation from the shackles of emotional, usually unstated and submerged, assumptions, values, goals, and loyalties.

The history of science seems to suggest that human thought and reason can no more be isolated from the matrix of a culture than from that of a period. The human being is one single organism with a modicum of rational behavior which like oil floats on the surface, hiding a vast reservoir of unconscious, interblanching, and interacting experiences and desires. It is no more possible to isolate pure thought or logic from this complex mental cauldron than to isolate the function of a lone gene, or the formation of a lone organ in a developing embryo. Anthropologists have on similar grounds concluded that it is impossible to understand the function of an isolated institution, or worse yet, a custom, unless the culture is analyzed in terms of its functional totality and of the personality complex it had generated.

There can be no doubt that the method of science is making continuous progress and that aspects of the universe, erstwhile deeply immersed in the emotional cross currents of the mind, are now significantly freed from irrelevant intrusions. Physics, chemistry, geology, astronomy, and many aspects of biology or medicine, have certainly become emotionally liberated to a considerable degree. Yet, this does not mean that they are completely unencumbered. Thus, the nineteenth century, characterized by an ebullient faith in its concepts of law and mechanistic interpretations, its peculiar version of evolution and progress, mixed with boundless faith in human goodness and perfectibility, definitely left its mark

on the various sciences of the time. And we have no reason to believe that limitations corresponding to our peculiar period are not with us now.

The main point to be made here, however, is that the identity of, for example, the pattern of witchcraft, with that of Communism or Nazism, suggests that there is a certain, as if constant amount of emotional tension and aggression in man which like a liquid under pressure will flow wherever the channels permit. When the culture shuts off some outlets, new ones are found, or forcefully fabricated. Thus, if the variously caused inner restiveness cannot exploit the stars for its release, it will impound or enslave some other aspect of thought. Man has not yet elaborated any tools capable of controlling those dominant primary forces operating beneath the surface layers of his conduct. These substrata of individual and social forces are as yet little known.

It is difficult to see what scientists can do in the face of the coming struggle for power between two apparently irreconcilable concepts of man, society, and freedom. Though the present phase of this struggle is hardly two years old, it is already nearing its victorious completion for Soviet Russia and her police state on the European continent, with success in Asia, in Korea or China, for example, not far in the offing. Much more often than not, ruthlessness wins over decency, particularly the ruthlessness and cynicism wielded by Communism and supported by a widespread fifth column.

Since one of our goals is national sanity, a glimpse at the ideological status of the domestic scene will not be amiss. We are witnessing today a group who style themselves Progressives, and who defend government by secret police, deportation of millions, secret imprisonment, exile or execution, one party mock elections, concentration camps. Should any average American express disapproval of these institutions, he is immediately labeled a war monger, a red baiter, a hater of the Soviet Union, a Fascist, an agent of Wall Street. In addition, a determined effort is being made to identify the above cited institutions, which constitute the Bill of Rights of Russia and Communism, with Democracy, or better still, the New Democracy, so as to confound and bewilder the American public, demolish their faith, and prepare the ground for the new gospel. And ideas are seeds regardless of initial resistance and loyalties. Already cynicism has spread regarding the goals and purpose of the war against Nazism, and the spark of idealism which glistered for a while during the war has already vanished in the mire of this subtle propaganda.

Devoted to democratic institutions, imperfect though they may still be, the American people are growing daily more frustrated. Their faith in the United Nations, so potent at the termination of the war, is being whittled down, what with Russian restoration of the Mussolini tradition of walking out, the endless Soviet bickering and stalling over atomic control, Russian refusal to participate in any agency that will foster internationalism, to say nothing of events in central Europe and the Balkans. The results of these frustrations are already apparent. A return to conservatism, isolationism, and anti anything that favors the erstwhile attractive ideals, is definitely upon us, endangering not only the lessons of the past war, but also the social and humanitarian accomplishments of the New Deal. And it is difficult to predict where the revulsion will lead an infuriated public.

How can the methods of the natural sciences help stem these tragic developments at home and abroad? Could the method of science have stopped Charles Lindbergh in 1940 from bairstorming the country for peace and against the admitted horrors of war, when apparently his primary motivation was sympathy for the Nazi terror and expansion? Can the method of science stop Henry Wallace in 1947, when his primary motivation is by analogous reasoning sympathy for the Soviet terror and expansion? Apparently the method of science is even helpless in situations involving agreement on some simple facts. It seems far easier to agree on the exact age of the Devonian or Cenozoic periods than on the standard of living of a Russian worker, even though Soviet wages and prices are available to all.

Is there anything that we, possibly one of freedom's last generations, can contribute toward "national sanity and international cooperation"? It seems to me all we can do is to scan the horizon for some possible token of solace even if realizable only in the far distant future.

It is a common remark of historians that ancient and medieval man made the earth the center of the universe and regarded himself as the object of nature's or God's prime concern. Modern man, it is claimed, has been taught by science to know his own insignificance. There is, however, a contrary aspect to this situation. It may well be maintained that man of antiquity and the Middle Ages recognized in God the universal forces and the governing fates which were much too mighty for his puny person. He therefore raised God to the rank of father and provider to protect his weak and sinful little self. Science and rationalism, on the

other hand, have swelled man's pride and self-importance. He was cocksure he could master the universe, and would submit to no such dictum as, "Thus far shall you go and no further." To stifle vestiges of past humility he conjured up a vile horde of environmentalist devils to be blamed for all evil. All one had to do was to remove the artificial causes of man's waywardness, and the release alone would raise him to an admirable level, which is his proper due. Thus, the folklore of radicalism declares that there is no true democracy without economic democracy. The assertion that there is no real democracy without biologic democracy is considered defeatism, presumably because economic democracy is held to be real and long since under control, while the biological factors are not yet so. The supposition that economic democracy may be the product of factors not quite under human control is simply inadmissible and unscientific.

Yet, surely, not every social institution is sufficiently malleable to be under human control, and one is not obliged to assume that all human conflict and frustration can be happily resolved once it is merely decided to do so. Contrary to past notions, social institutions are not as a rule the inventions of single individuals, but come into being in a devious and complex manner and as a result of the interaction of numerous forces and influences. They do not descend upon a society from a mystic nowhere, but emerge from people's responses and notions. They are therefore an organic part of the culture and of the individuals which compose it. Whether other institutions are able to perform functionally and emotionally the same tasks more efficiently, and at the same or less cost in friction and rebound, can only be answered by experiment and experience, certainly not by logical manipulations solely.

It is fashionable to invoke the atomic bomb whenever modern science and peace are being discussed. But how does the atomic bomb change the basic issues? Science is not a modern invention. Primitive man was a discoverer, inventor, and theorizer. When he first perfected the bow and arrow, mankind was faced with the same problem that confronts us today. Should the new invention be used to increase man's food supply and strengthen his security, or should man use it to kill neighbors and strangers? The question remained the same when gunpowder was discovered and is in the same state now.

It is quite obvious that the answer lies in the sphere of human conduct, hence in the realm of goals, values, and morals. There is nothing in

either the method or the meat of science to determine the social purpose to which it should be applied. There is no escape from the necessity of creating a moral and ethical matrix in which mankind can derive the largest benefits from human achievement. As vague or true as this answer may seem, there is, for good or for evil, no other answer that makes sense. Of course, in this age of gadgets and scientific management, it looks much nicer to offer a scheme or a formula; but even the most acute victims of nineteenth century rationalism can see by now that newly acquired knowledge can bring us back to old problems, though with better tools and understanding. Gunpowder, incendiaries, or atomic energy—there simply is no substitute for human values and decency.

The creation of a moral atmosphere, governed by an international ten commandments or bill of human rights which can in no way be abrogated by quibbles, is a prime necessity at the moment. The pursuit of science has as much to gain from its introduction as the physical and spiritual progress of man. So long as there is moral anarchy, science is in danger, particularly in these times when it is at the height of fashion. We have seen that the forces of aggression in man will express themselves in different forms at different periods as crusades or the witchcraft mania, as nationalism, class struggle, or racialism. In our times science constitutes the favorite hunting ground for rationalized defenses of all ideology coated aggressive outlets. Nazism, a purely nationalist outlet, based itself on science just as much as Communism, an internationalist emotional channel. The only responsibility of the scientist that is cogent, it seems to me, is to protect his field of labor from emotional invasions which are inevitable in an amoral world.^a

A second conclusion which emerges from the above discussion is that more than ever we must rely upon the method of science to enlarge our knowledge of the vast mystery of man's conscious and hidden psyche, the gates to which have been opened by the labors and vision of Freud and his followers. To do this successfully the rationalist folklore must be abandoned. No scientific advance is possible under its superstitious

^aComment by Robert C. Angell

This paper is at the opposite pole from Doctor Mudd's [C/ Chapter XXIII]. Where Doctor Mudd is too optimistic, it seems to me that Doctor Graubard is too pessimistic. It is true that science cannot set the goals of human effort. But scientists who are humanitarians may choose to work upon problems that are pertinent to the establishment and maintenance of a peaceful world order, and by so doing they can possibly design instrumentalities that will bring us more speedily to the goal desired.

sway. A little humility and some recognition of natural difficulties and limitations will prevent too facile solutions. A false theory in chemistry is no real tragedy, while a false theory in the realm of human or social relations has led repeatedly to the murder of millions.^b

Where should the energy and nurture for the creation of a strong moral and ethical matrix come from? Man has always sought it. Every culture and every tribe have had their prophets who inveighed against evil and exhorted the people to live in justice and decency. The only effective emotional vehicle for this ethical inspiration discovered so far resides in religion. Contrary to the hopes of the rationalists of the past, it does not seem as though reason and science can quite replace it. The rational props of human conduct proved so fragile and puny and themselves so much in need of diagnosis and treatment, that their use as a foundation for ethics and international morals was out of the question. On the contrary, it is from the establishment of an independent moral and ethical authority resting upon a common emotional nature of man, that both reason and science stand to benefit.

The discovery that religion has to be called upon again does not mean that one overlooks its past failures, or that one wishes its return in exactly the forms of the past. Religion is no more static than any other socio-cultural institution. It has been undergoing as much evolutionary change as, though perhaps at a slower rate than, alchemy or astrology. For example, two hundred years ago belief in the devil was a major tenet of Christianity. Today the devil is gradually being forced out of all religious belief. Even the notion of immortality or punishment and reward after death are no longer as vital or basic as they seemed a hundred years ago. Hence the primary religious belief complex seems eminently promising for the function needed. Its past failures were unavoidable, since it was not based on the science of man. Should the science of man and his inner as well as social interactions fail to advance in the future, the value

^bComment by Gottfried Salomon Delatou.

In the mythological struggle of the giants which raised the whole earth against Olympus and in the myth of Prometheus, our whole activist creed is involved. It assures us that knowledge is a kind of domination. Science for power, this is the demonic force which has succeeded. Mastering the world, science has not provided an answer to men and has not given us control of his fantastic sources. Nevertheless, man is the creator of a "second nature," the artificial world of sciences and arts. The sources of these cultural achievements are magical. Joel has shown how deep our natural philosophy is rooted in magical and mystical forces. What we have to understand seems to be, according to Jung, the archetypes and their hierarchy to fight the upheaval of the earth and establish a new authority.

of religion as the proposed ethical prop remains questionable. A functional moral atmosphere on a religious model, like a hospital or a power house, can only perform its intended function if based upon sound scientific principles. Their discovery and their subsequent employment in the building of a faith for modern man and in improving his national and international conduct, are the two major challenges of a culture based on science

CHAPTER XVI

History and International Understanding

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UPON FIRST CONSIDERATION, it may seem that there is no doubt about history's contribution to international understanding. Is not one of the great glories of history to narrate the deeds and the qualities of the nations, past and present? Is not one of its essentials to give an understanding of each other? In fact, if we look at the international situation as it developed in the generation prior to the First World War and as it was partly resumed in the interlude between the two wars, where was exhibited a more impressive example of international cooperation than in the field of history and its collateral spheres? Did not modern Rome and Athens appear to be ruled by an intellectual International built on a federal basis? Did they not establish national historical and archaeological institutions, send out cooperating national missions for excavation, and unite on publishing plans? It became fashionable in Europe, especially after 1930, to build up such cultural and historical institutes in most of the countries that had a somewhat interesting past and a not completely negligible future.

Nevertheless, a leisurely observer might ask, how far can we understand each other? How well can we understand a foreign nation and especially that foreign nation's past? How well can we understand any past? Of course, the most simple and impressive answer would be to point at the overwhelming number of outstanding works on the most remote past of the nations of China, India, Egypt, etc. The leisurely observer, however, might object that he did not doubt that knowledge could be gained, but that he had asked about understanding. And not without some irritation he might add, do the historians actually want to understand a foreign nation's past? Do they not rather, under the pre-

text of studying foreign history, discuss their own inner political problems? Think what the French historians of the Restoration period did with the English and American Revolutions, with Cromwell and Washington.

Think of Carlyle's Frederick of Prussia, and, certainly not least important, think how the writers of Roman history, Mommsen included, dealt with Caesar! Within recent national history the history of the French Revolution offers an impressive example of historical writing permeated with a contemporary political problem. To this argument can be countered the approval that Treitschke's biography of Cavour won with the Italians who, at least up to 1937, considered it the best work written on the founder of Italy's national unity.

Here we can ask, with some humility, what is history? what is the basic activity of the historian? This question has become much easier to answer in 1947 since the publication of R. G. Collingwood's *The Idea of History*.¹ The late British philosopher and historian followed a track along which Nietzsche and Dilthey, Simmel and Croce had opened new vistas. In the second of his *Thoughts out of Season*,² Nietzsche wrote, "Suppose a man is working on Democritus. The question is on my tongue: why precisely Democritus? Why not Heraclitus or Philo, or Bacon, or Descartes? And then, why a philosopher? why not a poet or orator? and why especially a Greek? why not an Englishman or a Turk? Is not the past large enough to let you find some place where you may disport yourself without becoming ridiculous? . . . Like by like otherwise you will draw the past to your own level . . . Thus history is to be written by the man of experience and character. He who has not lived through something greater and nobler than others, will not be able to explain anything great and noble in the past." To this overstatement the objection may justly be made that one need not be Caesar in order to understand Caesar, nor Luther to write a life of Luther.

Croce speaks of all history as being contemporary history. "the condition of the existence of history is that the deed of which the history is told must vibrate in the soul of the historian . . . How could there be a history of a sentiment or of a custom, for example, that of Christian humility, without the capacity for living again or rather the actual living

¹Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1946.

²Written 1873-1874

again of these particular states of the individual souls?"³ We may think that the failure with which a great historian like Eduard Meyer, this "sober rationalist," met in describing the "*Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*" (1920-1923), resulted from the failure of his soul to vibrate correspondingly. From a similar, though not identical point of view, to that held by Croce, the British historian, Lord Acton, made the distinction between the "modern world since Petrarca, when we know the inside of men, and earlier times when we see them in a glass."⁴

We will here broaden Collingwood's definition, that seems too much restricted to rational thought, and say that the historian understands the past by reliving it. Historical understanding is possible in so far as the reliving of the past is possible. To take one more example from Croce, "Do you wish to understand the true history of a neolithic Ligurian or Sicilian? Try, if you can, to become a neolithic Ligurian or Sicilian in your mind (*sic!*) If you cannot do that or do not care to, content yourself with describing and arranging in series the skulls, implements and drawings which have been found belonging to those neolithic peoples."⁵ Historians have not often asked, what are the limits of historical understanding?

Even Collingwood seems to see no particular difficulties in reliving the past. We should at least be aware of the legitimacy of such a question. Granted that human nature remains one and the same during history, no guarantee is given thereby that we may understand all the aspects and expressions of history. In some contributions made to the history of religion, music, or art, one is strongly tempted to think that such limits have been overstepped. As far as collaboration toward international understanding is concerned, much depends on the importance attributed to the early periods in forming the modern nations and the modern world.

There can be no doubt that our ability to handle the minutiae of historical problems and to write monographic studies has steadily increased during the past three generations. We may observe on the other hand a waning in the writing of Universal History, the waning of the very con-

³Benedetto Croce, *The Theory and Practice of History*, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1923, pp. 12ff.

⁴Cf. Friedrich Engel-Janosi, "The Correspondence between Lord Acton and Bishop Creighton," *The Cambridge Historical Journal*, 1940, p. 318.

⁵Benedetto Croce, *Theory and History of Historiography*, George G. Harrap and Company, London, 1921, pp. 134 f.

cept of Universal History. Those who still make such an attempt in our age, like Toynbee or Spengler, or did in the nineteenth century, like Guizot or Ranke, based their work, as if by necessity, on a supernational concept, whether that of Western civilization or a limited number of civilizations (twenty-one according to Toynbee), or the cultural unit of Spengler, or the concept of the community of the Romanic Teutonic nations, according to Ranke, the latter concept the narrowest among them. The attempt made by Eduard Meyer to write a Universal History of ancient times by a synchronistic method⁶ hardly offers a substitute "The unity of the whole" cannot be built up by outward synchronism.

Only a supranational concept determines the limit of the evaluation of the single nation or justifies a concept like that of national sanity. Only such a supranational idea attributes a value, modified value, to a part concept like the nation. It is characteristic that the concept of Universal History⁷ fades as the concept of Modern Nationalism develops. We certainly cannot parallel the technique of medieval historical writing with that of modern times. Yet in the Middle Ages all history turned into Universal History, whereas with us a short time ago, no such history seemed possible. Ranke considered it a definite achievement that all of his historical and biographical writing developed into Universal History. It is significant that Collingwood, unlike Ranke, deems it necessary to exclude the biography from history.⁸

But while supranational concepts would be of great value to the historian, we cannot expect him to create them. We can easily perceive how concepts like the *populus Christianus* of Thomas Aquinas, the *bonum orbis* of Francis de Vittoria, 1480-1546, the *res publica mundana* of Bodin, 1530-1596, would be helpful. On a narrowed and secularized stage, the concept of Europe as it existed at the Congress of Vienna was

⁶Cf. V. Ehrenberg, *Aspects of the Ancient World*, William Salloch, New York, 1946, p. 222.

⁷No Universal History can be seen in attempts made by a number of historians to unite their single monographic contributions into a general history like *The Cambridge History*. However, the program of *The Cambridge Modern History* as drawn up by Acton, in his report to the Syndics, is of much interest for its discussion of concepts upon which to base Universal History at the end of the nineteenth century. The plan was that the history of a particular country should be told "only in reference and in subordination to a higher series to the common fortunes of mankind."

⁸Collingwood, *op. cit.*, "At its best, it is poetic, at its worst, an obtrusive egotism, but history it can never be." P. 304.

basic to the historiography of Guizot or Ranke. Obviously the Whig philosophy had formed the background against which Gibbon could narrate the story of the Greatest Decline of history. These concepts were always prerequisite to the work of the historian.

In our times no such universal concepts have been accepted. An unresolved struggle to make a choice between different ones or to reject them all together continues to take place. Thus the modern historian is in a difficult position to deal with Universal History. His achievements have been of another kind. We return to the example of the Cavour study by Treitschke, which was warmly hailed by the Italians. How is such an achievement to be explained? Treitschke wrote the life of Cavour out of the longing of a North German patriot for a German statesman similar to the Italian minister, for the achievement of German unity similar to the foundation of Italian political unification. Truly we may say that Treitschke wrote his study while, in the words of Croce, the deeds vibrated in his soul. The purpose was not "international understanding." Rather the knowledge of the history of another nation was applied to the solution of inner political problems. However the warning of Creighton, the Anglican bishop and historian, here holds true, "A study which has for its subject matter the experience of the past, must beware of seeking too direct results." In any event, nobody can deny the impressive intensity which marks the telling of the story.

The answer to whether or not history can make a real contribution to international understanding will largely depend on the basic approach of the historian. We know of two basic positions that have been developed in historical writing. One goes back to ancient Greek thought, and Polybius may be considered its outstanding representative. In it the cycle is the pattern of the course of history, in a most literal sense, "history repeats itself." Certainly this approach has found followers in modern times from Machiavelli to Spengler, from Vico to Toynbee. The second basic attitude is developed from the Christian concept perceiving mankind on its march to the Day of Judgment, mankind unfolding itself on a unique, never to be repeated advance. Secularized and externalized by the philosophy of progress, this concept of history proceeding to a final goal has been the foundation of much historical writing in recent times.^a

^aComment by Alexander H. Leighton.

In regard to the "developmental" concept of History, where does the author place the

It provides the theory of Auguste Comte, according to which human history leads through the three historical phases of the human mind, as well as the Marxian philosophy of history, according to which all of mankind proceeds to the one terrestrial paradise of the classless communistic society. The nationalistic version of this approach may be seen in Hegel's philosophy of history, in which the unfolding of mankind is assigned in each historical period to one chosen nation, the representative of the world spirit, while the rest appear as the wasted energy of God.

However different, extravagant, and inconsistent some of these variations appear, they all go back to the one origin, the Christian concept of human destiny. This concept and its derivations make it necessary to base history on international understanding. The march of mankind is dependent upon some form of international community. Mankind, international and supranational, is the true object of history. With such a concept, every history becomes Universal History. The problem persists, will an historical concept involving such consequences be accepted by our age?

But even while this concept is not accepted, history is not deprived of its values for international understanding. These values may be mainly of a negative kind. They are the merits that intellectual honesty may be always assured of, to recognize the limitations of what one can accomplish, to be free of the attitudes based on veiled ignorance and a readiness to bow to slogans, prejudices, and vague trends. Among these trends I would include the belief that knowledge of historical facts has much to do with historical understanding, though, of course, it is an indispensable prerequisite. Thus the historian when he is not ready to pronounce judg-

influence of the concept of organic evolution? It has been my understanding that this had a tremendous influence in Western thought.

Professor Engel-Janosi's reply

The organic concept in history leads—I think—to the cyclical approach, as a matter of fact, the cyclical concept has to be traced back either to the observation of the astronomic “revolutions” occurring on the firmament or to those of the changing and returning organic life through the seasons. It may be recalled in this connection that a thinker passionately devoted to the observation of organic nature and vehemently averse to Christian thought as Nietzsche was, was led to the theory of the eternal recurrence, a similar approach may explain the cyclical theory of Spengler.

I do not see that a theory of “organic development”—though certainly highly influential in spheres like political, or social thought—produced any great historical writing. The examples of the Decay of Rome, of all the great empires of ancient times, and of some in more recent periods may have prevented an analogous trend to develop in historiography.

ment will learn to keep his mind and his judgment in suspense and to assert openly, on the basis of his training, that judgment, however urgently asked for, would be premature

Such an attitude may be practiced by the historian especially when he is called upon to deal with what is called "current history." Calmly he will watch for the great trends which slowly develop, rule, and disappear, for the basic attitudes. He will not be disturbed by the limelight played upon a few individuals. He will be entitled and prepared to warn against rash judgment. Even if he finds himself deprived today of the basis that a great common philosophy would give to his work, still he may be confident in his task. With a serene mind in the face of realities and bearing in mind the centuries old traditions, he will observe the developments of closely interwoven national destinies, destinies still not interrupted.

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CHAPTER XVII

Good Will as a Persistent "Underground"

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I

THE CENTRAL TENSION in human affairs, local or planetary, seems to be aptly summarized by Paul in the saying, "The good that I would I do not, but the evil which I would not, that I do."¹ We see and know and wish the alternative possibilities of friendly living, but Poe's "Imp of the Perverse," in the plural, seems to drive us to collective self-destruction.

The writer hopes he sees, as against the gargantuan growth of divisive tensions, a possible convergence of facts, theories, doctrines, practices, groups, all based on social solidarity feeling. He hopes that this convergence can be further strengthened by mutual recognition and cross-fertilization of philosophies, among men of good will. There is an underlying belief that these capacities cannot be stamped out and will express themselves perennially despite hell and high water, and that voluntary formulation and intelligent organization are parts of this process and reinforce it.

The modern Babel of myths and ideologies breeds widespread and personal and societal de-moralization. It breeds also recurrent efforts to escape demoralization by seeking uniformity, continuity, harmony, stability, finality. Ironically these new unities to end all diversities often find themselves merely competing dogmas, sects, or cults, added to the previous diversity. To point out the spiritual congruity and common denominators of motive and direction among certain of these widely scattered and apparently unrelated gropings may help to bring them all into better focus and perspective.

There follows a list of apparently widely diverged behaviors and

¹*Epistle to the Romans*, vii, 19

theories and experiments, underlying which the writer seems to see homologous psycho-social situation-processes,² in which the *common element is the capacity and/or felt need for spontaneous or genuine communal feeling*, as contrasted with the calculated, self-interested, utilitarian, pressured, strained, and unstable types of organization. Many of these evidences of mutualism show compensatory escape or protest patterns. Many are recent, some are historic,³ others represent perennial and typical patterns of which a multitude of cases might be cited.

Four aspects of this mutualism appear, *viz*, (A) the ontogenetic and psychosomatic, (B) the groupal or communal, (C) the "religious," (D) the ideological and organizational. However, the several aspects interlace in many of the examples.

A. Ontogenetic and Psychosomatic

(1) Cooley, Baldwin, Mead, and Piaget have analyzed⁴ the gradual and often difficult processes through which selfhood emerges as a subjective realization of separateness as against the projected "other" selves.

The "generalized Other" of Mead is not to be confused with the generalized larger self. "*We*" The "Group Self" is the kind of awareness which one hopes to find when one "loses himself" (*i.e.*, his "selfish," segmental, dissociated, incomplete self) to "find" a "larger self." The "generalized Other" is still in the third person—"They"—as against "*Me*." The generalized larger self, "*We*," is non-individualized, and is often used by modern mothers, elementary teachers, and conference experts to induce consensus and compliance. This "*we*" is almost the equivalent of the generalized pronouns, *one*, *man* (German), *on* (French), etc., which depersonalize an experience by assuming an impersonal though human unit.

²Cf. "Human Controls as Situation-Processes," *American Sociological Review*, VIII, August, 1943, pp. 380-388.

³Cf. Thomas D. Eliot, "The Possibilities of Cultural Hygiene," *Psychiatry*, VI, February, 1913, pp. 83-88.

⁴Charles H. Cooley, *Human Nature and The Social Order*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1902, pp. 15-69, 91-135, *et passim*. J. Mark Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, The Macmillan Company, London, 1913. George H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society* (Charles Morris, Ed.), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1934. Jean Piaget, *The Language and Thought of the Child* (Marjorie Warden, Tr.), Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1926, pp. 34-49. Cf. also Thomas D. Eliot, "The use of Psychoanalytic Classification in the Analysis of Social Behavior Identification," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, XXII, April, 1927, pp. 67-81.

For clarity it is desirable to distinguish also between such conduct and motivation as has been called "altruism," and the more inclusive and naive feeling of participation in a total social situation-process "Altruism" is *other-ism*, and implies as its prior condition a recognized split between self and other, a "selfish" and "non-selfish" or *alter ego*. What has been called *mutualism* is neither self-conscious nor other-conscious in any sense that implies a feeling of reciprocal incompatibility or bargaining between satisfactions of *ego* and satisfactions of *alter*. The typical "altruist" tries to abnegate self and identify himself with others, and then tries to live the other's life for him. The "mutualist" naively feels or deliberately accepts and imputes shared responsibility for collective activity in satisfying common human needs.

(2) The whole movement called "*gestaltism*" and "field-psychology" (Brown, Lewin, Koffka, Kohler), long paralleled independently by the "situational" sociologist, is set off sharply against the individualized "atomism" of the behaviorists (Edwin Guthrie, F. Allport) and stresses intragroup interaction. Much of the experimental work was with primates and children, and indicates that the partition of the total responsiveness into segmental discriminations of objects, and persons, is not spontaneous but is a learning process and an acquired condition. The group situation-process, especially if patterned, is felt as an inclusive, unitary configuration.

(3) Tugant Burrow and his disciples (Clarence Shields, William Galt,⁵ Hans Syz⁶ claim to have demonstrated, in practice and by laboratory tests, an essential psychosomatic cleavage or dissociation occurring specifically in the human species, ontogenetically but culturally induced, which, in producing what Freud called "ego" and "superego" leaves these universally in conflict with the rest of the individual, which is left as a sort of incomplete, struggling "id." For Burrow,^a mental health is not

^aComment by Tugant Burrow

I think we are very fortunate in having anyone of Professor Eliot's broad outlook take as much interest as he does in the effort to explain and correlate the various viewpoints of his colleagues. As to my own work, I feel rather guilty in having not always made clear certain aspects of our investigations that are of key importance. In the absence of a more detailed account of our work, readers have at times, through no fault of theirs, been led to interpretations of my thesis that are not wholly warranted. I am hoping to amend this situation through the publication of *The Nervous of Man*.

⁵*Psychoanalysis*, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Company, London, 1933

⁶Numerous papers in technical journals; "Phylopathology," *Encyclopedia of Psychology*, Philosophical Library, New York, (n.d.)

to be found in freeing either ego or id but in reuniting them so that neither appears separately or together, but the latent wholeness of a larger self (which he identifies with "man as a species") emerges

Burrow⁷ by implication attaches to men's underlying capacities for spontaneous cooperativeness a degree of reality greater than that of men's actual current and usual state of personal isolation and divisiveness. He also recognizes this "reality" as only latent or potential in most of us.

Burrow, Galt, and Syz⁸ have used certain intricate instruments to detect objective differences in physiological responses during periods when the subjects are presumably individualized and competitively tense (concerned) about status, success, etc., as compared with their responses during periods of relaxed group-identification and rapport. It would be interesting (if possible) to discover whether similar recordings would discover objective similarities during the status of body-mind induced by moderate alcoholic intake, systematic religious meditation, trance, etc.

(4) There is evidence that alcohol and other sedatives depress mentations and inhibitions in the "higher" centers most recently developed (ontogenetically and/or phylogenetically); *viz.*, individual responsibility, personal identity, language (for communication between individuals already differentiated from each other as self *versus* other), competitive judgment (self-interest), etc., and release thus the capacities (among others) for confidence, sociality, affection, and spontaneity.⁹

(5) The effects of lobotomy, the operation which cuts the connections between the frontal lobes and the rest of the brain, are interpreted in terms which seem quite congruous with those of Burrow and Syz on the

⁷Trigant Burrow, *The Social Basis of Consciousness*, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1927, *The Biology of Human Conflict*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1937, especially pp. 173-191, 272-291, 411-423, numerous papers in technical journals. Cf. also Thomas D. Ehot, "The Social Philosophy of Trigant Burrow," *Mental Hygiene*, XII, July, 1928, pp. 530-548.

⁸Trigant Burrow, "Kymograph Records of Neuro-muscular (Respiratory) Patterns in Relation to Behavior Disorders," *Psychosomatic Medicine*, III, April, 1941, pp. 174-186, Trigant Burrow and William Galt, "Electroencephalographic Recordings of Varying Aspects of Attention," *Journal of General Psychology*, XXXII, April, 1945, pp. 269-288, Hans Syz, "Burrow's Differentiation of Tensional Patterns," *Journal of Psychology*, IX, 1940, pp. 153-163, Hans Syz, "The Lifwynn Eye-Movement Camera," *Science*, CIII, May 17, 1946, pp. 628-629.

⁹Cf. E. M. Jellinek, "Acute Effects of Alcohol on the Central Nervous System," *Abridged Lectures of the First Summer Course on Alcohol Studies*, *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, New Haven, 1944, pp. 46-48, also H. W. Haggard, "The Physiology of Alcohol," *loc. cit.*, p. 29.

one hand, and the Freudians on the other. As reported introspectively by Helen Keller¹⁰ and by Syz's subjects,¹¹ the locus of self-consciousness is just behind the forehead.

It would be interesting if Syz's techniques could be applied to patients before and after anterior lobotomy, to test the hypothesis that their pre-operative recordings (anxiety psychoses) would show "dittention," while their post-operative responses would show "cotention."

(6) The demonstrable successes of Christian Science might prove traceable to quite distinct neural sequences in body and brain in different cases. One of them may be a voluntary denial of (i.e., refusal to be identified with) the messages called pain, this would amount to identification of the ego with the superego, or withdrawal of the "self" into the frontal lobes. The other mechanism would be a deliberate inhibition of the personally and socially disintegrative fears which arise in self-conscious strivings, and a positive identification with the capacities and impulses of love, affection, confidence, and cooperation which have their front (according to the brain specialists) in the autonomic system. The latter is good mental hygiene, of which neither religion nor psychiatry have a monopoly. "Perfect love casteth out fear."¹²

B. *The Groupal or Communal*

(1) In the submergence of individuality in crowd rapport (Gustave Le-Bon,¹³ Everett D. Martin¹⁴), the conscious, individuated personality is dissociated and in abeyance, but part of what is involved and active in the crowd experience (which gives such plausibility to the phrases "crowd mind," "mob spirit," "*esprit de corps*") may be the starved need in each person for submergence in a greater totality. In "High Morale"¹⁵ is seen or experienced a more conscious level of group inspiration.

(2) One notes next the quality of self-forgetting play, teamwork, drama, heroism, service in crisis, which amounts almost to amnesia, and which is devoid of sophisticated self-evaluation by one's secret superego.

¹⁰Personal correspondence.

¹¹*Op. cit. supra*, cf. also Tugant Burrow, *The Biological Basis of Human Conflict*.

¹²First Epistle of John, iv 18.

¹³*The Crowd*, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1909.

¹⁴*The Behavior of Crowds*, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1920.

¹⁵William E. Hocking, *Morale and Its Enemies*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1918.

This is "affective behavior" in which it is impossible to disentangle *means* from *ends*.¹⁶

Here one would also list the intimate, seemingly "telepathic" interplay of combat teams, of informal affectional play groups, of some Quaker business meetings, of well integrated gangs and clubs, of thoroughly married spouses. Social disorganization for such groups is essentially the critical emergence and supervening of selfish, suspicious persons. Suspicion itself arises out of the capacity to project into another an impulse of which one must himself be "guilty" or capable; thus out of a prior implication that others are similar but separate, and similarly competitive.

Partial emancipation from selfishness may be seen in intermediate loyalties to nation, class, church, or lesser groups. The members are participant but are still involved in partisan partitions. For the in group they function with some degree of mutualism, in relation to the out group they are still in a partitive psychosis.

(3) Franklin Giddings¹⁷ "consciousness of kind" has several levels we deal here only with the level of spontaneous mutual acceptance, not with sophisticated *self*-consciousness of kind which is posited upon emerging awareness of an *out* group dissociated from "*us*." In this matter Adam Smith's¹⁸ analysis of "sympathy" was an obvious forerunner, and Max Scheler and Howard Becker¹⁹ have carried the analysis further.

(4) Clyde Allee²⁰ has demonstrated the importance of spontaneous collectivism or "proto-sociality" in animal species. Peter Kropotkin²¹ and Henry Drummond²² dealt with the contrast between men's chronic and allegedly innate internecine struggle for existence and men's survivals through equally "innate" urges for solidarity. Nowadays we consider

¹⁶Cf. Howard Becker, MS.

¹⁷Franklyn Henry Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1911.

¹⁸*The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Millar, Kincaid and Bell, London and Edinburgh, 1767, cf. also Thomas D. Eliot, "The Use of Psychoanalytic Classification in the Analysis of Social Behavior Identification," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, XXII, April, 1927, pp. 67-81.

¹⁹"Some Forms of Sympathy," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, XXVI, April, 1931, pp. 58-68.

²⁰*The Social Life of Animals, etc.*

²¹*Mutual Aid*, McClure, Phillips, New York, 1902.

²²*The Ascent of Man*, Pott, New York, 1894. Cf. also Thomas H. Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays*, D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, 1894, pp. 1-116.

both the combative (divisive) and the cooperative (solidary) as structural capacities (heredity), capable of latency or potency

(5) The world *consensus*²³ is often used to describe agreement on the level of *opinion*—often highly conscious, self-interested, rationalized, and even reluctant. In root origins the word seems to mean *feeling together*, which is also the root translation of *sympathy*, and is on the level of sentiment or spontaneous rapport. Some degree of consensus is necessary by definition for the operation of any society. The concern in the present paper is spontaneous consensus based on homogeneity, security, and confidence (trusting together)—not on indoctrination, force, fear, despair.

(6) Emile Durkheim posited society, or community (as collectively represented in human minds) as the source of the sacred.²⁴

Lucien Lévy-Bruhl describes the so-called "*participation mystique*" of many non-literate peoples and attributes it to all "primitives" and exclusively to them.²⁵ Similar phenomena are widespread among "civilized" people and children, and much individualized thinking can be shown among non-literates; but the state of mind described is comparable to that we are dealing with in this paper.

On the objective side, Lévy-Bruhl's discussion of non-literate conceptions of the totem throws light on the psychology of stereotypes, which (partly through the structure of language) are experienced as "*composites*" projected on persons, thus at once single and collective.

On the subjective side, Lévy-Bruhl contributes to the understanding of collective empathy. Among "primitives" empathy takes forms which seem crude to us, but the evidence shows men's latent capacities for introjective identification.

Jane Harrison analyzes the emergence of sophisticated drama (in which empathy if it occurs is induced and vicarious) from the previously sincere, naive, group-participant empathy or shared emotion of religious rites performed for practical group objectives.²⁶ She also describes the emergence of deity (as a subjective experience to which objectivity is

²³Cf. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1916, pp. 1-7.

²⁴*The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (Joseph Ward Swain, Tr.), George Allen and Unwin, London, 1915, pp. 205-239.

²⁵*The "Soul" of the Primitive* (Lilian A. Clare, Tr.), The Macmillan Company, New York, 1928, pp. 67-109.

²⁶*Ancient Art and Ritual*, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1913, pp. 135-141.

imputed) in the religious rites of collective worship and "mystic possession" in ancient Crete²⁷

C *Religious*

(1) The idyllic social confidence of childhood, once lost, is projected into Eden and Heaven "Of such is the Kingdom of God . . . Whoever shall not receive the Kingdom of God as a little child shall not enter therein"²⁸ paraphrases modern psychological and sociological theories. Salvation by "rebirth"²⁹ (regeneration) symbolizes return to the womb, to the naive identification and unstrained selflessness of infancy. It often appears that the total process of civilization has had, at and as its fount or "original sin," the arrogant assertion of divisive egotism, accumulative and accelerative, so that man's pride has ever proceeded blindly and madly to successively more catastrophic ditches. The symbolic myth of man's genesis in the non-sophistication of Eden is not far wrong: the knowledge of good (and of evil) is too often a knowledge of selfish "good," replacing the spontaneous social enjoyment provided in a state of security and plenty. But modern man replaces heavens or "golden age utopias" (myths of a past state of nature or a future supernatural state) with myths of a future "heaven on earth," buttressed by science rather than by theology.

(2) If basic capacity for sociality is as universal as Burrow's group claims, and as Lévy-Bruhl's evidence indicates, it suggests itself as the fertile source or motivation of many religious doctrines, rites, and mechanisms. Such doctrines as those of original sin, of salvation, of once born and twice born men,³⁰ and of heaven being around us, or in us, in our infancy³¹ are cases in point. In rites of purgation and atonement, individual sins and responsibilities are taken up into collective sin and responsibility, and individual salvation is subsumed through collective sac-

²⁷*Themis*, The University Press, Cambridge, 1912. Cf. also *Gospel according to Matthew*, xviii 20, "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them."

²⁸*Gospel according to Mark*, x 14-15.

²⁹*Gospel according to John*, iii 3, "Except a man be born again, he cannot see the Kingdom of God."

³⁰William James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, Longmans, Green and Company, New York, 1902, pp. 166-188, cf. footnote 29 *supra*, also Paul's *Epistle to the Romans*, vii.

³¹Cf. footnote 28 *supra*. The phrase, of course, is Wordsworth's.

rifice, and the relief is felt as forgiveness or salvation or restored wholeness or social reintegration. Mysticism, the communion of the saints, pentecostal, baptismal, and eucharistic raptures or ecstasies in certain religions seem to share this common element of felt social solidarity. The spirits (of ancestors or of wine) are invoked in rituals of collective revival, for war or for other life crises.

(3) Scott Buchanan, in a now inaccessible paper, analyzed the integrative and therapeutic values of religious rituals. He had been studying the psychological exercises worked out by Pécie Giaty and Mary Boole for creative, problem solving meditation, which are comparable with the discipline of silent meetings analyzed in the Quaker literature.

(4) Very similar to the "*participation mystique*" of Lévy-Bruhl is the sort of alleged identification between self, folk, and nature in ancient peasant communities which Baker Brownell once called true religion.³²

(5) John Dewey³³ declared that *religions* (in the sense of theologies, sects, and ecclesiasticisms) are the enemy of the *religious* (i.e., the spontaneous orientation or way of life in which the unitary bonds of nature, including human nature, are felt).

The religious is "morality touched by emotion" only when the ends of moral conviction arouse emotions that are not only intense but are actuated and supported by ends so inclusive that they unify the self. According to the best authorities, "religion" comes from a root that means being bound or tied. The religious attitude signifies something that is bound through imagination to a *general* attitude. Whatever introduces genuine perspective is religious.

The things in civilization we most prize are not of ourselves. They exist by grace of the doings and sufferings of the continuous human community in which we are a link.³⁴

(6) The conversion, in recent years, of a considerable number of prominent "successful intellectuals" to Catholicism, or near-Catholicism has attracted attention. e.g., Heywood Brown, T. S. Eliot, Ruth Reed, Clare Luce, etc.³⁵ Relief from personal tensions of individualism and incompleteness may be a factor. Solidarity, continuity, security, unanimity,

³²*Earth is Enough*, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1933, *passim*. Cf. Baker Brownell's contribution to this symposium, Chapter XXXII.

³³*A Common Faith*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1934, pp. 1-28.

³⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 22-24, 87.

³⁵Cf. Dorothy Thompson, "Recent Conversions," *The Commonwealth*, XI, III, 24, March 29, 1946, p. 597.

seem to be major inducements. Recent editorials and feature articles in *Life* and *Time* call for revival of religious faith as salvation from cynicism, reuniter of humanity, restorer of national and international confidence, etc.

(7) There has been a noticeable increase in The Society of Friends, and in public respect and attention for their ways of life and worship.

(8) Whitehead identifies God as the syncretic principle, or cosmic binder without which the space-time manifold would fly into ultimate particles like an infinite chain reaction, and be incomprehensible subjectively.

(9) In Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy's³⁶ gospel of Christian rebellion against things as they are, one finds gropings for the communal as against the separative aspects of men's possibilities.

(10) For Emanuel Swedenborg, the essential quality of sinning was the separativeness of the act, the self-contained and concomitant penalty was the resulting isolation of the offender-victim.³⁷ Underlying separatism, the sin of the Adversary, is the ambivalence of pride and fear—the arrogating of self-sufficiency and the projection of similar "guilty" motives to others of whom one is then afraid.

(11) Reinhold Niebuhr's doctrine of history is congruous at this point: original sin is men's assumption that they can "go it alone," and the world's successive conquerors have each fallen for it.³⁸

(12) Everett Clinchy recently discussed the relations of religions to divisive ethnic prejudices as based upon the sin of bigotry, and suggests that the achievement of love is based on the will to understand: "The sin of man lies in his idolatry, either consciously or sub-consciously making himself, his culture group, his race, God."³⁹

There are those who sense religion and "the meaning of God in history" as man's quest for and approach toward a supreme spirit, i.e., an ultimate power to value experience—to know and to will relative good *versus* relative evil, and to act accordingly. From this viewpoint, "sin" is the narrowing of focus, the conscious regression to or "guilty" recognition of neurotic patterns of wish *versus* conscience, or self *versus* "super-

³⁶*The Christian Future, or The Modern Mind Outrun*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1946, *passim*.

³⁷*Heaven and Its Wonders and Hell* § 506, 556-565 (Ritch Ed.), Massachusetts New Church Union, Boston, 1906, pp. 363-364.

³⁸*Beyond Tragedy*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1937, pp. 295-296.

³⁹"The Effort of Organized Religion," *Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCXLIV, March, 1946, pp. 130-131.

ego" or "law," such as Paul described in the seventh chapter of Romans. Salvation, surcease of the conflict, comes through repentance and the acceptance of divine inspiration, the holy spirit. Henry Neumann once said, "Spirit is the power to value." The "holy" spirit would be the feeling of wholeness or solidarity, the broader perspective or synoptic insight, the sympathetic understanding, of so-called "brotherly love."

It is obvious, however, that some persons' god, who is not of truly catholic scope, cannot serve the function suggested by Clinchy, but rather is the Anti-Christ in God's guise, the spirit of pride, tension, competition, frustration, rebellion, division, and reciprocal destruction.

D Ideological and Organizational

(1) The doctrines or movement called the "distributive economy" are a protest against the segmentation of personalities by modern metropolitan life, and an effort to restore the alleged "wholesomeness" of small communities. Under this head one may place Arthur Morgan's⁴⁰ studies, organization, and experimental community, Baker Brownell's "Montana Study"; Ralph Boisodi's⁴¹ escape from the city if not from technology; Frank Lloyd Wright's visions, Black Mountain, Pocono, Commonwealth, Marlboro, and other pioneer colleges and so-called folk schools⁴² at least in their origins, Rosenstock's Camp William James at Tunbridge, Vermont.⁴³ Doubtless similar cravings and satisfactions were elements in the earlier religious and utopian colonies scattered over our map.

(2) Brownell has described Granville Hicks' exodus from metropolis to *The Small Town*⁴⁴ in the following terms:

The book is this question: How can we find a way of life where the true community, the folk, and free men can live without repudiating the advantages of modern technological and administrative techniques? . . . The book turns about the modern dilemma of *mind* and *folk*, their relationship, their conflict, and the sterility of the one without the other.

⁴⁰*The Small Community*, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1942.

⁴¹*Our Ugly Civilization*, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1933.

⁴²The authentic Folk Schools (in contrast to the synthetic) do not have to seek the community spirit; they already have emerged in that folk milieu and seem to *live* it.

⁴³Stuart Chase, "Young Men in Tunbridge," *Survey Graphic*, XXXI, 5, May, 1942, pp. 229-233.

⁴⁴Granville Hicks, *The Small Town*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1946, reviewed by Baker Brownell, *Survey Graphic*, XXXVI, June, 1947, pp. 357-358.

(3) The cult of the simple life by rustication was made famous by Charles Wagner.⁴⁵ Similar motives must often have moved the members of monastic orders and the religious hermits (for whom there was the communion of the saints). On their negative side these and other retreats, such as Sigtuna of the Neo-Lutherans in Sweden, are withdrawals from the competitive stresses of the World, the Flesh, and the Devil, into integrated and protective groups. On the positive side they often encouraged personal reintegration and released creativeness.

(4) Again we find a psychiatrist, Helen McClean,⁴⁶ attributing Americans' romanticized stereotypes of "backward" peoples as projections of repressed *wishes* for uninhibited sociality, supposedly attainable by regression to naive biological and cultural levels (Polynesia, Caribbean, Shangri-la). Such needs for escape are felt by those under the frustrations, anxieties, and strains of cultural or superego demands of status-maintenance, competitive egotism, and arbitrary moral individualism.

(5) Earlier stages of the Youth Movement in Europe protested the divisive hypocrisies and mask fronts of morally and politically regimented "adult" life. They called for "individual"⁴⁷ self-expression, but it was integrity rather than separatism they sought; they apparently got much basic satisfaction from collective loyalty to leaders, from mutual trust, from mass gatherings, and from spontaneous group feeling.⁴⁸

(6) "Escape from freedom," according to Erich Fromm,⁴⁹ occurs through fear of further competitive responsibility felt by increasingly exposed individuals under increasing moral and competitive pressures. ("I used to love to see and choose my path—but now, Lead Thou me on.")⁵⁰ Most significant is Fromm's recognition of the *wide spread* of reaction from individual responsibility under conditions hopeless for many, and his presentation of voluntary "democratic" cooperation as a positive al-

⁴⁵*The Simple Life* (Mary L. Hendee, Tr.), McClure, Phillips, New York, 1901.

⁴⁶"Psychodynamic Factors in Racial Relations," *Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCXLIV, March, 1946, p. 165.

⁴⁷The word *individual* is misleading. Individualism is divisive, but if all were considered as individualities, instead of being labeled into allegedly different and divisive groups, it would enable us to see overall likenesses, and all individuals could interact freely with all others. Doctor Lowie brings this out in Chapter IX.

⁴⁸Cf. Howard Becker, *German Youth Bond or Free*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1946.

⁴⁹*Escape from Freedom*, Farrar and Rinehart, New York, 1941.

⁵⁰"Lead Kindly Light," James Cardinal Newman. Cf. section C, 6, *supra*.

ternative to submissive abdication under brute power. The wide vogue of his book and acceptance of his interpretations is corroboration that people are ripe for a new ethos.

(7) Doctor Finei in Chapter I says that people of a given society get their sense of identity as a people from Place or from Grace. He might have added Race. "*Blut und Boden*" are sacred and solidary social symbols. Doctor Finei chooses the theological term *Grace* to characterize not geographic or biologic unity but the satisfying feeling of being collectively sanctioned, sanctified, and saved.

(8) Dictatorships have revealed the difference between domination and true leadership, as distinguished by Paul Pignos,⁵¹ in that they offer a hierarchy of irresponsible personal power and submission rather than of democratic mutual responsibility. For military or repressive or exploitive purposes "naked Power"⁵² has controlled larger units than does cooperative democracy so far, but it is less stable and it wastes as much in suppression as it gains in "efficiency."

The "solidarity" of a totalitarianism is not organic, but additive. It proceeds from pressure, not from growth, from without rather than from within. It ties up rather than releases energies. Social solidity based on centralization and robot discipline or fear is actually divisive of personality. It uses only parts of those who participate and suppresses the rest of the personality. Decentralization, in turn, is not necessarily partitive in its effects on personality but encourages free interaction. Integration of whole personalities in communal unities tends to develop best in face-to-face groups.⁵³

(9) The Middle Ages were no utopia, but historians seem agreed that there was much less person-to-person competition, much more group solidarity than after the rise of individualism. Guilds may have been idealized—but if so, that in itself is evidence of wishful projection of a felt need for the mutualism imputed to them.

(10) The Consumers' Cooperative Movement has not survived and grown merely on the basis of utility for Economic Men. Essential to its success is the idea, the attitude, and the practice of cooperativeness. Com-

⁵¹*Leadership or Domination*, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1935.

⁵²Bertrand Russell, *Power: A Social Analysis*, Norton and Company, New York, 1938.

⁵³Cf. Mary Follett, *Creative Experience*, Longmans, Green and Company, New York, 1924, p. 197, cf. also *The New State*, Longmans, Green and Company, New York, 1918.

munal face to face activities of recreation, mutual confidence, and service are typically included in cooperative programs and give to cooperatives much of their characteristic flavor and appeal

(11) Mary Follett⁵⁴ and Neva Boyd are among those who have imputed to intimate groups such as clubs, conferences, committees, an entity beyond that of the selves that compose them. One suspects that this so-called "group-fallacy"⁵⁵ which tends to attribute an independent self-hood spirit to a group or crowd, has its objective basis in the emergence, under collective stimuli and interaction, of capacities in the nervous system for joint action, feeling, or thought (creative or otherwise), which in a sense "were not there" before the group gathered. The creativeness of group experience is *intercreation* when considered interpersonally, *intracreation* when considered as groupal. Confidence or mutual good will is the condition of its operation.

(12) Neva Boyd⁵⁶ and her disciples, experts in group work with clubs, recreational groups, etc., claim that solidarity emerges spontaneously through interaction in joint projects and is spoiled by competitive rewards.

There is said to be a noticeable contrast between Russian "Pioneer" groups, who are rewarded for group service to the community or Plan, and American "Scouts," who are rewarded, chiefly, for individual skills.

Native social appreciation of the immediate, spontaneous sort is not a matter of acute conscious attention. While persons showing or experiencing it may be actively conscious about their collective objectives, the element of spontaneity in their *good will* would be vitiated by sophistication: the motivation itself, pristine, remains on what Alfred Korzybski would call the non-verbal level.⁵⁷

(13) Frankwood Williams,⁵⁸ observing not ruthless, cynical officials of a police state but the common people of Russia, 1925, attributed the comparative shortage of mental diseases to a cultural situation in which reduced competition and apparent assurance of economic security, with

⁵⁴*The New State*, pp. 19-92, *Creative Experience*, p. 197.

⁵⁵Cf. Floyd Henry Allport, *Institutional Behavior*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1933.

⁵⁶"Play as a Unique Discipline" and other mimeographed materials, Northwestern University Group Work Associates (n.d.). Cf. also Joshua L. Liebman, *Newer Trends in Group Work*, Association Press, New York, 1938.

⁵⁷Cf. *Science and Sanity* (2nd ed.), International Non-Aristotelian Library Publishing Co. (Science Press), Lancaster, 1941, pp. 416-417.

⁵⁸*Russia, Youth, and the Present Day World*, Farrar and Rinehart, New York, 1934.

general confidence in shared cooperative goals, seemed to give people emotional security, and in which undivided allegiances, together with a less repressive morality, reduced neurotic conflicts between ego and superego complexes (That was twenty-one years ago, and "twenty-one years is a mighty long time!")

(14) Gandhi's *ahimsa*, translated "harmlessness," is said by his followers to convey a far more positive meaning. If one can judge by context, however, it means at least a withdrawal from the Occidental competitive techniques and internecine attitudes.⁵⁰

(15) The craving for solidarity through homogeneity is seen in the doctrine of the "melting pot"—that out of the contact and competition of cultures the "best" will survive and merge and produce a superior, unanimous, and patriotic American community. A variant on Isaac Zangwill's⁵¹ theme was Horace Kallen's⁵² doctrine of the orchestration of many cultures, into symphony rather than unison, but an underlying *capacity and will for harmony* is assumed in both metaphors. Cultural consensus, through a voluntary "uniting of native and foreign born" was contrasted by Allen Burns⁵³ with "ization," i.e., inculcation of superficial conformity to a dominant culture under pressure.

(16) In the magazine *Common Ground*, Carey McWilliams⁵⁴ quotes from John Collier's introduction to a pamphlet on "action research" ⁵⁵

Men cannot live without a feeling—some kind of feeling—of belongingness, of power. When belongingness, power, wholeness, are unattainable in the work sphere, in the political sphere, in the lapsed local community, on any line truthful and benign, then inevitably the remaining possible ways to attain these essential ingredients are resorted to. Most of these other available ways—drink, obsessive pursuit of sex, spectator-sportsmanship—are of a rather neutral significance, mere dissolutive substitutes for the spiritual nurture that our age denies its men and women. But very wide in the world today is another substitute, group-

⁵⁰Cf. Haridas Thakordis Muzumdar, *Gandhi versus the Empire*, Universal Publishing Company, New York, 1932.

⁵¹*The Melting Pot*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1909, pp. 198-200.

⁵²"Democracy versus the Melting Pot," *The Nation*, C, February 18 and 25, 1915, pp. 190-194, 217-220. [Cf. Stewart G. Cole's discussion of the "melting pot," Chapter XXXIX, II, B.]

⁵³"Americanization—True and False," *City Club Bulletin*, Chicago, circa 1920.

⁵⁴"Round-Up," *Common Ground*, VII, Summer, 1947, p. 91.

⁵⁵H. A. C. Dobbs, *Operational Research and Action Research*, Institute of Public Affairs, Washington, 1947.

ings of hate, groupings of fear, groupings of scorn the fascisms which threaten all our remaining hopes To recapture for human effort—for human life—the master quality, the supremely necessary ingredient, of wholeness: this is the overriding task of the epoch of revolution which is upon us

It is quite possible that certain of the examples above recited will prove on closer analysis to be not representative of the pattern It is hoped that they may be discarded without impairing the general theory presented. Many of the examples have come to hand since starting this paper, many continue to appear, and many doubtless are occurring to readers of the paper

In all of this array, the participant experience is contrasted with the partitive experience, the solitary with the separate or segmental Men have shown their felt need for mutualism and community, and have sought it, however speciously, in isolation, in submission to territorial and dynastic nationalisms, in racial and ideological totalitarianisms, in small "sacred" communities, retreats, and colonies, in credal sects, fanatic cults, or inclusive ecclesiasticisms, or in mythic fantasies of solidarity and native bliss Few have found any valid and durable alternative way of combining community with freedom, but the point is that men *persist in the quest* for such a way.

II

Wherever men of good will go over the planet, by some freemasonry of the spirit they discover and recognize and are accepted by their kind and trust each other Kipling's less quoted lines are

"But there is neither East nor West, Boider, nor Breed nor Birth,
When two strong men stand face to face, though they come from the
ends of the earth!"⁶⁵

It has been the universal experience of persons of good will that in every walk of life there are trustworthy friends who respond to trusting friends If one cannot trust people one probably is not trusted, and should search his heart to see if there be in him any way derived from the pervasive culture of partitioned egos

History has many an example of dominant cultural controls secretly resisted and outlived by more or less organized "Undergrounds" A pre-

⁶⁵"The Ballad of East and West," *Departmental Ditties*, 1889

condition of contact and continuity for all such groups has been a vivid conception of a common cause and of consensus or homogeneity of values

Most such resistance movements are irresponsible and ruthless. One may also conceive the role of a non-violent, friendly "underground," un-hated because unbating, because without fear, cooperating with good will wherever it appears, resisting only hate and selfishness, not the hater or the aggressor.

There is evidence that, even under totalitarian government, sincere friendliness and outgiving spontaneity and native selflessness can survive—with or without protective coloring. Observation seems to confirm factually a perennial quest by people of this type (and by its genotype thwarted in the psyche of each of us) for ways of life which will realize the integral aspect of human nature. The wider sharing of this vision or *gestalt*—or dynamic myth, if you like—may give to increasing thousands *the faith that makes them whole with their kind* to replace the fear that makes them partitive atomistic monads and thwarted egocentrics or ethnocentrics.

The thesis of this paper, which remains speculative and wishful hypothesis, is that even if our children are doomed to live under a police state if they survive, those who still seek the kingdom (or rather the democracy) of heaven may learn to cultivate it even in this hell on earth, and to recognize and stimulate it in others, and to conspire with such others in good will rather than ill will. Such an "underground" may survive the new militarism as it has the old—enduring all things, it abides."

III

To the extent that social scientists are the Cassandra's of current history they can at best say, after the event, "I told you so." At worst, they will be destroyed (along with their predictions and those to whom they pre-

¹Comment by Gottfried Salomon Delatour

Do we learn from history? We could find that the question of retreat from the world is in times of the great migrations only one possible escape for a new "underground." There is no doubt that not only philosophy, but science itself is unintelligible for the common man, and on the other side, that the leaders of the common man abuse ideas as weapons. The devil cites science as well as scripture. Why do we not, therefore, say frankly in an *esprit de corps* that esoteric thought is needed and that the whole process of sedimentation or popularization is always a devaluation? We are confusing values and acceptance, because we are impatient and ask for immediate applicability.

dict) by the bombs and/or by the police state which they foresee. Their only chance is to prophesy in the mood of Jeremiah, in the hope that, if they are listened to, their predictions (predicated on the assumption that they will be ignored) actually will produce compensatory offsets in world behavior sufficient to prove themselves "wrong."

Last fall the writer predicted that the Four Horsemen are already riding, that men cannot or will not be reeducated in time to accept One World, and that we face extermination and/or the police state. But one may also predict that, if there be survivors, the capacity and need and vision and practice of good will will also persist and recur and resist and rebound. Grass roots organization of men and women of good will can outlast the holocaust.

Jane Addams once published a little volume entitled *The Excellent Becomes the Permanent*⁶⁶. Biblical scholars refer to the "doctrine of the remnant"—the successive elimination of iniquitous majorities falling by the wayside of Hebrew history, with salvation or perpetuity for the chosen few, the just men. Tolstoi⁶⁷ contrasted the perennial alarms and excursions of internecine wars with the patient survival of the eternal peasant—"Ivan the Fool." Even H. G. Wells in his *Outline of History*⁶⁸ contrasted the kaleidoscopic history of egotistic wars with cooperative cultural achievements. Years before the atomic bomb it was Wells who defined the situation-process of the past and the future as a race between education and catastrophe.

One senses a common theme—a germinal plasma persisting in and enduring the vicissitudes of feuds, wars, class struggles, personal rivalry, and strain. By assembling sufficient evidences of the innate sociality of our common humanity, and of the widespread craving for its realization, psychological and social scientists may be able to give new faith and reinforced predictive assumptions. By "action research"⁶⁹ methods it may prove possible to make new converts. Some day the social faith may be sufficiently realized in enough people to pass a critical point of societal

⁶⁶The Macmillan Company, New York, 1932.

⁶⁷*Complete Works of Leo Tolstoi*, XII (Leo Wiener, Tr.), Dana, Estes, Boston, 1904, pp. 481-519, cf. also Wagner, *op cit supra*, pp. 117-119.

⁶⁸The Macmillan Company, London, 1920.

⁶⁹Cf. Ronald Lippitt and Marian Radke, "New Trends in the Investigation of Prejudice," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCXLIV, March, 1946, pp. 172-176.

conversion to start a chain reaction, fissioning and fusing supposedly indivisible "individuals," even as atoms are broken down and recombined. In losing the individual selves, men may rediscover the souls they lost in "gaining the whole world."

IV

The perspective of history can be viewed through $n + 1$ lenses. Each lens will reveal different tints and configurations. Such *gestalts* as are perceived are obviously not the *total* mass of human events, they are representations and projections. They are myths, blending in a continuum into philosophies of history, they are men's efforts to "see life steadily and see it whole," in order to accommodate their own behavior to emerging experiences in some manner tolerable to body-mind. This "wholeness" of philosophy, however, consists of some unity and relative stability, discovered and achieved through selection and abstraction, thus sacrificing that other "wholeness" (*viz.*, all-ness or complete inclusiveness). The clarity of oversimplification lures minds which crave security and economy of attention, but it imposes itself by ignoring or repressing the "irrelevant" or even inconsistent portions of the historic panorama.⁷⁰ In this panorama a new lens or fresh insight may reveal other previously unsuspected cross threads and lines and patterns of potential continuity, recurrence, or predictability.

Such visions of the past are doubtless affected by the seer's inner needs. Wishful thinking rationalizes history and molds it more nearly to men's fancy—by elimination of the incompatible, if not by positive hallucination. The myth, then, has its pragmatic test as a working definition of the current and emerging situation-process: if it seems to solve problems, if as a map it seems thus to represent the territory by getting one to desired destinations, if a pattern, extrapolated or projected into the future, points to the land of promise and releases energies from anxieties,—then, and to that extent, it tends to be accepted as truth. Thurman Arnold⁷¹ points out that the nineteenth century operated on the myth of Competitive Man, and proposes the equally approximate but potentially potent alternate myth of Cooperative Man.

⁷⁰As Korzybski might say, the map is confused with the territory. A given territory may be remapped for $n + 1$ purposes.

⁷¹*The Symbols of Government*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1935, pp. 259-271.

V

The cultural inertia, the "cake of custom," the organized ethos, are hard to break, as many an impatient revolutionist from Ikhnoton to Stalin has demonstrated. On the other hand, the rapidity with which certain dominant culture complexes have dissolved is encouraging. Witchcraft, slavery, the flat earth—these are cases in point. Racism and nationalism may be nearer to their liquidation than their current reinforcements seem to show.

Edward Haskell has compared the world situation to those trick pictures in which, for example, the configuration of mottled leaves conceals/reveals some creature; or to the trick diagrams in which perspective is reversible. At first the observer sees in, or into, the picture only the overt meaning most familiar, then there is a flash of insight, and it is hard to see anything *but* the second picture. The world has been seen as tribes, races, nations, blocs, conflicting groups, and competing persons. Global transport and radio emerge. Suddenly one sees the planet as One World,⁷² and it can never look the same again. *Earth is Our Habitat*.

This type of sudden insight or *in-visioning*, like all perception, has in it a predictive implication and a dynamic quality. It affects also behavior in the situation, and therefore affects the total situation-process as it emerges—whether creatively or destructively. As a predictive assumption⁷³ such an insight introduces a new factor into the event, which may arouse counter-compensatory acts, or may corroborate itself by reinforcement of the pattern.

Like conversions, which mystics have compared to dropping of a burden, sudden insights may release major energies and latent behavior. The iceberg, melted from beneath, suddenly flops after long seeming stability.

There is, said someone, one thing which nothing can stop: *viz*, an idea whose time has come.

If, as most of us would agree, the human society has been "sick"⁷⁴ for

⁷²Cf. H. G. Wells, *Outline of History*, ed. cit., pp. 1-11. Wells did much to popularize the idea, Wendell Willkie popularized the phrase.

⁷³Cf. "Reactions to Predictive Assumptions," *American Sociological Review*, II, August, 1937, pp. 508-517.

⁷⁴Lawrence K. Frank, "Society as the Patient," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLII, November, 1936, March, 1937, pp. 335-344, 718-719, also Burrow, *op. cit.*

a long, long time, new insight may do what it often does for the individual psychopath. In personal psychopathology, the patient is experiencing *misery without insight* into the sources of conflicts which produce this misery. The new insight comes from *super-sight*, that is, the seer's ability to stand *off* or *up* and look *over, around, beyond* the current scene, to observe from a new vantage point rather than be sunk as a myopic participant of the narrower situation. The new *in-sight*, by adding a new *out-look* or dimension to the perspective, enlarges the dynamic field or situation process in which the person operates, and enables him to view more objectively the divisive conflicts in which his energies had been monopolized. Seeing his conflicts objectively in new perspective, he reacts newly toward his conflicts, and the conflicts themselves are no longer the same: they may vanish, and release the energies previously drained into them to maintain the tensions. Problems are solved, dissolved, or dismissed.⁷⁵ For the "psychopathic" patient, such a process is called therapy, for the "sinner," conversion. In cultural crises or depressions it is called leadership, revolution, renaissance, or revelation.

"Where there is no vision, the people perish."⁷⁶

VI

The basic conditions for the atrophy of cultural structures based on competition, conflict, class, and ego, and for the efflorescence of spontaneous good will, are probably those of relative plenty and security, through either abundant sources of energy or control of fertility.

Nuclear physics offers the possibility of both. It also offers universal annihilation or universal dominance and oppression. Until the obsolete forms, anachronistic ideologies, and atavistic mentalities distorting the configuration of the present political financial world are superseded, the chief duty of men of good will is to survive, and to bring up children of good will and good skill, able in turn to recognize their kind and to work with them. We must "hang on" with dogged faith that "society as the patient" will also survive its historic crisis, and that, with or without drastic therapy, cultural health will supervene—faith strengthened by

⁷⁵Hermann Keyserling, *The Book of Marriage*, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1926, p. 16, footnote.

⁷⁶*The Book of Proverbs*, xxix 18.

recognition of our historic and collective strength and by the assembled evidence of the human sciences and historic philosophies, that mankind is perennially capable and ready for collective salvation whenever the conditions are released which will release our full capacities as social beings.

CHAPTER XVIII

The Contribution of the Psychology of Reading to International Cooperation^a

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THE LINE OF ARGUMENT in this paper is as follows: Understanding underlies international cooperation and control of destructive forces, this understanding can be gained by mass methods of communication, one of the most important means of communication is reading, people all over the world should learn to read with adequate comprehension, the applied psychology of reading contributes to this goal of a literate world

Understanding Through Worldwide Communication

The crying need of the world is for peace. Ignorance is the enemy of peace. In the words of the preamble to the UNESCO Constitution, "Ignorance of each other's ways and lives has been a common cause, throughout the history of mankind, of that suspicion and mistrust between the peoples of the world through which their differences have all too often broken into war." To understanding must be added faith—faith based on a long distance view of human progress and a sense of man's possible destiny. There is much support for the thesis that "inaccurate and inadequate modes of communication are at the root of the world's present difficulties." At least it is true that "communicative behavior underlies and makes possible collective and corporate behavior."¹

Understanding, perspective, and a vision of a better world cannot be

^a[Cf. Chapter X by Irving D. Lorge.]

¹Mapheus Smith, "Communicative Behavior," *Psychological Review*, LIII, September, 1946, p. 294.

achieved without mass means of communication. Effective means of communication among the peoples of the world can focus attention on the common interests of humanity, "show the reality of human progress in the past," and present concretely the potentialities of the future. Psychological barriers to communication among peoples must be removed. For example, mass methods of communication can promote a popular understanding of applied science, which will free people not only from hunger but from the fear and insecurity that arise from inability to procure the physical necessities of life. Large groups of people will no longer be driven into war by want.

Reading as an Avenue of Communication

Of the major media of mass communication—the press, the radio, the cinema, and television—the oldest and most widely used is still the printed word. Accordingly, conservation of the world's inheritance of books, preparation of new literature to promote international good will, translation of the cherished treasures of human wisdom from all ages and nations, and the exchange of printed materials among all the countries have long been emphasized in programs for promoting international cooperation. Fiction is particularly useful in building the reader's understanding of other peoples—their mores, the ways in which they are like him or different, and the reasons why they behave as they do. Accurate, undistorted, complete information in readable form is essential for worldwide communication.

The real effects of reading have been studied in a limited way. The responses people make to a passage reflect their reading ability, their mental alertness, the need they feel to communicate ideas gained from their reading, as well as their interests, attitudes, and activities.² In an experimental study, Cherrington³ found that a single lecture and the reading of a single pamphlet markedly influenced students' responses on an attitude test. Gray⁴ reviewed some scattered evidence that

²Ruth Strang, *Exploration in Reading Patterns*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1942.

³B. M. Cherrington, *Methods of Education in International Attitudes*, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, 1934.

⁴William S. Gray, "The Social Effects of Reading," *School Review*, LV, May, 1947, pp. 269-277.

1. Reading a distorted account increases the inaccuracy of college students' information on the subject
2. Confidence in the source of the information leads the reader to accept it
3. Readers without initial bias about a person or problem build up either favorable or unfavorable opinions as a result of reading favorable or unfavorable editorials. Headlines likewise influence the attitude of readers
4. The effect of argument and emotional appeals varies with the person's predispositions. Instead of neutralizing an existing prejudice, propaganda opposed to it may increase the person's perplexity, indecision, and conflict, and have no effect on his preconceptions and biases. When opposing points of view are presented, the majority of readers tend to follow their preconceptions and biases.⁵
5. "Emotional" appeals are more effective than "rational" propaganda in influencing votes

Reading must be recognized as a two edged sword. Aggressive tendencies are present in nations having high percentages of literacy.⁶ Reading may lead to aggressive nationalism and international ill will instead of to world brotherhood and peace. Nevertheless, reading, varied as it may be in its effect on people's behavior, remains a major avenue of understanding. It makes possible the spread of information within and across national boundaries.

Literacy a Prerequisite to Communication through Printed Sources

Though the printed word is indeed powerful, it does not influence the vast numbers of human beings who cannot read or write. "It will be impossible for humanity to acquire a common outlook if large sections of it are the illiterate inhabitants of a mental world entirely different from that in which a fully educated man can have his being, a world of superstition and petty tribalism in place of one of scientific advance and possible unity. Thus mass campaigns against illiteracy and for a common

⁵Helen Jameson Crossen, "Effects of Attitudes of the Reader upon Critical Reading Ability," unpublished doctor's dissertation, Division of the Social Sciences, University of Chicago, 1946.

⁶L. Kindel, "Salvation Through Literacy," *School and Society*, LXIV, December 7, 1946, p. 396.

fundamental education must form part of UNESCO's programme."⁷ It is because literacy is a prerequisite—though not a guarantee—of full personal intellectual development and of international awareness and understanding that UNESCO plans a campaign against illiteracy. This campaign has been planned "to promote the kind of common learnings which every citizen of the world really must have."^{8b}

Campaigns Against Illiteracy

One of the most thrilling national programs for increasing literacy began during World War I when Doctor James Yen, a Yale graduate who had studied the psychology of reading, was called to Europe to

^bComment by Harry B. Friedgood

The teaching of reading as a means of combating illiteracy *within* nations is at the crux of Doctor Strang's campaign. It stands to reason, however, that in a world which contains over two billion people speaking 2,769 different languages, one of the outstanding barriers to mutual understanding is the lack of a *common* medium of expression.

Bismarck once remarked that the key to the power of the English speaking peoples was to be found in their common language. His thought poses a question: can an interlanguage link the vital, but divergent, national interests of independent nations?

Through the years hundreds of such plans have been suggested, but only two have acquired enough of a following to be considered seriously. The first is Esperanto, a synthetic, artificial language that looks like Spanish and sounds like Italian. It was invented in 1887 by a Russian physician, Zamenhoff. In over fifty years, the number of its adherents amounts to only about forty thousand.

The second, Basic English, by 1939 was being taught in approximately thirty European countries. The three countries which have developed it most extensively are India, China, and Russia. A. S. Richards' most spectacular success was achieved with one thousand native Chinese seamen, who were taught a sufficient command of Basic English in six weeks to qualify them for naval instruction in the operation of destroyer escorts. In eighteen weeks all had passed the course. Of these only one hundred could speak English prior to their introduction to Basic, while three hundred of them could not even write their native Chinese. Doctor Richards stresses the fact that the amazing results can be duplicated with any other language by reducing it to a comparable Basic form. German and Spanish, for instance, reduce to Basic in two thousand words. Professor Chao Yuan Ren of China's Academia Sinica has developed recently an eight hundred and forty-nine word Basic Chinese.

Those who advocate the universal adoption of Basic English are not proposing to force its acceptance on an unwilling world. They suggest, rather, that all of us share a common method of expression for the sake of promoting unity of thought and purpose. Wherever other countries similarly simplify their language, the English speaking peoples should participate unequivocally in the culture and tradition of each of them by the same device.

Obviously, this means of intercommunication is only one of the ways in which mutual good will and understanding can be fostered.

⁷Julian S. Huxley, *UNESCO, Its Purpose and Its Philosophy*, Public Affairs Press, 1947.

⁸The University of Chicago Round Table, "Can UNESCO Educate for World Understanding?" A Radio Discussion from Paris by Etienne Gilson, R. P. McKeon, J. B. Priestley,

work with two hundred thousand Chinese laborers building trenches in France. When the war was over Doctor Yen returned to China where he found illiterates in every province eager to learn to read "It is estimated that since 1926 ten million persons have learned the twelve hundred characters considered necessary for simple reading. The average cost for all China was \$1.40 per pupil."⁹ After the invasion of China by Japan, this program was taken over by the People's Military Training Corps.

The essential features of Doctor Yen's method seem to be as follows:

1. Building the idea of a literate China
2. Creating a "climate of willingness to go to school" through posters and handbills showing how ignorance hinders China's progress, by governors' proclamations, by laws taxing illiterates, by parades and mass meetings
3. Preparing a list of the thousand most commonly used Chinese characters—a "basic Chinese," comparable to "basic English"
4. Recruiting teachers from government and mission schools who work on a volunteer basis
5. Developing the "brotherhood" idea that a person should teach others as soon as he himself has learned
6. Preparing cheap, carefully graded reading material: books each containing twenty-five lessons with ten characters in each lesson; little paper covered books for artisans, farmers, soldiers, and other workers, a weekly paper written as far as possible in the thousand most commonly used Chinese characters. Thus people are taught to read with materials which at the same time improve their citizenship, health, and economic efficiency.

In 1921, Russia began the largest literacy campaign in history. As in China, literacy was associated with an idea: "An illiterate people cannot build a Communist State," Lenin said.

Procedures included the following:

1. Simplification of the reading problem—a phonetic alphabet was adopted, and people were taught to read the languages that they spoke rather than only the official Russian language, as had formerly been the policy.

and G. D. Stoddard," (665th Broadcast in Cooperation with the National Broadcasting Company), *The University of Chicago, Chicago, December 1, 1946, Number 154*, p. 12.

⁹Frank C. Lawbach, *The Silent Billion Speak*, Friendship Press, New York, 1913, p. 111.

- 2 Preparation of textbooks in the principal languages
- 3 Use of volunteers—"cultural soldiers"—as well as hundreds of special, paid teachers.
- 4 Surveys of illiterates
- 5 Government pressure—after August, 1931, illiteracy became a legal offense
6. Campaigns to teach reading to all age levels In 1933, Stalin announced that ninety per cent of the people of the USSR could read and write

Other countries—for example, Guatemala, Poland, and Mexico¹⁰—have employed similar methods: government pressure, "each one teach one" systems of free instruction, and simplified reading material

In the United States the methods and materials of the Army have been described in detail. Witty¹¹ summarized the Army's methods as follows:

- 1 Functional reading materials—illustrated manuals, film strips, planned repetition of terms in different functional contexts, a supplementary weekly paper and monthly magazine, and other reading material
- 2 Teaching of language skills as a whole, with attention to speaking, listening, writing, and arithmetic, as well as to reading
- 3 Lessons easy enough so that the feeling of achievement is established at an early stage.
- 4 Individual programs arranged so that learners proceed as fast as their ability permits
5. Recognition of the importance of interest and motive
- 6 Awareness of "clear objectives and specific purposes," with "steps in their attainment outlined and objective tests used to check progress at regular intervals."
- 7 Frequent use of the demonstration followed by exercises that apply what has just been learned and give the student a basis for judging his performance


¹⁰International Bureau of Education, "Campaign Against Illiteracy," *International Bureau of Education Bulletin*, XX, Third Quarter, 1946, pp. 107, 111, 113

¹¹Paul A. Witty, "Army Experiences with Readers and Reading and Their Implications for Postwar Education," *Appraisal of Current Practices in Reading*, (Annual Conference on Reading Held at the University of Chicago), The University of Chicago, Chicago, VII, Supplementary Educational Monograph No. 61, pp. 10-14

The Psychology of Reading

Many features of the programs briefly described are in accord with sound reading psychology. If that psychology were fully understood, however, many programs for the improvement of reading would be more unified, efficient, and efficacious.

Perhaps a diagram, representing an expansion of the $S \rightarrow R$ formula, will convey more effectively than words alone an understanding of the dynamic or functional concept of reading.



O represents the dynamic self with its readiness for reading, its changing and persistent moods, its expectancies, its incomplete activities, and other motivations. The goals and needs of the organism, and its bias or false assumptions direct its attention. Thus the "set" of the organism not only regulates the effort put forth in reading, but also influences the selection of books, favors certain parts of the books as against others, and controls the meaning derived. Thus, too, the reader's "set" may result in efficient reading because his knowledge of what to look for and his ability to see relationships, recognize important ideas, and skip over irrelevant material improves his comprehension and increases his speed. On the other hand, the reader with a biased or distorted mind set may be "blind" to other points of view, give overpotency to parts of the passage in accord with his preconceived ideas, and make false assumptions.

S stands for "stimulus configuration." Reading is a visual task, and requires a certain degree of visual efficiency. The stimulus cues from any given passage, however, are different for every reader, depending upon his mental ability, previous experience, present needs, and future goals. Psychologists need to know much more about what cues are used in reading and how they are used. Perception—the ability to distinguish one form from another—is guided by the situation goal set, as in the case of the nurse who read "abominable calumny" as "abdominal cavity." Perception of words is also checked by the person's expectation. If the word read does not fit into the situation as perceived, the reader looks at it again.

R calls attention to the process of interpretation of meaning "Meanings are in persons' minds, not in words, and when we say that a word has or possesses such and such meaning, we are really saying that it has evoked or caused those meanings"¹² Thus the interpretation of meaning is highly individual. Moreover, language requires a "leap of the imagination" from the word form to the meaning that the writer wished to convey by it. In order to interpret the passage accurately, the reader must try to think and feel with the author who is communicating. This process of putting oneself in the writer's place is especially important in reading about persons or cultures different from our own. Among the obstacles to international understanding are "the inability to transcend personal experience in intergroup communication; stereotypes; the assimilation of material to familiar frames of reference, and the confusion of percept and concept."¹³

T refers to the "trace" left as a result of previous reading—some structural modification, perhaps, following the discharge of tension through certain pathways. Proficiency in reading depends upon the retention of previous learning. No progress in reading would be possible if words and phrases continually remained unfamiliar. The associations between words and their meanings seem to be strengthened by the kind of experience that gives reinforcement, especially the experience of having successfully reached the goal. Reading, like games and sports, should furnish its own reinforcement. It should persist as an activity because "it satisfies."

P represents the perception of the next reading situation. Because of his previous experience in reading, the person perceives the new situation as pleasurable, threatening, "something at which he will succeed," "something at which he will fail," an opportunity to strengthen his prejudices, or an opportunity to gain real understanding of people or problems. Thus his perception of the reading situation influences his response by creating certain expectancies and a certain readiness.

Reading is part of a total situation, involving the person, his environment, and the reading material. The person's past experience, his present

¹²Edward L. Thorndike, "The Psychology of Semantics," *American Journal of Psychology*, LIX, October, 1946, 613-632.

¹³Daniel Katz, "Psychological Barriers to Communication," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science*, II CL, March, 1947, p. 18.

needs and inclinations, and his future goals all enter into his reading proficiency.

The person planning a program for the reduction of illiteracy and the positive improvement of reading should apply the psychology of reading. He should recognize and build people's readiness for reading, and help them to set for themselves specific and attainable goals and purposes. By simplifying the reading task, he will make easier the perception and interpretation of meaning. By assuring success and satisfaction in and through reading, he will increase retention of word impressions and help to create a favorable "set" toward the next reading situation. Thus he will make an important contribution to people's understanding of each other and to the improvement of living, through knowledge gained from printed sources. The preparation and dissemination of cooperation promoting printed material among the literate peoples of the world is yet another problem.^c

^cComment by Robert C. Angell

Doctor String's concern for reading with adequate comprehension strikes me as premature in the field of international communication. So long as so much of what is printed is misleading, it is perhaps best to read with inadequate comprehension. Her argument strikes me as a little like that of a person who is insistent that medicine be taken at a certain time every day before anyone knows whether there is any medicine to cure the disease.

Comment by Thomas D. Eliot

I do not think that mere adept literacy will resolve international tensions. It must include adequate discrimination and evaluation of what is read: general semantic alertness can be imparted to children so that they will not be so susceptible to false propaganda, nor so prone to ethnocentric bigotries. Even this will not succeed without adequate freedom from fear and want, and basic civil rights.

Doctor String's reply

There are many facets to the problem of international cooperation. One facet of basic importance is the universal enjoyment of civil rights and freedom from fear and want. Another is the unconscious motivations that influence the attitudes and actions of individuals and groups. Still another facet is the role of understanding, especially understanding accompanied by acceptance of persons as they are and as they can become. Understanding of other peoples may be gained from personal contact and by various avenues of communication—through an international language, radio and television, motion pictures, and reading.

There are also three facets to the problem of gaining understanding through reading—(1) authentic facts supplied by all kinds of reading material, (2) ability to read these facts with adequate comprehension, and (3) resistance to susceptibility to false propaganda and errors of fact and interpretation. UNESCO has rightly placed initial emphasis on the preparation of accurate, complete, undistorted information. However, even while this material is being prepared, people can be taught to read it. *Reading*, as defined in this article, goes beyond mere word recognition to the broad view of reading as the ability to comprehend, interpret, evaluate, and apply what is read. This article is limited to this one facet of the total problem.

CHAPTER XIX

Toward a Sharper Accent on Man in History; an Essay on Relief of International Tensions Through Historical Study

By QUIRINUS BREEN

Professor of History, University of Oregon



AS ONE WHO IS CONCERNED with truth as truth, the historian is faced with the question whether his work is of any earthly use toward the salvation of human society. The question is stated with poignant urgency by the many who think that very soon—at best within five or six years—mankind will be on the way either to destruction or to Elysian beatitude on this science blessed earth. Now if the historian is pressed for an answer as to what he has to offer here and now—or within half a dozen years—he may be regarded as a fool, no matter what he says. He may say that in so short a time he cannot provide an answer, and by that token he were useless. If he should say that he *has* an answer, who would believe him?

I believe, indeed, that the study of history can help mankind save itself, because it can make a considerable contribution to restoring man's sense of the dignity of being human. The historian can perhaps do nothing, within a few years, to prevent the destruction of the greater part of the race, but he can help at least part of the race to die like human beings. Whether dying or living, we ought to be human.

This view has been of concern to the best men of our race. But a great deal of talk and writing reflects it too little. The awfulness of a possible destruction of civilization is over pictured in terms of catalogued items and of numbers of people lost—which losses were awful indeed, as anyone knows who has bemoaned the destruction of the library of Alexan-

dria and the millions of people murdered by tyrants. But more awful than all that were it for a man not to live or die like a human being.

The historian's business is to preserve the record of past human events, to augment our information through research, and to communicate his knowledge to society. It is to the historian not ignoble to have a concern for everything that man has done. The whole record is worth preserving. Now there is a close relationship between this quest of the historian and the view that man has a peculiar dignity. For after all why should one care about the past of man if he is not worth something as an individual? The historian of biology is not interested in preserving the record of each insect, but the historian of human beings is concerned to do precisely that for each individual. Each human voice is unique, unlike that of Keats' nightingale.

The voice I hear this passing night was heard
In ancient days by emperor and clown

The Aegean waves Matthew Arnold beheld were the same Sophocles had seen centuries before, but Sophocles and Arnold, how unique was each! The researcher knows the thrill of rediscovering some forgotten writer or artificer. The daily practice of the historian confirms the view that the individual man has a dignity which does not pertain to anything else in nature.

But a number of historical craftsmen appear too little aware of certain implications of this high view of man. Ralph Linton, for example, is one of our top anthropologists, as an anthropologist he is of course an historian. (His *Study of Man*, I have made required reading in some of my classes.) Linton says

Structurally man has so much in common with the other mammals, especially those of the primate order, that no other theory [than the evolutionary] seems tenable. That the human mind was similarly evolved from animal mentality is less clearly demonstrable, but there can be no doubt that the human brain and nervous system, its instruments, were so evolved. The problems of the existence and origin of the human soul do not fall within the scope of this book. However, granting the existence of the soul, there is no basic inconsistency between this and a belief in the evolution of man's body. Divine grace was certainly capable of awarding a soul at any stage in his physical development.¹

¹Ralph Linton, *Study of Man*, D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, 1936, p. 7.

This is a statement that—but for one sentence—a theologian were captious indeed if he should disallow. The guilty sentence is, “The problems of the existence and origin of the human soul do not fall within the scope of this book.” This sentence spoils much. It seems to say that the concession to theology was made grudgingly, that forthwith the author wants to be left to his traditional anthropological devices. Linton’s book, despite its value, cannot properly be called a *study of man*, for one of man’s components is left out of further consideration. His soul is left out. It were no more odd for a chemist to inform his students that H_2O is water, then to discuss water without the O. In Linton’s book man as a body-soul complex makes an entrance now and then—how could he stay away!—but the intention has been to deal with man as *animal brutum* and not *animal rationale*. A history of *animal brutum* has enormous human significance of course, for we are concerned with the history of our own origin and existence as body. By the same token the existence and origin of the soul is significant for a study of man, and the more so because the soul distinguishes man from the brute.

Halting between two opinions is better, however, than the one and only opinion characteristic of philosophical naturalism. The naturalist makes no acknowledgment of man’s soul, as does Linton. There was the great James Westfall Thompson, one of my own revered teachers, whose contribution to medieval studies needs not our praise. His imagination was such that he could give a sympathetic treatment of the cult of the Virgin—which I realized one day when he graded C a paper in which I had made a snide remark about it. Yet when it comes to an understanding handling of scholasticism he seems to get lost. The scholastic method which Grabmann has made so plain and credible seems, to some great scholars even, something almost missing significance. One may well ask, why? It is perhaps in part our Reformation heritage of belittling natural man. In view of their estimate of man the Reformers rejected the serious use of speculation in theology. Luther led the way, and while Melancthon and Calvin tried to find a formula whereby human reason could be given a place in theology, they could not produce it. Certainly Kant had much to do with it, for if God, freedom, and immortality are unknowable, how can men take the scholastics seriously? While Kant gives succor to romanticism and to practical piety, the naturalists also defer to him. What, then, is the sum of all this but the present mood of irrationalism? Man is deflowered with respect to his reason. It is on that

account that scholastics are treated patronizingly—and pooh-poohed. I say nothing of the devotees of John Dewey, who see little more in Plato than some tute data for the history of education, and in Aristotle see nothing exciting. The chief themes of human discourse (Kant's God, freedom, and immortality) are all mere matters of opinion. How, then, can there be an argument against the strongest dictating *his* opinion to the rest, save the argument of counter violence?

But the reply of violence (though one possible aspect of the reply to tyranny) is not the most characteristic of man. The reply of reason alone has that distinction. G. Pico della Mirandola gave noble expression to it in his *Oration on the Dignity of Man*. Pico, who was interested in knowledge or understanding as an end, came to be outshouted by those who wanted knowledge for power. The latter has in turn been effectually neutralized neither by the Enlightenment nor by modern humanitarianism. In all our learning there still appears the question (how *can* it be suppressed?) What *is* a man? We know it is the question of questions for the historian, who deals with human events. But the confidence seems lost whereby a man dares to make a thumping affirmation of the dignity of man. Meanwhile such as the Marxists do not hesitate to make their bold affirmations.

Surely, it is not dishonorable to hold that the true is compatible with the good, or with the beautiful, for that matter. Of course history should present a true record of human events. But the historian is more than a mere name-date-cause-effect machine. He is also a man. He reflects on the nature and meaning of what it is to be a man. Professor Costigan² shows how fruitful have been the reflections of Marx and Freud. In view, however, of Costigan's penetrating criticism of these men it seems odd that he should characterize as "outmoded concepts" the religious and the idealistic interpretations of history. Surely the religious conception has a view of man which our critic might find it easier to live with than either Marx's or Freud's. He thinks highly of Spengler (more so than of Toynbee), but what is man to Spengler? Always the individual gets lost in such systems as grow out of Marx, Freud, and Spengler. The Judeo-Christian view (which absorbed the best of the Greek) recognizes man as a rational animal and endowed with free will. Thus Socrates inspired his disciples with the notion that the unexamined life is not worth living. Moses and the prophets assume that man is the sort of be-

²"General Studies," *University of Washington*, mimeographed, 1917, pp. 157-161.

ing that *can* hearken to the moral law. Christ addresses himself to men as beings who find eternal life in the knowledge of God and as having the expectation of achieving a righteousness theretofore not thought possible of attainment. I suspect that detractors of this concept of man dislike it because it derives in part from what religion calls revelation. I will not argue the point, since I am no theologian. It seems captious, however, to impugn an idea because its origin is not understood. It is a happy circumstance that the millions can love flowers for their fragrance, that but few judge them by their origin.

The dignity of man as *the* theme of historical study seems the obvious one. It is not necessary to deal less thoroughly than we do with environmental conditions, or with groups, or with institutions. But we must deal more effectively with man. We fail because we do not reflect on what is a man. Of course we hardly have the tools for proper reflection. We have so long been away from metaphysics that we can scarcely understand the significance of its elementary terms. Besides, the most respected men have so long denounced metaphysics, that it is hard to believe there is anything to it. Now it seems we have no choice but to return to metaphysics. Marx and other naturalists pronounce on the being of man as surely as do Aristotle or Thomas Aquinas. We cannot accept any statement about man's being that negates his dignity, for the true cannot conflict with the good. Charles Beard has stated that the historian has a faith. Some of his critics have wondered if Beard is not tending to betray the scientific historical method. If Doctor Beard gives that impression it is his fault, for a faith must itself be such that it does not conflict with reason.

The central concern of history is with the deeds of a being of the highest dignity. The historian has an eye for what really matters in history, namely, man. Several aspects of this have a bearing on our subject.

1. History should never be propagandistic in the sense of being slanted in favor of a particular way of life (such as our American) or to the disfavor of any (such as the Russian). There is but one loaded die—the dignity of man. The historian is thus very truly an internationalist. As a citizen he may have to make choices dictated by spot emergencies such as national safety. But as an historian he can speak only what seems to him based on objective evidence. As an historian he is not first an American but a man. In this respect history is like religion, philosophy or fine

at, in which man can always meet man Antigone giving honorable burial to her traitor brother exemplifies our duty.

2 History ought not to be interpreted in terms of its particular aspects, save as special monographic studies. There is of course a class struggle in history, but it is a particular phase only. To discern between the particular and the universal requires a man to be a philosopher as well as an historian. He may have to be a theologian also. Toynbee seems to H. Holborn to be on the track but failing to reach his destination (save in hope). Says Holborn:

One could say also that his [Toynbee's] work renewed the great tradition of the Christian philosophy of history, which dominated Western thought from Augustine to Bossuet, if this view of history had not rested upon the belief that divine rather than human actions constituted the only objects worthy of speculation. Toynbee remains a humanist, and though he knows of higher hopes, the achievements of man constitute the proper subjects of research.¹

Toynbee doubtless has gone as far as our generation is capable of going. It is not far enough. History has a beginning and an end. Man as rational or as soul—as Linton suggests or believes or hopes—is not traceable to the primates. If that is so, man's destiny cannot be adequately expressed by a biological metaphor. Toynbee is aware of this, but his thinking on it is unclear. Now when Linton speaks of soul, he uses a word whose meaning is defined by Christian theology. It presumes revelation. And, as Gilson put it: "Once you are in possession of that revelation how can you possibly philosophize as though you had never heard of it?"² This can be paraphrased for the historian: Once man is defined in terms taken largely from revelation, how can one reflect upon his destiny as though man were essentially a primate? In other words, the history of human cultures in their "cycles" is not a history of the whole man. It is a monograph on one aspect of human events. I do not decry such monographs. But the part is not the whole.

Let it be true that our generation cannot express the whole as it ought in historical terms. (I will readily acknowledge my own inability.) Nevertheless we can say our work is but partial. We can acknowledge that we are only monographers. There is an urgency about this, for we

¹*Saturday Review of Literature*, May 31, 1917, p. 29.

²Etienne Gilson, *Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1940, p. 5.

have indoctrinated a generation to think that what we said about history pertained to the whole man. We have given a generation a learned faultiness. This has had much to do with the very prevalent notion that man really is no more than the brute. With two world wars on the head of our century the tendency toward violence has been strengthened. It is worth our while to begin seeing ourselves as human beings, and thinking as they ought. Even a drop of dignity, like blueing in a tub, can effect much. Grotius's *Law of War and Peace* softened even Richelieu.

3. The historian can do much toward changing man's sense of values. Man ought to have a better concept of what is good. One can and ought to advocate the notion that life consists not in the abundance of the things a man possesses. Juvenal's *Vanity of Human Wishes* has been appreciated as clever satire more than as solemn truth. Juvenal's ineffectiveness comes in part from not knowing what kind of life *is* good, or at least from being unclear about it. I take the pedestrian view of good as that which is undiminished being. An apple is good to the extent that it has no worm or rottenness. A man is good when he is unimpaired in body and soul, and when the body is made to serve the purposes of the soul. We thus call good a culture in which manifestly the pursuit of truth and the exercise of individuality are unhampered—unhampered, that is, by an excessive standard of physical living or by a greater demand for power than is necessary to defend the pursuit of truth and the exercise of individuality. The economic interpretation of history has rightly been called a notable achievement of modern times. It has, however, often been used mistakenly. It has fed a cynical Machiavellian estimate of man. It has confirmed the persuasion of those who say, Tell me how a people makes its living, and I'll tell you what that people *is*. Thus we encourage power politics, instead of politics for the benefit of man. This economic view is of the same cloth with that which pronounces on St. Francis that, after all, he must have had lice. If there is a consciousness of the true dignity of man an economic interpretation can (along with explaining this important aspect of events) exemplify the frequent imbalance between man's physical and spiritual pursuits. The charge that this were moralizing will be serious in the eyes of the unreflecting only. It seems evident that—if man is a body-soul complex—the historian of human events cannot but be curious as to what happens to the entire man.

In what I have said, I have certainly not intended to belittle that which our American historical guild has achieved. I am proud to be of its mem-

bership. But I am moved by a concern about our sons and daughters as future citizens of the world. The "one world" which is coming into being (by compromise or by violence) will continue to be tense with hostilities unless a very strong core of our race has a reverence for human dignity. The historians can do much to show young people how fruitful (in new ways) the record becomes when looked at in the light of what a man truly is.

As I see it we have no option about this. Fascistic cynicism and Marxian materialism are no mere academic questions. The life of man as man is at stake. It is a paradox that with these non-academic, real life questions we must deal academically. We cannot make decisions of the sort made by the State Department, but we make decisions more momentous, for they lie in the realm of spirit. That is a considerable responsibility.

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CHAPTER XX

Ideology and Power in the Strategy of World Peace ¹

By DAVID BIDNEY

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1 *Atomic Energy and the Crisis of Humanity*²

THE DEVELOPMENT of atomic energy has revolutionized the whole process of war and the concept of peace, and upset the traditional notion of the balance of power among nations. Man's ability to induce nuclear disintegration has made it possible for him to produce cultural disintegration on a scale never imagined before. Atomic war is essentially a war of annihilation, just as the release of atomic energy involves the transmutation of elements and the conversion of matter into radiant energy. The atomic revolution, therefore, necessitates a corresponding social and axiological revolution.

A crisis offers the possibility of disaster as well as an opportunity for a new creative advance.³ The nations, especially the big powers, are now faced with a crucial decision: whether to participate in one intelligible world of universal values, or to go on competing with one another within their conflicting, private cultural worlds, whether to seek their mutual welfare within the framework of a genuine, democratic world order, or

¹The research involved in the writing of this paper was conducted under the liberal auspices of the Viking Fund, Inc., of New York City, and is part of a larger project on theoretical anthropology.

²This section as well as section three is based on an earlier paper entitled "The Concept of Cultural Crisis," published in the *American Anthropologist*, XLVIII, 4, October-December, 1946, pp. 534-552.

³The self-allotted task of the critical thinker and social leader has ever been to call attention to the imminent danger of some crisis and to indicate prospects for resolving it, thereby turning the critical situation into an opportunity for cultural progress. There is, therefore, a direct relation between intellectual cultural creativity and social crises.

to promote their own interests and so-called sovereign power irrespective of the social cost. The alternative of power politics has been tried exclusively throughout recorded history by the "practical" statesmen and has led to a series of ever increasing disasters. Perhaps, now, with the threat of planetary destruction, the alternative of a universal, human order and common civilization envisaged by the great spiritual leaders of all ages, may yet be put to the test.

It is one thing, however, to point up the ideal direction for a resolution of the world's basic problem, it is quite another to indicate the practical steps to bring about this consummation. It is all very well to submit the proposal that the world is in need of a super-national government and of international laws.⁴ But one has also to reckon with the existing cultural situation which makes it impossible to proceed immediately with the realization of this ideal. Whether the world will respond to this "most challenging opportunity of all history" with constructive vision and achieve greatness, or whether it will find the task too difficult—that is the question of our troubled times. From a historical perspective, as Arnold Toynbee⁵ has reminded us, the formula of "Challenge and Response" in all historical epochs provides the cultural conditions of human progress. Whether we of this epoch have the greatness of mind and courage to meet our challenge, or whether, as has recently been claimed, "all signs indicate that we are failing to meet the challenge,"⁶ is something which yet remains to be seen.

2 *The Problem of One World in Theory and Practice*

Politically, the quest for world unity is as old as the recorded history of man. All the empire builders were motivated by this ideal. But they all sought a unity of power and dominion, an imposed, "organic" unity. The crucial question of our times, then, is *not*, Shall we have world unity? but rather, *What kind of unity shall we have? Unity on what terms?* Shall we substitute for the one world which the Nazis dreamed of, the utopian, classless, world society envisaged by the Marxists? Or shall we

⁴See, for example, IMRE RESS's popular discussion of *The Anatomy of Peace*, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1945.

⁵Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1947, chapter V.

⁶Statement by Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists, *New York Times*, June 30, 1947.

rather strive for a voluntary, democratic world order based on the concept of a supra-national government which recognizes no absolute, sovereign, national rights and is dedicated to the ideal of world peace?

Of course, we of the twentieth century are especially conscious of the unity of the world from a functional and geographic point of view. Geographical isolation is a thing of the past. Economically, too, the development of specialized industries and of world trade has made all nations dependent on one another. Culturally, however, we are still living in ethnocentric worlds of our own creation, worlds which are the products of our diverse human historical experiences and geographical environments. The question arises, is it impossible for men to emerge from their ethnocentric worlds to participate in a common cultural world, and if so, how is this to be achieved?

The answer would seem to be, as Plato discerned, that it is possible for mankind to emerge from its cultural caves and behold a common world in the light of the sun, provided men learn how to distinguish scientific knowledge based on reason and experience of nature, from the subjective opinions and wishful notions derived from their limited, traditional cultural environments. Through scientific knowledge alone can man conceive of one world subject to universal, natural laws the same for all. Only a science of cultural phenomena capable of producing a sense of human cultural kinship, parallel to the sense of biological kinship which we have as members of the same species, can overcome the cultural isolation and conflict which is the curse of our times.

Since *the common cultural world of man is primarily an ideal world of common objectives*, of moral values and principles, it must necessarily depend upon the common will and efforts of mankind for its realization. Hence, we must not assume, as the Positivists and Functionalists among us tend to do, that because of the interdependence of modern societies, the human world is *in fact* one.⁷ Mere functional or geographic interdependence of cultures is a mechanical kind of unity which would apply to any kind of world organization or lack of organization. A genuine and significant world unity is one characterized by the mutual acknowledgment of common values or objectives; it is a *teleological unity* manifested in harmonious social, political, and economic relations. Only in such a common universe of cultural participation can there be real or enduring

⁷This confusion, it would appear, also underlies Wendell L. Willkie's discussion in his *One World*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1943.

peace As Wendell Willkie so clearly realized in his *One World*, unless the United Nations dedicate themselves sincerely to the actualization of this wartime ideal, this Second World War, like the First World War, will have been nothing more than a "costly fight for power" ending "with an armistice, not a real peace" *The ideal of one world requires that we substitute a strategy of peace for the strategy of war, since peace is not merely the absence of overt strife, but is rather a positive social state and common mental attitude which must be deliberately cultivated and promoted.*

3 *The Problem of Ideological and Survival Crises*

Every genuine cultural crisis marks a transition to some new form of cultural life but it does not of itself indicate the direction which events will take. Cultural crises may be either constructive or destructive. In so far as the critical situation is a product of the revolt of human agents against self-destructive cultural inertia and is intended to prepare the way for constructive, socio-cultural reforms, it may be a *decided* good. On the other hand, a society may drift into a critical situation, such as an economic depression, without any prior deliberation on the part of those affected. But whatever the origin of the crisis, it may be converted from a potential evil into a potential or actual good. The good envisaged may be the restoration of the *status quo* or some radical reform. The issue between conservatives and radicals is whether the *status quo* is to be maintained until there is absolute proof that change is necessary, or whether change is desirable so long as there is no indisputable evidence to the contrary. The phrase, "to restore law and order," so often used in times of unrest is, for this reason, highly ambiguous, since the real question is, *What kind of law and order shall we have and who is to decide the form it should take?* Law and order may be "restored" either by reinstituting the old order of social affairs or by removing the sources of discontent.

From the perspective of theory and practice, a cultural crisis may appear in the ideational-affective experience of individuals as a basic conflict or incoherency of thought and emotion which occasions a suspension of voluntary and intellectual activity. Thus one may speak of scientific, moral, or religious crises when he wishes to refer to the fact that commonly accepted theories, ideals, and beliefs have broken down because

contradicted by new evidence or found incompatible with new conditions. Similarly, a practical crisis may be demonstrated by the unworkability or incompatibility of prevailing institutions or customs and by the suspension, through active or passive resistance, of normal or routine cultural behavior.

There is usually considerable *lag* in the conformity of theory and practice, a radical change in theory not being immediately accompanied by corresponding change in practice, while reactionary practice is often misrepresented as in accord with traditional theory. In this manner, many Quislings and Laval's have sought to justify their conduct in terms of the professed, ideal traditions of their people. In an era of transition each party represents its own position as progressive and that of its opponents as reactionary. Only critical, particularized thinking, an unbiased eye for correlating party labels with pragmatic consequences, and a measure of historical perspective can protect a society from unwitting cultural corruption and eventual self-destruction.

In the long run, theoretical and practical crises are bound to be closely correlated, a crisis in practice leading to dissatisfaction with prevailing theory or ideology, particularly on the part of the articulate intellectuals, or else, some radical innovation in theory undermining accepted social institutions. In democratic societies, especially at election time, social radicals as well as reactionaries and conservatives have a tendency to develop what appears as a *crisis complex* and to envisage either the introduction of certain measures or the failure to support certain reforms as making for a potential social crisis—an eventuality which, it is anticipated, would arouse public anxiety and win partisan adherents for a particular platform or candidate. On the other hand, in non-democratic societies, whether of the right or the left, governments tend to supervise the education of their subjects and to institute various modes of "thought control" to make certain that no subversive ideas penetrate the social mind or affect opinion. While it appears to be the case in general that societies are more likely to accept radical changes in times of troubles, the crisis acting as a kind of *cultural catalyst*, totalitarian societies must depend on such practical emergencies to a much greater extent than democratic societies, since the former make no provision for peaceful change.

One may distinguish two corresponding types of crisis, namely, *sur-*

vival or *existential crises* and *axiological* or *ideological crises* Survival crises involve the preservation of the existence of a given society, axiological or ideological crises refer to transformations in the form or system of values of a given culture. In a survival crisis, the question is, *to be or not to be*, in an ideological crisis, the problem is, *how to be and what to be*. Put in Darwinian terms, the issue is the factual survival of the fittest as over against the normative determination of the fittest or most worthy to survive.

The tragedy of ideological crises lies in the fact that so many of them need never have occurred, if only the disputants did not regard polar values, which ought to complement one another, as if they were mutually exclusive. In the political sphere there is always the temptation on the part of those in power to govern in the interests of one class or vested interest, even though the opposition may represent a polar interest essential for the well being of the state. In a democratic society, this admittedly evil practice is mitigated somewhat by the fact that the opposition partly may look forward to governing in turn and thus either undo or offset the measures introduced by their predecessors. In totalitarian governments, however, the myth must be inculcated that the party in power alone represents the true interests of the state as a whole and that any opposition to its rule is treason.

In historical experience, ideological and survival crises are closely bound together, since man is prepared to sacrifice his very life, if need be, for the values and institutions which render his life meaningful. Man, it appears, is not content with mere self-preservation in the biological sense, since the self he is most concerned to preserve is his cultural self, the one expressed in his moral, religious, artistic, and scientific ideals and practices. A society, like an individual, may sometimes be too weak to cope with the social forces which confront it, and may, in frustration, yield its will to live in order to escape the burden of an existence which it finds intolerable. The decline of many native societies when brought into contact with Western peoples points up this social attitude. Modern Zionism, on the other hand, quite apart from its political tendencies, is at bottom a folk expression of a cultural renaissance among the Jewish people, brought about largely by a growing anti-Semitism which has made it impossible for many Jews to participate in the cultural life of the European nations among whom they wished to live.

4. *The Struggle for Power and the Ideology of Power*

Ideological and survival crises are brought closely together by the struggle for power between nations or classes. The closer the cultural similarity, the more intense has been the rivalry for territorial expansion and dominion—a fact which the history of modern Europe amply illustrates. Karl Marx has made the world conscious of the class struggle within society, and by thus rendering diverse economic groups class conscious has intensified the conflict. Marx has taught the workers and those intellectuals who identify themselves with the working class to distrust the profession of universal social ideals and to detect behind every idealistic principle some concealed economic interest. As a result, there has developed among large segments of contemporary society a *perpetual crisis complex*, since it is maintained that there is no rational or peaceful way of reconciling opposite social values, and that the so-called state of peace between societies and within non-Communist societies, is but a truce.

Whereas formerly ideological and power crises were kept distinct and the attempt was even made to justify expansionist or imperialistic tendencies by appeal to universal values, now the quest for power has become an end in itself. Ideals have become the tools or instruments for rationalizing the irrational will to power of some particular nation or class. The Marxists in particular now seek to "debunk" all idealism in culture history and to reduce all human ideals to symbols of economic power interests. *What is new, therefore, in the present world unrest, is that henceforth one may not separate ideological conflict from the quest for power as was formerly the case.*⁸ This is the significance of our new age of *realpolitik* and materialistic cultural "dynamics." The "logic of power" has preempted the place of the power of logic and reason. *Instead of power in the service of ideals, we now have the doctrine of ideals in the service of power. Therein lies the ultimate meta-cultural issue of our time.*

Thus social and political security are now regarded as tied up with ideological identity or affinity. The Russians, for example, are using their active influence to enable Communist governments to take over in the

⁸See W. G. Carleton, "Ideology or Balance of Power," *Yale Review*, Summer, 1947, pp. 590-602. The writer contrasts former national struggles for power with modern ideological conflicts. The point I am concerned to make is that ideology and power conflicts are inseparable in the modern world.

countries they have "liberated." Unless the democracies encourage the peoples within their sphere of influence to develop democratic institutions, they will find themselves at a great disadvantage in maintaining their way of life.

5. *The Meta-Anthropological Problem: Ideological Determinism Versus Freedom of Thought*

Underlying the new ideology of power there is a basic philosophical or meta-anthropological assumption as to the nature of man and of human thought. The basic issue is one of thought-determinism *versus* the inherent freedom and creativity of thought.

If one assumes with Nietzsche and Marx that ideals always serve the special interests or will to power of some group, then it follows that thought is necessarily determined by sociopolitical or economic conditions. On the other hand, if one agrees with Aristotle and Albert Einstein in postulating the fundamental creativity of the human imagination and intellect, then it follows that man is inherently capable of transcending the limitations of his sociocultural environment, notwithstanding the very considerable influence which they exert upon him.

The attraction of the theory of thought determinism for many historians, sociologists, and anthropologists, lies in the fact that it purports to explain scientifically the natural laws of cultural evolution and to predict the corresponding stages of development in diverse culture systems. On the other hand, those who, like the present writer, deny such unilinear cultural determinism, contend that human affairs are *not entirely* a matter of science and that due allowance must be made for the arts and humanities as independent, significant factors in the cultural process. They would question, furthermore, the claim that cultures are logically integrated wholes whose character is determined by the predominance of some one cultural element such as economic conditions or family relations.⁹

It is significant to note that ideological, historical determinists inconsistently assume their own ability to transcend the ideological relativism

⁹See Wilhelm Reich, *The Mass Psychology of Fascism*, Orgone Institute Press, New York, 1946. Reich has drawn attention sharply to the lag between changes in ideology and the economic base of society, pointing out that personal character structure is formed in early childhood and is therefore much more conservative than the forces of technical production. There is, therefore, reciprocal influence between ideology and economic social conditions.

they discern in the historical process. In brief, historical relativism, whether it takes the form of historical idealism or historical materialism, tends to be accepted as a scientific theory of cultural development, precisely because its adherents claim to present a timeless or absolute perspective. Hegel's idealization of the Prussian state of his day, and Marx's ideal of a classless society are cases in point. In practice, this means that cultural relativists tend to deny the objective validity or ideal universality of any system of thought other than their own. Thus what appears to be a scientific, relativistic doctrine of the stages of mental evolution becomes, in practice, the justification for rigid intellectual dogmatism and authoritarian intolerance of dissent which precludes any genuine synthesis of, or respect for, opposing views.¹⁰

The contrast between the theory of ideological determinism and of intellectual freedom may be illustrated by reference to the diverse conceptions of the methodology of science to which they lead. If, for example, one adheres to Marxist theory, no scientific interpretation is allowed to contradict the absolute formula of dialectical and historical materialism. Science virtually becomes the handmaiden of a given dogmatic philosophy and in this respect parallels the medieval doctrine of the subordination of science and philosophy to theology. A case in point has been the changing reception accorded to Einstein's theory of relativity, in so far as it was thought to be essentially idealistic or compatible with dialectical materialism.¹¹

Similarly, the arguments used by Lysenko to controvert the scientific genetic theory of an internationally acknowledged expert such as Vavilov, reveal the subservience of Soviet science to Marxist political philosophy.¹² Thus science tends to be subordinated to "secular myth"¹³ which coerces all thought and permits no adverse criticism.

On the other hand, the theory of the freedom and creativity of thought insists upon the primacy of fact or verified experience over theory. Science is progressive, precisely because its results are regarded as subject to revision and reinterpretation in the light of new discoveries. A sci-

¹⁰See "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" by X, in *Current Affairs*, July, 1947. This article, believed to be by George Kennan of the United States State Department, gives a clear, tactical description of the practical import of Communist ideology as regards the attitude of Soviet Russia toward other nations.

¹¹See Philipp Frank, *Einstein: His Life and Times*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1947.

¹²Karl Sax, "Soviet Science and Political Philosophy," *Scientific Monthly*, July, 1947, pp. 43-47.

¹³Reid Bain, "Man, the Myth-Maker," *Scientific Monthly*, July, 1947, pp. 61-69.

tific hypothesis is, as Einstein has maintained, a free invention of the mind to render intelligible the facts of experience within a limited field of observation and is subject to verification by empirical observation and pragmatic consequences. It is this combination of intellectual creativity and practical respect for the data of experience, this *self-corrective*¹⁴ function of scientific method which accounts for the advance of scientific achievement.

6. *The Concept of the State and the Problem of World Order*

One's theory as to the nature of man and the functions of human thought also has a direct bearing upon his theory of the nature of the state and international relations. In so far as thought is held to be determined by economic or power interests, there is no objective good common to all classes. Hence Marx and Engels¹⁵ were quite consistent in regarding the state as essentially a power or instrument for the protection of the interests of the dominant economic class while moderating the conflict between classes. It follows that any given state is in a *condition of perpetual crisis* since any opposition to its policies may logically be construed as a threat to its dictatorial power. This overt or covert conflict inherent in the very structure of the state may eventually be overcome only when the revolutionary proletariat seizes control of the state apparatus and succeeds in "liquidating" all other classes. Only then, when the "dictatorship of the proletariat" has achieved its goal of a classless society, may one look forward to a "withering away" of the state as an instrument of coercion. According to Lenin's *State and Revolution*,¹⁶ men will gradually "grow accustomed" to brotherly love and to self-regulation in the pursuit of common ideals and interests when there is no further eco-

¹⁴See James B. Conant, *On Understanding Science*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1947. The author's distinction between the strategy and tactics of science is especially illuminating.

¹⁵Friedrich Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*. International Publishers Company, New York, 1912, p. 155. The state "is a product of society at a particular stage of development, it is the admission that this society had involved itself in insoluble self-contradictions and is split into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to exercise. But in order that these antagonisms, classes with conflicting economic interests, shall not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle, a power, apparently standing above society has become necessary to moderate the conflict and keep it within the bounds of "order", and this power, arisen out of society but placing itself above it and increasingly alienating itself from it, is the state."

¹⁶See V. I. Lenin, *State and Revolution*, Little Lenin Library, 1, International Publishers Company, New York, 1932, pp. 68, 73-75.

nomic incentive to class struggle. The conflict within the Communist party itself, and the purges and treason trials of the founders of the Soviet Russian State since the death of Lenin, demonstrate the fallacy of his utopian assumption.

If, however, one grants that ideas and ideals do have an objective reality and validity and that men by nature do have common interests, then it is possible to conceive of a universal good in which members of a given society may participate. On this basis it makes sense to conceive of the state as a moral person¹⁷ which represents the true interests of all classes or groups. The state is then not primarily an instrument of coercion but an agency for the promotion of the common welfare and the harmonization of opposite interests. As such its power rests on the continued assent of the governed, and not upon enforced submission.

With regard to international affairs a similar contrast prevails. In so far as the state is thought to be primarily an instrument of economic power, all states must regard one another as rivals who threaten one another's security and sovereignty. The relation between states is, therefore, one of *perpetual crisis*. If, however, the state is held to be primarily a moral person concerned with the welfare of its members, then states, like individuals, may unite to promote their common interests without loss of their integrity and power of self-determination. A world government based on international consent is a logical consequence. The ideal of *perpetual peace* between nations becomes a practicable objective.

In view of this analysis, the problem confronting the United Nations becomes intelligible. *The conflict between Soviet Russia and her dependencies on the one hand, and the Anglo-American democracies on the other, is owing to failure to agree upon a common theory of the state and of the nature of man.* The Marxian Communists think in terms of two extremes, namely, either a dictatorial state governing in the name and interests of some economic class, or else an anarchic, stateless, classless society whose members have so altered their character structure that they have become conditioned to seek one another's welfare without governmental supervision. Since the latter alternative has not been realized and, according to Stalin,¹⁸ is not likely to be realized in the near

¹⁷See the scholarly paper on "The Founding Fathers" by M. F. X. Millar in *Foundations of Democracy*, edited by F. E. Johnson, Institute for Religious and Social Studies, New York, 1947.

¹⁸See Joseph Stalin, *Foundations of Leninism*, Little Lenin Library, 18, International Publishers Company, New York, 1939, p. 119. "The achievement and maintenance of the

future, there remains only the former alternative. In the case of Soviet Russia, the tension is enhanced by the alleged hostility of the capitalistic democracies to the Communistic form of government.

Hence Soviet Russia is wary of yielding any of her "sovereign rights" or of participating in good faith in any plan for world government. *Thus the "one world" objective which originally inspired the formation of the United Nations may now be seen as involving a confusion between an ideal possibility and the actual cultural reality.* The tragedy of the situation lies in the fact that, culturally, distrust soon becomes mutual and thereby creates its own justification. There can be no actual one world unless the nations of the world acknowledge its validity as an ideal compatible with diversity of group and national interests. The only alternative is the never ending struggle for a precarious "balance of power" which has already been the source of two world wars within one generation.

7. Ideological Theory and Political Practice

While it appears that there is no immediate prospect of reconciling the conflicting cultural and political views of the Communistic states with those of the democratic, capitalistic states, this should not be taken to mean nothing can be done to alleviate present socio-cultural tensions. It does mean that we must not delude ourselves into believing that the resolution of this world problem may be readily achieved through mutual good will and especially through a sympathetic "understanding" of the Communistic point of view. The trouble with the counsel of "understanding" is that one party is asked to do all the understanding, while the other party apparently may do as it pleases, on the assumption that adverse criticism may be attributed to lack of understanding of its legitimate needs and intentions. This, it may be recalled, was precisely the propaganda tactics pursued by the Fascists and Nazis preceding and during the Second World War. In view of the abuse of this weasel word, it must be emphasized that *mutual understanding is not enough* since a *de facto* understanding of differences does not necessarily breed har-

dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible without a party which is strong by reason of its solidarity and iron discipline. But iron discipline in the party is inconceivable without unity of will, without complete and absolute unity of action on the part of all members of the Party. . . . The Party becomes consolidated by purging itself of opportunistic elements." On this premise, the state constantly needs strengthening rather than weakening.

mony; it may as well, and often does, breed mutual contempt and hostility

There is a common tendency on the part of so-called practical men to assume that theoretical issues are not important and that the immediate task is to face practical objectives upon which agreement is possible. This practical approach assumes that reasonable people will readily agree to "self-evident" truths, and that differences of opinion regarding means can be easily adjusted.

What the advocates of the practical approach fail to appreciate is that *the sphere of the practical is relative to, and is delimited by, one's theoretical ideals*.¹⁹ The determination of the practical objective may involve an entire ideology or philosophy of social life which comprehends a special configuration or hierarchy of values. Hence what may be practical for a member of one society may be highly impractical for a member of another. What is practicable for a Moslem is not at all so for a Hindu—a condition which has led to the setting up of two distinct dominions in modern India. In brief, an objective is practical not only because it can be achieved but also in virtue of the fact that it is considered desirable.

It may be readily granted that self-interest and mutual fear of aggravating tensions may lead to some cooperation on practical issues which are not very vital or do not require any radical reorientation of one's cultural perspective. The willingness of the United States to do business with Japan almost up to the time of Pearl Harbor is a case in point. Both parties to an ideological disagreement may yield a point here and there in the hope of gaining some greater advantage for themselves in the future. But it would be foolhardy to mistake such good will tactics for a genuine reconciliation or for unity of purpose. It is significant to note in this connection that Lenin²⁰ quotes Marx to the effect that "If you must combine, then enter into agreements to satisfy the practical aims of the movement, but do not haggle over principles, do not make concessions in theory."

Thus while the Marxian Communists subscribe to the inseparability of theory and practice as a philosophical doctrine, politically they are prepared to compromise themselves and enter into agreements with op-

¹⁹For a previous analysis of this point, see David Bidney, "On Theory and Practice," *University of Toronto Quarterly*, 1937, pp. 113-125.

²⁰V. I. Lenin, *What Is to Be Done?*, Little Lenin Library, 4, International Publishers Company, New York, 1929, pp. 27, 29. See also Bertram D. Wolfe, "Lenin as a Philosopher," *Partisan Review*, July-August, 1947, pp. 396-413.

ponents in order to maintain their ultimate objective.²¹ Marx was the first to proclaim the tactics of the "democratic front" and Lenin²² later reminded the party members that, "The Communists support every revolutionary movement," and that, "We are obliged for that reason to emphasize general democratic tasks before the whole people." It is these tactics of combining in a "United Front" with unsuspecting liberals that have often enabled the Communists to gain control of organizations. Politically, therefore, the Communists tend to subscribe to the doctrine that *then* ends justify *any* means they consider expedient—a "practical" doctrine which has served to disillusion many a fellow traveler who has been attracted by some elements of their social idealism.

8 *The Ideological and Political Approaches to the Resolution of Socio-cultural Tensions*

It is implied in the preceding remarks that the resolution of international tensions may be approached from an ideological, as well as from a political perspective. The ideological approach seeks to establish a common frame of reference or system of cultural values as a prerequisite for any lasting social peace. The political approach makes its appeal to the satisfaction of immediate interests. It is obvious that there is no inherent incompatibility between these two approaches, provided one is not allowed to supersede the other.²³ There is, for example, need for immediate cooperation in drawing up peace treaties and for the rehabilitation of

²¹See Joseph Stalin, *Foundations of Leninism*, Chapter VII on "Strategy and Tactics."

²²Lenin, *op cit*, p. 80. For a revealing study of the application of these tactics on the American scene, see *American Communism* by James O'neal and G. A. Werner. T. P. Dutton and Company, New York, 1947.

²³See the paper by V. J. McGill on "Northrop's Meeting of East and West," in *Science and Society*, XI, 3, Summer, 1947, pp. 249-59. According to McGill (p. 259) "the author's most serious error is the assumption that world understanding and unification require the adoption of a common philosophy, and a reformation of world cultures to meet a preconceived ideal. The error is dangerous because the change of cultures and world philosophies is painfully slow, whereas the need for world understanding is immediate and imperative. The present task of the United Nations should not be to insist upon the best possible world philosophy, but to work out a *modus vivendi* permitting diverse cultures and philosophies to vie and compete with one another amicably in a world organized for peace." It is rather amusing to find a writer who is so obviously sympathetic to the Marxist philosophy of culture insisting upon the irrelevance of theory in the resolution of contemporary world tensions. He begs the whole question of whether it is possible to work out a *modus vivendi* whereby conflicting cultures and philosophies may compete amicably with one another.

Europe On the other hand, there are, as noted, definite limits to the direct, practical approach since ideological considerations soon make themselves felt The failure of the Truman-Marshall Plan for the economic rehabilitation of Europe to win general acceptance is a case in point. Hence every effort must be made to promote common ideological objectives

One source of hope in the contemporary situation lies in the fact that both Soviet Russia and the Western democracies have the same ultimate objective of ultimate peace and the brotherhood of man They differ essentially in their strategy and tactics for the realization of this common goal The Communists are committed to a *philosophy of perpetual crises* or "permanent revolution" until such time as their Utopian, anarchistic ideal of *social entropy*, or absolute equality, is achieved The democrats, on the other hand, are committed to a *philosophy of harmony* and rational persuasion through majority vote in the resolution of social conflicts

The tragedy of the situation lies in the fact that this unceasing ideological conflict is really one of means and not of final values In so far as the Communist is a social idealist, he finds much to agree with in the democratic doctrine of the intrinsic value of the common man and the humanistic role of scientific effort in raising the common standard of living Politically, the Communist stresses the fact of social responsibility, while the individualistic democrat stresses the role of individual initiative *These are both polar interests which modern democracies recognize as mutually complementary ideals and functions*

Hitherto both Communists and democrats have acted consciously or unconsciously on the assumption of Social Darwinism by supposing that the struggle for existence within society is the condition for cultural evolution. They differed primarily as regards the *locus* and objectives of the social struggle The popular spokesmen for the capitalistic democracy of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, men like the sociologists, Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner,²¹ viewed the struggle in individualistic terms within the framework of a *laissez faire* economy of individual competition and opposed major social reforms as interference with the laws of nature The Marxian Communists, on the other hand, have maintained that the historical struggle is one

²¹See Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought, 1860-1915*, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1945

between conflicting economic classes. To this Social Darwinism the Marxists added the Hegelian, romantic postulate of the "dialectic" of history, thus interpreting the social struggle as a necessary, logical development²⁵ Hence the Marxian doctrine provided an ideal goal and a militant faith in the inevitability of final victory for the proletariat, whereas the Anglo-American Neo-Darwinian theory envisaged no final consummation and was utilized by its reactionary adherents as a justification for the *status quo* of economic practice

Modern democracies have gone a long way since the time of Spencer and Sumner and are now prepared to recognize the responsibility of the state for the social welfare of all its citizens *If the Communists, similarly, were prepared to discard their form of Social Darwinism and to replace the doctrine of the class struggle by the democratic doctrine of common interests, the way would soon be open for mutual cooperation* The present growing tension is the product of mutual fear and distrust which in turn is the outgrowth of an outmoded, nineteenth century ideology *The conflict is irrational precisely because it is not based on incompatible ideals or clash of material interests but on outmoded theories* It is especially tragic that at the very moment when the democracies of the world are approaching most closely to the social idealism of the Communists, the political conflict between them is at its height

The practical import of the above analysis can scarcely be exaggerated It means, in the first place, that every effort must be made to alleviate tensions by stressing our common objectives It is up to social scientists and philosophers to clarify the historical presuppositions of the conflicting social systems²⁶ This task will not be an easy one, inasmuch as many

²⁵See Thorstein Veblen's essay, "The Socialist Economics of Karl Marx and His Followers," republished in *The Place of Science in Modern Civilization and Other Essays*, Viking Press, New York, 1942, pp. 431-456 Veblen demonstrates (p. 432) that "It is not the Marxism of Marx but the materialism of Darwin which the socialists of today have adopted" "Even Engels," he writes (p. 437 n.), "in his latter-day formulation of Marxism, is strongly affected with the notions of post-Darwinian science, and reads Darwinism into Hegel and Marx with a good deal of naiveté" The point I would make here is that Marxism as a philosophy of social and political culture is a synthesis of Darwinism and Hegelianism and that this synthesis accounts for its admixture of ruthless "realism" and messianic faith

²⁶What is needed, especially, is a synthesis of philosophical analysis with the distinct perspectives and methods of the social sciences For a stimulating discussion of the need for scientific analysis of the presuppositions of contemporary law and government, see Felix Cohen, "The Role of Science in Government," *Scientific Monthly*, August, 1947, pp. 155-164

sociologists and anthropologists have adopted the relativistic perspective of the Marxists while professing opposition to its economic interpretation of culture history. There is urgent need, therefore, for a complete reorientation of contemporary social theory toward the *systematic universalism* demanded by the ideal of a "science of man" or a "science of social relations."

In the second place, so far as our own society is concerned, we must make every effort to satisfy the legitimate demands of labor for a higher standard of living and a voice in the regulation of industrial affairs. This puts the responsibility on both labor and management to recognize their common interests and complementary functions in the social order. We must demonstrate to the world, even more clearly than in the past, that class struggle is not inevitable and that class conflict need not lead to the triumph of one or the liquidation of the other.

There is grave danger at present that in our efforts to curb Communism we may be led to condone fascistic tendencies. A genuinely democratic government which recognizes its social responsibilities, and humanitarian industrialists who regard labor as a partner in their enterprises have nothing to fear from the totalitarianism either of the left or of the right.

In the meantime, political realism requires that we neither confuse ideals with social facts nor cease to proclaim our faith in the democratic ideal and our criticism of those who would prevent its realization. This means that we understand clearly that Soviet Russia and the governments under her control are practicing a "dictatorship of the proletariat," a one party system of dictatorship. It means, furthermore, that we reject the *ad hominem* argument as to the obvious imperfections of our own democratic society as an excuse for the dictatorial policies of the Communists in setting up puppet governments in the countries they have occupied. "Understanding," as practiced by some of our so-called liberals, consists in adopting the party propaganda line of the critics of democracy and in attributing to their own governments motives which are alien to its ideals and policies.

A sane and realistic appraisal of factual, cultural trends is quite compatible with a rational appreciation of democratic ideals. There will always be some disparity between cultural facts and ideals. The real danger to progress lies in refusing to reckon with the social realities, and in fail-

ure to distinguish clearly the democratic ideal from the extremes of the right and left which seek to march under its banner

9. *The Social Responsibility of the Scientist*

Upon the anthropological or social scientists in particular falls the task of providing a common ideological frame of reference for the relative perspectives of the diverse, sociocultural configurations. *What is needed above all is a theory of sociocultural integration which will provide a rational, as well as empirical foundation, for the ideal of a common humanity.*

The appeal for world unity must be directed primarily to the scientists of the world as the group most potentially qualified for realizing this objective. Instead of the slogan, "Workers of the World Unite," or the implied but not articulated, "Politicians of the World Unite," we might substitute the call, "Scientists of the World Unite."

The appeal to economic, class interests as a basis for world unity has been proved a failure. The assumption of Marx and Engels that the proletarian class will somehow transcend the limitations of their historical folkways and loyalties and combine to crush their capitalistic oppressors, has been demonstrated as contrary to the facts of culture history. It is precisely the sort of ideal which may appeal to rationalistic, political exiles, to desperate, rootless men who cannot conceive the strong cultural and emotional bonds which unite a people reared in a common tradition. The Communist leaders furthermore failed to reckon that class or social differences are no bar to participation in a common cultural perspective, so long as all classes alike accept the given system of social values and their places in the social hierarchy. The peasant, for example, will not resent his feudal landlord and may even fight to protect him in preserving the traditional social hierarchy—a fact which was demonstrated in Hungary after the First World War when the Hungarian peasants broke the back of the Communist revolution.²⁷ Cultural anthropology provides many examples of societies, such as the Australian aborigines, who tolerate gross inequalities because they accept the arrangements of their cultural folkways. It takes a complete and radical social and cultural revolution for a given class to demand the abolition of all classes but itself.

²⁷I am indebted to Doctor Paul Feyer for this example.

The class of scientists, on the other hand, is by its very nature the one group in modern society which is, and ought to be, dedicated to the principle of objective, universal truths. I do not mean that all scientists are free of prejudice or of the limitations of their cultural environment, all I do wish to assert is that the *scientist as scientist* pursues the one method capable of achieving universal, verifiable results, and thereby also a common universe of discourse and action. Science is the one cultural process which is self-corrective and progressive, precisely because it is both free and self-disciplined, free in its universal postulations and disciplined in reckoning with the data and consequences of experience.

From a social point of view, therefore, the scientist requires a democratic, cultural environment which will guarantee him complete freedom of scientific thought and research. The freedom of science and political freedom are thus closely bound together. The scientist is logically and morally bound to resist the corruption of science which results from the practical application of the theory of the sociological determinism of thought. Such an "integration" of science and society reduces science to myth or political propaganda and renders the scientist incapable of communicating intelligibly with other scientists of different cultural backgrounds.

The scientist, and especially the anthropological or social scientist, cannot and ought not be indifferent to the sociopolitical situation in so far as it affects his very existence as a scientist.²⁸ Scientific objectivity does not imply sociocultural indifference, the Olympian attitude so often assumed by scientists is hardly appropriate to the socially conditioned animal which is man. Hence the scientist who is aware of the humanistic implications of his vocation²⁹ must be on guard against the twin extremes of ideological regimentation and social irresponsibility. Scientific idealism, like philosophical idealism in general, tends to neglect the social and material conditions of genuine, scientific enterprise, and thus nega-

²⁸My point is that the scientist as scientist, and not only as citizen, is and ought to be concerned with the major sociopolitical issues of his society. This, of course, does not mean that he must take a partisan interest in all political struggles, since much of politics may be of interest to him as a citizen of a community but *not* in his role of scientist.

²⁹Science as a human vocation is part of a "humanistic" education. The all too rigid separation of the sciences and humanities has fostered the attitude that the scientist must be objective in the sense of "beyond good and evil." Thus, I should maintain, is a presumptuous, self-defeating attitude.

tively helps prepare the way for the cultural irrationalism and mythological fanaticism to which it is opposed in principle^a

10 *Conclusion*

The human world is one in fact, but the character or quality of that unity, whether it is to be a world of common humane values fit for civilized man to live in, or whether it is to be a world of social entropy or one shaken by perpetual crises—that is the question which we of this generation are required to answer. The general direction in which a resolution of the social and cultural tensions of our times is to be sought is, in the main, clear. What is needed above all is the active faith and united resolution to make the ideal of a common cultural objective for mankind, and of a world democratic society, one that will work both at home and abroad. For unless we are sincere in our conviction that the ideal of a common humanity is a practicable ideal, and are prepared to make the effort to provide the adequate material, social, and educational conditions for its realization, then most assuredly it will not work.

In the last analysis, the final test of the sincerity of one's faith, whether it be the faith of the theologian, of the humanist, or of the scientist, is the effort one makes practically to achieve the realization of his ideals. This is the perennial challenge to human freedom and intelligence.

^aComment by Gottfried Salomon Delatour

There is a mutual distrust between scholars and politicians. However, ideas are in service and the new Ancilla-relation is the dependence upon the state. With outmoded theories of man and the state we cannot overcome relativism and perspectivism. Since other religious, moral and cultural thoughts, not of our Jewish-Christian tradition, have shaken our belief in the absoluteness of our history and culture, I think we have to find a new common ground and to build a new Pantheon.

CHAPTER XXI

The Idea of National and International Sanity

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Introduction

IN HIS MAJOR WORK, *The Law of Civilization and Decay* (Alfred A. Knopf), Brooks Adams made explicit his premonitions of the decay of our international order. Holding the view that human activity is but a special means of dissipating solar energy he could generalize that, after the establishment of any great social order, "A stationary period may supervene, which may last until ended by war, by exhaustion, or by both combined, as seems to have been the case with the Eastern Empire; or, as in the Western, disintegration may set in, the civilized populations may perish, and a reversion may take place to a primitive form of (social) organism."

This prediction has been verified by our generation. The world, victors no less than the defeated, seeks desperately for answers. For, behind the question posed by this Conference, lies an anguished plea, calling on science to enlighten the dark background of our time.

The question of "sanity" and the quest for a scientific answer reveals a deep unrest about the "facts" of national and international insanity. The scientist is considered a fact finder in America, with the task of informing the people who, with their common sense, will choose the proper way out of confusion. But what is a fact? The eminent scholar, Henry O. Taylor, answered: a romance of the mind. He said "that in every field of human thought and life, fact will be whatever the mental or psycho-bodily processes of apprehension and coordination accept and reconstruct as fact."¹ No new examination of old empirical materials

¹Henry O. Taylor, *Fact: The Romance of Mind*, Copyright, 1932 by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission. P. 73.

will dispel the misery into which we have been led by delusions. Delusions are not the antithesis of science. Indeed, we shall see that empiricism has merely substituted, even if unwittingly, a new romance for the old one. Therefore, resignation of our false pride in our objectivity is the *sine qua non* of a successful attempt at reconstruction. To this end, we need—first—a synopsis of the situation and not merely a critical analysis, for such analyses do not proceed far enough to demonstrate the fact of a “false consciousness.” Anyone who has ever had any experience with party politics has surely found the sophistic distortion of ideas as weapons, and facts twisted according to partisan interpretation. The falsity is not a lie. This is most unsettling to the utilitarian idea that honesty in politics, as well as business, is the best policy. I think that even an optimist must agree that, in this age of propaganda with a mass production of opinion, public opinion does not follow the path of reason. We must always remain aware of emotional cross currents. And we must recognize the “pragmatic truth of falsity,” so highly effective in totalitarian countries.

But to think purely pragmatically is to lack the foresight that comes from imagination. Our present mood of crisis comes from the unrelenting feeling that we have failed to master man. Constantly, we have been talking of societies, groups, parties, classes—but what of man? There have been but two answers—a magical one or an ethical one, and man either disappears in the collective, or stands out as a person. These two positions are in a dialectic process, the dialectic of might and mind. Either we sacrifice man for power or we raise him toward his spiritual destiny.

At present, it appears as though we have lost faith in the creative role of ideas. Instead, the intelligentsia has been mobilized in the power and party struggle, has become the user of ideas and not the creator. Reality exists only in the political-economic realm. All other ideas are called Utopian, and yet it is these dreams and the men who dream them which have given the ideal of a new community a communion of realization. When we speak now in biological terms of “sanity,” instead of “equilibrium” in mechanical terms, what do we mean, if not concord and harmony among men? We use the old term of “organism” as an analogy of the articulated unity. The primitive and the ultimate aim is unity. Let us remember that this has always been considered the ideal. In the mind of the masses, this unity has a miraculous quality because it comes

to them as given and it enchants them as magic from another world. Their leaders are always charismatic, and masses are always primitives.

Magic in Our Time

In a single epoch of advanced civilization and great scientific progress, like our own, one often unexpectedly notices an impetuous flood of magic beliefs in their primitive forms. These are phenomena of collective, pathological suggestion which strike society after great wars or famines, during periods of terrific misery. When humanity is physically and economically impoverished, the critical faculties of the group-ego are impaired and the instincts of the collective unconscious rise to the surface. In a weak and impoverished society, a prey to anguish, suggestion finds fertile soil, because of the predominance of emotionalism, just as in a man endowed with a highly developed critical intelligence, who is ill or convalescing from a serious ailment, the way is open for an uprush of primitive ideas and a reversion to the search for the supernatural and for magic.²

It is quite obvious in our time of psychoanalysis and psychosomatic medicine that the comprehension of the mind appears as important as the experimental knowledge of the body. However, the prevention and treatment of mental disorders cannot be directed according to the principles that had such success in the control of infection, the improvement of sanitation, etc. All practices of modern magic medicine from mesmerism to Christian Science, from Couéism to the Swamis of Vedanta, are forms of spiritual healing. In the face of the problem of life and death, birth and disease, sufferers of all ages react in terms of an orientation toward magic. Only the illusion of progress prevented us from considering the residues, survivals, and regressions of the primitive mind, not in exotic and far distant countries but in our own. The exclusive investigation of infantile minds provided an acceptable explanation to save our conceited appraisal of urban rationalism.

Hegel affirmed that magic is characteristic of all times and people, magic conceived not only as the practice of medicine men, but as a nexus of ideas, fascinating and enchanting. Men of genius, war leaders, and explorers, as well as the masses, are under the spell of visions.

²Arturo Castiglioni, *Adventures of the Mind*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1946, p. 415.

There is magic in the facts determining fascination (a word that because of its significance is closely related to sexual images), charm (which derives directly from *carmen*, meaning poem, from verse, from rhythm), enchantment (which etymologically derives from *chant*), or witchcraft. There is magic in the fascination of ideas that permit or accompany this state of mind, in the facts which develop in it and which in their turn bewitch those who determined them, active magic which derives from natural facts or from an exceptional mood, but above all from faith in success and from the will of the enchanter, who imposes faith and will on his listeners. This state of mind is the ground on which all beliefs and all faiths are born—the condition in which critical judgment is suppressed or silenced. This is why, as we shall see, in a broad sense—the history of outstanding men, warriors, and poets, founders of religions and explorers, adventurers and healers, is closely bound with that of hallucinations, visions, collective obsessions and mass suggestions, and belongs to the history of magic.³

In our day the basic decisions on which the routine of government rests are made by magic and countermagic. Political quacks of today use methods not dissimilar to the hypnotic or hysterical states induced by the magician. Men with a critical spirit are not good either as political leaders or blind followers. The maintenance of power dictates not only the setting up of a clear differentiation between the leaders and the led, but also guarantees of a superiority of the ruling class, expressed in codes of chastity, purification, and the renouncement of material goods. Asceticism or self-control is the means of mass control. Those who arouse passion must themselves be impassioned.

The element of myth in all our political techniques and the "Satyagraha," the power of the soul, show that our materialistic and positivistic orientation misses the main trend of social life. It is an error to describe magic as a pathological phenomenon. It is a rhythm in the manifestation of man's deepest desire for beauty, peace, and goodness, and for the erotic arts of the creative phantasy. Scientific rationalism apparently does not fill this creative need, but seems to exert a critical-destructive influence. As Henry O. Taylor put it:

The age of scientific innocence is past. It is not merely that the limitless range of our ignorance is realized, which was known before, if

³*Ibid.*, pp. 27-28

more narrowly Doubt companions the thoughtful scientist along the path of his investigations and lurks behind his discoveries. He suspects the adequacy of scientific fact, even of all postulational and experimental science. A need is felt of surer basic principles and a consistent and impregnable procedure.⁴

The human mind, according to Vico, describes a cycle from sensation to imagination and thence to reflection, from violence to law, and then completes its turn back to sensation and social violence. Civilization comes to an end, predicts Vico, in a "barbarism of the intellect," which is worse than the primitive "barbarism of the senses."

Symptomatic of our *relapse into barbarism* is the recrudescence of polytheism in the guise of relativism. Our vision and action, tradition and morals, as well as our beliefs, are no longer absolute. Together with nominalism, devaluating the ideal world, goes voluntarism becoming activism which has ruled out the whole process of participation and identification with the transcendent.

Philosophy

Philosophy has attempted to reconstruct a monistic system by relying on a central discipline of science. This choice of a central science is a metaphysical construction of *Weltanschauung* based on science.

All our scientific knowledge presupposes the belief in the uniformity of human nature and reason. However, in the great period from 1770 to 1830, complementary or divergent lights from abroad penetrated our ideal world. *Secularization* meant not only emancipation from church but the opening of the system of the Occident to all Oriental influences. From Herder to Hegel history in a new sense appeared and the universe was governed by a demi-God, *demiurgos*. Languages, religions, and states were bound to a social order in history.

Positivism and idealism were attempts to restore spiritual and social order, by establishing the stages and defining the forms of the whole movement. Only ascent and descent, progress and decadence, the normal life and death circle with rebirth, gradual growth, and slow decline could be discovered. The disenchanted soul declared the religious and metaphysical spirit dead. Positivism was "Catholicism without Christendom" (Thomas Huxley), the natural sciences were basis for a new

⁴Taylor, *op cit*, p. 83

dogma, proved by the miracles of technical achievements, but it was no system of salvation. The old wisdom was not replaced, and in this emptiness there returned from the "unconscious" all kinds of magic. We can say it was a process of "alienation." Beginning with the *Weltschmerz* and all kinds of accusations against culture, pessimism was the outstanding feature from Schopenhauer on to the philosophy of Klages which declared the spirit the adversary of the soul.

Paganism

A new anthropology has contested Christian humanism and reverted to the ancient Roman ideals. In Seneca and Epictetus, reflection was centered in the personality which declared its independence from the world. Man can achieve harmony with the reason which rules the world. This ideal can be realized by those few who are capable of living according to rational norms. The plebs, devoid of reason, is pathological. The average man, driven by his passions, ends up in conflict with himself and with society. Independence is conciliation with oneself. The will to be cured in this stoic psychotherapy is a self-affirmation of man who has the ideal of the sage. In this situation "*odi profanum vulgus et arceo*" is the expression of the apathy toward social improvement. Life poses for a Roman a negatively heroic task, to know how to die.

Paganism was revived in the Renaissance of classical antiquity. At the same time, Reform in a Christian sense meant the restitution of the original Christian community apart from culture, which was *adiaphora*, no means of salvation. This rigid attitude led to sectarian dissent, the modern form of a monastic order. Any compromise with social conventions was looked upon as a surrender of the destiny of man. Not revelation, but only conscience prescribed the retreat from common and public life. Solitude again saved the human person from the sinful world. This world persisted and was accepted by the intellectual layman against any holy order. The state was not Christian and the new, flourishing trades and arts, sciences, and techniques could not be organized according to the Holy Scriptures. The priesthood was defrocked, the layman emancipated, but the new *Bildung* derived from a liberal theology. The scholar had the ideal of a sage, a kind of stoicism or epicureanism. Since Shaftesbury the model of artistic self-perfection has prevailed. This is the fundamental dilemma of the modern intellectual. The only alterna-

tive to the ivory tower is subservience to the political boss or charismatic leader

People after people, social layer after social layer, were brought into the conflict of forces. Secret police and thought control, discipline and purge of intelligence are social institutions. The place of a social philosopher is that of an outsider.

Taine in his *Origins of Modern France* points out that the normal man of normal times is apolitical and that the political types are often pathological. In my opinion, a normal man lives in a private circle and returns to it from public life. It is highly interesting that men with defects, compensating their inferiority, adventurers and criminals, sublimating their asocial drives, are in times of instability popular leaders. The activist who replaces good and evil by the distinction of friend and foe in a concrete, existential sense, is an "occasionalist." In a state of disintegration, masses are led without real purpose and consent on occasion to hostile actions.

Biologism

In an age of struggle, the last unquestioned value is life. It is not surprising, therefore, that the thought of the past century was founded on a biological view of the universe. The vogue was concomitant with a biological revolution. The population of Europe rapidly multiplied. Whole continents were settled, native populations exterminated, and the world's ecological balance upset. The means of life seemed abundant and inexhaustible. A negative freedom, to waste and to destroy, had been achieved. Man's time perspective was extended and organic growth detected in geological strata. The reason for the great influence of Darwin's theory was its usefulness as a sanction for the predatory mode of life. Marxists and the Nationalists were able to make a dogma of non-cooperation.

In the application of biological values to the problem of social cohesion, a new social theory against Social Darwinism reverted to the idea of the organic qualities of the body politic, of the Roman Menenius Agrippa. Significantly enough, the word organism was first used in modern times by the physician, Quesnay, father of the physiocratic school of economists. It also appeared at the beginnings of the historical school, in Roscher's first book. The vogue affected sociology first in the work of Albert Schaeffle, who spoke of social health, pathology, and

therapy. Paul von Lilienthal in his *Social Pathology* laid down his idea of the biological sociology of the future. Biopsychological influences were found in the Italian school of criminology. Ferri and Sighele studied mass crimes. Hellpach and Grotjahn advanced a complete social therapy of mass disturbances. F. Schneerisohn tried to develop empirical methods in the study of mass pathology. He was influenced by his observations of the Russian Revolution as was Le Bon by Taine's history of the French Revolution. Social psychologists like Tarde stressed the selective and limitative aspect of social disorder in which not all members are participants in the mass.

But what is the meaning of normal and abnormal applied to groups? In the natural sciences there is a standard meter. In the social sciences, normalcy is only a statistical average. The danger is that abnormality comes merely to stigmatize the nonconformity of the great leaders. Mohammed had hallucinations and Dostoevsky was an epileptic, however, their insanity had a creative effect. A social pathology should not be concerned with individual insanity but only with epidemic insanity, with "sick society."

Mass psychology and mass pathology, however, became a valuable weapon for the political propagandists. Social insanity attributed to the enemy was described by K. Baschwitz in his *Massenwahn*. It is fashionable to deride the attitude of the enemy as pathological. During the past war, German books appeared on the *psychopathia Gallica* to match the works of Allied authors on *furor Teutonicus*. Beneath the journalistic services of psychiatrists rendered in times of war and revolution, there was a serious attempt to develop a social psychiatry. In periodicals of the First World War, men like Kraepelin and Stransky began to develop a technique of mass therapy. Unfortunately, in these articles a rampant nationalist prejudice prevails. This kind of science evidently could not escape propagandistic orientations.

The concept of insanity has a peculiar history. Accepted in ancient Greece and ignored in the Middle Ages, the limits of its application are disputed. For a long time the concept was applied only to bodily disturbances. It was quite modern medicine to attack the disease by physical means in contrast to the method of the so-called primitive who considered all diseases as manifestations of evil spirits. The abnormal had always had an extraordinary character of destiny, secret and occult. A diseased person did not belong to normal group life. Insane persons were

considered like criminals and treated in prisons up to 1792 when Pinel liberated them. Insanity had in the eighteenth century a moral implication because vices were considered the cause of insanity, defined as the hatred of the existing order, the lust for power, and the violent reaction against authority.

Social conditions of mental health were discovered when supernatural causes were excluded. The rational view of sanity developed an environmental theory of adjustment. The science of sanity tried to find norms guaranteeing for the coming generations institutions of welfare. The control of health, eugenics, preventive medicine, improved child care, birth control, were developed in a social hygiene which replaced social ethics.

If evil means only a maladjustment to the environment, it is presumably curable on the natural level. Indeed, Elster developed a detailed technique for social hygiene by changing the physical environment. The predominant influence of biology on population policies, the preoccupation with the regulation of nutrition, the prohibition of alcohol emerging as a fundamental political issue—all these and many other contemporaneous social ideas are characteristic of a belief in science.

With the emphasis on individual and social sanity, it is not surprising that physicians considered themselves counsellors and organizers of society. From the time of the medicine man to the use of his psychoanalyzing counterpart, the medical profession has been considered the model of a scientific technique. Taking medicine has the characteristics of a moral duty. However, the sick person must accept the cure, if the healing is to be affected. He must believe in the healer, he must set his will to survive the crisis. If health is a norm, it must be a desirable norm. We are forced to the assumption that the last value of the profaned society of the nineteenth century was life without any qualifications.

At a time of mass production, conformism, depersonalization, it is obvious that the eccentric and abnormal, even the insane, become the center of interest for the psychology of personality. A neurotic temperament seems to imply an extraordinary sensitivity and so is correlated with great cultural achievements. However, a creative state of mind seemed to be an affair of certain glands. William James realized that it is ludicrous to believe that a life history can decide the significance of thought. Indeed, this psychophysical theory which connected values with physiological mechanisms is an old sophistic attack against the superiority of a

creative mind. When we read Lombroso we are shocked to find that geniuses derive their superiority from a hereditary degeneration. Only the philistine is healthy minded and in a happy go lucky mood.

Organology

When we use the words, sanity, equilibrium, harmony, we think always of an organic analogy. The theory of organism, organology, served to provide a correspondence between biological and sociological structures.

Organology did not appear first as a biological analogy, but as an expression of a philosophy of life. Against the mechanistic idea of quantitative individualism, the whole romantic philosophy, epitomized by Schelling, tried to expound an organic principle in which qualitative individuality participates in a well proportioned unity. The romanticist sought to proclaim the creative contribution of art in the social order. This social creation forms an articulated organon, a unity of thought and feeling in the constitution of a whole. These ideas have influenced Coleridge and Spence.

From Buffon to Lamarck, biologism permeates French thinking. The word organic was first used by Saint Simon in his division of cycles in organic and critical periods. The intent of the new philosophy of positivism was the creation of new order. It longed for a return to normalcy after the revolution, *savoir pour prévoir* was the program of science as an organon of political organization of humanity as unity. Later in the crises of the French Third Republic, the problem of organic unity was seen as a national one, and the solution was named solidarity. Now, at last, the results of the French Revolution were incorporated into a definite order; the *juste milieu* of the bourgeoisie could even be called a natural system. It was not, as in Germany, society against the state and mind against might. The French society seemed to be a natural product of natural rights and natural morals. All that seemed to be needed was a common ground laid down by education for cooperation. Sociology became a program of civil education in schools.

We can see, then, that the organic concept is a doctrine of or the aspiration for a stable society, a natural growth. The alternative is a theory of coercion. This antithesis hides a deeprooted symbolism. Organic *versus*

mechanical, cooperation *versus* coercion, corresponds to the symbolic distinction between man conceived as a vegetative plant or as an animal to be domesticated

It seemed that primitive conditions were free of coercion With the expansion and complications of social organization, coercion increased Only wishful thinkers could believe that subordination would be abolished in some future Utopia Both the French and the Russian Revolutions witnessed an increase of coercion, despite the liberal ideologies of human nature, the declarations of rights, the liberations of labor

However, Durkheim, the official thinker of the Third Republic, thought of progress from mechanical to organic society The unity was a moral one and was based on the collective representation of lasting beliefs and values

Durkheim, Max Weber, and Mannheim

What is the function of morality? Durkheim tried to answer this question with the significant positivist intention of laying the foundation for a "social art" He was convinced that modern society was in a critical state because the French Revolution had suppressed occupational corporations and other bodies intermediary between the individual and the state A sick society, approaching anarchy, gives the individual no reason for living—no discipline and no solidarity Tradition has lost its sway and it now remains for science to point the way toward internal peace and cooperation There exists the situation in which the social scientist becomes a moralist This follows from Durkheim's sociologism as a *Weltanschauung* For where Kant postulates God, Durkheim regards society as the Great Moral Person Collective representations have an imperative character because they are exterior and superior to individual interests Individual submissiveness is an ordinary fact because society is a transcendent objective for individual consciences This idea of society as an entity of a higher order, a continuous collective conscience, is the presupposition of the Historical School, which was opposed to Hegelianism.

From the French Revolution on, the social question in France was the establishment, and justification, of a new order Positivism assumed the function of the Catholic Church by taking over education and recodifying the principles of solidarity and integration, yet without giving up the newly won liberties to an omnipotent state This consequently posed

for the positivists the main problem—the determination of good and evil, or as Durkheim expressed it, of the normal and the pathological. If we can find an objective criterion, science will be in a position to clarify social politics even while remaining faithful to its method. According to Durkheim, those facts which are general are normal, while those which, in time or place, are exceptional, are pathological. A social fact is connected to a social type at a selected phase of its development. But in case of a crisis, when adaptation to the change has not taken place in the milieu, what then? How can we explain the new condition except in relation to the old one? Then it sometimes becomes clear that the moral conscience of societies is subject to deception, that rules of conduct have been sanctioned which were not of themselves moral.

Since, for Durkheim, sanity is normalcy and the normal type is the average standard, he cannot explain the new type, the new standard, the new order. What knowledge can a positivist have of non-experienced conditions? By eliminating imagination from science and utopia from social construction, the positivist has, even if he takes a gradual evolution as a method of perfection, no possibility of social action. Sociology in this positivist sense is a bourgeois theory. Since, in the Third Republic, the bourgeois order was considered a normal economic-political structure, the *status quo*—even with gradual change—was an ideal. But it is not at all obvious, as Durkheim would have it, that everybody wants to preserve the social order and the political body to which he belongs. This tendency toward change, Durkheim acknowledged as subversive, and he countered it by speaking of patriotism as a fundamental duty, the obligation which was a foundation for all other obligations.

There is a premise hidden in his distinction between normal and abnormal, namely, that science can determine or estimate the usefulness of certain procedures. This is a purely subjective assumption. The social facts determine social action only if you believe and accept the going system. The rationalist prejudice—that our thought imposes the direction of our activity and enables us without doubt to reach a certain state of satisfactory conditions—must always smuggle in the goals or ends, the teleological speculation. There are always many ways to an end, and it is doubtful whether science can help us to choose the better and shorter one.

To understand Max Weber's moralistic answer to the problem of social disintegration, we must keep in mind the other meaning of rationalism,

in the idealist tradition. In Germany, where the revolution was cultural and not political, the entire system of values became, according to the tradition of the Reformation, a matter of purely personal—not collective—conscience. The ethos, therefore, was a personal responsibility for the cultured man, who could appeal neither to conservative rulers nor revolutionary masses for a scientifically based program of social improvement. The scholar or intellectual was a critic, a liberal critic. But—and here is the paradox—these cultured critics, unable to organize themselves into political factions, turned to the bureaucracy as a harbinger of political freedom.

Thus, the expert replaced the humanist. And so it was that the realm of rationalism was no longer metaphysical but economic and juridical. The meaning of this German rationalism was not the theoretical mastery of forces but the increasing calculation of means for definitely given ends. The ideal expert is the detached observer. As a consequence, rationalism could not give rise to a new belief but could only work along with irrational and traditional values. Ends, therefore, were given. There was only the question of means. Max Weber, for instance, a nationalist, opposed the policy of the Kaiser and the Junkers because he wanted to increase the social integration of all social classes in the Reich.

This ability to choose among means fell to the disinterested and cultured men who staffed the bureaucracy, which was consequently considered a neutral source of power in the midst of conflicting social classes and their ideals. As such a cultured critic following his calling, in the Lutheran sense, Max Weber, in a speech on "Science and Sanity," reaffirmed his stolid resignation in the face of the decline of all moral values. He liked to quote Schiller's phrase, "the disenchantment of the world," to indicate a whole trend of secular rationalization, measured in terms of the displacement of magic by technology.

In times of great stress, however, magic always breaks through. The concept of *charisma*, the gift of grace, is introduced to counter the development of technological means. Founders of religion, military and political heroes, conquerors and robber barons are charismatic leaders. Max Weber has shown that the mastery of the world by virtue of the magical powers, obtained by self-abnegation, does not belong to the scientist. Science, as well as morals, is now subject to political direction. There is a change in the ancilla-relation of knowledge, for it is no longer dependent on a non-temporal power, like the Church, but upon the

dominant political groups. The mobilization of the intellectuals was called by Julien Benda, "*la trahison des clercs*." The emancipation of the layman, as the background for modern scientific development, lacked the counterpoise of priestly authority. It has even been forgotten that all modern values are to be traced back to Judeo-Christian religion, values which even in secularized form are deeply rooted in the socialist movements. If you take the role of a political technician, you must insist on the preservation of values. A pure functionalism is meaningless and social techniques do not supply directions. That is why the socialist and atheist, Mannheim, is forced by the logic of his insight to return to the religious foundation underlying the plans for a new social order.

He says that we are living in an age of transition from *laissez faire* to a planned society which will be established either by a minority in terms of a dictatorship or by a new form of government which will still be democratically controlled. Speaking about coordination of the means of control, such as education, propaganda, and administration, Mannheim insists that planning by bureaucratic and militaristic groups is a misinterpretation which neglects the given values of Western culture. In an address before a group of clergymen, he said that if a new democratic system starts with the destruction of the older leading groups in society, it destroys the whole value system, and that only a generation which has been educated through religion to discriminate between immediate advantage and the lasting goals of life, will be capable of accepting the sacrifice which a properly planned order must continually demand from every single group and individual. In *Man and Society* Mannheim says that the entire planning of a cure for the diseased society leads to a haunting question: "Who plans those who are to do the planning?" He condemns the Machiavellian answer that an élite in the general political mobilization will give the right direction. In the conflict between functionally rational behavior and mass psychosis, he believes that the democratizing process raises the pent up irrationalities and uncontrolled impulses of the crowd to the level of the more individualized and rational élites. "But it is impossible to foresee the fate that awaits public morality if once the mob gets hold of the secret which formerly overwhelmed the intellectual powers of even small sophisticated leading groups. Whereas cynicism was originally a sublimated form of embarrassment in the mind of those responsible for acts, once this cynicism penetrates in the masses, it encourages the open expression of brutality and destruction becomes a

public force."⁵ He is forced to the conclusion that "functional" rationalization is bound to deprive the average individual of thought, insight, and responsibility, and to transfer these capacities to the few organizers who direct the process of rationalization. Mannheim confesses that the liberal social order offered a much better chance of psychological preparation for the growth of "substantial" rationality. Based on the system of small property holdings, the subjective rationality was a kind of competitive thinking, in contrast to what Durkheim called the mechanical solidarity of horde morals. In the latter case, the rights of vulgarity pile up against the privileges of culture and enable the oligarchies, the elected—not selected—leaders to reduce the communal life to civil war, proclaiming violence, force, and direct action as the real democracy. It is an attempt to combine the primitive and the technical in a world of naked power.⁶

Every attempt at planning is utopian and presupposes a transformation of human nature. However, at the stage of "planned thinking," the gap between knowing and acting is so vast that the average person feels that it is beyond his range of vision. It is a new myth. If we have progressed so far that we can plan society and plan man himself, then pragmatic behaviorism, unable to illuminate inner motives, has to be replaced by psychoanalysis. Mannheim depends upon Freudianism in his strategy of attacking the collective unconsciousness. This looks like a transition from independent to interdependent thinking, because we pass from a stage of primary groups to larger contact groups without emotional and personal translation of the virtues of neighborhood and brotherhood to the conditions of the Great Society. A despotic system is an escape from this intolerable situation. To avoid this, the sociologist has the task of showing the process of value reconciliation. Only a control of the emotions can reestablish community on a larger scale. In the past, the regulation of human affairs and emotional drives has been left to the churches, and it is quite significant that National Socialism, as well as Communism, has a pseudo-religious character. The social order is always based on a moral system, and it is not the wickedness of man but the failure of society if the forces of disintegration prevail, because values are based on tacit or explicit consensus. Mannheim recognizes this moral basis for

⁵Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society*, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Company, London, p. 72.

⁶*Cf.* Ortega y Gasset, *Revolt of the Masses*, Norton Publishing Company, New York, 1932.

a greater community in a traditional way. However, he states the social problem of a sick society as follows "Is it possible . . . that the religious truth conveyed through the example of a saint or a sage can be a remedy for the dehumanized defects of our mass production?"⁷

But I believe that we can humanize the environment and still not transform man. A real revolution calls for the reevaluation of values and a changed attitude toward inwardness and privacy. Ethos is strictly personal and redemption does not lie in collectivity. In spite of all rituals of mass demonstrations, this is not a Holy Mass. The distressing fact of our times is that the human creature is miserable, for the Industrial Revolution did not simply replace men by machines, but made men into machines. Stated in old terms: the soul is sick. The great literature of the nineteenth century, from Schopenhauer to Nietzsche, from Gobineau to Renan, from Brooks Adams to Toynbee, voices a fear of the devaluation of the spiritual world. The greatest poet, Goethe, professes in *Faust* nothing but resignation. Mythology was exhumed from the classics, and a cultural wall was built to isolate the creative mind from politics and economics.

Theology was replaced by anthropology. Man, once the son of God, was considered simply as an animal. In the social sciences, however, the search for a utopia of unholiness was going on. Salvation was not in the Beyond but in the Behind, and Heaven on earth became a promise of the future. The history of disbelief can be told in the rise of Marxism. The antinomy of the theoretical and practical spheres, the cleavage between the ideal and the new material world—all this came out into the open with the Marxist overthrow of the superstructure. The substratum was in a dialectical upheaval, the subject of the objective world was in revolt. The truth was reduced to a kind of weapon ready for use in the final struggle of social classes. Production and reproduction summed up the destiny of mankind. To the proletariat, claiming superior "health" in an insane, diseased capitalistic world, was promised a new society. To man, denuded of intrinsic values, is left only the prospectus of an insect who moves instinctively in an organization which guarantees the satisfaction of his wants. The masters over life and death are to be the magic rulers.

The anti-Marxist thinkers likewise revealed their Darwinian heritage. Nietzsche proclaimed the new metaphysical philosophies of existence.

⁷*Diagnosis of our Time*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1911, p. 135.

The scheme is life against the spirit, blood against history, earth against humanity. Sanity and insanity was the underlying problem in the analysis of a sick soul. Nietzsche declared philosophy to be the confession of the passions and sufferings of its author, and culture to be the record of the decadence of the age. He indicted Christian morals, the weakening of the original instincts which impose a bad conscience on the human animal, and he precluded the therapy for the future. Man is an animal capable of taking a position against himself, this negation is the principle of his spirituality. Experimenting with himself, he gains self-control which gives him control of nature. The price of the contradiction of his own nature is man's creation of a second nature—culture. It is his ability to disguise his instinctive uncertainty which makes man a weak and sick animal. How life is directed against itself, how man can be his own enemy is not explained. The whole functionalization of ideas leads to the reduction to pure vitality. Following the voluntarist philosophy of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche declared the intellect only a function of the will and its effect a deception and illusion. The only question meaningful for him is "Who will be the ruler?"

Conclusion

It is impossible to talk about national sanity, solidarity, and harmony, and international cooperation, and peace with righteousness, without mentioning what Spengler after the First World War and Toynbee after the Second World War called the decline of Western civilization. All the magical practices and ethical postulates stand against the background of Russia. In a country where science has no liberal foundations and technology is not based on humanism, Western ideas are only weapons. In Russia modern economy is a political means, and socialism is without liberal aims. Byzantium has survived and a new "Third Rome" has been announced; Caesaropapism remains the orthodox rule. The period of the "Westerners" came definitely to an end with the purges. The new Asiatic rulers are technicians of power like Genghis Khan of the Golden Horde. They lead the world revolution against the *status quo* everywhere.

It is a prophecy of Marx that the transition from capitalism to socialism can lead to barbarism. The French Revolution was the beginning of the new order in the Occident and the New World, but the Russian Revolu-

tion with its dehumanizing and depersonalizing ends is, in a mythological sense, a chaos

In Russia the technique with men and machines is opposed to the Western civilization in which technology is a neutral area. Our heroic age is the seventeenth and eighteenth century of a rational system which was expanded in science, laws, morals, and economics, and which was based on a personalist religion. Technology as a neutral power could not establish a rule in the West, a technocracy or rule of managers, however, it is the core of the experiment in the East.

Social and international peace cannot be achieved by an ever widening application of the conflict principle. Conflict has a way of perpetuating itself even though it unifies the competing groups in the process. From this viewpoint planetary peace could be bought only at the price of interplanetary war. The problem of synthesis in an age of conflict is susceptible to scientific analysis, at least in terms of the conditions it must fulfil. We cannot accept with equanimity the prospect of a world without conflict. Such a world presupposes life on the most primitive level for mankind. Conflict is the assertion of the differentiation and individuation of man. The abolition of bases of diversity leads to a collectivist uniformity.

We can share Simmel's insight into the nature of conflict as a binding rather than disruptive force. Harmony and disharmony are the separate elements which give form and proportion to the common life. The unity as community inheres in these separate elements. We can profit much from extended study of the integration of complementary forces in conflicts between individuals and groups. Gumplovitz and Oppenheimer have already taught us much about the gradation of conflicts, about varying degrees of settlement and enforcement, about peaceful conflict in competition and discussion. Integration need not be subjugation. It implies different degrees of limitation within diverse circles of identification and participation.

Ideas which are effective in reshaping the social universe must traverse the path of popularization from the transcendent inspiration of the conceptor to the level of its meanest acceptor. The path is long and tortuous, and ideas and ideals are radically transformed on the way. The distortions which result are frequently more significant than the original conception. Thus, it would be folly to attempt to trace the Socialist development back to Karl Marx. He himself cried out, "*Je ne suis pas Marxiste*." Human routine perseveres through wars and revolutions. The masses

carry on through the bombardment of their cities and hold placidly to old values while the reformers who "lead" grow ever more panicky. In society as in physics, inertia is the great conservative force. Even "new" ideas are usually revivals of the past. A new doctrine will, therefore, not presume to create a new world but to fulfil the expectations of the old.

We have already referred to the fact that beliefs, even as "errors," must have a functional validity. The test of a new, integrating ideal, will be its serviceability as a community of meaning for our times, larger than the nation. It must be a common spirit in which persons and groups can be incorporated by the sharing of experience, sentiments, and memories. Thus, it would be one of those greater and more inclusive unities which transcend conflict in preserving it. A sharp distinction must therefore be drawn between the notions of collective and communal. The latter notion of communal prescribes mutual participation in a regulated system of social intercourse which is not uniformity or conformity. It recognizes the existence of an unbounded area of agreement, ritually placed outside of a limited polemical area.

Behind collectivism is a barbarous idolatry of power. Declarations of rights are only a camouflage for the depersonalization and mechanization of men. There is no liberty, where there is not the right of opposition. Men can fulfil their lives only by limiting politics and by recognizing that the political field is not the whole of life.

It is necessary to stress the enduring character of community cooperation, solidarity, and tolerance to oppose the popularized theories of conflict, war, and revolution, and to develop a strategy of peace. Permanent discord reduces religious, moral, and legal disputes to political issues and destroys the social formation or organization of centuries in an amorphous mass empire which has organized peoples in a permanent struggle for survival. Gregariousness is a social end product. The problem of society is the transfer of the common values from the intimate centers of incubation to the ever larger circles of Great Society. "The object of government is not to change men from rational beings into beasts or puppets, but to enable them to develop their minds and bodies in security, and to employ their reason unshackled."⁸

⁸Benedict Spinoza, "A Theologico political Treatise," *Writings on Political Philosophy*, (Balz, Ed.), D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, Chapter 20.

CHAPTER XXII

The Role of Social Science in the American Scene¹

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APPRECIATION FOR, one might also say veneration of, science is one of the cultural traits of our society. We are inordinately proud of the achievements of our laboratories. Few of us understand the theoretical accomplishments of our physical scientists which make their work, on the applied side, possible, but we glory in and use their practical discoveries. From electric razors and neon lights to B-29s and atom bombs the good old U.S.A. is "tops." Why mix a cocktail or squeeze an orange by hand when electric energy can do the job?

But to the man in the street social science is something different. If he is stupid or if he is a reactionary, he will tell you, as the dean of a well known state university has told me, that social science and socialism are one and the same. If, on the other hand, the man in the street is inclined to levity, he will meet an inquiry about the utility of social science with the hoary witticism that if all social scientists were laid end to end they would not reach a conclusion. The truth of the matter is that from the days of Newton, to those of Pasteur, to those of Darwin, to the recent conflict between Compton and Millikan about the cosmic ray—both of whom were working from many objective observations—physical scientists have engaged in just as heated arguments as have social scientists and have been just as unable for just as long to reach a conclusion.

The more thoughtful man in the street will raise another objection. To

¹The Comenius Day lecture given at Moravian College, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, March 28, 1946. The paper originally appeared in the *Teachers College Record*, April, 1946, and is reprinted in slightly abbreviated form with the generous permission of Doctor Max R. Brunstetter.

him sociology and economics lack precision because they deal with human beings, and therefore with unpredictable behaviors. But the animal husbandry scientist, while he can predict the milk production if the feed is changed in this way or that, cannot predict cow behavior. There are variations in the psychology and tastes of cows and hogs just as there are in the psychology of human beings. Even the physicist cannot tell which railroad rail will crack during a very heavy frost, and the mathematician will admit that the value of π is but approximately finite.²

My thesis is that the generalizations of the social scientist, in areas where he has the data to make them, have the same validity as those of the physical scientist, that they have predictive value, and that the failure of society to give them due weight has caused great loss and suffering.

I turn first to economics. Some years ago a law was passed by Congress raising tariffs very substantially. Practically every member of the American Economic Association, of whatever party, signed a letter to President Hoover asking him to veto the bill. They pointed out the harm it would do the domestic economy, the retaliations that would ensue abroad. Their warning was based on the findings of research. But Mr. Hoover signed the bill. The predictions became facts. The decline in our exports was practically the predicted amount. The consequence was increased unemployment and suffering.

Take another illustration. From the days of Adam Smith, Ricardo, and other early economists, ideas concerning the relation of income distribution to prosperity were derived from deductive reasoning. In the past thirty years, hard data of considerable scope and amount have become available. Using research mechanisms familiar to us (some of which were developed here) and building policies upon their results, countries as far apart as Sweden and Australia have to their credit a series of socioeconomic achievements that make the United States look like a backward nation. These include overcoming the depression in less than half the time it took us, an amazing reduction in strikes without resort to government operation of industries, and maintaining, in the past three years, as has Canada also, a stable price level. Unfortunately, much current discussion, such as that in Congress and in the press over the so-called full employment bill, shows an appalling lack of knowledge of the

²These last two illustrations appear in a valuable article by Chester Alexander, "Is Sociology an Exact Science?" *American Sociological Review*, XI, 1, which the present author read after preparing his paper.

facts of economic life in an industrial society. The businessman too often sees only his end of the process, the labor union officer only his. But the totality of society is broader than labor and business. We need both approaches, and still others.

Similar illustrations could be given in a number of other important areas of our economics. The fact, demonstrated by another Brookings study, that business or labor or both can price themselves out of a market, is being completely ignored by both parties to most of our current labor difficulties. Despite the real possibility that inflation can destroy the great backlog of savings on which we count to give us years of prosperity, many organized groups are pursuing policies, either out of fear or stupidity or in the hope that they can profit before the deluge, that make this calamity more imminent.

In Australia, shortly before the war, I had what would be a humiliating experience for any American. My official duties brought me in contact with the presidents and the directors of research of all of Australia's six banks and with some of its leading economists and industrialists. Without exception they said, in effect (a direct quotation from one such). "You use science in applied technology so wonderfully and so intelligently. How then does it come about that the United States is a nation of economic illiterates?"

Not long ago the great Swedish sociologist and economist Myrdal, now prime minister of his country, returned home after several years in the United States. In a remarkable address before the Royal Economics Society he reported upon our economy. Closely reasoned, replete with data, his conclusion is that the United States will have to go through another depression, worse than that of the 1930s, before we come to our economic senses. His fear, shared around the world, is that such catastrophic folly would drag the whole world down to economic ruin because of our enormous power and resources.

In sociology, also, considerable amounts of data have been assembled. For instance, sociologists know a good deal about the behavior of institutions or, if you prefer, social organizations or agencies. It is of the nature of institutions that they live both for their purposes and for their growth in power. This second aim is rationalized in terms of the first. The result is that health or recreation leaders, churchmen or schoolmen, can make a case for their interest in institution that is convincing to their professional colleagues who think in institutional terms, but that is too fre-

quently unconvincing to the layman. It is no accident that some of the strongest local and even state institutions have been built by persons with sociological understanding of this point.

Again, much of the success or the failure of community organization for war purposes was determined by forces and trends at work for many years. The sociologist knows that the social forces operating in a community have all had a past; that no community can be understood, let alone organized for any purpose whatsoever, unless the proposals appear to fit into the on going social processes of the community. It is a sociological axiom that no two communities are exactly alike. It applies to racial origins, local traditions and mores, structure and composition of the population—to both quantitative and qualitative phenomena. Hence the sociologist can and does guide community organization successfully in situations as diverse as Gordon Brown's in Samoa, Alinsky with his People's Organizations in Chicago, or many rural sociologists in rural communities.

An even clearer illustration is our present housing shortage. When the 1930 census data showed that by the end of the decade the United States would have the largest youth population in its history, it was a simple matter to forecast a peak demand for housing in the first half of the present decade. The suggestion was made that a housing program would help increase employment and was self-liquidating. A halfhearted, no a tenthhearted, effort was made in that direction. For the most part there was a chorus of condemnation. Our real estate people would not risk their capital. Didn't these idealistic, impractical professors know there was a depression? Nor did those concerned want any federal aid. That was to become involved in bureaucracy, to go communistic. So the number of housing units erected annually dropped from the more than a half million record in several years in the 1920s, to well under one hundred thousand in two of the years in the 1930s, and at no time in that decade equaled the quarter million built in 1912. Many of these few were built because, usually after bitter battles, local housing authorities were approved. But for this government aid, our present situation would be worse than it is. Interestingly enough, in the locations studied, for both houses and schools the cost per room of government aided or constructed housing has been ten per cent less than that of other comparable structures.

We have had a phenomenal increase in the birth rate in recent years,

following the decline from 1925 to 1936. It is likely to continue high, though not at the peak, for two more years. In 1957 we will have the highest elementary school enrollment in the history of the nation. In 1960 or 1961 high school enrollment will reach a new peak, and soon afterward there will be a new top level demand for housing. Nothing but an atomic and germ war can prevent this. We have less than twenty years to catch up on our present huge housing deficiency, to rebuild or modernize our millions of obsolete or dilapidated houses, and to get ready for the new demand. A sane program by the construction and financing interests, with or without federal and/or state assistance, is called for. One item in that program should be the securing of maximum profit, not by charging all the traffic will bear per house, but by the techniques of the mass distribution industries, namely, maximum production at lower per unit costs, the profits to accrue from the large number of units produced. The facts are clear. Will we have a second demonstration within one generation, in housing, of too little and too late?

The sociologist has demonstrated that slums cost society more than they are worth. Again and again the above average crime, fire, morbidity, and mortality rates, and retardation in the public schools, in poor housing areas, have been found to cost the taxpayer more than the tax collector received. Comparably, the rural sociologist can document the fact that poor land makes poor people. There are a considerable number of poor-soil counties in the United States where state and federal aid during the depression amounted annually to more than the value of agricultural production. The social scientists have shown that our practices are faulty, have suggested remedial measures, and have been ignored by a society whose intelligence does not seem to get beyond the gadget level. Losses of this sort are not taken out of pay checks like income taxes or union dues. They are losses, nonetheless, and heavy ones.

One remedial measure would be federal aid to education in proportion to need, a principle that most democracies, Russia, and Germany have adopted. The disadvantaged, largely rural third of the states spend a higher proportion of their wealth for education than do the richer states, but even so they have such meager resources that they buy a far poorer quality of education. They have proportionately up to twice as many children to educate as the richer states. Half of this surplus emigrate to the cities. They are unable, as a rule, to meet the demands of life in industrialized, urban areas, and their maladjustment costs urban

taxpayers plenty. Cities guard the source of their milk and water supplies very carefully, as they should. They have accepted what physical science has to say in such matters, but they are extremely careless about the source of their human supply.

As a matter of fact, both sociology and economics *know* that capital spent on human beings earns its return in dollars and cents terms just as much as capital spent on a new steel mill. Let me just illustrate one area of data on this point. Yugoslavia has fairly good soil, fair natural resources, and very low per capita income. Norway has poor soil, a very short growing season, and few resources, but in peace times a high income. But Norway also has an unusually high level of education. Rumania has fertile land, forests, oil, a good climate, and poverty. Switzerland has very poor soil, very limited agricultural land, a severe climate, few minerals, and a very high per capita income. Switzerland also has one of the best educational systems in the world and one of the most highly trained industrial populations. Norway and Switzerland have invested capital in their human resources largely because they had no other. The dividends have been enormous. Now apply this to our own South. It has not invested in its people. When it does or when the nation does, it will become our number one area of opportunity.³

Finally, in this category, the rural sociologist can, for instance, after a survey, tell within a small margin of error the needed population, the necessary economic base, and other factors requisite for a consolidated high school. This, of course, has very practical applications. If a consolidated school district is laid out on an inadequate basis, there is a serious waste of capital funds. If it is too large, transportation costs eat up the current expense budget. What applies to the school applies to other social institutions. East of the Rockies, the rural churches have been built up largely in terms of the horse and buggy community. Today we have the automobile and the hard surfaced road. The proportion of members in village churches coming from the agricultural hinterland has more than doubled in the past twenty-five years. It now stands at over forty per cent. It is usually the more advantaged farmers who leave the open country church for the one in the village or town. This is in large part responsible

³The above paragraph is based on a very considerable amount of socioeconomic research. Especially valuable is the work of Professor Harold Clark, summarized in his "How to Make Every Nation Rich," *Teachers College Record*, March, 1945, from which the above illustrations are drawn. See also *Education and Economic Well-Being*, Educational Policies Commission, Washington, D. C., 1940.

for the high mortality of open country churches, which averages over three per cent a year. New churches fail by a considerable margin to make good the loss. The result is that, contrary to popular opinion, the proportion of population in churches in the open country is lower than in the villages, towns, and cities of America. Theoretically we know enough to lay out rural church parishes, give better religious service, and enlist a larger proportion of the farm population in the church. To date only the Roman Catholics have adopted these procedures.

With respect to psychology and social psychology, also, great studies have been made. It is possible to predict with a high degree of accuracy whether a given adolescent is a good or a doubtful college risk. The rating devices applied in the selection of officers for foreign service for the OSS in the war were a remarkable extension of these techniques and are already being popularized and used by business personnel officials, although they are by no means as perfect as they will become. The similar construction of tests that separated bombardiers from fighter pilots, from bomber pilots, and so on, resulted in an amazing reduction in the number of failures.

But psychology has other, perhaps more substantial and socially significant, achievements to its credit. My colleague Edward L. Thorndike's work, extended by Irving D. Lorge, has disproved the adage that you can't teach an old dog new tricks. These men have measured the loss in speed of learning with advancing years and found it real but relatively slight. By the same token, they have learned a lot about how to teach adults. In a world of rapidly changing technology a finding of this sort is of great importance in terms of the retraining of adult workers whose skills lose their market value.

Another great contribution of psychology, also largely by Thorndike, relates to the demonstration that rewards are effective in securing desirable action while punishments are not. Applied originally in education, this demonstrated theory has far wider applications, including labor relations. In the ladies' garment trade, for over thirty years there have been incentives for workers, arbitration of disputes, and growing union-industry cooperation. The union even has an industrial engineering department that will help the small employee become more efficient, in the true meaning of that term. Of course, it also safeguards employee interests in terms of agreed upon working conditions. If the employer doubts the wisdom of using this resource, *the union* offers to pay for an

outside, impartial study of his plant. The union has an elaborate educational and social program for its members. The research department of the union is concerned with economic and social problems, especially in relation to wages and prices. Of course, benefits are shared by both sides and, both would claim, by the consumer as well. I am not saying that the plan is perfect, that there are not frictions and now and then disputes. But outlaw work stoppages and lockouts are all but unknown, the former being prohibited by the union and both by contract.⁴ Strikes are obviously rare. Social science has been successfully applied.

Based partly on these discoveries of Thorndike and largely on studies in social psychology, are a whole group of findings which apply to the present difficulties in employer-employee relations. In the first place, why do workers join unions? "To get higher wages" is only one part of the answer, about one-third of it, to be exact. They join also for psychological reasons, for self-expression, to secure creative outlets. They want to share in community activities through their own organization, controlled and operated by them, not one handed down by even the best of paternalistic employers.

There is considerable concern, especially in the automobile industry, over reduced production per man hour of work. As a matter of fact, over all industrial productivity per man in 1944 was more than half again as much as in 1929. Where reduction occurred it was partly the result of the replacement of skilled personnel in the armed services, but that is only a small part of the story, as is feather bedding. Psychologists have conducted a number of definite experiments in which conditions of work with respect to hours of labor, lighting conditions, mid-morning and mid-afternoon rest periods, with or without a light lunch, and so on were periodically changed. Regardless of what was done, production either increased or remained at the high levels attained. In one case, the unit experimented with had previously been rated as the most efficient in a big steel mill. But production increased one hundred and ten per cent.

⁴The ILGWU Management Engineering Department, Educational Department, ILGWU, New York, 1943.

Meet the ILGWU, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, New York, 1946.

William Gomberg, "The Relationship between the Unions and Engineers," *Mechanical Engineering*, June, 1943. See also other articles by Gomberg in *Industrial Engineer*, March, 1944, and the *Bent of Tau Beta Pi*, December, 1943.

Mark Starr, *Training for Union Service*, Educational Department, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, New York, 1940.

The explanation was twofold. First, the employing corporation guaranteed that there would be no reduction in personnel, or where it applied, in piecework rates. Second, and more important, the employees were participating in planning with respect to the conduct of their jobs. Again, given these conditions, it is possible to predict results—which is the criterion of science.⁵

Why has America been so slow to use these and other assured results of social science? One reason relates to the small amount of money available for research in this general area of human knowledge. It is true but true to say that if social science had been given early enough the four billion dollars that have been spent on the atomic bomb and on chemical and germ warfare—say half for research and half for popular education—perhaps then the first release of atomic energy would have been for constructive, not destructive, purposes. This remark is futile bureaucracy other reason than that all the social sciences together of each township have spent such a sum in a few years. They would committees. Many constrained personnel to put into a gigantic venture of tax to the Republican been too long on a starvation diet.

But there are deeper reasons. Except for theoretical work, the problems the physical scientist solves have an immediate application with respect to very definite things. A new machine is invented, an old one is retooled, and a new product is born. A new combination of chemicals is made, and a better soap appears on the market—or one the advertisements say is better. Some institution stands ready to utilize and publicize any practical discovery of the applied physical scientist. No such institutional arrangements exist in the social science field. We are, thank God, a democracy, an imperfect one but nonetheless enjoying a considerable measure of the freedom which exists to some degree in all societies that have embraced democratic ideals. In this connection, that means that the facts the social scientist discovers appear to the man in the street only as ideas which must compete in the market place of public opinion for acceptance.

As already shown, many of these facts contradict preconceived ideas. They seem to run counter to vested interests. This arouses fear and inhibits honest thinking. This fear comes also because, in large measure, research in the social sciences grows out of problems of which society

⁵See especially C. S. Golden and H. J. Rutenbergs, *The Dynamics of Industrial Democracy*, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1932, or, for a summary of this and other studies, Thomas Carskadon, *Workers and Bosses Are Human*, Public Affairs Committee, New York, 1943.

has but recently become conscious. It is therefore applied to areas of concern in which differences of opinion, and often conflict, already exist. Furthermore, research, even in the physical sciences, lags behind need. Therefore, for many of our social problems there is no answer at the exact moment we want one. There is a certain medicinal product sometimes called 606. That number signifies that the attempt to find the cure for one disease failed 605 times. The public has long since forgotten those 605 failures. But if a public policy, proposed by social scientists because of the need for such a policy and before all the data are in, fails just once, the conclusion is that social science is not science. The remedy, one may well say, lies in education. But examine the relative place in the total curriculum in school and college devoted to the social sciences. The do-~~we~~ result can be illustrated in a thousand ways, most recently by the answer, ~~above~~ senators have asked treasury experts explaining the pro-~~re~~asons, for self-ex-~~pl~~ questions which, alas, betray a complete ignorance in community activity facts of economics. Being of society, we take it for granted that they operate by themselves to do their food. From the point of view of our well-~~em~~ individual and national, nothing could be more dangerous.

I have already hinted at another reason why the findings of social science are not adequately recognized. The institutional arrangements are largely lacking, unless we use government. At the mention of that word, cold shivers run up and down many backs. Yet clearly a half destroyed world can find no other instrumentality adequate to the job of rebuilding itself. In our own land, as *Fortune* magazine has often stated, big business inevitably means big government.

I hold no brief for some types of government control. They are completely foreign to our culture and our ideals, so much so that the mouthings of an economic fossil like Hayek capture the imagination of the American business public, even though he would end all government ~~all~~ to business, such as the tariff and ship subsidies. That part of *The Road to Serfdom* most people must read, and the *Reader's Digest*, of course, left it out of its summary. One of America's conservative economists calls the book an "unbelievable full throwback to atomistic competition."⁶ In contrast to this either ignorant or insulting Teutonic misinterpretation of British and American culture, I wish to give a single illustration of how government may be used effectively in harmony with our traditions—the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Because of politics,

⁶E. G. Nourse, *Journal of Farm Economics*, May, 1945, pp. 484-488.

few laws have suffered from such a barrage of false propaganda. It was a measure designed to help farmers adjust production of given crops according to market conditions, down or up. But, unlike the practices of business, if any farmer agreed to cooperate, when he cut down production of one crop to meet sales forecasts, he put those acres into other, more desperately needed crops. The law was flexible enough to apply to a depression such as we had in the 1930s, or a period such as that of the war, when, in the face of stupendous odds, our farmers broke all food production records by wide margins.

The law offered a mechanism by which farmers could cooperate. Each crop plan was worked out with representatives of the farmers concerned. Even then no plan was adopted until it had been approved by large majorities of the producers concerned. No farmer was forced to cooperate. He could stay outside the plan if he wished. No huge bureaucracy was set up to administer the law. Instead, the farmers of each township and county elected a few of their neighbors to committees. Many committees I know had a majority of members belonging to the Republican party. Even the state committee of five was composed of farmers. No salary was paid these committeemen except on the state level. They received expenses, plus a per diem roughly equal to the cost of employing someone to do their work on days when the committeeman had to be away from his farm for the AAA. Moreover, these local committees, from their experience and problems in the operation of the Act, made suggestions for improvement to state offices and to Washington which were acted upon. Said one farmer to me, "Regimentation? 'Tarnation! We worked this thing out. We voted for it. We operate it. If the need comes, we'll change it or end it." This is democracy in action; it is an authentic expression of the American spirit and culture, and, most important, it shows a way in which we can use government democratically to assist us in carrying out policies based on the assured facts of social science.

We have no greater need at the moment than putting the facts and plans of social science in the hands of the people. That means adult education. It also means a realistic approach to the social sciences in schools and colleges. It means building confidence among our people in the possibilities of the social sciences to improve their lot in the social processes and conditions of our collective life, as the physical sciences have improved their health, comfort, and conditions of living. It means ade-

quate support for, and freedom of, research. It means patience with, objectivity toward, and constructive criticism of, the results of that research. We must become willing to meet new social facts and adapt our behavior to them; in short, when necessary, to change our lives. Moreover, it is extremely doubtful that we can make more effective use of advances in the physical sciences without greatly strengthening the social sciences.^a

America is one of the world's democracies. Never has our way of life seemed so precious or so threatened as in the past few years. We have recently seen one of the world's great nations, a people whose blood flows in the veins of millions of loyal Americans and whose constitution of 1919 was a democratic instrument, changed in six years into a brutal aggressor that plunged three quarters of the world into war and the whole world into fear. How was it done? That story, too, is clear. Every medium of education and propaganda was unleashed and used toward the single end of enabling Germany to dominate a prostrate world.

We in America have no zest for that type of domination, but our democracy is still being challenged from without and from a few groups within our boundaries. We have the possibilities of a standard of life for all our people undreamed of until recently. But it will not come unless we devise the social arrangements to distribute these gains. We cannot, as some are now doing, in almost the same breath claim that free enterprise will bring the millennium and foretell a depression in a relatively few years. Free enterprise itself needs a social structure and organization in which it can function to capacity; and on the record some who speak for it show too little knowledge of many of the factors that have helped America achieve what she has.

The America of our dreams will be built, if it is, by Americans; by the inventions of physical scientists; by the producers with the know-how to turn inventions into goods, by farmer producers who, with the aid of agricultural science, will help answer the world's prayer for daily bread, by other scientists, who will conquer disease and bring healing,

^aComment by Stewart G. Cole

With the viewpoint of this paper many of us are in agreement. Is it not true, however, that social scientists have much groundwork to do (1) to acquire a common scientific ideology and methodology across the lines of the various divisions of social science, (2) to agree upon a working core of democratic values against which to interpret the American way and the use of methodology in enriching the American way, (3) to get over their petty jealousies which frequently lead them to be content within their ivory towers of departmental study, and join forces to make the maximum joint impact upon the issues in our civilization that threaten the life of man?

and by social scientists, who will study human behavior and reveal its meaning to human beings and play their part in building the requisite institutions of the future on the sound foundations of knowledge. The social scientist knows the truth of what the prophets declared—that "man lives not by bread alone." Each group must play its part in making America truly great.

Like Germany of 1933, we have schools, we have adult education, we have a literate people, we have press and radio. We know something about how to influence people and mold opinion. We can take the great principles of our land stated in the Declaration, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, not as words to be memorized but as ideas to be practiced. We can find out their meanings for our industrialized society and teach our people those meanings and how to achieve them. We can turn away from chaos and destruction and toward what a few years ago would have seemed utopia.

We lack chiefly in this effort what social science must contribute. But social science has shown enough to warrant freeing it, supporting it as never before, and using its findings from grade school to graduate school and in every adult group. Social science alone will not remake America or the world, but America and the world will not be remade without it. I do not know whether we will do this. I do know that we need desperately to do so. And the time to begin is now.

CHAPTER XXIII

The "Survival Value" of Science

By STUART MUDD

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THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE of science is to understand nature, to apprehend, in so far as may be given finite human minds, the attributes and interrelationships within the natural universe. The development of science has its abstract motivation in universal human curiosity. Its practical motivation is rooted in the instinct to survive. For survival a certain adequate degree of adjustment to natural and human environment is essential, the growing understanding of nature has been a principal means of achieving that adjustment.

Scientific method proceeds through observation and experiment to the rational induction of generalizations, these generalizations may be the bases for deductions, which are then subject to check with observation and experiment, the validity of the general inductions may thus be evaluated. This procedure may be followed by anyone who develops the requisite knowledge and skill. It is merely the systematic elaboration of man's curious scrutiny of himself and his environment, and of reasoning from his observations.

Science as such is independent of religious and political creeds. Religious feeling frequently, however, serves powerfully to motivate the scientist in his quest for truth, and political purposes may motivate his society to provide him with the necessary equipment. Or religious or political tenets may obstruct science by obscuring the self-evident truth that the *laws of nature* are not subject to human will, however holy or however powerful that human will may be.

Science, we thus see, in its primary goal and in its abstract motivation, is a concern of all mankind. The attributes of nature are universal and the efforts to apprehend them transcend all subdivisions of man in terms

of religion, nation, or race. In its pure aspects, therefore, scientific investigation is an undertaking common to all civilized man, and the fruits of such investigations are a means of uniting men through a growing heritage of understanding which may be shared by all and from which benefits may be derived by all.

Science in its applied aspects, however, becomes intimately involved with all sorts of practical considerations. Can any guiding principle be found to orient us within this maze of practical and often conflicting values?

The soundest principle, perhaps, is contained within the practical motivation itself of science, namely the *instinct of survival*. The prime necessity for any living species is obviously to survive. In the course of evolution emergent characteristics have been tested by natural selection for their "survival value," and those which have aided the species to survive have on the whole been fixed and those which are unfavorable for survival eliminated by natural selection. The characteristics of organisms which now exist are therefore such as to adapt them to continuing life in the environment in which they have evolved. And since environment itself is constantly changing, the capacity to adapt, adaptivity itself, has very great survival value. Considered in biological terms, therefore, pragmatic evaluation of science as an activity of the human species must be in terms of its *survival value*.

In the evolution of systems of natural ethics, also, it is the writer's understanding that the social acceptability of human conduct has constantly been measured, although often unconsciously, by its effects in promoting or endangering the survival of the group.

Evaluation and orientation of scientific activity in relation to the continuing existence of the human species and to the conditions of that existence, has become superlatively imperative because of the unique position science and technology have assumed in modern human civilization. Natural evolution has proceeded through the gradual selection of slowly changing species in an environment undergoing slow and gradual modification. Human society, on the contrary, has undergone change under the molding influence of science and technology, which have developed swiftly and at a steadily accelerating rate. In a very real sense, therefore, the consequences of pure and applied science have superseded the gradual processes of natural evolution and have assumed a highly critical relationship to the fate of the human species.

What has been, then, and what is the survival value of natural science? It is perfectly obvious that natural science has had enormous survival value, it is equally obvious that the beneficent contributions of *natural* science are incomplete and inadequate. Applied science has absolved modern man from danger from wild beasts. It has on the other hand exposed him to a degree unique in history to peril from the deadliest and most destructive beasts, man himself intent on killing. Modern technology has provided means of averting famines, controlling floods, providing food, shelter, and security for all men. Lack of adequate motivation based on love and human brotherhood, and failure of economic and social technology to solve problems of distribution, confront us now with war, famine, and want of elementary necessities involving a great proportion of the present inhabitants of the world. Modern science within the recent past has added decades to the life expectancy of the individual, it has not protected mankind from the monstrous crime of genocide. Civilization itself has never before been in such acute danger of extinction.

If, as already considered, natural systems of ethics have been measured in large part by their value to the survival of the group, it is also true that the size of the group to which loyalty is demanded has steadily increased. The tribe, the city state, the nation, the empire, have successively claimed the fealty of men. Modern science and technology have greatly accelerated this broadening of loyalties which are essential for survival, until now world society and world civilization have become the units to which human loyalty is imperative. The human species must survive, its welfare, the fruits of its age long strivings, indeed its very continuing existence as a dominant species must be preserved against the very real dangers which threaten.

The world has become like a vast organism, whose functions are integrated by worldwide systems of communication and exchange. We "are members, one of another," in a new and more literal sense than ever before. The benefits of scientific understanding and of techniques of social and economic adjustment can now diffuse through and enrich the entire world. Thus our present understanding of human behavior has as source springs the scientific investigations of a Russian neurophysiologist, I. P. Pavlov, an Austrian psychiatrist, Sigmund Freud, and an American physiologist, Walter B. Cannon. Children in the Soviet Union are being consciously conditioned to affection, security, acceptance in the

social group, and responsibility to the social group, as the writer was privileged to observe during the summer of 1946. This represents a genuine advance in human relations, valuable anywhere. It was equally apparent that the Soviet Union, even in a time of political isolation, was conversant with and benefiting from Western science.

On the other hand, evils of famine, pestilence, social and political maladjustment can now no more be regarded as of purely local concern than can a local infection be regarded as not endangering the health of the whole organism. And the implements and acceptance of the ghastly concepts of total war and mass destruction remain as urgent, imperative, and unresolved problems, threatening all civilization.

Certain leaders in biology have recently attempted to state the essential principle of ethics in scientific terms. We are indebted to Dean C. D. Leake of the University of Texas School of Medicine for the following: "The probability of survival of individual, or groups of, living things increases with the degree with which they harmoniously adjust themselves to each other and their environment."

The inadequacy of *natural* (as distinct from *social*) science in this time of crisis is inherent in its preoccupation with adjustment to environment. The sciences of human relationship, those preoccupied with harmonious adjustment of man to man, are by no means so well developed. We have not mastered the principles of equitable distribution of the riches modern technology can produce. We have not learned the conditions crucial for human happiness.^a We have insufficiently the essential charity and love for all mankind in our hearts.

The conditions which determine human happiness, the writer most sincerely believes, are discoverable by scientific methods, and are to a major extent capable of realization in a world of men of good will. The great religions of the world offer us the motivation essential for human society based on the brotherhood of man. God grant us the wisdom and the goodness to seek these things earnestly while there is yet time!^b

^aComment by Harry B. Friedgood

To Doctor Mudd's cogent remarks, one might add that overt international conflicts and the unconscious civil war that rages within many individuals have a similar structure. We can learn a good deal about armed or ideological conflict between nations from our knowledge of conflicts studied in the test tube of the individual. [Cf. Chapter XL by Doctor Friedgood.]

^bComment by Robert C. Angell

The inference from these two statements that science has survival value for all mankind ignores so many other factors in the situation. Men have beliefs about the kind of social

organization that is best, these beliefs are in sharp contradiction to each other, for each group of believers science is an instrument of its own survival. The fact that many of the scientific discoveries and principles that they use in procuring their own survival are the work of their rivals, does not prevent conflict. Witness the manner in which German and American scientists, who had great admiration for each other, loyally served their countries during the late war. Mere communication and interaction does not necessarily build world unity. There must be moral consensus, and that is a result that not even social science, let alone natural science, can be sure of achieving. [Cf. also Doctor Angell's comment on the chapter by Mark Gaubard, Chapter XV, note a.]

Doctor Mudd's reply

The general considerations raised by Professor Robert C. Angell are of course correct. His essential criticism seems to be based on the fact that there must be a *moral consensus*. May I call attention to the fact, however, that I place ahead of technology the "lack of adequate motivation based on love and human brotherhood." Also to the statement, "We have insufficiently the essential charity and love for all mankind in our hearts," and to the last paragraph. It seemed to me that as a scientist it was appropriate for me to write primarily of science. However, does Professor Angell not agree on reconsideration that the primary necessity of *moral consensus* is appreciated and indeed is proposed as a scientific conclusion?

Comment by Alexander H. Leighton

The only hope for the future is the application of science to human relations—and a *willingness to abide by the results*. We need to face and deal with truth regardless of the temporary insecurities it may invoke. There has been a great deal said and written about the difficulty of social science due to "the complexity of man." It may be doubted, however, that the complexity is the real cause of trouble. Other sciences such as organic chemistry deal in matters of tremendous complexity. The difficulty seems rather to lie in the emotional sets that prevent clear seeing, clear thinking, and clear doing.

One of the effects of Hiroshima has been to make some people feel that there is a potential building up for the extinction of humanity. However, it may be that some fringes of humanity will survive another war and gradually spread again like new vegetation over burned land. These might be primitive people who now live behind mountains, in jungles, or on arctic tundra. Or, they might come from some maimed fragment of one of the contestants. Whoever they are, it is very likely that they will have learned the lesson. It is probable that they will turn their science to the mind and society of man, with the result that machines and other physical powers can be safely handled and put to work solely in the interests of humanity.

When scuffling about the stones and pieces of fused glass in Hiroshima I could not help wondering, why, if the human race were capable of learning this lesson at all, it could not do so without first going through the tearful experience that is coming. With the war only a short time over, we who fought for ideals and for peace are already deep in the historic cycles of postwar self-seeking, disillusionment, apathy, realigned hostilities, and witch hunting. It did not require Hiroshima to bring realization of the slowness of man in rising to meet his needs and his opportunities. Progress in civilization has been a slow business. However, always before there appeared to be time. Given a long enough period, humanity seemed generally able to "muddle through" to some solution. But Hiroshima brought the realization that time has almost run out. It is not sure that nothing can now be done to avert the disaster that is imminent, but, the habits of our minds and the set of our society being what they are, such is the probability. It is certain that if there is any time left in which to alter an otherwise downward course, it is very, very short.

This means that one can no longer work in problems of human relations with the feeling that any progress made, however minute, is something gained. An inch made is not now an inch gained. On the contrary, no progress is of value unless it adds up to crossing soon the threshold between things as they are now and a world order in which there will be no clash of power and the wipings out that go with it. Unless the threshold is crossed, there can be little significance in present day scholarly work in universities, in creative art and literature, in political careers, in building a business, in developing a labor union, in finding new cures for disease, or any other item on the list of things people do, including raising a family.

When the impact of these circumstances is felt, it is natural for one to look for a remedy. Like other workers, the social scientist is inclined to believe that help is to be found in his own field. In this he shares the common bias. When he examines his resources, however, he finds that there are some distinctive features. The fact that social science is relatively new means in part lack of knowledge and skill, but it also means lack of trial is compared to other kinds of endeavor. This makes it a possibility that something effective can be uncovered. Another difference is that it has ready no assured answers. In place of answers, the one substantial thing which social science has to offer is the element that is common to all sciences—the scientific method. In this there is promise, if the history of science is any guide. This is not a promise of an immediate answer, but it is a reasonable assurance that there exists now the knowledge and skill necessary to make the tools which in turn will yield the desired results. There is in this no guarantee of success, but it is a substantial hope, and where else, in any realistic sense, can that be found?

CHAPTER XXIV

The Organizing of Statistics in World Recovery

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The Role of Statistics in the Global Community

A DISASTROUS SPIRIT of divisiveness is alive throughout the world. Divisiveness brought us down the tragic road to Buchenwald, Lidice, Corregido, Stalingrad, and the Britain of blood, sweat, toil, and tears. Even now it is producing bloodshed in various parts of the globe. It has given us a postwar world in which, save for a few fortunate areas, there are devastation, austerity, famine, and the imminent danger of economic paralysis. This grim environment, in turn, fosters the divisive spirit which brought it on.

The vast misery of 1947 does not, of course, stem solely from the existence of divisiveness. Man is in a bad way not only because he is ornery, but also because he is a poor manager. It was a commonplace even before World War II that there was an enormous gulf between the comforts which man could have provided for himself and the comparatively meager ones which he had actually arranged.

It has been estimated that, even before the recent war, "In areas containing over half the world's population, food supplies at the retail level . . . [were such as] to furnish an average of less than 2,250 calories per [person] daily." In any given area, of course, there are likely to be large numbers of persons with a diet substantially less adequate than the average.¹

The same authority has estimated that, out of sixty separate countries, about forty are "underdeveloped." The "underdeveloped" countries are

¹Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *World Food Survey*, July 5, 1946, p. 6. Because of waste, avoidable and unavoidable, the intake of food per person is always less than the amount per person which reaches the retail stores.

inhabited by three fourths of the world's two billion people. All of these countries "are poor and all suffer from malnutrition with its inevitable ill health and premature death."²

The ability to read is no specific against manmade or man tolerated evils. But it is certainly a prerequisite to obtaining the benefits of modern technology. In the complex society of today, literacy is essential also to democracy. Yet less than half of the world's population can read or write. Indeed, two thirds of the world's people live in countries which are between fifty per cent and almost one hundred per cent illiterate, and where, besides, there either is a death rate of fifteen or more per one thousand, or serious and widespread malnutrition, or both. To get the full impact of these facts, one should remember that, in the United States, where there still are deplorable economic and social conditions to overcome, nevertheless the 1940 death rate was below eleven, and, as of that same year, only fourteen per cent of the adult population³ had completed less than five years of school.⁴

Into this far from satisfactory milieu came World War II. The devastation wrought is equalled only by the depravity which caused and that which resulted from the war. According to French official estimates, twenty per cent of the houses in France in 1939 were destroyed or damaged during the war, leaving seven hundred thousand families homeless at the time of liberation. In the United Kingdom the number of houses destroyed or damaged reached nearly thirty per cent. Czechoslovakia had nearly one hundred thousand freight cars before the war, and emerged with less than twenty thousand. Luxemburg's food situation is reflected in the following figures on calories per person per day:

Year	1938	1944	1945	1946
Calories	3075	1900	1860	2080

This recovery since liberation—back to two thirds of Luxemburg's pre-war consumption—is regarded as a considerable improvement! One of the most pitiable of postwar groups is Europe's displaced persons, esti-

²United Nations Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture, report of the Technical Committee on Nutrition and Food Management, *Nutrition and Food Management*, April 9, 1945, p. 5.

³More precisely: persons over twenty-five years of age.

⁴See Walter H. C. Lives, Deputy Director General of UNESCO, *Address to the Anglo-American Press Association*, Paris, June 25, 1947, p. 4, and Elizabeth E. Hoyt, *Freedom from Want: A World Goal*, Public Affairs Committee, Inc., New York, 1943, pp. 14-18.

mated at one million, of whom six hundred thousand are in the United States zones.⁷

Reflective men of good will want an end put to such appalling conditions. They want a sensible enough utilization of the world's resources that the general run of humankind, placed for the first time in decently comfortable circumstances, can invite their souls. The question is, how is this goal to be reached? The job will be attempted in part by the action of individuals, of voluntary organizations, of local and provincial governments, and of national governments working separately from each other. But, in addition to these traditional forces, a large group of intergovernmental organizations is intended to make a substantial contribution to this worldwide endeavor. Predominantly these are organizations which carry over from a period prior to World War II (witness the International Labor Organization) or have a definite predecessor (here the conspicuous case being that of the United Nations). Their new aspect is that the appalling problems which they face are of unsurpassed magnitude and, appropriately, this array of organizations is now intended to engage in activities more varied than hitherto, and on a scale markedly larger than has previously obtained.

This paper is focused upon the role of statistics in world economic and social betterment, rather than upon so deeply fundamental a matter as the relative merits of various institutional patterns in international relations. Hence it is concerned with statistics within the existing structure of international organization. It assumes that, for good or ill, we shall continue to have intergovernmental organizations and not a world government. Furthermore, this paper assumes although the author would hardly try to prove, that the world will for quite some time continue to have at least its present degree of peace. There are public measures, such as those focused on world economic recovery, which are useful in lessening tensions although they are not, by themselves, sufficient to prevent war.

To the success of any attack upon global economic and social prob-

⁷See United Nations General Assembly, *Preliminary Report of the Temporary Subcommission on Economic Reconstruction of Devastated Areas* (issued in 1946), pp. 124 (France), 137 (Luxembourg), 184 (United Kingdom), Director General of United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, *Economic Recovery in the Countries Assisted by UNRRA* (issued in 1946), p. 105 (Czechoslovakia), and "Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eightieth Congress, First Session, on S. J. Res. 77" (hearing on United States membership in the International Refugee Organization), March 1, 1947, p. 7.

lems international statistics are a *sine qua non*. I say that in all humility, remembering that the same may be said of many another factor. Granted that official international organizations are one type of medium through which the world is to try to better itself, what, within the programs of these bodies, is the role which statistics can play in remedying the intolerable existing conditions? Are not the conditions so serious that no precise quantitative description of them is necessary? If the author of this paper has a professional bias regarding the encouragement of statistical activity, it is a bias which, in Washington, would be regarded as against statistics and not for them. He is a member of a staff which is charged by Congress with the task, among others, of keeping the statistical activity of Federal agencies within the bounds of necessity. It nevertheless seems clear to the writer that there are economic and social problems which are too big to be grasped by direct observation, problems which cannot be effectively tackled without numerical data about them. Adjustment of available resources to community problems demands a quantitative approach even within the local community. In the world-wide community, such an approach is even more essential.

The world knows of the existence of its major economic and social problems, but, in tackling them, it cannot know where it is most advisable to start, and how it can most fittingly use the men and materials available, until there are meaningful and adequate quantitative data regarding the location and extent of the problems. It is not sufficient to know in what countries there is dire hunger. One must know, for each of these countries, such things as the calories available per person per day. Beyond that, one must know, for example, how much of this diet is protein. Beyond that, what kind of protein is available in each of the food-deficit countries? What kind of protein is customarily acceptable? (E.g., is horsemeat satisfactory?) What kind of protein is available in countries of comparative abundance? The questions, of course, are never a series of purely quantitative ones. Witness the above query about the acceptability of a specified type of protein. Statistics is not the private property of the statistician. It is, instead, an aspect of administration and of research, which derives its meaning from, and gives meaning to, a qualitative context.

Statistical Activities of Intergovernmental Organizations

1. The United Nations Of the various intergovernmental organizations, the United Nations is the principal one not only in the realm of military security, but also in the field of social and economic problems. The United Nations charter⁶ includes, as one of the organization's purposes, "To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character . . ."

The statistical needs of the United Nations are likely to be both large and varied. The Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Secretariat (notably the Department of Economic Affairs, the Department of Social Affairs, and the Department for Trusteeship and Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories) are the organs of the United Nations most likely to need the services of statistical experts. The chief statistical bodies in the United Nations are the Statistical Commission and the Statistical Office. The Commission has, as members, twelve countries, designated for three year terms and each choosing one representative on the Commission. Its task is to assist the Council in

"promoting the development of national statistics and the improvement of their comparability;

advising the organs of the United Nations on general questions relating to the collection, interpretation and dissemination of statistical information;

promoting the improvement of statistics and statistical methods generally,

coordinating the statistical work of specialized agencies, and the development of the central statistical services of the Secretariat of the United Nations."⁷

The Statistical Office,⁸ located in the Department of Economic Affairs, is the statistical secretariat for the entire United Nations establishment. It is responsible for

"(a) The collection, compilation and publication of official statistics for the United Nations,

⁶Chapter I, Article 1, Section 3

⁷United Nations, *Structure of the United Nations*, May, 1947, p. 14

⁸See United Nations General Assembly, *Budget Estimates for the Financial Year 1948*, July 14, 1947, p. 50, and Interim Note by the United Nations Secretary-General, Document E/471, *Expert Assistance to Member Governments*, July 17, 1947

- (b) Providing statistical services, including the data needed for research projects, for all the departments and divisions of the United Nations, and
- (c) The coordination of the over all statistical programme of the United Nations and the specialized agencies”

Moreover, it is probable that the Statistical Office will make statistical experts available to member governments, especially governments of the less developed countries, in accordance with a recent resolution of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (applicable to all varieties of experts available in the United Nations)

Here a word is necessary about the collection of statistics undertaken by the United Nations and the specialized intergovernmental agencies. It is contemplated that, in the main or entirely, they shall “collect” statistics only in the sense of obtaining them from national governments and from other bodies engaged in the “primary collection” of data. Furthermore, the data thus obtained are commonly tabulations (national totals and the like), rather than information about individual persons, corporations, etc. Thus, for example, the United Nations Statistical Office issues a “Monthly Bulletin of Statistics” containing data on—among other things—the production of coal. These coal data for the United States are the figures compiled by the United States Bureau of Mines (primarily on the basis of reports submitted to it by the railroad companies which transport coal).

An example of the United Nations’ concern with the improvement of statistical comparability is the work being done by the United Nations Statistical Commission’s Committee on Industrial Classification. Using as a point of departure a classification scheme devised under League of Nations auspices, the Committee has experts at work on the task of providing an up to date scheme which would tend to make international comparisons valid—a result which cannot be achieved when various countries define their industries differently.⁹

2 The United Nations Specialized Agencies. In addition to the United Nations itself, numerous specialized intergovernmental organizations exist or are in process of formation. Those which, in the language of the United Nations Charter, have been “brought into relationship with” that organization are the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United

⁹See United Nations Statistical Commission, Committee on Industrial Classification, *The Proposed International Standard Industrial Classification*, June 19, 1947.

Nations, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); the International Labor Organization, which was originally established as an autonomous part of the League of Nations, and the International Civil Aviation Organization

"Relationship agreements" between the United Nations and the nascent World Health Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Universal Postal Union, and the International Telecommunications Union are under consideration. It is also contemplated that the International Refugee Organization and the International Trade Organization, which are in process of formation, each be a specialized agency of the United Nations.

The interconnection between the United Nations and its specialized agencies has been well summed up by UNESCO

"The success of the United Nations is a condition to UNESCO's success, but UNESCO, in the fields defined by its Constitution, can make a major contribution towards the ultimate success of the United Nations"¹⁰

The specialized agencies do not necessarily have exactly the same group of members as the United Nations, and each agency obtains its funds directly from its member states. Each agency has an agreement with the United Nations, which gives to the United Nations an advisory role and which prescribes, among other things, the relationship between the United Nations and the specialized agency as regards statistics. It is contemplated that each specialized agency will engage in the statistical work peculiar to its own needs, and that the United Nations Statistical Office will have a responsibility commensurate with the very broad interests of the United Nations, including the provision of statistics (such as on population) which are of interest to various specialized agencies but are not of primary concern to any of them. Coordination of the statistical work of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies is also a United Nations function, as noted above.

a The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. The FAO seeks to raise the level of nutrition, to foster improved efficiency in the production and distribution of food and agricultural products, and to better the condition of rural populations. The organization's first major project was a comprehensive world food survey, covering

¹⁰UNESCO Executive Board, *The Programme of UNESCO for 1948*, July 3, 1947, p. 28

seventy countries. It showed food supplies, country by country, for the immediate prewar period and compared those supplies, in various countries or areas, with targets for better nutrition. This agency is also preparing, at intervals, short term appraisals of the immediate food prospect during the emergency period of shortage. Of FAO's five major technical divisions, one is the Economics and Statistics Division. FAO will assemble, analyze, and publish existing data from various countries. Its principal statistical periodical is a continuation of the "International Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics," which was issued by FAO's predecessor, the International Institute of Agriculture. FAO will seek to bring about international uniformity of definitions and classifications in agricultural statistics, and will promote other improvements in national statistics. To the governments concerned, FAO has recently sent a world forestry resources questionnaire, which will provide "benchmark" data,¹¹ after which it will be possible to obtain useful information of a more limited sort on a periodic basis. As a preliminary to sending out the basic questionnaire, FAO developed jointly with experts from numerous countries a uniform set of definitions and classifications. In like manner, but with a broader subject matter, a 1950 World Census of Agriculture is being planned by FAO and numerous member governments, to be conducted almost simultaneously, by as many countries as possible, on a basis as nearly uniform as is feasible.¹²

b. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) also has its statistical interests.¹³ In its program for 1947 it has provided for (a) the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information in the fields of education, science, and culture, (b) assistance in the standardization and improvement of national educational statistics, and (c) exploration of the possibility of publishing an international education yearbook.

Illustrative of UNESCO's need for data on such factors as the location

¹¹Comprehensive basic information of a sort gotten at very infrequent intervals of time.

¹²See Valentino Dore, "The Role and Work of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations in International Statistics" (a paper presented at the United Nations World Statistical Congress, September, 1947), and United States Office of Government Reports, *United States Government Manual*, 2nd 1947 edition, p. 544.

¹³UNESCO, *The Programme of UNESCO in 1947*, March 28, 1947, pp. 7, 9, Walter H. C. Laves, Deputy Director General of UNESCO, *Address to the Anglo-American Press Association*, Paris, June 25, 1947, p. 6, and UNESCO, *The Programme of UNESCO for 1948 Proposed by the Executive Board for Consideration at the Second General Conference*, August 5, 1947, p. 19.

and extent of illiteracy, and the available educational facilities, is a project which was begun this summer in a small corner of Haiti, at the invitation of that country's government. In a local population of twenty-six thousand, eighty per cent are illiterate. Up to date techniques and materials are being used to overcome illiteracy and also to teach good citizenship and modern methods of agriculture and hygiene. What UNESCO learns there will be applied in other countries.

UNESCO is directly concerned with the general theme of the 1947 Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion. The 1946 General Conference of UNESCO decided that the organization's chief undertaking in the social sciences in the near future should be a collaborative study of "Tensions Conducive to War." The preliminary phase of the study is under way. In the program which the UNESCO Executive Board has proposed for 1948, various prospective inquiries related to this topic are indicated, among them being one ". . . into the conceptions which the people of one nation entertain of its own and of other nations." This particular inquiry is perhaps the one most likely to involve statistical techniques, as one approach to such an investigation is the familiar device of the public opinion poll.

If that approach is used, it will be both challenging and potentially very fruitful.¹³ A deeply perceptive account of some of the difficulties encountered in any such work was recently published by the Director of the Scientific Institute of Mexican Public Opinion in a paper entitled "Problems of International Opinion Surveys."¹⁴ "The main concern," he observes, "must not be how to transplant methods and techniques, but rather how to obtain valid and commensurable results in all countries." In order to achieve the effect of the same question, it may sometimes be necessary to use *different* wordings of the same question for various countries. He notes that even the word "war" does not at this time mean the same thing universally. Some countries recall it as death and destruction, while many people in other countries recall it as prosperity. This means, if I correctly understand the above author's thesis, that people with the latter recollection might require some elaboration of the word "war"—such as verbally transplanting the facts of Coventry and Shanghai to their home towns—in order for them to give a response comparable

¹³[Cf. Chapter XXXV, "International Polling and International Democracy," by Elmo Roper and Julian L. Woodward.]

¹⁴László Radvanyi, an article in the *International Journal of Opinion and Attitude Research*, June, 1947, p. 30 *et seq.* See especially p. 50.

to that which the word "war" alone might well evoke in a survivor of *Blitz* or pillage. In the design of a statistical sample, one uses "controls", *i.e.*, tries to insure that the sample is representative—does not include a disproportionate number of people of any given income group, or educational attainment group, or the like. To a United States statistician it would seem bizarre to use the polled persons' type of footwear as a "control", but the author cited above points out that, in opinion surveys in Mexico, one must cover proper percentages of people who go barefoot, of people who wear native sandals, and of people who wear shoes. If a Mexican lacks shoes, it may be that he is able to afford them but nevertheless is attached to the traditional way of life—a significant trait in an opinion poll but not reflected in income data.

c. The International Labor Organization. The ILO seeks to contribute to the establishment of peace by furthering "social justice"¹⁵—meaning, by fostering minimum wage and maximum hour controls, free collective bargaining, social insurance, and other measures on behalf of labor. As is remarked in an ILO publication on "The International Standardisation of Labor Statistics,"¹⁶ "Good labor statistics are essential to both the framing and the administration of progressive social policy." In its substantive program and also its betterment of statistics, the ILO proceeds by means of *recommendations* and *conventions*, the latter being binding upon any states which ratify them. In the first of the organization's six International Conferences of Labor Statisticians, a resolution was adopted on "Statistics of Industrial Accidents." This consisted of a set of recommendations on such basic matters as the scheme of classification of accidents by cause and by degree of disability, and the definitions of "frequency rate" and "severity rate." Also by means of recommendations the ILO has sought to improve and to standardize data in various other fields, such as statistics of the labor force, employment and unemployment, and cost of living index numbers.¹⁷

In the standardizing of labor statistics one of the most important accomplishments has been the issuance in 1938 of a "Draft Convention

¹⁵ILO constitution, preamble.

¹⁶Montreal, 1943, p. 1.

¹⁷See the following reports, published in Geneva, 1947, and submitted by the ILO secretariat to the Sixth International Conference of Labor Statisticians. *Amendments to the Resolution on Statistics of Industrial Accidents Adopted by the First International Conference of Labor Statisticians in October 1923*, pp. 23–25; *Employment and Unemployment Statistics*, pp. 131–132 and *passim*; *Cost-of-Living Statistics: Methods and Techniques for the Post-War Period*, pp. 53–54 and *passim*.

(No 63) concerning statistics of wages and hours of work in the principal mining and manufacturing industries, including building and construction, and in agriculture." This convention has been ratified by over a dozen countries (including the United Kingdom, Canada, and Mexico). The convention concerns data to be collected from employers by the member governments, published by the latter, and furnished by these governments to the ILO on a uniform basis.

The ILO publishes a *Yearbook of Labor Statistics*, and makes various *ad hoc* studies consisting at least in part of statistical analyses—e.g., a study, published in Montreal in 1944, entitled *Social Policy in Dependent Territories*.

d The International Civil Aviation Organization. The immediate origin of ICAO was the International Civil Aviation Conference held at Chicago in 1944, but its successor to a somewhat similar organization, having narrower membership and functions, which had been created in 1922. ICAO is concerned with both the economic and the "air navigation" aspects of the control of international civil aviation.

The international convention¹⁸ establishing ICAO provides that the international airlines of all member states must furnish that organization with "traffic reports, cost statistics and financial statements showing among other things all receipts and the sources thereof." ICAO has chosen to have these data submitted through member states, but in terms of individual airlines rather than as national summaries. This reporting scheme is not only highly comprehensive but—quite unusually for an international reporting system—it is compulsory. ICAO also has under consideration various proposals for obtaining data on other aspects of civil aviation. In January, 1948, the organization will hold the first session of its Statistics Division, a group of experts, employed by member governments, whose role is to make recommendations on the content and form of ICAO statistical programs.

e The World Health Organization. In 1946, an International Health Conference, which was convened in New York by the United Nations Economic and Social Council, prepared the constitution of a proposed World Health Organization. The constitution has not yet been accepted by the required minimum number of states, but an Interim Commission of WHO was established by the Conference. The Commission has assumed the functions of the League of Nations Health Organizations.

¹⁸Article 67

WHO's constitution prescribes a very broad range of functions, such as (1) to provide, upon the request of the United Nations, health services to the peoples of trust territories, (2) "to stimulate work to eradicate epidemic, endemic and other diseases", (3) "to promote and conduct research in the field of health", (4) "to provide information in the field of health", and (5) to issue regulations concerning sanitary and quarantine requirements and purity standards for biological and pharmaceutical products moving in international commerce—the regulations to be binding upon each member state which fails to reject them within a prescribed period of time after their issuance. The constitution explicitly includes among WHO's functions the maintenance of "epidemiological and statistical services" and the establishment and revision of international nomenclatures of diseases and of causes of death. It stipulates, further, that "Each Member (state) shall provide statistical and epidemiological reports in a manner to be determined by the Health Assembly" (the organization's policy making body). The statistical approach is an integral part of epidemiology. One cannot learn the incidence and extent of epidemic disease without a systematic reporting and assembling of data regarding the cases involved. We are being forced by advances in air travel to learn today on an international scale what we learned imperfectly on a national scale only yesterday, *viz*, that germs are neighbors who cannot be kept in their place by our snobbishly refusing to recognize their existence.¹⁰

Substantial progress has already been made on a statistical project of major importance. Over a half century ago, under the auspices of the International Statistical Institute, a classification scheme for causes of death was devised. Known subsequently as the International List of Causes of Death, it came to be used by a large number of countries in their respective bureaus of vital statistics. It was revised from time to time, in international conferences called for this purpose. There has been an increasing demand for an international classification scheme for sickness and injury (both fatal and non-fatal conditions), and a considerable

¹⁰See *International Health Conference*, United States Department of State Publication 2703, Conference Series 91, and see "Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a Suggested Joint Resolution Providing for United States Membership and Participation in the World Health Organization," United States House of Representatives Document No. 177, 80th Congress, 1st Session, especially p. 4. On WHO functions, see the WHO constitution, Articles 2, 21, 22, 64, and 44, "Year of Progress in World Health," an article in the *United Nations Weekly Bulletin*, March 4, 1947, pp. 210-211.

amount of work has been done in the course of a number of decades toward the devising and adoption of such a scheme. In January, 1947, there was appointed under the auspices of WHO's Interim Commission an International Committee for the Preparation of the Sixth Decennial Revision of International Lists of Diseases and Causes of Death. Previous revisions had been focused on the International List of Causes of Death, while the present venture is an attempt at an integration of the two sorts of classification system. With morbidity and mortality statistics comparable to each other, it would be possible for countries to compute case fatality rates for individual diseases. The above mentioned International Committee arrived at a proposed "International Statistical Classification of Diseases, Injuries, and Causes of Death." Broad review of the proposed scheme is being achieved by circulation of it to numerous official health and statistical agencies throughout the world. The Committees' proposal, as modified in the light of this consultation, will probably be laid before an international conference of technicians called especially for this purpose and having WHO sponsorship.²⁰

f. The International Trade Organization. The ITO's charter is still in draft stage. Its statement of objectives makes clear that an abundance of economic data, on a comparable basis, will be of central importance to ITO's analysis of problems, its plans for coping with them, and its measurement of its success. The member states would, by the proposed charter's terms, pledge themselves to promote national and international action for such purposes as (1) the increasing of production, consumption, and the exchange of goods and the promotion of an expanding world economy; (2) assisting economic development through international investment; (3) furthering access on equal terms to the world's markets; and (4) reducing trade barriers and eliminating trade discrimination.²¹

²⁰See *Report on the Proceedings of the International Committee for the Preparation of the Sixth Decennial Revision of the International Lists of Diseases and Causes of Death at Ottawa, March 10-21, 1947*, issued by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Ottawa, and *International Statistical Classification of Diseases, Injuries, and Causes of Death. Introduction and List of Categories, Proposed by the International Committee for the Preparation of the Sixth Decennial Revision*, issued by the Interim Commission of WHO, Ottawa, April, 1947.

²¹*New York Times*, August 21, 1947, pp. 1, 4.

Professional Statistical Societies on the International Level

In addition to the intergovernmental organizations with substantial statistical interests, there are international bodies of a predominantly professional type which have such interests—*i.e.*, unofficial statistical societies composed primarily of individuals. The principal organization of this type is the International Statistical Institute (ISI). A series of International Statistical Congresses, beginning in Brussels in 1853, was held from time to time during a third of a century, being finally succeeded, at the Congress held in London in 1885, by the ISI. In 1913 the Institute established a small secretariat known as its Permanent Office, located at The Hague. The Institute elects as members persons in various countries who are prominent as statisticians or who are administrators of official statistical agencies. Until recently the ISI has played a dual role. (a) It has had what might be described as an academy function, somewhat analogous on a worldwide scale to the American Statistical Association's function within the United States and adjacent areas. This involved the fostering of the development of improved statistical methods and the encouragement of the acceptance of good statistical methods (notably, in national statistical offices), by such means as the exchange of information and views at the organization's periodic sessions. (b) In addition, through its Permanent Office the Institute brought together statistical tabulations obtained from various governmental sources, particularly demographic statistics, and thus arrived at international comparisons, which it published. In recognition of the usefulness of the Institute's services, various governments—including that of the United States—have for many years made modest subventions to the organization.

Then came the League of Nations and other intergovernmental organizations with statistical interests. The rise of such organizations has made it unnecessary that the ISI continue its function of compilation and the like. The intergovernmental organizations will, in carrying out their respective programs, engage in that type of statistical work on a scale far overshadowing what the Institute, with its very limited funds, can afford to do. At the same time, the proliferation of official international statistical activities makes all the more necessary the existence of a worldwide academy of leading statisticians, with both enough compe-

tence and enough dissociation²² from those activities to furnish constructive criticism of such work. Furthermore, the Institute's traditional concern with the betterment of national and less than national statistics is now of heightened value, since these are the main source materials used by the statistical offices of intergovernmental organizations.

Still another development having an impact on the ISI's role is an increasing tendency for statistical specialists in each of various fields to establish an international society for their specialty. This is no cause for dismay to the ISI, if it will address itself to the task of integration of the work of specialized groups, rather than to competition with them.

A marked revision of the ISI's structure and purpose has been proposed within the Institute, to take into account these altered circumstances, and has received widespread support. The proposal was to be considered at the Institute's Twenty-Fifth Session, held as a part of the International Statistical Conferences, Washington, September 6-18, 1947.

The emphasis at the Conferences was, of course, to be on statistical methods and their application. Illustrations of the papers are, "A Concept of National Income Applicable to Countries Differing Significantly with Respect to the Role of the Government in the Economy," and "Recent Developments in the Application of Statistics to Tuberculosis Control Programs."

In addition to the session of the ISI, the International Statistical Conferences mentioned above concurrently included an *ad hoc* World Statistical Congress under the aegis of the United Nations, in which attention focused on the statistical activities of the United Nations and the specialized intergovernmental agencies. The Conferences also included meetings of specialized international professional societies.

The Inter American Statistical Institute (IASI)²³ is one of the youngest but most active of such societies. Established in 1940-42, it has both individual and institutional members, the latter including the governments of seventeen American countries, which make subventions to it

²²Presumably some, but only a minority, of the members of ISI will in the future, as now, be closely connected with the intergovernmental statistical offices.

²³See *The Inter American Statistical Institute: Its Origin, Organization, and Objectives*, issued by the IASI, Washington, 1943; IASI, *Progress Report of the Inter American Statistical Institute*, June 30, 1947; IASI release of November 27, 1946, *1950 Census of the Americas*, and Ricardo Luna Vegas, "*Métodos de los Censos de Población de las Naciones Americanas*," in *Estadística* for March, 1945.

It seeks to bring about improvements, within the Western Hemisphere, in both official and unofficial statistics, and comparability of economic and social data among the various American nations. It has pursued these objectives by various means. Among these means are (a) *Estadística*, a quarterly professional journal which it publishes, and (b) technical projects (conducted largely by experts on loan to the IASI from Latin American governments), one such project being a survey, now in process, of the methodology underlying the existing educational and cultural statistics of the American nations. However, the IASI's pre-eminent achievement to date has been its part in the shaping of plans for a 1950 Census of the Americas. Originally proposed by Alberto Arca Parró, of Peru, Chairman of the IASI Committee on Demographic Statistics, the plan envisages that each of the twenty-two American nations will take a national census at some time in 1950 (or within six months before or after that year). It is proposed that certain agreed standards as to questions and definitions be adhered to, with regard to the basic portions of the information obtained. Inter-American comparability of census data would thus be achieved for the first time. Data would be obtained on population and (in some countries) agriculture or housing or both. Development of the agriculture census standards will be under the auspices of the Food and Agriculture Organization, as this portion of the Census of the Americas will also be a part of the World Census of Agriculture. Population and housing census standards, as well as over all guidance in the Census of the Americas, will be provided under IASI auspices. Actual conduct of the census will be in the hands of national statistical bureaux.

Critique

In one fundamental respect the organizing of statistical work of the United Nations and its specialized agencies has followed a pattern somewhat similar to that of the statistical organization of the United States government. Within our government there is a Bureau of the Census, engaged in the gathering and processing of types of data in which various federal agencies have a common interest, and the remainder of the data collecting and tabulating (i.e., the greater part of federal statistical work) is done by the respective agencies in whose subject matter fields the data lie. Thus wage statistics are collected by the Department of

Labor. To coordinate the work of these various statistical units, and to foster a balanced statistical program, adequate but not excessive, there is a central office known as the Division of Statistical Standards, of the Bureau of the Budget. It is the conscious intent of the United Nations to have a statistical organization more or less of this type, which has been found highly useful in the United States government and with variations on the theme is used also in certain other governments, including those of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. This contrasts to the practice of having a single, all embracing statistical bureau to serve an entire government.

In the "relationship agreements" between the United Nations and the specialized agencies, each specialized agency has direct access to national governments and other sources, in so far as concerns "such statistics as are uniquely relevant to" its tasks. The United Nations has the statistical functions outlined above—the collection of "statistics concerning the general purposes of international organizations" and of any statistics essential for its own purposes, and the coordination of the statistical work of the United Nations and its specialized agencies.²⁴ This healthy situation should go a long way toward making the statistics of these organizations what official statistics always should be—an instrument well adapted to whatever administrative or research problems they are designed to serve, and instructive to the public in order that sound decisions may be reached by private critics of public programs. Statistics should never be regarded as an end in themselves. To insulate the statisticians from the uses of statistics is to court that danger.

In one regard the statistical organization of the United Nations and its specialized agencies may be somewhat unfortunately arranged. The United Nations Consultative Committee on Statistical Matters, which is the statistical coordinating committee, consists of one representative each from the statistical offices of the specialized agencies and of the United Nations, with the latter person serving *ex officio* as chairman. The specialized agencies are not located at Lake Success but in Washington, Montreal, Paris, and Geneva. This dispersion markedly limits the frequency of Consultative Committee meetings and hence the committee's usefulness. Moreover, the staff for statistical coordination work is pro-

²⁴United Nations, *Report of the Statistical Commission to the Economic and Social Council, First Session, 1-15 May 1946*, document E/39, pp. 13-17, 20. See also United Nations, *Statistical Commission Memorandum Prepared by the Secretariat for Consideration under Item 4 of the Provisional Agenda*, document E/CN.3/28, August 22, 1947.

vided mainly by the United Nations Statistical Office. Thus the position of leadership in statistical coordination is exercised by a United Nations unit which is also engaged in data collection. In the gathering of statistics the United Nations is to have the unenviable task of serving as umpire between itself and other data collecting organizations. The arrangement may prove to be satisfactory in practice, but it is hardly ideal. Experience under this arrangement in the United Nations is as yet too meager for one to draw conclusions.

It is common knowledge among statisticians that, even within a single country, serious complexities arise in the collection of statistics from (let us say) a given industry, by reason of the fact that the various firms differ widely as to the adequacy of the records from which they will prepare reports, differ as regards the meaning attached to trade terms, and differ in other ways. In the vernacular, the job of getting satisfactory statistics in such circumstances is a headache. If so, the international statistician's job is migraine. On top of the tangle of divergences within each country are piled the differences among countries, both as regards the persons, companies, etc., originally supplying the statistics and as regards the national statistical offices, through which the information reaches the intergovernmental organization. Despite the need for getting statistics on a basis which makes valid international comparisons possible, how *can* one standardize statistics in a world teeming with variety?

As was indicated above, in connection with UNESCO, in the remarks about attitude surveys, the solution to this problem lies sometimes in emphasizing uniformity of results even at the expense of uniformity of methods and wording. A different answer is that involved in the work of the United Nations Committee on Industrial Classification. The Committee's experts have recognized that a classification system as detailed as that in use by some of the highly industrialized countries would encounter two serious obstacles. Countries with little of industry and still less of industrial statistics would regard the system as burdensome; or, if they simply omitted the refinements, much of the system would, from the standpoint of those countries' use of the system, have proved to be futile work for the United Nations. On the other hand, countries already having an abundance of statistics classified on the basis of industry would be quite unwilling to undergo the expense and nuisance of a wholesale change. Hence the proposed system does not extend to a level of more minute detail than the defining of such broad groups as "manufacture

of chemicals and chemical products." For the less developed countries this is something practical to adopt on first beginning to have systematic statistics which are classified on the basis of industry. For a more developed country this is something easy to shift to, if its own industrial classification system is somewhat out of line with this

The 1938 ILO convention on wage and hour statistics exhibits still a different solution to the problems arising from diversity of situation. Any member state, in ratifying the convention, is authorized to exclude certain types of statistics (e.g., those on farm wages and hours) from what it is to report. Any ratifying country is authorized to exclude from its reporting obligation such parts of its territory as are so underdeveloped that the compilation of satisfactory statistics would be impracticable. It is quite feasible to recognize that this is a world of varied circumstances and yet attempt, on an international basis, to do something about the world's problems

So much for the intergovernmental organizations concerned with statistics. What of the professional societies? The contrast, in statistical organizations, between the "academy function" and the function of providing statistics is important but it can easily be overemphasized. Between the two there is a continuum. The former activity is likely to occur in such a body as the International Statistical Institute, the latter, in such a body as the United Nations. It is consistent with the purposes of either organization to engage in a standardization venture. Here as in many another aspect of human affairs it is delusive to try to decide what is, in the nature of things, a public function and what is a task belonging to private individuals and societies. The fruitful questions are "Does the job need to be done?" "Who can do it best?" "Who is ready and willing to do it?" "What is the most effective contribution that each group can make?"

The international professional societies of statisticians can best be of service in a role which is toward the academy end of the continuum. In that capacity they can achieve results out of proportion to their slender economic resources and their lack of authority. Just as the American Statistical Association furnishes constructive criticism of federal and other statistics and promotes an *esprit de corps* among statisticians, who, like other men and women, like to have the professional esteem of their fellow craftsmen, so the international statistical societies can bring a beneficial influence to bear upon the large and diverse development of

intergovernmental statistical work which is now getting under way. For them it is especially important to remember the words of Louis D. Brandeis, "If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold."²⁵

²⁵*New State Ice Company v. Liebmann*, 285 U. S. 262, p. 311.

CHAPTER XXV

Next: To Build a New Outlook

By HARRY A. OVERSTREET

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City of New York*



I

IN YUTANG WRITES that Democritus set men free from the fear of death and the gods but left them afraid of their neighbors. The statement is, of course, literary license. Democritus, the individual philosopher, was probably not as powerful an influence as that. Yet taking Democritus to mean all philosophers put together, there is an important truth in the statement. When we remember the terrors of ancient men in the face of death made horrible by ghosts and demons, and their terrors in the face of the unpredictable caprices of the gods, we are able to realize what philosophers (all put together) did. They were cosmic debunkers. It is sometimes said that philosophy has had no great influence upon life. But the cumulative influence of philosophers in creating new outlooks among men has been immense.

The philosopher, from the most ancient of days, was the bringer of reason. He was the man who dared laugh at superstitions, dared to show up their logical absurdity and turn men to rational thinking. "If horses and lions had hands to paint," etc. That sentence of Xenophanes was a small piece of the philosophic dynamite that blew an ancient world of dark magic out of existence.

This, historically, was the first powerful accomplishment of philosophy—"to free men from the fear of death and the gods."^a

^aComment by Alfred C. Lane.

Doctor Overstreet's paper shows how personal experiences change the meanings of words. What I have known of missionary work suggests that the savage man is afraid of being bewitched or having some spell put on him in this life, and that the missionaries have a great work in freeing them from taboos. But we still all have to die, and I do not know that phi-

The second accomplishment of philosophy was again cumulative. It was not the work of one philosopher, but of scores and hundreds of them. Nor was it accomplished in a single year or in a score of years, but in a matter of centuries. This second accomplishment was the paving of the way for the scientific outlook on life.

The Middle Ages and the early Renaissance record the fight between dogmatic faith and science. Science eventually won its right to be the free way of the human mind. That right was won not only by the scientists—the Galileos and Keplers—but by the whole succession of philosophers who reasoned unceasingly against the shackling of the mind by dogmatic faith.

If today we are free to explore our world, praise must go not only to the scientists but to those philosophers who, century after century, refused to abandon the mind's freedom to the tyrannies of organized faith.

I cite these two historic accomplishments to show that philosophy can be a powerful influence in changing the outlooks of men and in building among them a new common consciousness. I cite them particularly at a time when philosophy must again be an influence in changing men's outlooks and building among them a new common consciousness.

Our problem is that of saving man from his own suicidal inability to live with his fellows. It is the problem of helping him to get a new slant and a new grip on himself as a member of a world society.

Are philosophers at work on this problem? Obviously they are. Not a philosopher writes or teaches today without a mind seriously bent upon the future of our ways of thinking about fellow human beings. Are philosophers effective in what they are doing? They are, and of course, like the rest of us, they are not. As in the case of the other two historic

philosophy has made any marked difference in our attitude in that respect. Mahomet was a religious leader rather than a philosopher when he made his followers free from fear of death.

Comment by Rudolf Allers

Did philosophy truly free man from fear? Or were not the fears of old replaced by others? One may even doubt whether man, in bygone times, actually feared death more than he does today. If one takes, in a maybe permissible manner, as a criterion the admiration aroused in the average mind by deeds of valor, by heroic sacrifice, by fearlessness in danger of death, there seems to be no great difference between the past and the present. There have been at all times some who did not, and many more who did fear death. The Stoic attitude has never been common, and it is questionable whether it has become more general in recent times.

adventures, this is not a six months campaign. This is a task for years to come. It is the job of creating a new comprehension among men of their relation to one another. It is the task of reshaping the human outlook to a world pattern.

II

For forty years and more philosophers have spent most of their energies examining the basic assumptions of the mathematical and physical sciences. This was an important thing to do because those sciences were creating a new heaven and a new earth. Philosophers had to be in on this job of cosmological reorientation. If supernaturalism has a slighter hold on men today, if men are braver and more intelligent in their facing of the vast impersonalities of the universe, no small credit must go to the philosophers who joined with the physical and mathematical scientists in working their way to new assumptions about the universe.

But today philosophers, like the rest of us, are handed a new task of reorientation. Two things have happened in our time: one of them bad; the other good. In the first place, our human world has reached an all time low in the ability to make sense out of itself.^b No philosopher can fail to see that. But in the second place, just in this unhappy time of the world's worst unreason, the special sciences that try to make sense out of life—the psychological and social sciences—are just at the point of emerging into competence.

A science, as we know, has to wait upon the order of its coming. It is only today that the time clock of science has struck the hour for the entrance upon the scene of the psychological and social sciences. This, in a time of the world's unhappiness and near despair, is a lucky conjunction. Perhaps, now that we shall be able more clearly to know ourselves, we may learn to be more expert in discovering what to do about ourselves.

In any event, here is where philosophers find themselves today: they are faced by problems of human relationship so urgent that they cannot

^bComment by Rudolf Allers

One feels tempted to ask, has this neglect of things human been truly nothing but a necessity imposed by the actual development of science, or is there not also a real guilt on the part of the philosophers? Has not their "cumulative influence" been more to the bad than to the good in about the past century?

neglect them; but also they are companioned by sciences increasingly equipped to tackle these problems "

The most important thing about the coming into competence of the psychological and social sciences is that philosophers need no longer talk of psychological and social problems in their accustomed *a priori* way. Just as they became more rigorous in their mathematical and physical thinking by entering the laboratories of the physicists and joining in the computations of the mathematicians, so by moving about in the fields of anthropology, psychology, psychiatry, economics, and sociology, they will become more rigorous and effective in their social and ethical thinking. The ethical, social, and political philosophies hitherto spun out of the philosopher's brain and set forth in a *priori* chapter and verse will now wait upon the observations and experiments of these social and psychological scientists.

We have long needed such a cooperative relationship between philosophers and scientists in the field of human concerns. There is every reason to believe that as this relationship grows stronger, the impact of philosophico-scientific thinking upon our bewildered world will make itself increasingly felt.

III

This, then, is a time for the making over of people's outlooks upon their human world. Making over people's outlooks means making over people's minds. This is why it is a time for philosophers.

*Comment by Ralph T. Flewelling

We are informed that science has created a new heaven and a new earth. A new earth perhaps, though it continues to exhibit some long-existent characteristics, but obviously also a new hell of fears (not of demon and jinn) which Professor Overstreet takes the pains to describe. It would be interesting to know why at just the moment psychology and sociology have triumphed, the hell on earth he describes has broken forth and "the world has reached an all-time low in the ability to make sense out of itself." The actual result of a great deal of modern psychology and social science has been to destroy the belief in moral values and the possibility of moral judgment and to reduce human action to nervous mechanism. In such a case the "changing of men's minds" becomes problematic. What the author demands is really visioned in the Christian doctrine of the "new birth," but it would have to be carried out by those who profess not to believe it possible.

Professor Overstreet's reply

I did not say that psychology and sociology had "triumphed." I said, modestly, I hope, that the psychological and social sciences are "just at the point of emerging into competence."

The front page of any American newspaper on any day of the week is a page out of social chaos. Angry, self-centered, ungenerous, suspicious, inwardly terrified and ununderstanding minds! Here is where our problem lies today: the minds of most of us are not yet good enough for the building of a sane world.

In his paper for the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in 1945, "An Intelligent Understanding of Man," Doctor William Seifriz wrote

Plans for world peace are futile until we arrive, in our own inner consciousness, at an answer to the question, how real is the desire for good will on earth

An honest survey of public opinion will reveal that an individual's willingness to accept international good will usually rests on a condition, that private wealth shall remain undisturbed, that big business shall flourish, that communism be crushed, the Germans kept impotent, and Negroes, Jews, and Catholics restrained

The plain fact is that the minds of most of us are not yet good enough for the world task ahead of us. They are of limited outlook—not "citizens of the world" minds, as the Stoics would have had them be, but "citizens of this nation" minds. They are provincial, localistic, group loyal, absurdly ethnocentric, cloaking their restricted outlooks in grand but ineffective abstractions of "justice," "patriotism," and "brotherhood." They have created and still maintain a world based on false assumptions: an economics based, of all things, on the divisive principle of self-interest; a politics based on the war breeding principle of arbitrary sovereign power; human relations based on the snobbish principle of racial and cultural superiority.

Our next job, therefore, is to create a new kind of mind among us. I know of no job that philosophers would care more about undertaking,^d

^dComment by Paul A. Schilpp

I fear that Professor Overstreet is engaging in all too easy going wish-thinking at several points in his paper where he claims that philosophers are largely engaged in doing just these things which need to be done and which philosophers, being what they are, ought to be doing in this kind of world. Frankly, I can see little evidence that philosophers, generally speaking, can qualify on *any* of these claims which Mr. Overstreet makes in behalf of them. Precisely because the situation is so fraught with danger to the very existence of humanity on this planet, what we need now is clear thinking, straight talking, and a fearless facing of the facts—let the chips fall where they may (even on philosophers, who, on the whole, are still far too much occupied with their own little esoteric and technical problems to be able to see that a world threatened with destruction demands just the kind

for the nature of the mind of man has always been their central concern. Philosophers have liked to quote the words of the Gospel of John "In the beginning was the Word" They have seen the world about us—ugly in so many of its institutions and behaviors—as the externalization of men's inadequate minds

Philosophers begin to realize, therefore, that nothing less than an almost total reconstruction of men's basic assumptions about human life and human relations is required Let us examine these scriam.

(1) We have never yet created for ourselves a basically satisfactory philosophy of property (economics); a philosophy, that is, that evaluates property in its relation to human personality. Philosophers and economists will now have to go at the job of removing the last vestiges of our absurdly national "self-interest" philosophy of economics and create a philosophy based broadly on the requirements of human personality.

(2) We have never created a basically satisfactory philosophy of the state In fact, excepting that perverse philosopher, Machiavelli, philosophers have had little to do with the making of the state The generals, the politicians, and the power interests have taken over this job, creating the state in the image of their power desires. Now nemesis is upon them, and the power state they have created is at the point of blowing us all—generals and politicians included—into annihilation

(3) We have never created a basically satisfactory philosophy of group relations.⁶ How could we? Hitherto we have lived within our jealously

of basic reorientation, at precisely those points, for which Mr. Overstreet so ably calls in his paper)

Professor Overstreet's reply

Perhaps I am doing a lot of wish-thinking about philosophers I like to think of all of them as deeply concerned about the world's imminent tragedy and as manfully doing their best to bring saving clarity out of dangerous confusion Perhaps I am deceived It is probably true that many philosophers are still piddling while Rome burns I wish they weren't Some that I know aren't They are making manful efforts to get at the causes of our world's difficulties and to do something about them—at least to the extent of getting the minds of their students oriented to the kind of world that has come upon us But I confess that our philosophic training is hard to mitigate In spite of our best intentions our training has kept our heads in the metaphysical, epistemological, and other esoteric clouds, and now that we are called upon to walk where the Hitlers, the Bilbos, and the foreign diplomats walk, we don't walk very well

⁶Comment by Rudolf Allers

It seems to me a dangerous suggestion to make philosophy, when it is concerned with human relations, dependent on "psychological and social sciences" Human relations must be ruled by ends, and no science, whether of the mind or of atoms, of society or of electricity, can have anything to say on ends We, of course, learn many things by applying

bounded groups and have felt vague terrors about groups we never saw. We crooned ourselves to sleep with thoughts of our ethnocentric grandeur.^c We shall have now to work out a philosophy that makes the meeting of East and West, of Jew and Gentile, of Negro and white, of Protestant and Catholic, the most natural and expected thing in the world.

(4) Finally, we have never had a basically satisfactory philosophy of the goal of life.^e Religion has talked of the glory of God and His redeeming grace, but these have meant everything from the most self-centered otherworldliness to the noblest spirituality.^h Business and common sense

the methods, developed or to be developed, by these sciences, we shall become acquainted with many things as they are. We may even be taught what to do to change things which we do not like. But whether we ought to like them or not, no science can tell us. A satisfactory philosophy of property—will it result from economic analysis? Will a satisfactory philosophy of the state be the outcome of social studies? These studies, particularly in the light of history, are indispensable for collecting material evidence. But they cannot say anything on what a satisfactory state is like.

^cComment by Ralph T. Flewelling

The main forces working for interracial understanding are religious, as demonstrated in Christian missions. Witness, the hospitals and colleges of China, and the case of the "fuzzy-wuzzies" in the late war.

^eComment by Alfred C. Lane

When Doctor Overstreet says that we have never created a basically satisfactory philosophy of property, or the state, or group relations, or the goal of life, one is tempted to say, speak for yourself. I think that on any one of these points some philosopher would have had what was to him a satisfactory philosophy, a philosophy which satisfied many, but not everyone. In fact, I personally believe in a "diversity of gifts." Many of us have found that the old catechism definition of the chief end of man as "to glorify God and enjoy Him forever" was satisfactory if we enjoyed the study of nature and tried to make ourselves a respectable specimen of God's handiwork. To expect unanimity is too much.ⁱ

^hComment by Ralph T. Flewelling

With almost all religious men, *all* truly religious, the object of religion is to promote morality, truthfulness, honesty, integrity, benevolence, justice, and brotherly love. To those ends, as religious duties demanded of God, the generality of religious organizations were founded and may justly claim to lead the world in accomplishment. Does the author now propose that psychology and social science shall take over the conduct, administration, and expense of the countless hospitals, dispensaries, educational institutions, homes for the destitute, that have brought what little amelioration of suffering there now is? What indication have we that, unaided by the "drive" of religious convictions, these two scientific disciplines intend to, or can be induced to do anything about it?

Professor Overstreet's reply

Apparently Mr. Flewelling does not like psychology and the social sciences. He prefers to depend upon a religious "drive." But may I ask him where in his entire comment he makes clear what he means by a religious drive. The kind they have in a Fundamentalist camp meeting? The kind that drove Calvin to burn Servetus at the stake? Is not this just the issue today? We need a powerful conviction about the direction in which life should go. Does it help to tell us that this direction is to be found in anything as profoundly ambiguous as a religious drive?

have stressed the need for getting busy and being successful. Today we face the need for rethinking the goal of individual life. Here, I think, philosophers will talk long with psychologists and psychiatrists. For these scientists seem to have something new on the ball. They see human life essentially in terms of growth. The goal of life, as they see it, is to *grow up*. It is as simple as that. The tragedy of life, as they conceive it, is that most people do not grow up. When a person in his adulthood is still a child or a fixated adolescent, there is usually the mischief to pay. As the poet Robinson has said in his *Toussaint L'Ouverture*:¹

the few that have the word
Are mostly the wrong few in the wrong place
On thrones or chairs of state too high for them,
Where they sit swollen or scared, or both, as may be

A psychiatrist, Doctor G. B. Chisholm, puts it this way: "So far in the history of the world there have never been enough mature people in the right places."² A philosophy of maturity, then, is to be next on the philosophic agenda.³

In brief, a world of new minds, with a new outlook upon human relations, has now to be created. Those minds will not be created in a year or even in a score of years. It may be that we shall not be given time to create them. But if time is given, here is the next philosophic task that now is under way.⁴

¹Edward Arlington Robinson, *Nicodemus*. Copyright, 1932, by F. A. Robinson. Used by permission of The Macmillan Company, publisher.

²*Psychiatry*, IX, February, 1946, p. 1.

³Comment by Rudolf Allers.

But the very definition of maturity cannot be given in terms of psychology only, and even less of psychiatry. Since I may make claim to be both a psychologist and a psychiatrist, I do not hesitate to declare that the arrogance of particularly the psychiatrists, their demand to be not only heard in discussion on "reconstructing the world," but to be given the task, their hasty conclusions by which they apply what they know of abnormal to normal people, that all this is a sort of dogmatism much more dangerous than even that about which Lucretius complained: *Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum*.

⁴Comment by Paul A. Schilpp.

Mr. Overstreet fails to stress the importance of the "lack of time" now available to philosophers before the curtain may forever fall upon the drama (or was it the "farce") of Occidental civilization. Time is of such importance as it has never been before. Unless, indeed, we are to join H. G. Wells, in his last testament, and assert that, mankind having failed as miserably as it has, isn't worth saving anyway, and that we ought, perhaps, to be glad if the atomic war should wipe the whole human race off the face of the earth and give the amoeba the opportunity to start the entire evolutionary process all over again. Yet,

"The difficult we do immediately"—so runs an ancient saying; "the impossible takes a little longer." Philosophers will have to be given a little longer. But one after another they will now begin to help shape the new necessary outlook among men. And this time they will not be setting men free from the fear of death and the gods, nor from the fear of the free uses of the mind. This time they will be setting men free from fear of their neighbors¹

it is obvious from Mr Overstreet's paper that he would be the very last person who would take such a position

Professor Overstreet's reply

Frankly, I haven't anything to say I hope time won't run out too soon, for the job ahead of us is one that will require a long time to accomplish If philosophers could become adept in *speeding up* the business of getting people to understand, they might get in their licks before the bombs put an end to us But I see no signs that philosophers are learning to unlimber their wisdom more rapidly than heretofore We're just about as dull as ever.

I don't even see philosophers moving off the campus (even for a night a week) to hold counsel with adults If they were to do that (all over the United States) they might help a lot, for it is the adult today who is the lost babe in the woods I wouldn't say that philosophers could "bring the solution" to these adult fellow citizens, for philosophers don't themselves have the solution We're all more or less—chiefly more—in a dither But holding counsel with adults in the good Socratic fashion of knowing that we don't know, and then proceeding to talk out our ignorances until we get some glimmer of saving truth, might help a lot

Meanwhile the best I find I can do myself is to go whistling through the world's terror with old Vaihinger's philosophy of "as if " I act *as if* there is going to be time to do something, and while there is still time, I try to be on the side of whatever angels seem to me to be angelic

¹Comment by Philipp Frank:

There is one point, which as it seems to me has not been sufficiently stressed in the several papers which I read Before we discuss what philosophy can contribute to the relief of tensions, we have to recognize what philosophy has contributed to the encouraging of tensions In all religious and ideological wars "philosophy" has been used as a pretext for the most terrible cruelties Its role has been to produce the "good conscience" for the people who committed these atrocities Even today there are people who maintain that the well known "East West tension" has its basis in a conflict between "Eastern and Western philosophy " Admitting that "conflicting philosophies" are only figleaves for the conflicts of power politics, the question remains why "philosophy" so lends itself According to the attitude of tolerance there are fundamental questions about which one can hold different "opinions," like "realism," "idealism," "materialism," etc To hold one or the other is a matter of "convictions " There is no way to convince an opponent by a scientific or anyhow rational argument This means the recognition of an area of "permanent disagreement " This area lends itself as a very convenient background for group tensions For the existence of a permanent disagreement in questions of theoretical nature, in questions of knowledge or truth, is in flagrant contradiction to the scientific world view If one does not believe that permanent disagreement is a legitimate situation and an agreement by argument is im-

possible, the agreement by coercion seems the only way to eliminate people who are not willing to recognize the "truth "

The relief from the group tensions which are encouraged by the doctrine of "eternal disagreement" can only be achieved by a conception of philosophy which eliminates "conviction" and replaces it by "knowledge," as science has done for centuries. John Dewey has occasionally advanced proposals in this line. According to him, the different "convictions" of philosophers about "being" are actually aspirations or wishes of different individuals or groups. Between different wishes or aspirations a compromise is always possible. Everybody understands that he has to meet the aspirations of other people somewhere in the middle. But between truth and falsity no compromise is possible.

The only practical contribution which philosophy can make to the relief of group tensions is the precise recognition that philosophical statements which exceed the statements of science do not express any truth about facts, but are formulations of aspirations.

If a creed claims to contain some eternal truth about the "real world," it has to eliminate these truths before it can enter into any discussion with adherents of a conflicting creed. It can only make use of those parts of its doctrine which are either scientific truths about which no disagreement is possible or a formulation of wishes about which a compromise with other wishers is possible.

Considering all these arguments it seems strange that some still maintain that "relativism" is responsible for the actual crisis and that relief can only be achieved by the introduction of a doctrine of "absolute truth." The doctrine of absolute truth, if applied to the domain of "philosophy," means practically the doctrine of permanent disagreement and the justification of permanent group tensions.

CHAPTER XXVI

Philosophy and the World of Politics

By LINCOLN REIS

Professor of Philosophy, Bard College



I SHOULD NOT BE so bold as to say what can be contributed to the relief of international tensions by scholarship in general. What common denominator relevant to our theme can cover at once research in explosives and in medieval church manuscripts? What knowledge derived from either can help to elucidate a subject so different from both in intention and method as philosophy? If we abandon the detailed knowledge to be won strictly within the fields of our professional competence, we may hit upon a few common and basic questions—questions all too often asked, and all too infrequently, if ever, answered.

I mean primarily questions of the sort which inquire into the relation between intelligence and will, between virtue and knowledge—the old difficulty of first hitting upon a suitable pattern for action, and then insuring its successful application. This is a problem common to all of us, because every problem of scholarship is a problem of intelligence, and every application of scholarship is a problem of action. But these are after all perennial questions of principle—too diffuse to shed any clear light upon the particular corners of our interest.

Consequently this paper will stay wholly within the limits of my own subject, philosophy. Now philosophy has the odd character that it will not stay with the particulars with which it begins: unlike other fields of scholarship it will not confine itself to an object already defined in terms of some known class mark, but it must look for relations and resemblances which transcend the class and the object, if only because it is as much concerned with the thinking about the object as with the object itself. Such a course does not recommend itself to the practical man, especially in our Western civilization, which is so convinced that its divisions of labor are secured within the natural divisions of things. (We still

know better in the small town where we do not so readily separate the work from the man, but it is not the small town way which we follow in our larger undertakings.) It is wholly unsuited for action, and plainly the solution of the problem of international tensions is matter for action. Bible scholarship is Bible scholarship, research into the nature of explosives, only that—why call in the one in the problems of the other when what can result is uncommon and unalterable confusion? And confusion is the death of action. Hence, with what suspicion we look upon our atomic scientists who will not see the illegality, the illogic of mixing morality and inquiry.

It is the fact, however strange, that people cannot live or work well together without some idea in common of what they are about. The trouble is that such an idea need not be true to do the work of unity. It may be false, incomplete, distorted, it may have an infinite capacity for mischief—if it seems to do the job, nothing else will necessarily stand in the way. An ideology will do as well as a philosophy, perhaps better, since it has a greater range of possibilities. It need not be true or in accord with any reality save that of the phantasy of its adherents. Using the names ideology and philosophy interchangeably (as having the same intent of picturing our place in things), it is not enough for the solution of our problem of peace to determine a philosophy—Rosenberg did that for Hitler. A philosophy must be truly determined and truly formed, else somewhere there will be the inevitable collision with reality. But for a philosophy to be effective as a determinant of action it is not enough that it may be truly determined in the mind of this isolated thinker or that. It must be generally accepted and its terms agreed upon. And to be politically effective it must be accepted by politically dominant groups. If its proponents are unequally distributed nationally or internationally, it may exert a divisive influence. If the area of its acceptance coincides with a national boundary, there still remains the problem of making it equally acceptable to all. Suppose one nation holds to the “true,” another to the false? The “true” philosophy must be generally accepted if it is even to begin its work. What persuasion has the strength to see to this? But how shall we discover a philosophy at once common and true, and how shall we insure our agreement upon it? Until then, what contribution can philosophy make in the sphere of international action mutually agreeable to all?

There are other difficulties. It is not the case that misunderstandings

or intellectual difficulties always lie at the bottom of individual conflicts; conflicts of interest suppose nothing as to conflicts of principle. May not the most intense, the most savage struggles come about when the opponents understand one another only too well, as in the dissensions caused by the divisions of fortunes or in civil war?^a We may each of us see the same slice of cake and may equally approve of it and alike desire it; but it is through this very agreement that we are headed for trouble. The same difficulty may run in the sphere of international relations. Acceptance of a common body of doctrine assumed, and that doctrine correct, what is still to prevent an irreconcilable difference within the area of that agreement? By what means can principle alone direct practice, and how can principle wholly embrace the totality of individual and particular differences? Though we have faith in our own intentions, how can we have a like faith in the intentions of others? This is a problem for nations and individuals alike, I do not see the solution for it.

Neither nations nor men can operate long without an idea—so much is to be accepted. But by what guarantee is the idea true, and if true, generally accepted, and if generally accepted, necessarily an agent for peace? Surely this still remains in dispute. It is impossible for peoples to live, at peace or at war, without the help of ideas. It is difficult to see how by their acceptance people must necessarily live at peace.

I have expressed what must appear to be an extraordinarily gloomy view, if to point out the reality of an obstacle is to be gloomy. But the view is not hopeless. The choice is not between philosophy and no philosophy; it is impossible for men to live without philosophy, without ideas, without the attempt to create unity out of the diversities of times and spaces and men. If it is difficult to choose between one philosophy and another, with no sure safety in the result, yet, without philosophy, destruction is certain. But we need not worry about that; men will think, will imagine, will speak, will make slogans, and will live by the dramatic attitude. These are as native to the adult as games to children.

^aComment by Harry B. Friedgood

Professor Reis has made a telling point. The frequent reference to mutual understanding as the most important basis for peace, assumes a rather superficial significance in the light of this cogent observation.

It appears to me that *self-analysis* and *self-understanding*, leading to a critical definition of primary motives, are more pertinent to the problem of solving differences between individuals and between nations than *international understanding*, although I doubt if one would deny that the latter is an essential factor in the over all social equation representing human relations.

It is not the lack of such activities we must fear, but rather the exuberance and superabundance of them, the proliferation of ideologies and systems without measure and without criticism. One or the other ideology may prevail, but until it suffers the test of understanding and analysis, its rule is a rule of force, and faith in it is not the part of wisdom. The doctrines men live by can be no more free of examination than their techniques, and they have no more to fear by examination than the latter, for scrutiny is no acid to corrode good and bad alike.

No special technique can deal with man, whether looked at as object or process, as one. Each such technique has its start in this feature and that, but to deal with a man for what he is and with a people for what they are requires a science suspiciously like the "wisdom" of antiquity, with all that the term connotes in the union of intelligence and knowledge, logic, and experience. A people can no more than an individual act with deliberation and well, unless they have some idea of what they are about, that is, unless they work in and through philosophical activity.^b

^bComment by Paul A. Schilpp

The last three paragraphs impress the present reader as nothing more than Mr. Reis's whistling in the dark to keep up his courage. His paper really should have concluded with his first conclusion: "This is a problem for nations and individuals alike, I do not see the solution for it." Frankly, at the level at which Mr. Reis puts it, neither do I. Yet I must agree with him that that *is* the level of philosophy.

As for me, I am convinced that only the actual achievement of an honest to goodness federal world government (*not* the poor imitation of such which is the United Nations) can save humanity. And I have to admit that the hour of the day is (probably) already too late for philosophy itself to be able successfully to accomplish that end—before the likely crash. I greatly begrudge finding myself forced to such a distasteful admission. But I fear the facts of today's case require it.

CHAPTER XXVII

Philosophia—Philanthropia

By RUDOLF ALLERS

Professor of Philosophy, Catholic University of America



PHILOSOPHY MEANS love of wisdom. Philanthropy means love of man. Is it wise to love man? Does wisdom, or what kind of wisdom does, suggest that man is lovable, and that therefore one ought to love "one's neighbor"? It is not for wisdom to command or compel. Wisdom only counsels, and the wise man is he who heeds. Does wisdom advise that man love his fellows? And if it does, in what sense should this advice be understood?

Suppose that concrete conditions make it imperative that there be friendship and even love among men, and suppose furthermore that several widely different sets of ideas, all claiming to be wisdom, are offered, then one may ask: if such is my and everyone's desire, what ideas may I choose to provide an intelligible basis for my demands? The mere existence of a demand, however general, is not any demonstration of its reasonableness. It might be that man desires everlasting peace, mutual understanding, cooperation, and nonetheless deludes himself, aspiring to what is denied by an inexorable destiny. Such a view has been rejected by all those thinkers with some sort of theistic view; one recalls Descartes's argument of the *deus malignus*. To others it appeared unthinkable that a primary need of human nature should be utterly incapable of fulfilment, as they used to say, *natura non agit superfluum*.

There have been philosophies which were far from commending any sort of neighborly love. Some have considered man hateful. Others have felt that only a few of their fellows deserved love and esteem, whereas the rest appeared contemptible. There were those whose attitude was that of pity rather than of love and who showed consideration for their fellows not on the latter's but on their own behalf—to acquire merit, or because *noblesse oblige*.

But "thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," say the Scriptures. And Master Eckhart commented on this "If you do not love the man you never saw as much as yourself, you are on the wrong way." Of this love speaks the well known chapter in Corinthians I, of the love called *agape* or *caritas*, disinterested, "not seeking its own." The idea is that we should love our "neighbor" not for the sake of any gain, either here or hereafter, not because loving him will provide satisfaction to some inclination, nor because of merit we acquire, but because he is a neighbor—in the language of Christian theology, a child of God, actual or potential.

Little knowledge of history is needed to realize that this ideal of love has never been attained by a notable number. But as long as Christian doctrine was universally recognized in the Western world, this ideal stood, at least, as an ultimate directive before man's eyes. Man sinned as much in medieval times as in any other age, but he knew that he sinned and did not embellish his deficiencies by calling them right.

If neighborly love could claim absolute compulsiveness only because of its Divine origin or if no intelligible reason might be discovered for such a demand, then the situation of the world would be hopeless. However, the idea that certain truths, considered as revealed by the faithful, can also be discovered in the "light of natural reason," is stated by the great exponents of theology. Thus, Thomas Aquinas says that Revelation contains many truths which man may also discover by himself, but not all being able to do so, Divine Mercy provided by Revelation for all to know these truths.

I refer to these ideas not to appeal to the authority of a *doctor ecclesiae*, but to point out that even he, who assuredly credited Revelation with the most important role in man's life, admitted the knowability of certain truths also without the intervention of a supernatural power. Even though the notion of one's "neighbor" received its full meaning only after and through the spread of Christianity, it is in no way alien to non-Christian and pre-Christian thought.^a

^aComment by Harry B. Friedgood.

The essence of the spiritual teachings of Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Mohammedanism is that one cannot live to or for oneself, that love of one's neighbor is essential to man's happiness and peace of mind and to the fulfilment of his destiny. This is an age old truth which modern psychiatrists have reduced to scientific formulation through the methodology of psychoanalysis.

Freudian psychoanalysis has been accused of being a foe of religion to the extent that it has tampered, in the case of Catholicism, for instance, with the concepts of sin and confession. In my experience, psychoanalysis also has had the effect of reaffirming in some in-

It seems, therefore, a legitimate task to inquire into the rational foundation of neighborly love, and hence of "philanthropy." Obviously, it is the task of philosophy to provide such a foundation.

Any such attempt encounters several objections. It is argued that theoretical ideas have no influence on the shaping of man's life or on "practical" questions. Some do not believe in the power of reason to determine human behavior; others think that speculation and theory appear only as an after effect, when the course of history has already brought forth certain events. The latter side with Hegel's well known phrase of Minerva's bird spreading its wings only in the dusk of the evening. But even if the real forces shaping man's life are other than those of reason, nonetheless these forces become effective mainly when they are formulated in an intelligible manner. Ideas, after all, have played a decisive role in history. However much a theory of history like that of Marx may emphasize the basic importance of economic or other social factors, it has to recognize that goals have to be stated, approaches clarified, ideas rendered conscious (e.g., "class-consciousness"). It is philosophy which casts into their intelligible forms what is dumbly and vaguely sensed and working without definite direction.

It is furthermore the task of philosophy to point out the problems which are concealed by the things an age or a group takes for granted. The disintegration of certain cherished beliefs, of time-honored customs, social structures, political forms, would not strike man with such bewildering force, were he heeding the warnings of philosophy. In Kant's words the *quaestio iuris* has to be answered, and this answer cannot be anticipated before a careful analysis of the whole set of problems.

It is a general prejudice that single problems may be studied and solved one after the other. That this is true for many practical situations is beyond question. But even in these, one has often to take account of a multiplicity of other problems which, at first sight, seem hardly related to

dividuals the validity of certain aspects of their religious faith, against which they had reacted unfavorably for unconscious reasons prior to analytic therapy.

In the light of modern experience one cannot regard the tenets of religion and the data of science as mutually exclusive and incompatible. Each has much to learn from the other, if they will but jointly explore their common area of interest, *viz.*, the ultimate significance of life. The welding of faith and fact should relegate the ancient impasse between religion and science to the status of a frayed myth.

As indicated in my paper [Chapter XL, Part I, "The Superego"] the problems involved in ethics, and the truth or falsity of moral ideas, cannot be decided in exclusively psychological terms.

the one in the foreground. Such a complicated network of relations is the rule in all "human studies." It is the more so when ultimate questions are considered. If we raise the question, what kind of philosophy might be most suitable as a foundation for philanthropy, we must try to discover the characteristics of such a philosophy as a whole.

True love is only that of persons. All other love, so-called, is either mere liking or preference, or it is the result of an unwarranted, maybe even immoral, "personification" (hence we give proper, even human, names to our pets). Another, equally spurious "love" is that we feel for "possessions"; this is mostly self-love, and the grief we feel when we have lost one of our possessions is not on behalf of the thing lost, but because we are deprived of it.

The primary condition for brotherly or neighborly love is, accordingly, a sharp distinction between man and any other being. No philosophy which refuses to give to man an unique position in the realm of being can claim to provide a reliable basis of philanthropy.¹

With the recognition of the uniqueness of human nature must be allied the recognition of the uniqueness of the human person. Things which are interchangeable measure the worth of one another, they therefore "have a price"—but "man alone has dignity." He is in no case interchangeable. Possessing dignity, a peculiar kind of worth or value, he becomes, and only in virtue of this, the goal of the specifically personalistic attitude of love.^b

This recognition can be based on intelligible grounds only if there is

^bComment by Ralph T. Flewelling

The basing of democracy on the uniqueness of man is sound and incontrovertible both politically and psychologically. I like particularly the argument from "uniqueness" as putting man out of the category of "things." Love, too, in the high sense of that term, can exist only where there is potentiality for response, as between human beings.

Comment by Edgar S. Brightman

The essential point of Doctor Allers's paper—that the love of one's neighbor is rational—is in my judgment thoroughly sound. It is in harmony with Plato, the Stoics, Kant, and modern personalism, as well as with St. Thomas and St. Paul (especially when one takes the thirteenth and fourteenth chapters of I Corinthians together). It is grounded in the essential nature of persons as persons, while totalitarianism rejects both reason and love. The paper of Doctor Allers is a sound and welcome antidote to current irrationalisms and immoralisms.

¹The recognition of the uniqueness of human nature is compatible with all sorts of biological theories, a conception of "emergent evolution" is forced to maintain such an exceptionality of human nature. But other forms of evolutionism may do so as well, the position taken by J. Huxley is an example.

recognition of an objective order of values. All relativism is by its very nature opposed, in last resort, to the recognition of the peculiar dignity of the human person.^c As soon as values are made relative to any set of circumstances, be they individual "interest," or social and historical conditions, there is no longer any reason to justify the exceptionality of the human being.

None of the arguments taken from psychology and from cultural anthropology against an absolute and objective order of values proves tenable. It is not true that values are "felt," apprehended on the basis of emotional or appetitive experience, rather these mental states are responses ensuing after an apprehension of value which is in itself of the nature of a cognitive process. Nor is it true that the comparative study of civilization proves a relativity of values. What is true is that the extensiveness of certain evaluations is viewed differently at different cultural stages (e.g., the notion of "neighbor," evolving from the restricted use only in regard to the member of the same tribe through many intermediary stages—of which the *civis Romanus* is a very important one—to our conception which is rooted, at least within Western civilization, in the Christian doctrine). A fargoing relativity exists only in regard to values of a secondary kind and those referring to the lowest class of values, like those of mere sensuous pleasure, as in food. It is already questionable whether esthetic evaluation is as "relative" as it is claimed, maybe we are just beginning to discover the objective principles of esthetics.

It seems the more necessary that the uniqueness and intrinsic dignity of the individual human person be justified on intelligible grounds, because the whole development in recent times tends toward an ever increasing "depersonalization" and "dehumanization" of man. Every situation which forces man into the role of such an indifferent atomic element threatens to deprive him of his dignity; this dignity, being inherent in human nature, never can be actually abolished, but it can be denied utterance and recognition. The more man is viewed mostly as "element" or "member" the less assured he becomes of his personal worth.

^cComment by Ralph T. Flewelling.

The statement seems to me to partake of the fallacy of the universal unless Professor Allers defines his terms more closely. We all believe that an absolute ideal is necessary to the achievement of the highest possible good, but not only will the achievement fall short, but the ideal itself, as conceived, will be transplanted with higher ones as the individual grows morally and spiritually. Values actually achieved are relative to a supreme value, and the comprehension by men of the supreme value is dependent on growing revelations of worth.

Totalitarianism, which represents the height of depersonalizing forces, deprives man totally of his dignity. It is dangerous to make even the slightest concession to this mentality. I am afraid that the distinction some "personalists" make between "person" and "individual" is already too fargoing a step toward the totalitarian conception, however hostile the advocates of this view be to any sort of totalitarianism.¹ It should be noted that totalitarianism is basically a negation, it exists in virtue of the denial of personal worth, thus viewing the person as an instrument subservient to the State, or the Party, or the Race. Totalitarianism does not posit any new view, it draws all its strength from a negation.

In this, totalitarianism falls into line with many highly different trends in modern times. It was the pride of philosophy, that affirmations were made on the nature of the universe, on man, his nature and destiny. The thought of the nineteenth century, at least of its second half, felt proud of its negations. The great passion of this century was "debunking," not indeed primarily persons—that was a later product—but everything labelled "higher" in the past. "Reductionism," as this attitude has been called, destroys the manifoldness of reality, its slogan reads: nothing other than.

To a reductionist mentality all "higher" things appear as having fraudulently appropriated this name. In recent days one notices a definite change in this regard, but the leveling down tendency has grown roots in many minds.²

I have attempted to show on a previous occasion that the idea of founding neighborly love on "biological facts" is self-contradictory and leads to impossible consequences. The same is, so far as I can see, true of all

¹Comment by Ralph T. Flewelling.

I would like Professor Allers to be more specific, since I myself may be a guilty party. Surely it is allowable, if one defines his terms, to use a term in the sense defined. Individuality might for purposes of discussion be applied to those expressions of the self which separate a man from his fellows, his duties, and the service of God. Individualism might be a mere expression of differences, of oddity, as in the case of flaming neckties and long hair, things by which the individual draws attention to his egotism. Personality also, might be seen as an achievement of the highest self-expression which can come only when the individual surrenders his selfish interests to the service of others, loses himself in the spiritual side of his work and the service of God.

²How far the influence goes of this destruction of higher values may be evidenced, e.g., by the remark of a college student in a recent survey: "This man, obviously a typical representative of his class, named three things he considered necessary: a reasonably high and secure income, opportunity for sexual satisfaction, opportunity for enjoying life. No word on love, or family, or civic responsibility, or the hope to be useful."

so-called naturalistic conceptions which want to give man his due and nonetheless to consider him as a mere "object of nature"³

A philosophy which refuses to base its ethical proposals on a general metaphysics and on principles considered as unshakable and of universal validity must prove ultimately unsatisfactory. It cannot answer the *quaestio iuris*. This applies, among other conceptions, to that of utilitarianism. This philosophy, however much it may appeal to many because of its "common sense," has no answer (as long as it remains strictly within its own boundaries) to the objection that there is no intelligible reason why the "greatest happiness of the greatest number" should be made an universally recognized goal. It can be and has been argued that the unhappiness of the many is not too high a price to pay for the happiness of the few who represent some elect, superior group. Nor can utilitarianism define the kind of happiness which man ought to desire and to attain.⁴

³The human person can never become an "object" to himself, as has often been said. But strictly speaking neither can he become an object, as other things are, to another. There is no greater degradation of human dignity and human relations than the unfortunate term Freud chose to designate the partner in a relation of love, "sexual object."

⁴Comment by David Baumgardt

I entirely agree with Professor Allers that secular ethics need not be hostile to the essence of the great historic faiths. In his attempt, however, to give us a sketch of a rational ethics Professor Allers is, I think, less successful.

As to his criticism of every type of hedonism, I feel obliged to play the role of the *advocatus diaboli* at least on two fundamental points. (1) Are the very same objections Professor Allers makes to utilitarianism not pertinent to his own ethics? Does not Professor Allers admit himself that "the unshakable" and "universally valid" principles of his own ethics are rejected by the totalitarians in almost the same words as are used against utilitarianism? Certainly, the *quaestio iuris* in ethics cannot be answered by the fact that certain principles are said to be "unshakable" and "universally valid," nor by the other fact that certain people deny the validity of other principles and give some "intelligible reason" for their denial. In astronomy and all other sciences as well as in ethics, the validity of a fundamental principle, i.e., a fundamental hypothesis, can be demonstrated only by the fact that the hypothesis in question presents all the relevant phenomena in a more coherent whole than any other hypothesis. The belief in absolutely valid principles, however, seems to me possible only in theology but not in any science—be it astronomy or ethics.

(2) It seems to me that it is far more hopeful to describe "the kind of happiness which man ought to desire" unambiguously than to describe precisely in what sense a human personality can legitimately be considered as a "member" of the Church and other communities or is illegitimately considered as "a mere element" of those communities; for, utilitarianism ultimately refers to objective facts, the real feelings of man. Professor Allers's ethics, however, refer to concepts which applied to reality may allow rather different and even contradictory definitions. No Nazi and no Fascist maintained and could maintain that he cared for the "greatest happiness of the greatest number." But many Nazis and Fascists

I cannot presume to develop a philosophy that might comply with the indispensable conditions, as I view them, for becoming a reliable foundation of any philanthropic endeavor. I may be allowed, perhaps, to add one concluding remark.

What is the use, some will indubitably ask, of talking of such a philosophy, maybe not even existing, and probably unattainable, if history, past and present, shows so clearly that philosophers have never notably contributed to the fashioning of the real world? I have commented before on the fact that this notion of the total inefficacy of philosophy seems to me refuted by the same history to which the critics appeal. Nor should the philosopher be condemned for speaking a language of his own, any more than the scientist is reproved for using formulae and signs which are unknown to the uninitiated. Philosophical ideas have molded the ways of thought of generations without every person being able to understand perfectly, or at all, what the philosopher said.

The philosopher cannot rule the world. Even Plato realized that his Republic was an utopian construction, as evidenced by his change of attitude in the Laws. The philosopher often has been, and perhaps ought to be more conscious of this, a prophet—one of those who "prepare the way and straighten out the paths."

Minerva's bird, in fact, spreads its wings not only in the dusk of the evening, its flight continues throughout the hours of darkness into the early dawn of a new day.

denied and could deny that they "depersonalized" man and treated him as a "mere element." They even said and, I think, could say that they respected the "dignity" of an opponent by killing him, in the same sense as non-totalitarian states respect this dignity even when they execute a criminal.

CHAPTER XXVIII

The Task of Philosophy in an Age of Crisis

By PAUL A SCHILPP

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FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS we have, almost incessantly, been told that "humanity stands at the crossroads." Aside from the fact that we have all grown tired of this old cliché, the slogan is no longer true. Humanity today stands before the abyss. How soon we may be hurled into this abyss—as the result of the inventive power of our own creative mind—no one actually knows. But, at least among people who know the facts, the fear is growing that the time is very short, indeed, so short, in fact, that we can no longer speak in terms of generations or even of decades, but—probably—only in years below two digit figures.

That prospect, in itself, is ghastly enough. What seems to me, however, to make it infinitely worse is the fact that leaders of church, science, and the university insist, in general, upon continuing to act as if nothing had happened. True, we do talk about the "Atomic Age," but this talk does not seem to mean very much. By and large, we are not *doing* anything about this new "Atomic Age." It seems next to impossible to awaken the average professional man out of his indifferentism. As a professional man he is so deeply and exclusively engrossed in his own specific professional interest(s) that it is practically hopeless to arouse him to the imminent danger. Besides, the average professional man would probably rather "go down with the ship" while standing at his particular post than bestir himself to find out, first, just exactly what the present facts in the world are, and, second, what needs to be done—and done immediately—to stop this mad onrush of humanity over the edge of the abyss. The insistence of any one of us to "live life as usual," is so natural and so great that not even the threat of disaster is capable of arousing us out of our stupor.

When it is asked "How can scholarship contribute to the relief of

international tensions?" the present writer is, at one and the same time, encouraged and dismayed. He is encouraged because it seems significant that scholarship should recognize its responsibility to contribute to such relief. But he is dismayed because, having lived for the past twenty-five years in communities of "scholars," he is painfully aware of the practical impossibility of getting the "scholar" out of his scholarly rut. It seems to be in the very nature of scholarship to cause its devotee to shrink from action. The scholar has too often abominated the market place. Others feed the populace rhetoric and oratory—for which he has only contempt. Yet he himself shuns public speaking on "controversial issues." And, for this very reason, he is ineffective—where the decisions of men are made and where the future of humanity is likely to be decided. In his blind devotion to scholarship he has lost his devotion to the cause of mankind. Even though he may not actually be "fiddling while Rome is burning," he is quite likely to be counting commas while the atomic bomb is rubbing him out of existence.

Applied to the Philosopher

Neither the attitude nor the likely fate of the philosopher differs much from those of his fellow scholars. Having been taught, by some of the greatest of his predecessors, to view the universe *sub specie aeternitatis*, the philosopher withdraws from the clamors of the market place. Unconcerned about the powers and principalities of this world, the philosopher is likely to be occupied with basic principles and ultimate ends. He cannot afford to delve into "dirty politics," because it is his task to explain the intricacies of the undistributed middle—not the distribution of oil in the Middle East.

I shall be accused, of course, of attacking the most sacred precincts of philosophy and therefore of being a charlatan instead of a philosopher. Frankly, I do not care to defend myself against such charges. My interest lies in describing what actually is, let the chips fall where they may. It certainly is not my intention to claim that investigations in logic, epistemology, or even metaphysics are just so much idle waste of time. But, as the Nazarene said, "These things ye should have done, and not have left these other things undone, for, these *other* things are the *weightier* matter of the law." In other words, there is a time and place for "fiddling." Certainly the world would be much the poorer but for the

life and work of a Fritz Kreisler. What was wrong with Nero was not that he fiddled, but that he had nothing more significant to do in the midst of a burning Rome! I would not desire philosophers to give up some of their logical analyses or epistemological investigations, but I would like also to see them rise to the needs of this crisis. And I still believe that this is possible without their having to lower themselves to the level of the soap box orator. In fact, some of the very greatest figures in the history of Western philosophy demonstrate that the philosophical scholar may write not merely works of logical analysis and metaphysical speculation, but also works on ethics, politics, the problems of human relations and social institutions, of war and peace, and of the future of mankind. Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics* and *Politics* have, in the modern age, had their counterparts in Hobbes's *Leviathan*, Rousseau's *Social Contract*, Kant's *Perpetual Peace* (with its demand for an actual world government as long as one hundred and fifty-two years ago!), and More's *Utopia*, to mention merely a few more or less at random. Moreover, the social, economic, and political ideas of Karl Marx have already had a profoundly greater effect upon the actual history of mankind than have Hegel's *Logic* or Leibnitz's *Monadology*.

The Double Task of Philosophy

All of this leads directly to the major theme of this paper. Seen from the vantage point of the edge of the abyss, the paramount need of this hour is first, *thoughtfulness*, and, secondly, *human understanding*. At both of these points philosophy needs to make major contributions *now*. (It should be added, in all honesty, that no one, today, can guarantee that it may not already be too late. However, the effort will have to be made in any case.)

(1) Thoughtfulness

Thoughtfulness simply means thinking before acting. To the scholar this requirement may appear so obvious as to say almost nothing at all. But the world is in its present chaotic state of affairs precisely because what may have been obvious to (thoughtful) scholars has not merely not been obvious to the men of action, but has, all too often, been entirely repudiated by such men. How little the thoughtful, the wise, the even so-called "expert" man is wanted in the company of men of power and of

action ought to have been proved—to Americans at least—by this country's reaction to Mr. Roosevelt's so-called "brain trust." This country was so completely unaccustomed to having "high I Q" in or near the driver's seat of the national government that, when an American President had the temerity to surround himself with advisers who were experts in their various fields, the whole country sat back and roared with laughter. To have brains in Washington was so foreign to our ways of doing things that it was all a huge joke.

This one illustration will have to suffice. But the point itself should be clear. Not merely are men of action and men who decide on policies rarely (apparently) men of brains, but, by and large, they mistrust men of brains and learning and consequently prefer not to have such men around. And scholars—and other thoughtful men—in their turn, look down on men of action and retreat into their ivory towers of intellectual isolation, from which towers they are inclined to look pityingly down upon the thoughtless "rabble" and upon their just as thoughtless but axe-grinding masters.

This type of behavior gets humanity nowhere fast—except onto the slide over the abyss.

The cure is, one would suppose, obvious. It must take at least two forms.

In the first place, the thinker must be able to get sufficiently "under the skin" of his fellow men, both young and old, to get them to begin seriously thinking for themselves. In a democracy at least, it ought to be self-evident that it is more important to bring men to think for themselves than to get them to follow a leader, no matter how wise that leader himself might be.

And secondly, the thinker (theologian, scientist, or philosopher) must emerge from his ivory tower and acquaint himself with the world. He must be thoroughly at home in the surroundings in which most of his fellowmen live. How else can he understand them? And how, if he does not understand them, can he thoughtfully react, much less provide intelligent leadership to such as may seek his advice and help?

Real thoughtfulness means the capacity for critical reflection. For philosophers especially, this has all too often meant merely acquaintance with the great ideas and thinkers of the ages. Familiarity with the great books certainly should enable a man to deal more capably with at least certain contemporary problems. But it would be foolish to assume that

such acquaintance, in and of itself, guarantees that a man will know how to react intelligently to the presence in the world of atomic bombs

In fact, some of the "solutions" of the "atomic problem" which have come from well meaning scholars of national (and even international) reputation bear out this point. To the—after all, rather obvious—suggestion that the only possible way to preserve peace in a world of atomic weapons is some sort of federal world government, some of our—brilliant—scholars have come back with the reply: "World government presupposes world brotherhood. It is impossible to achieve anything like world government unless we manage first to get a spirit of world community" (As if the dropping of atomic bombs would just conveniently wait till we have achieved real world brotherhood—fifty thousand years from now, perhaps?) It certainly does not speak very well for the acumen of men—who expect "the market place" to refer to them as sages—to be discovered blind to facts. For we have witnessed all kinds of working governments all over the world without having achieved brotherhood at any one of those places. Would anyone wish to suggest that the people of Chicago constitute a spiritual community? Nevertheless, even in Chicago we have had government of some kind, no matter how disreputable at times. At least always enough government that even in the heyday of the Al Capone regime, civil war did *not* rage on the streets, and people were—in general—reasonably secure against violent outbreaks from gangsters, as well as against a militant military marching down Michigan Avenue with machine guns popping in all directions.

The achievement of our own federal government out of the disunited thirteen colonies constitutes only one more proof. But, unfortunately, even scholars, having become preoccupied with pious slogans, and ideas—even if they have been "mothballed" out of significant idealistic movements of history, such, for example, as the beginning of Christianity—have permitted their judgment to be warped to the point where they are unable to see patent facts or do serious, critical thinking.

Here, in helping both leaders and the masses of people to learn to think clearly, honestly, logically, and consistently, and in the light of ascertainable facts, lies certainly one of the major tasks of philosophy in this human crisis. We may call this philosophy's *methodological task*. For, if it is true that "without vision the people perish," it now has become equally true that without serious thoughtfulness our age of action will all too soon send us over the abyss.

(2) Human Understanding

The second major need of the hour is *human understanding*. How is philosophical scholarship to "contribute to the relief of international tensions" if not—on the side of content—by aiding the cause of human understanding?

Even if it is pointed out that at much of the bottom of international tensions there lie such attitudes as economic pressure or need, national pride and aggrandizement, superiority complexes, and national and individual selfishness—how far, actually, are any of these from the problems of human understanding? For, human understanding need not refer exclusively to the understanding among nations, it may refer just as importantly to the understanding of human nature.^a In other words, by the phrase "human understanding," I think we should mean an understanding of everything which pertains to man and to his life on this planet. For, certainly, an understanding of man's basic (though by no means exclusive) selfish streak is just as necessary, if we are to learn to "contribute to the relief of international tensions," as is an understanding of men in their social relationships, this is all the more true, when it is realized that class, nationalistic, religious, and race selfishness are, after all, merely social extensions of the basic selfishness which can be found in the individual.

It can, probably, never be pointed out too often that without a basic understanding from man to man (in the family, in employer-employee relations, in the state, in school, and in the church, etc.) any significant relief of social tensions is unthinkable. This is just as true when it comes to international and interracial relationship. Nor does such fundamental understanding imply that one nation has to applaud everything another nation does or stands for, any more than the true patriot has to approve every deed and commitment of his own state. But it does require the willingness, first of all, to acquaint one's self as completely and as objectively as possible with the facts of the other nation's (and race's, or religion's) life, and, secondly, to attempt to understand and appreciate that other national (racial, or religious) life as from the inside rather

^aComment by Harry B. Friedgood

Whereas I have been accustomed to think of the philosopher as a scholar, who is concerned with human affairs beyond the horizon of psychodynamics, this paper leaves one with the feeling that one of the tasks of philosophy in this era of unrest is to bring about an understanding of man by man through self-analysis

than from the totally extraneous point of view of the carping onlooker

It is, however, confessedly difficult to see how this sort of attitude can be achieved without an ability really to understand the basic *differences in thinking* which often differentiate nations, religions, and races. Such differences in thinking have such a far-reaching, dissension breeding effect precisely because they usually go back to radical—and sometimes even to contradictory—differences in basic outlook, interpretation, in what the philosopher likes to refer to as *Weltanschauung*.

Here, certainly, there is another tremendous task for philosophy. For, if the matter of thoughtfulness constitutes philosophy's methodological task, this business of helping men to get to understand each others' widely differing *Weltanschauungen* gives to philosophy its major present contentual problem.

It certainly is not this writer's intention to suggest that all differences in *Weltanschauung* be composed and all men's attitudes toward life and the universe be brought down to a common and universally to be accepted denominator. It is difficult to conceive a more deadly and boring existence than a life spent in surroundings where everyone thinks just exactly like everyone else. But there is, of course, no need for worry at this point. The experience of twenty-five centuries of philosophizing in the Western world should offer sufficient proof that it is an impossibility to expect such a complete composure of men's basic differences in *Weltanschauungen*.

But this very fact makes it all the more incumbent upon us, therefore, to try as hard as is humanly possible to understand—and thus to learn actually to appreciate—the other person's (nation's, race's, religion's, etc.) point of view. And this, as will be admitted by anyone who has ever seriously attempted it, is by no means an easy task.

It certainly is no secret that even well veised and identically schooled philosophers, who otherwise speak the same national tongue, all too often do *not* understand each other. It is not only true, as F. C. S. Schiller stated not so long ago, that "philosophers *must* disagree" because of their temperamental differences, but it seems just as true that, even in their disagreements, they often seem to be at an almost complete loss to know what the other philosopher is trying to say. The so-called "scandal of philosophy" is notorious. Is it really necessary for experts supposedly educated in the same professional field to drift so far apart in their fundamental ways of thinking and speaking that they become more and more incap-

able of understanding one another, especially when they engage in the esoteric parlance of their own particular "brand" of philosophy? And is it really necessary to carry this sort of thing so far that other philosophers not only cannot understand the particular philosopher under consideration, but even doubt whether he is able to understand his own—privately manufactured—language? Anyone who is even to the slightest degree concerned with human weal and woe must inevitably care about human communication. And the very root of this word "communication" means "becoming one with." Any language—be it technical or anything else—which fails to carry over understandable ideas from one person to another person of at least approximately the same cultural level, betrays the very meaning and intent of language.

If, then, the philosopher is ever to become anything more than a technical hairsplitter over professional foibles, he must begin to clean house in his own bailiwick. It does not make sense for philosophers to insist that the only ultimate road to relieve international tensions is by way of an increasing achievement of human understanding among all the peoples, nations, races, and religions of the world, while philosophers themselves are unable to achieve any understanding among themselves even within the area of the same—Occidental—major culture patterns. I am, frankly, afraid that—at least in the light of past philosophical history and experience—I am asking philosophers to mend their habits at the precise points where they are both most vulnerable and least inclined to turn over a new leaf. If this should turn out to be the case, there is no hope for humanity in looking for leadership and help from philosophers, it would need to be admitted that philosophy has nothing to contribute to the relief of international tensions. The point should be self-evident, yet thus far philosophers seem hardly to have paid any attention to it. Here is a sincere hope that, as philosophers, we shall begin to smite our own breasts and exclaim *Mea culpa, mea culpa!* But, of course, that will not be enough, we shall need to mend our own—scandalous—ways.^b

^bComment by Ralph T. Flewelling

In suggesting that philosophy "clean house," Professor Schilpp might have dwelt more fully on the reasons for the present neglect of philosophy, which has come about largely through two causes:

1) The feeling that philosophy must defend all the dogmas of science under penalty of being judged either ignorant or "religious." Many of these dogmas have now been discarded by forward looking scientists while they continue to be defended by the belated philosopher.

2) The dominance in philosophy of the feeling that science and sense must be propiti-

The Task of the Teacher of Philosophy

Having mended our own ways, it will, of course, be necessary for us to turn our attention to the rest of the public, and more particularly to those who, in a very short time, are bound to take over the leadership of humanity, namely, the university students

Having achieved at least *some* sympathetic understanding of widely differing philosophical points of view and positions within his own culture, the teacher of philosophy needs next to pay serious attention to obtaining an equally sympathetic grasp of *Weltanschauungen* of other cultures. And then he needs to communicate his own comprehension of such totally different philosophies to his students, in order that they, in their turn, may be able to see and understand the existing international (inter-racial, and inter-religious) tensions no longer only from the provincial point of view of their own particular culture pattern and philosophy of life, but rather from that of the wider perspective gained through sympathetic insight.

Yet I suppose it really is too much to expect anyone—even a philosopher—to be able actually to represent and do ample justice to a philosophical position radically different from his own. For this reason it would seem wise to offer another suggestion as well. On the theory that, if it is not possible to bring the mountain to Mohammed, it makes sense to try to bring Mohammed to the mountain, it would appear that—inasmuch as it seems, at present, hopeless to get any very large number of students from the various countries of the world to study foreign and different philosophies in the countries and at the universities where these philosophies are native—one of the major tasks for universities in this present postwar world is to bring philosophers from other countries, culture patterns, and ideological backgrounds to the various universities of the world. Thus the students of every country would have an opportunity to study the philosophies and *Weltanschauungen* of the world by direct contact with scholars who themselves understand and treat these respective philosophies as, at least relatively, true. In this way, students could begin

ated by presenting a hostile front toward religion, and even toward moral and spiritual values as real.

The remedying of such a position can come only through a return to metaphysics, a morality and spirituality grounded in the nature of the universe. Without values considered as real, philosophy has no content, and these values must be Cosmic and Universally valid. As Hegel remarked: "A philosophy without metaphysics is like a temple with no Holy of Holies."

at least to develop some sympathetic understanding for other peoples' points of view. For example, let us bring Mohammedan philosophers, Hindu philosophers, Buddhist philosophers, Confucian philosophers, Communist philosophers, Catholic philosophers, and what have you, to our American universities. And then let every other country and culture do likewise.^c

^cComment by Stewart G. Cole

Isn't this a tedious and long range program, which is doubtfully effective as a means of meeting the urgent problems facing us at present? Not that such an exchange is ill advised or unnecessary, but isn't a more dynamic and activist program needed? What can scholars do *now*, and *directly*, to effect favorably social change? Or must we accept the verdict that our sole function is that of educational pioneering such as UNESCO stands for, and which is necessarily a slow, painstaking endeavor.

Comment by Edward W. Blakeman

We suggested this in the Fifth Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion and all of us were surprised to discover that the Sunday *New York Times* gave the idea a prominent place. In other words, the public dares to believe that scholars, regardless of national and religious patterns of thought, can and should pool their wisdom. This is to suggest that certain foundations be asked to finance about ten seminars, the universities concerned bearing one half the expense.

This Conference, the Association for the Advancement of Science, and UNESCO might participate.

The following table showing the distribution of students in departments of religion in colleges and universities, 1945-46, bears out the contention of Professor Schilpp that we go right on being indifferent. The study of comparative religion should have immediately jumped high in the list, and ethics should have ascended the scale immediately after the war. But this table is practically the same as a similar one made in 1940-41, prior to Hiroshima and the atomic energy advance.

CLASSIFICATION OF UNDERGRADUATE COURSES

(A study of the curricula of the 136 colleges and universities in the states of Pennsylvania, Illinois, and California, 1941-45. The Administration of Religion in Universities and Colleges by associates: Charles M. Bond for Pennsylvania, Ernest J. Chave for Illinois, Herman Beimfohr for California. T. Scott Miyakawa, University of Michigan Research Assistant.)

<i>Type of Course</i>	<i>Semester Hours</i>	<i>Per Cent Of Total</i>
1 Religious Interest	1,259	21
2 Biblical Literature	1,135	19
3 Doctrinal and Philosophical	755	13
4 Religious Language	626	11
5 History of Religion	609	10
6 Ethics and Social Religion	528	9
7 Religious Education	333	6
8 Comparative Religion	257	5
9 Worship and Religious Arts	214	4
10 Seminar, Research, and Reading	132	2
Total	5,948	100

(Junior Colleges Included)

Someone objects that this proposal is far too expensive to be actually practicable. Admittedly it *is* expensive. But how infinitely less expensive such a program would be than our present spending on national preparedness for war! If the major nations of the world today were willing to spend one tenth of one per cent of what they are now spending on military preparedness on implementing the suggestion just made, it would pay for all of the cost of this so supposedly expensive program—and at the same time would enable those same nations to save almost all of the other ninety-nine point nine per cent which they now budget for military preparedness and expansion.

It appears at least to this writer that philosophers have a profound moral obligation at this point. But I admit that this means public and political propaganda for such a program for which most philosophers (as, indeed, most scholars of any kind) have little stomach, simply because it means entering into the work and spirit of the market place.

Yet the alternative would appear to be quite clear. If scholars and philosophers can see this thing as clearly—in their nature as scholars and thinkers—as they ought to be able to see it, and then refuse to *do* anything about it, then they are not merely criminally culpable, but can hardly lay claim to being the leaders in thinking which philosophers have always claimed to be.

Permit me to end this discussion on the frankly pessimistic note required by the subject. Last October (1946), one of America's great living philosophers, speaking at one of the sessions of the Conference on the Humanistic Tradition in the Century Ahead (one of the series of conferences with which Princeton University celebrated its Bicentennial), urged the members of the Conference to engage in "radical self-criticism," and suggested that "in view of the mess man has made of this planet, a suitable costume for humanists is sackcloth." The speaker was Professor Arthur O. Lovejoy of the Johns Hopkins University. I cannot do better than to reiterate Professor Lovejoy's advice and apply it to philosophers. But I wish to warn that wearing sackcloth, no matter how appropriate an attire, will, in itself, not assure any relief of international tensions for today and tomorrow. To accomplish such relief—or, at least to make philosophy's own particular contribution to such relief—will require more than penitence for the past; it will need an unswerving resolution today and tomorrow to do those things which the exigencies of the present world situation require and demand of us as philosophers and thinkers. Are we men and thinkers enough to accept this challenge?

CHAPTER XXIX

Philosophy and Cultural Internationalism

By ROY W SELLARS

Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan



IN CONSIDERING the relation of philosophy to cultural internationalism, the first job is to make clear the situation within philosophy itself. No cultural activity can make for cultural understanding if it is confused and at odds with itself. If, on the other hand, it has achieved reasonably clear notions and methods, it is probably in a position to make its contribution if it can get a hearing. Such a hearing depends, in part, on its own efforts and, in part, upon the cultural situation. But, except in times of cultural disintegration of a semipathological sort, it is wiser for a subject like philosophy to blame itself than to put the onus on the community. Its duty is to hope that its own clarification will have its effect on the culture of the time.

More than the sciences, perhaps, philosophy is affected by the general temper of the times. While it acts upon society, society, in turn, reacts upon it. An illustration of this reaction is the appearance of rather irrationalistic types of philosophy throughout the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries.

Now irrationalism is of at least two types. The first brings in data which have been too much ignored. This may be called the healthy, or benevolent, type of irrationalism. Thus philosophy and psychology were long too intellectualistic in that the Cartesian stress upon clear and distinct ideas neglected feeling, impulse, and the will. This bias of seventeenth century rationalism continued into the eighteenth century and characterized its ideology. This intellectualism was, I take it, healthy and valid enough but somewhat superficial. It needed supplementation, and has secured it. The second type of irrationalism is that which distorts philosophy by attacking the very ideal of rational comprehension. In this

type we have an attempt to substitute feeling, intuition, or authority for reason. As every one is aware, fascism supported this type of irrationalism.

My own feeling is that philosophy is now in a fairly healthy condition. All through the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth it was absorbing the protests of the first type of irrationalism. Bergson's critique of the mechanistic categories of Cartesianism and of Newtonian science forced a reconsideration of methods and concepts. Greater justice was done to biological and psychological data, and ideas of time and of growth gave greater flexibility to thought. On the whole the result was a retention of rationalism, but a more empirical type of rationalism. While Bergson had tended to conceive the sciences as valuable only for the control of nature and to rob them of full cognitive import, philosophy, after it had assimilated the Bergsonian challenge, took a more empirical interpretation of both scientific knowledge and of the texture of natural processes.

In addition to Bergsonian anti-intellectualism there were such movements as pragmatism, operationalism, and logical positivism. Philosophy has been constantly alerted and challenged. If it has had the capacity to digest these movements and assimilate what was significant and valid in them, it can be regarded as in a healthy condition.

Philosophy is today in a peculiarly favorable condition, for reasons which we may summarize as follows:

- (1) It has learned how to combine rationalism and empiricism;
- (2) It has overcome something of the distortion introduced into modern philosophy by Cartesianism, and
- (3) It is less pretentious and artificial than it was during the period of romanticism, that is, more critical and less speculative.

A few explanatory comments on these three points should enable us to make fairly clear the situation.

First, modern philosophy has, on the whole, succeeded in uniting rationalism with empiricism. In this respect it belongs to the Aristotelian stream of thought, but with marked differences due to the gradual development of a conception of reason less tied in with a Platonic conception of forms or substantial species. Reason is now a term for the growth of conceptual patterns and for a plasticity of these patterns in relation to modes of testing. At the same time, empiricism is connected with scientific methods of induction and deduction and the formation of hy-

potheses. It is, if you will, a logical empiricism less concerned with the psychological origin and make up of ideas than with their employment and testing. Logical positivism has helped to drive home the implications of developments in logical and mathematical analysis along with the import of scientific methodology. Pragmatism of the Dewey and Lewis variety has operated in much the same direction. In short, there has been much clarification of issues.

Taken alone, however, and in union with operationalism and extensions of relativity theory, this union of rationalism and empiricism has very often led to the kind of outlook called *antimetaphysical*. Much of positivism's antimetaphysics has been unnecessary, emotional, and directed at what I consider bad metaphysics. There is reason to believe that the origin of this phobia can be connected with romantic currents in German philosophy, such as that of Heidegger.

Passing to the second point, the overcoming of Cartesian distortions, I shall confine myself to the weakening of the subjectivism and dualism which gave to modern philosophy an artificial cast, making it pervious to false problems and attitudes. The subjectivistic strain in Cartesian thought was too frequently exaggerated and exalted into speculative romanticism in Post-Kantian idealism. The return to realism was a slow process but, with the union of empiricism and rationalism, it bids fair to be accomplished. But this return to realism is, quite clearly, to a realism in the context of science. It is not the mere scientism of logical positivism because it emphasized the need to include theory of knowledge, theory of value and ethics, and ontology in its comprehensive framework.

In suggesting, in the third place, that philosophy at present is less pretentious and also less vague, I implied that its cultural promise is that much greater. It pontificates less, cooperates more, and is readier to confront cultural decisions in union with science, art, enlightened public opinion, and undogmatic religion.

To sum up, philosophy has gained in analytic ability and in clarity and, cooperating with other cultural activities, should be able to contribute to a rebirth of a realistic humanism within an international field of human relations. There are grounds for hope that philosophy may play a more positive and constructive role. In the Western world the analogies are with Stoicism in the Hellenistic and Roman period, Christian Aristotelianism in the brief flowering of the thirteenth century, and the cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment. In the Far East the outstanding

analogy is with the Confucian pattern of life, with its balance of principles and conventions for human relations. But life today has a dynamism, range, and comprehension which make the cultural task unparalleled. We are rightly frightened by the destructive power physics has put into the hands of the aggressive. But fear alone will only paralyze. There must be constructive vision guided by rationally grounded principles. And here philosophy may be of aid if time is allowed it.

I

Turning now to the specific problem before us, I hazard the statement that, on the whole, present day philosophy is making for greater understanding among men. Let me give reasons for my answer.

There are, in the Western world today three dominant philosophical currents. The first is the secular current which contains as eddies in it scientism, pragmatism, positivism, realism, empiricism, and rationalism in the modes I have indicated. I have tried to show that these eddies are confluent. They are moving interactively in the direction of a naturalistic humanism able to interpret the results of the sciences and to connect them with the sympathetic imagination of an ethical humanism. And, while I have stressed the secular context, I do not wish to belittle the high ideals which religion at its best has fostered. The hope is that the traditional religions can cooperate in the humanism and universalism, while cherishing such additional hopes of a supernatural sort as they can retain faith in. In the eighteenth century some measure of this toleration was attained and the old persecuting fires were damped. The Age of Reason was dominant and the Age of Faith recessive. It is, in my opinion, highly likely that something akin to it promises to recur. In any case, much can be agreed upon as to a moral and social scale of values and the means thereto. It is not without significance that Dewey and Maritain both speak of humanism. Nor should the fact be ignored that Soviet thinkers speak of Soviet humanism, as of Soviet democracy. Even a common, *generic* terminology contains a promise which should not be completely ignored.

The second living philosophical tradition is that of the Christian Churches in the West and the corresponding revitalizations of Confucianism and Hinduism in the Far East. My conviction is that the main

current to which I have alluded is most fruitful in calling attention to what is most humanistic and universalistic in these various cultural traditions. Institutional particularism and provincialism will not make for greater understanding among men. The absence of axes to grind works in favor of the first movement, which is of ideas, attitudes, methods, and values. Such factors easily leap boundaries and become a part of the intellectual air people in all walks of life breathe. But here we touch upon education and the climate of opinion. That there are lions in the path is obvious, but they are unable to do much against the march of ideas unless they resort to censorship and violence, which are self-destructive agencies.

The third philosophical current is Marxism. Let us appraise the agreements and differences of the first current, which is largely that of academic and technical philosophy, and this third current which is academic chiefly in the U S S R. (In doing this, I shall not concern myself with political affiliations and parties.)

It should, I believe, be remembered that Marxism reflected the meeting in the mind and personality of Marx and Engels of German, French, and English cultural and intellectual influences. Unlike fascism, it was born in a still liberal era. Feuerbach, the left Hegelian who most influenced Marx, has been compared with Mill. French utopian socialism was an extension into the nineteenth century of eighteenth century ideas along less individualistic lines. And there is much of classical English economics in Marx. What he added was a shift of perspective from individualism and the middle class to collectivism and the masses. The general philosophical background was Hegelian dialectic embodied in the evolutionary movement of matter. Into the details of all this I cannot, of course, here enter.¹

II

I suggest that these two philosophical currents are in their own spheres increasing understanding of the human situation and thereby preparing the way for cultural agreement in the large. I fear that competitive values

¹Any one who may be interested may find an analysis of dialectical materialism in my article, "Reflections on Dialectical Materialism," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, December, 1944.

of the economic sort enlisted in nationalistic and class programs will long continue to divide in practice And yet general ideas and a sense of human kinship will even here have a dissolvent effect

More than most people appreciate, there is agreement in fundamentals between dialectical materialism and the academic, secular philosophical current in which pragmatism, empirical rationalism, and naturalism are confluent Already the term, non-reductive materialism, has been employed as expressive of the ontology envisaged by Dewey, Hook, and Nagel, and by myself

It must be admitted that dialectical materialism has in its terminology an Hegelian inheritance which challenges reinterpretation to gain adequate recognition in the first philosophical current Struggle, conflict, tension are stressed as against the too easy belief in inevitable harmony in the older liberal tradition But, with the two cultural blocks in some measure both united and divided in their understanding by these two philosophical currents, any effective increase of translatability would be a cultural asset

III

The two dimensions of philosophy which we have emphasized are the analytic and the interpretative The analytic has dominated technical philosophy during the past few decades, as it has sought to overcome speculative vaguenesses and to get in touch, once more, with science This phase was manifested largely in logic and in theory of knowledge It may well be that the time is ripe for the interpretative dimension. Incisiveness here might well give an effective role to philosophy It would help to clarify the human situation and its desirabilities, even its moral imperatives

I have no wish either to exaggerate the cultural role of philosophy or to separate it from the movement of other factors in culture So far as the overt sweep of social forces is concerned, the predominant role of science, technology, and economics in the world situation immediately attracts attention And yet it can be quickly discerned that these forces operate in a context of largely traditional values and stubborn human demands The obvious reason is that these expansive social forces are in large measure instruments and tools rather than ends By themselves they give no adequate interpretation to life

Interpretative philosophy is not so much something distinct from, and alien to, the moral and religious insights of the past as an endeavor to introduce systematic reflection into them and to give them the benefit of a tested and verifiable framework, a framework which, in the main, they have lacked, making a mythological outlook inherited from the dim past do duty for it

It is, then, because philosophy in its interpretative dimension is concerned with human ends and values that it is culturally important. And I do not, be it remembered, think of philosophy as a specialty with its *amour propre* and restrictive emphasis on its own achievements. Rather do I think of it as working with the integrative tendency of social thought and knowledge as a whole. We are, I take it, entering a period of cultural syncretism of a reach and range unparalleled in past history.^a The need, I suppose, is to dampen the competitive while strengthening the cooperative and the comprehensive.

In the abstract this statement is almost a truism. But the seizure of the truism and its translation into attitudes and vital programs wait upon a lively comprehension of the human situation and the firm rejection of myths of all sorts which encumber nations. Standing, as it does, for reason, experience, and well based insights, philosophy may well play an important role.^b

To sum up, I am persuaded that philosophy is increasing understanding among men because it encourages reflection and offers comprehensive ideas. It is not a matter of indoctrination but of clarification. And even philosophical divergence is not without its stimulating character, for it has the tonic effect of enlarging the imagination through the pres-

^aComment by Gottfried Salomon Delatour:

I have felt that the most important development of continental Europe from 1770 to 1830, the age of discovery of history and cultures, is left out in the Anglo-Saxon tradition. Therefore, the old struggle between church and science is going on. The moral belief is like a remnant or sometimes a revival of a kind of Christianity without mysticism. Scientism of the positivistic trend cannot include morals, and the "sympathetic imagination of a new humanism" cannot be connected with a naturalistic theory. What can "non-reduction" be in a time when science from Darwin to Freud is reducing men to the animal level? What can "syncretism" mean if there are no beliefs?

^bComment by Ralph T. Flewelling

I am grateful to Professor Seilers for providing the first paper among many that contains a note of optimism concerning the present world situation. I can only wish it were possible to share his optimism. However, he indicates, I believe, the fundamental basis on which philosophy can serve the present age, and what appears to me to be a growing trend in our thinking.

entation of alternatives. Another feature is that it, itself, stresses understanding rather than emotion and prejudice. And it aims at comprehensiveness of outlook and integration. It has also been my thesis that the union of rationalism and empiricism in the dominant stream of modern philosophy is making for understanding in a greater degree than is Neo-Thomism, or Christian Aristotelianism, because more in touch with all the sciences and less bound to a fixed framework. But, in so saying, I wish to put on record my admiration for the philosophical achievements of many Neo-Thomists and for their historical scholarship. Marxism as a mode of thought has obviously been very effective and almost as much in touch with science as the first complex current of philosophical thought has been. Its ardor for reform and revolutionary action has given it a social impact which the more academic philosophy has, on the whole, lacked. I anticipate a greater interaction between these two currents as non-Marxist philosophy increasingly stresses interpretation and comes to grips with decisions in human life, decisions which are pressing upon our culture in an imperative way which permits no continued postponement.

CHAPTER XXX

Advice From Philosophy

By PAUL KECSKEMETI

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I

PHILOSOPHERS ARE often accused of failing their fellow men. With all the burning issues of the world waiting to be solved, it is said, they withdraw to a private world of their own, they seek purely intellectual satisfactions without a bearing upon the state of our society. What is needed, these critics say, is a philosophy that is of some practical use. Philosophy should be an intellectual instrument of human progress. Philosophy could be of possible value if it communicated a message which everyone could understand and apply. Otherwise, it is worthless.

To one who is concerned with very specific problems, this petulant demand that he should make the whole world a partner in his quest for a solution, must sound thoroughly senseless. And yet, it is worthwhile to examine the implications hidden in this popular criticism. We may find that, wrong headed as it is, it does reveal something about the true essence of philosophy.

Now it is curious that this kind of criticism is never leveled at empirical science. Nobody doubts that physics has great practical value, despite the fact that its propositions are couched in a language which is understandable only to specialists. What are the reasons for this differential attitude toward science and philosophy?

One of the reasons is immediately obvious. Everyone knows, not only that the empirical sciences can be applied to immediate practical ends, but also that they can be applied only by specialists whose training includes control of a specialized language. Moreover, everyone can identify these experts and the kind of situation in which they may be called to

help. Philosophy, however, proceeds in a different fashion. There is no standardized set of situations in which the philosopher would have to give expert advice. Accordingly, the practical man knows what empirical science is up to, he knows when and where it can be useful to him, even though he does not understand its language. But the practical man is baffled as to what philosophy is supposed to accomplish, and he understandably insists upon knowing "what it is all about" before he pays philosophy the same respect he does empirical science.

Scientific theory as a whole, whether "pure" or "immediately applicable," can be considered as a conceptual system which defines the limits of human action in terms of certain "invariants." Whatever aims we pursue, our action must keep within the limits specified by science. The scientist looks at human action, so to speak, from without—from the perspective of the immutable facts which set a limit to it.

The philosopher looks at human action from within; his problem is to find criteria by means of which "right" and "reasonable" action can be distinguished from "wrong" and "unreasonable" action. This problem cannot be solved by means of a scientific theory and a technology based upon it, because "rightness" and "reasonableness" cannot be reduced to a set of invariants limiting action. To be right or reasonable, human action must limit itself; it must proceed on the basis of principles consciously chosen and comprehended by the agent.

This is not a problem which experts can solve by applying specialized techniques. It is, in a way, everybody's business, human action cannot be self-limited and self-determined unless each agent chooses and applies his own set of principles.

Thus it is easy to come to the conclusion that the philosopher is not needed at all, since the large topics he deals with are the common possession of mankind. The philosopher does not *discover* the Good or the Reasonable or the Right. We can see a need for the philosopher's advice only if we consider, not those basic concepts themselves, but the way in which they are intertwined with all the other aspects of life. Everyone has at least a working knowledge of what "good" is *in abstracto*, but Instinct and Desire and Compulsion and Subservience and Routine all put forward their own version of *what* is good, alongside of the promptings of Insight and Conscience; and all these versions of the Good are hopelessly inconsistent with each other. Man often realizes when it is too late that, in pursuing some Good, he destroys some other Good that is

more essential to him. This raises the problem of organizing life in terms of the various levels and aspects of the Good—a problem upon which philosophy has a very special bearing. I do not mean to say that a special class of experts, called philosophers, has to be called in, I only maintain that philosophers, who spend their life experimenting with patterns of life and of value hierarchies, are apt to come up with insights which society as a whole would do well to heed. How the philosopher can reach “society as a whole” is, of course, a difficult question. His meditations are a solitary business, attractive and feasible only to a few. Yet society as a whole can be moved or at least gently inspired by ideas developed by the solitary thinker and reaching by stages circles further and further removed from the centers of philosophic activity.

Those who accuse philosophers of failing their fellow men pay philosophy an exaggerated compliment. They imply that philosophers, if they only said the right word, could put everything right, all the anarchic and mutually destructive forces of life would arrange themselves in perfect order if the magic formula were spoken. Such perfect solutions, however, are beyond the reach of man. He can expect only to get over his worst errors gradually, and that only if circumstances are favorable and if he makes a strenuous use of all of his opportunities. The insights of solitary thinkers represent some of these opportunities, and it is by no means incumbent upon the thinker alone to make society avail itself of them. The public may fail itself by shunning the necessary effort for comprehending truths which lie a little beneath the surface.

II

The philosopher knows that his specific contribution to human affairs would be meaningless if man had no freedom—if life were wholly determined by “brute” factors such as instinct, desire, and compulsion. We must, however, stop at this point to deal with a plausible objection. Is it possible, in fact, to speak of “the” philosopher, as if all philosophers were agreed on basic principles, such as freedom and reason? Some philosophers deny freedom altogether, others extol irrationalism.

The answer is that, regardless of what philosophers may say, they cannot *really* deny either freedom or the supremacy of the rational. For, as Paul Weiss has brilliantly shown,¹ any argument purporting to prove

¹Cf. Paul Weiss, *Nature and Man*, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1947, p. 25.

determinism presupposes freedom, since if it is accepted on its merits, its acceptance is not due to the working of inescapable ubiquitous forces. One could add, in a similar vein, that any argument purporting to demonstrate the truth of irrationalism presupposes the supremacy of reason, for we cannot prove that reason's claim to leadership is invalid except by showing that it is *unreasonable* to trust it.

Thus, the philosopher is committed to maintaining that man has freedom—i. e., that ordering his life in the light of freely and responsibly held intelligible principles is not beyond his reach. However, the philosopher cannot blink the fact that free and rational action is rare among men. While his primary concern is with the determination of behavior by reason, insight, and responsible, free decision, the philosopher cannot overlook the vast extent to which human action is determined by such things as instinct or fear or compulsion or convention or routine.

The nature of the advice which a philosopher is willing or able to give his society depends to a large extent on the way in which he squares his principles with his realism. To be sure, he can confine himself to stating his principles, in a mood of "take it or leave it." Advice of this kind, however, has only a limited value. The question whether people *can* act upon it is left entirely in suspense. If a philosopher wants his advice to be as useful as possible, he should consider the question whether, in his society, a motivating force of sufficient strength can be marshaled to bring about the behavior he advocates. This means that the philosopher should try to make an estimate of the strength of all the "brute" factors influencing behavior—instinct, fear, compulsion, etc.—and of the extent of resistance or help that rational motivation may expect from these "brute" factors. It may be recalled that Plato, whom many consider as an exemplar of the "take it or leave it" school of philosophy, urged the development of a science dealing with the impact of words upon the soul, as a preliminary to a technique of rational control of behavior (*Phaedrus*, 271d).

This does not mean, however, that the philosopher should seek to become a mere technician of controlling behavior. The assessment of the various motivating forces present in a society, and the mapping of practical ways of harnessing them to definite ends, is not incidental to his proper task, which is the study of the nature and the presuppositions of free and rational behavior as such. I think that, in engaging in this study, the philosopher fulfils a vital function. What this function is may best be suggested, I think, by assuming that it is not carried out any longer, and

that the task of suggesting collective patterns of behavior on a rational basis is entirely handed over to social science. Both the ascertainment of the actually existing motivating forces and the development of the various techniques of harnessing them to ends will presumably reach the ultimate of refinement. Nor do I suggest that the scientists will not be able to agree upon ends that will be, in most cases, thoroughly commendable. But even if the best ends are chosen they will somehow lack life, because nobody will raise the question whether they have been chosen by free, responsible, rational insight, or simply out of conformism and deference to the prestige of science. One of the crucial questions is how the human agent comes to embrace his ends, rather than what ends he has and how he attains them. The latter questions largely concern science and technology; the former is wholly philosophical.

For the philosopher, then, it is not enough to be on the side of the angels, and to advocate the "right" ends and the "right" means for putting them into practice. His concern is not with the ends and means as such, but with the spirit in which they are adopted and held.

We may assume, as Hegel said in the preface to his *Philosophy of Law*, that "the Good" is already generally known—or, at least, that any philosophical advice will be heeded only to the extent that men are conversant with, and believe in, "the Good" it appeals to. The practical advice the philosopher can give is concerned, it seems to me, with the *strategy* of the Good, rather than with its primary revelation or its technology. That is to say, the philosopher is able to suggest which aspects of social life and organization are hopelessly in the grip of "brute" factors and types of motivation, and which ones can be wrested from these and made secure for rational deliberation and autonomous, responsible decision.

This task requires the philosopher to be equally strong on the side of principle and on the side of realism. If he suggests rational and moral solutions for problems that no concerted effort can, for the time being, free from the control of irrational traditions or passions, he may be theoretically right, but he will not achieve anything strategically. On the other hand, if the philosopher fails to invoke moral and rational principles merely because a certain amount of opposition from benighted traditions and passions is to be reckoned with, he will be unfaithful to his mission. His advice will be most valuable if he avoids both these pitfalls, that is, if he can point to some real progress that can be made in the free, responsible and rational ordering of human affairs. To be sure,

this "strategic" advice involves a certain amount of struggle. The philosopher has to admit that violence in certain situations cannot be avoided, since it is forced upon his side, but from his point of view, violence and compulsion cannot finally settle any problem. He is primarily interested in inducing insights, not in eliciting conforming behavior. To the extent that his "strategy" is successful, it results in increasing the sector of human life that is controlled by non-violent methods.

III

We may now attempt to apply the conclusions we have reached to a specific problem of philosophical "strategy." What can philosophy contribute to the solution of the most momentous problem the world is confronted with today—that of preserving peace?

Philosophy as a whole is definitely on the side of peace, not war. A philosopher may extol violence and compulsion, but he cannot do so without contradicting himself. For if one accepts his doctrine, it becomes superfluous, there is no need to bring violence and compulsion to bear upon someone who has submitted.

In any event, the case of the philosophers of violence—I may mention Nietzsche, Sorel, and Pareto—is by no means simple. They praise violence because they consider a certain non-violent regulation of human affairs immoral. Men are oppressed and exploited and tyrannized by the profiteers of the non-violent order. Violence is more honest, it openly proclaims itself for what it is. On the whole, therefore, we may say that these philosophies of violence really condemn a disguised form of violence rather than non-violence pure and simple. Such a critique of traditional social and moral systems may be reckless in its exaggeration, but it is not as inconsistent as a straight praise of violence for its own sake.

Philosophy as such, then, will always be "for" peace. But what can it do for peace, here and now?

The greatest contribution the philosopher can make does not consist in proclaiming the supreme value of peace, or in asserting that peace can be attained by the universal observation of the principles of justice and non-violence. Such general dicta are true in every situation, but what we need *now* is some advice on what progress we can make *now* to make peace more secure. Obviously, such "strategic" advice is not expected from the philosopher alone; statesmen, political scientists, economists,

etc., also should make proposals. There is one respect, however, in which the philosopher's advice will differ from theirs, that is, the philosopher is interested, not only in the fact of peace, but also in its genuineness, the spirit in which it is observed. The main thing for him is whether a certain settlement is merely enforced by compulsion and fear, or whether it evidences a spirit of fairness and responsibility.

In order to give advice that is really helpful, the philosopher must first survey the world scene and assay the strength of the factors that influence the chances of peace. Unfortunately, the picture he will see is not an attractive one.

Some aspects of the situation are familiar to everyone today. Man now possesses instruments of destruction far more powerful than at any time before, these instruments, moreover, are being perfected all the time, with the prospect that war will be more destructive, the later it breaks out. Of public record, too, are the efforts to prevent the manufacturing of these atomic instruments of destruction, and the small progress they have made so far.

There is a widespread feeling that an atomic convention, even if it were generally adopted, would not really ward off the danger. For if war broke out between major powers, they would conceivably start making and using atomic weapons even if such weapons had been successfully outlawed prior to the conflict. To be sure, self-restraint due to fear of reprisals is conceivable, in the case of the atomic bomb, however, such self-restraint is less likely because the first party who uses it may attain such an initial advantage that he no longer need worry about reprisals. Hence, danger of a super-blitz attack without warning—and of a “preventive” super-blitz to forestall it. Since neither conventions outlawing atomic weapons nor hopes of self-restraint hold any real promise, people's thoughts concentrate more and more upon the possibility of making sure that no armed conflict should henceforth break out.

Is it possible to make sure that there will be no armed conflicts from now on? The risk is obviously so much greater that reluctance to start a war may also be hoped to be greater. But is this sufficient? There have always been wars; can it be assumed that man will abandon one of his deeply ingrained behavior patterns over night, only because it would be reasonable to do so? Decisions to start wars have always been unreasonable; yet the habit has persisted.

And then, is there no terrific ideological cleavage among “Communi-

nist" and "Capitalist" states? We may assume that no war will break out for *purely* ideological reasons—*i.e.*, due to preference of different social systems. But it is undeniable that clashes of interest can be greatly aggravated by ideological differences. Ideologies are powerful instruments in building up "we" and "they" stereotypes.

More important than ideological differences are, to my mind, "psychological gradients." I speak of a "psychological gradient" where propensity for a certain kind of behavior is greater in one participant in a situation than in another. Between totalitarian and non-totalitarian groups, there is always a psychological gradient. For instance, the totalitarian group will always have a high propensity to enforce its will, while this propensity is low in non-totalitarian groups. Hence, totalitarian countries pursue a clear cut, "absolute" course in their policy: those who live in their orbit always know what is expected of them, even though this prescribed behavior is subject to drastic and sudden changes. For those who live in a non-totalitarian regime, there are always various alternative courses of action which are recognized as legitimate.

It is easy to see that a psychological gradient of this kind renders the adjustment of divergent wills extremely difficult. From the point of view of the non-totalitarian party, for instance, all compromises with the totalitarian party must appear essentially unstable, because he is given to understand that the other party can only consider as "normal" and "stable" a situation in which his, the totalitarian's, will is enforced.

How can we try, then, to make real progress toward the elimination of conflicts? It seems to me that it does not help either to ignore the fundamental difficulty due to the "psychological gradient," or to try to solve it by removing the gradient. We must seek to work out methods by which compromises can be made less precarious, although the psychological gradient continues to exist.

The methods I propose will look strangely unphilosophical for someone who wants to give advice in the name of philosophy. That is, I do not recommend any appeal to fundamental moral principles of non-violence, reasonableness, responsibility, justice, and so on. Such principles have a "strategic" application in a society not torn by a "psychological gradient." In a society like that of the great powers today, these principles are likely to have a divisive rather than integrating effect.

In the kind of situation in which genuine compromise, based upon equally held concepts of fairness, seems impossible, progress can be ex-

pected only from a regulation of behavior by cut and dried, externalized rules. The great powers cannot hope to agree on a basis of common moral principles. But they may agree on a set of rules concerning outward behavior which can be applied without too great difficulties of interpretation.

I am thinking of the definition of a *status quo* which all powers will pledge themselves to respect, especially by undertaking to refrain from certain overt acts such as sending troops or projectiles into a foreign country by unilateral decision, for whatever reason. The more "objectively" the kind of forbidden behavior is described, the better. What we have to aim at are overt acts, not attitudes and motives.^a The kind of convention I have in mind would forbid (1) any overt act violating a *status quo*, (2) any unilateral reprisal impinging upon the *status quo* in case of alleged violation.

The main advantage of such a course is not that it automatically excludes conflicts. It is always possible for a power to violate a pledge it has given. A convention of the kind described can remain in force only so long as all parties sincerely desire to avoid conflicts "if possible." The convention would show them how it is possible by doing away with certain vague formulas that make aggressive wars appear legitimate. Moreover, a pact of this kind would make it much easier to recognize the aggressor and thereby to isolate him.

Obviously, a definition of the *status quo* and of its overt violation would not be sufficient in itself. Other international instruments concerning disarmament, atomic control, and the modification of the *status quo* by genuine agreement also are necessary. Precisely because unilateral reprisals are excluded or at least greatly curtailed, it is necessary

^aComment by Ralph T. Flewelling

This statement seems in general to be in contradiction to the theme of the paper—the interest of philosophy in the genuineness of the spirit of peace. I should like to know how, this genuineness being wanting, a promise to refrain from overt acts would be effective. Perhaps we should, in addition to obtaining consent to certain general propositions, aim also for correct attitudes and motives by a stricter application of democracy among ourselves. After all, the great issue is that between Democracy and Totalitarianism, and we cannot maintain both principles without having a house divided against itself. The most convincing argument abroad will be the practice of democracy in such a way as to demonstrate its efficacy for general well being. To do this we should recommend the discarding of our own lingering Totalitarianism and the application of the democratic principle everywhere, in politics, business, school, and society. It seems to me important that with all other safeguards attended to it is the distinct task of philosophy, to create changes of attitude and motive, on which a genuine spirit of peace is dependent.

to make sure that the very first attack cannot in itself bring the decision, and the prohibition of unilateral reprisals should not benefit the aggressor. But these are questions of detail. The main point I wanted to make is that, in the present world situation, the greatest progress toward peace can be expected from specific instruments of international law.^b

Having set out to give "philosophical" advice, I rather deplore that my final conclusion is non-philosophical, at least in appearance. The reason is the regrettable condition of the world today. Where there exists no common set of principles upon which to base an agreement, we cannot act as if there were one. We have to take recourse to the "second best" method, as the realist Plato has suggested.

^bComment by Harry B. Friedgood

One cannot agree entirely that the status of our culture today is such that there is no other practical course of action. History teaches that outbreaks of violence between individuals, as well as between nations, continue to occur in spite of law enforcing agencies on civic and international levels. Therefore, I would go one step further in suggesting that the powerful agencies of communication (*i.e.*, press, radio, and cinema) be enlisted in a worldwide, mighty effort at educating statesmen, as well as the peoples whom they govern, in the primary motivations that lead to conflict. An understanding of the dynamic forces, which lead to the externalization of unconscious psychological conflicts, may tear the veil from rationalizations that appear to justify amoral and unethical acts of aggression. The media of propaganda have been used in the past most successfully by those who sought to promote aggression (*e.g.*, the Nazis). It is about time that we learned a lesson from these perversers of the instruments of propaganda, and utilized them for exactly the opposite purpose.

CHAPTER XXXI

International Tension and the Teaching of Ethics

By A CAMPBELL GARNETT

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NO ONE IS LIKELY to question the statement that there are moral issues involved in, and underlying, international tensions. But it is doubtful whether many will look to Ethics, the theory of the moral life, for much help in their solution. The reasons for this are varied.

One reason is the tendency of much philosophical discussion to spend itself in a competitive display of intellectual acuteness and erudition in thrashing over old straw with the flails of a technical vocabulary. It is true that ideas cannot fruitfully be separated from their history and that criticism cannot avoid technicalities. But philosophers need to be particularly careful in these days of dynamic ideological friction to show the relevance of the history and technicalities they discuss to the living issues of the present and to select for attention the ideas that clearly have such relevance. It is true that a scholar does his best work when he follows a line of inquiry whithersoever his interests lead him. But the scholar who allows his major interests and consequent activity to wander into by-paths that have no relevance to the issues of contemporary life, at a time when civilization itself is in danger, is failing in his obligations to society. Philosophy, therefore, and Ethics in particular, must be studied and taught with special attention to the moral issues that disturb the social order of our day.

A second and more important reason for ignoring ethical theory is the unfortunate fact that there is so much disagreement on ethical questions. There is never an international dispute in which both sides do not claim to be in the right. Part of this difference arises from the fact that

both parties lack a proper knowledge of the facts on the other side, part from the natural tendency to pay chief attention to one's own grievances and ignore those of the opposition. But the difference often goes deeper. It involves fundamental moral judgments, basic questions of moral theory—the nature of social justice, the rights of property, the rights of labor, the right to *lebensraum* and “a place in the sun,” the right to occupy unused lands and exploit their resources, the right of backward peoples to freedom from such exploitation, the right to political liberty and self-determination. These claims to incompatible “rights” involve conflicting views on ultimate questions of value and human obligation.

In the present day the traditional differences of ethical theory are further complicated by the widespread doubt as to whether there is any rational basis for ethical propositions at all, and by the almost equally disastrous conviction that such propositions are entirely relative to the period and culture within which they are made. If this is the case, then ethical theory is irrelevant to the solution of international tensions. The rival claims of the disputants to have right on their side, in so far as they are not due to ignorance or the ignoring of part of the facts, are simply a part of the clash of cultures and there is no court of appeal beyond them. Where the tension is one between people of different cultures, this type of ethical relativism may try to relieve the tension by arguing that it is meaningless for either side to try to apply its conceptions of right and wrong to the issue. But this removal of moral considerations leaves the issue to a compromise based on whatever common interest can be found and, if this is not possible, then to the arbitrament of force. The really difficult and dangerous international tensions are, however, just the ones where compromise based on common interests is not possible, there being no sufficiently strong interests in common. Thus relativism fails just where it is needed. If ethical theory is to help, it must therefore either overcome its relativism or find some basis of moral assertion that will have significance in spite of it.

A third reason why many doubt the value of ethics in the solution of these problems is the fact that ethical principles are in practice so largely ignored by people who accept them in theory. This, however, is not such a serious objection as it may seem. It is not claimed that moral ideas dominate human conduct, but it can scarcely be denied that they are an important influence. This is shown by the anxiety of every government that goes to war to convince its people that its cause is just. Warfare calls for

moral resolution, and an army fights half-heartedly if, as in the case of the Italians in the recent conflict, it has little faith in the justice of its cause. Further, no people likes to have the actions of its government condemned in the court of international public opinion. And the United Nations has provided a sounding board for the expression of such opinion. Thus a common moral judgment is by no means devoid of influence. The difficulty is to formulate it. Part of this difficulty is in making the relevant facts impartially known, but that problem is beyond the scope of this paper. The other part of the difficulty is to find a common ethical court of appeal. This is the task of ethical theory; and it calls for some way of overcoming or bypassing contemporary relativism.

A fourth reason for ignoring ethics is the fact that each party to a dispute is apt to rest its moral case on the dogmatic assumption of principles narrowly based on a single ethical tradition. Even the moral philosopher too often confines his inquiry almost entirely to one tradition. Textbooks on Ethics too often are content to trace the sources of their ideas to European philosophers and the Hebrew and Christian scriptures. They may criticize those ideas, but the criticism itself is apt to be based on the assumption of our own typical "democratic" and mildly "Christian" scale of values. An ethic based on the accepted ideals of a single culture is apt to be inapplicable, however, to problems raised by the clash of cultures, or by such a revolt against the cultural tradition as is manifested in Soviet Russia.^a

For these reasons *the study of Ethics today should be based upon an examination of the development of moral ideas in all the world's great cultures*. Even elementary courses should begin with such a study. Out of such investigations three conclusions of major importance emerge. First, there is a remarkable similarity between the ideals expressed in the

^aComment by Harry B. Friedgood.

Professor Garnett has directed his scholarly attention to an aspect of philosophical thought which takes up the problem of aggression at the point where psychology seems to leave it. The truth or falsity of a moral issue cannot be defined exclusively in terms of the dynamics of the personality because the superego reflects necessarily the ethics of the culture after which it is modeled. The superego may, in certain circumstances, fail to react unfavorably toward social forces leading to aggression. Thus, the social code of a child, reared within the authority of a fascist state, would perforce exhibit traits characteristic of violent nationalism, a circumstance that would engender the very same aggressive attitudes that the superego might be expected to hold in check were it to react in orthodox fashion. These views are in accord with those expressed by Professor Garnett in the statement noted.

It seems to me that our thinking has not yet penetrated the circumference of the problems concerned with the nature of mankind's moral consciousness.

classical moral literature most cherished by the people of all the great civilizations—Far Eastern, Indian, and Occidental-Near Eastern. Second, there is an enormous difference between these ideals and the primitive moral ideas out of which each of the moral traditions arose. Third, this development has been due to the independent thinking of morally sensitive and critically thoughtful teachers in each of the great traditions with very little interchange of ideas between the different civilizations.

This means that the course of moral development is neither an accidental development of customs nor an arbitrary following of leaders. It is due first to the critical analysis of their experience of value and obligation by morally sensitive thinkers. And it is due, in the second place, to the fact that when these thinkers have given expression to their insights, their hearers, though often at first reluctant and opposed, have been driven by their own thinking to acknowledge the validity of those insights. Thus the ideals that have been incorporated in the classical moral literature of all peoples are thoroughly well validated insights into the requirements of the moral nature of man.

In all these great ethical traditions there is emphasis on the dignity and value of the individual human personality, on his moral responsibility, on the ideal of impartiality and unselfishness in human relations, on the wrong of arbitrary distinctions.^b Principles approximating the

^bComment by Paul A. Schilpp

I am very much afraid that Professor Garnett's argument is either a case of oversimplification or of—perhaps justifiable—wish-thinking (but wish-thinking just the same). It is not merely the practice of Soviet Communism and both the theory *and* practice of Fascism of every description which seem to put the state (or the social group) ahead of the value of the "individual human personality." But in certain forms of Buddhism also it seems that the ultimate nature of the Good and therefore the aim of a good person is to lose his individual human personality in the totality and individuality-denying and abnegating character of Nirvana.

Ethics, I fear, will become more relativistic instead of less so, the more ethical investigation proceeds to study the basic facts of human conduct. Yet, perhaps, the relativistic could be bypassed by an ethics of *method* instead of an ethics of—supposedly identical—standards. A methodological ethics which would emphasize the procedural function of creating constantly new proximate objectives of human behavior, might answer our need for something universal, while at the same time leaving the door wide open to the finality of the moral judgment of each (relatively) free moral agent. Thus we could have unity of methodological procedure while at the same time preserving the variety of individual and specific moral judgments. This possibility could be all the more fruitful, if a scientific analysis of human nature could help us to see and to come together on the unique features which characterize the human being, no matter where found.

Professor Garnett's reply

The reference to Communist and Fascist exceptions may be met by drawing the dis-

Christian concepts of "the brotherhood of man," of love to one's neighbor, of the "Golden Rule," can be found enshrined by all the great religions. And these principles can be clearly seen to have been attained and acknowledged by reflection on the reaction of the inner consciousness of value and obligation as it has responded to the social relationships in which the thinker has found himself. They have been acknowledged as ideals and obligations (even though they have been all too often denied in practice) because the inner moral consciousness demands their acknowledgment of those who reflect, even when private desires and common practices run counter to them.

Here, then, is the ground on which relativism may be bypassed (it not refuted) and a means by which the other weaknesses of ethics as a factor in release of international tensions can be overcome.^c The primary aim of the study of ethics should be to reveal the gradual emergence of

unction between a gradually emerging consensus and general and final agreement. The former may exist without the latter. It is manifest in the *trend* of ethical thought away from the limitations of primitive group mores to universalistic ethical ideals and in the likeness of ideals in the classical literature in which each of the great ethical traditions culminates. The reality of such a trend of thought is not to be called in question by pointing to the failure of mankind to put the ideal into practice, nor by the emergence of reactionary movements seeking to justify striking departures from the ideal, nor by occasional thinkers facing special political or personal problems, such as Machiavelli, Nietzsche, and Marx.

The reference to Buddhism may be met by noting the distinction between the good considered as an otherworldly beatitude and as a this-worldly obligation. The same Buddhism which interprets the former in terms of Nirvana interprets the latter in terms of the Eightfold Noble Path and defends the dignity of man by asserting that the true aristocracy is not of blood or caste but of simple spiritual worth.

^cComment by Rudolf Allers.

It is gratifying to realize that Doctor Garnett feels so strongly concerning the hopelessness of all relativistic approaches. The failure of relativism to contribute effectively to mutual understanding and harmony is, obviously, not an argument which might be viewed as philosophically relevant. But it is a factual warning, it is a reason for self-examination.

It is, however, not enough that people become aware of the fundamental agreement among their most basic moral convictions. Such an agreement might still be viewed as a mere chance product of history and as relative to the state of civilizations. As long as this attitude prevails, there is always the way open for some particular moral system to consider itself as "more advanced," as the "ethics of the future," and therefore to despise all other systems. We must find ways and means to anchor firmly our moral principles in a well-founded metaphysics. Man's mind feels not at home in an intellectual world where one part is unrelated to the other. It is not to science we can look for achieving such an unity, since science does not and cannot know of human ends. If there is any hope at all for final agreement, it can be fulfilled only by the common endeavors of metaphysics and ethics.

a world consensus of moral judgment, a body of ideals endorsed by the reflective moral consciousness of mankind and embodied in the classical literature of every great civilization—the literature which has come to be most cherished because it most clearly and fully enshrines the spiritual aspirations of a people.

Ethics can function in the release of international tensions if it can show the peoples of the world that their most cherished aspirations and fundamental moral convictions are essentially the same. In doing so it will go far to create that mutual respect which is the basis of trust and goodwill. It will establish a standard for moral judgments on the conduct of governments which, in spite of the relativism of critical philosophers, the people of the world will respect. It will establish a standard that is independent of any particular culture. And it will remove from the study of moral philosophy the stigma of a pursuit of historical irrelevancies and disputation over terminological technicalities.⁴

⁴Comment by Henry N. Wieman

I agree with all that Mr. Garnett says as far as it goes, but there are other conditions, outside the field of ethics itself, which render ethical principles ineffective in guiding action in the world today. When powerful creative forces are at work in human life for which ethical principles have not yet been clearly and precisely and comprehensively formulated, one can live a model life according to accepted moral principles, only if he is sheltered from those creative forces and does not get caught in their twisting and transforming power.

According to Toynbee, the basic order of human existence is undergoing radical transformation from the human level achieved in primitive society to some other level as yet unattained and unknown. The period of civilization and of history, he says, in contrast to primitive society and prehistory, is necessarily unstable and indeterminant. Therefore (he himself does not draw this conclusion so far as I know), no final and determinant normative order applies to man precisely and comprehensively as he undergoes this transformation.

Ethical principles do certainly apply to human life, but when rightly discerned and correctly formulated, they are specifications of the way we must act to meet the demands of the creativity in our midst that is working to make us into something which we have not yet become. We are like the adolescent in his most chaotic state, midway between boy and man. Since he is neither the one nor the other, he cannot live according to the norm of either. The relatively disorganized state of his personality and the unformed impulses which he himself does not understand, make it difficult to put the general moral principles into such form as to cover his case precisely, and comprehensively. Doubtless there are moralists who disagree with this, but they lack sympathetic understanding and insight into the complexity of concrete situations. All this does not release the adolescent from living according to moral principles as best he can, but it does indicate creative and coercive forces working upon him which make his morality somewhat more uncertain and indeterminant than a more stabilized order of life might be.

The test by which we can know whether a moral principle is rightly formulated and genuine, and how to make it more precise if it calls for greater precision, is to study

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the demands of the creative process because moral principles are precisely the formulations of these demands

If it can be shown that ethical principles derive their authority from a creative power whence all the good of life must come, and that the operations of this creativity can be studied by the several sciences, each within its own area, to discover what these operations require in the form of human behavior, if it can be demonstrated that the sanction of moral principles is the sufferings and destructions that ensue when we resist the demands of this creativity, then ethics may become potent and effective in dealing with international and other problems of our age and of all ages

Ethics can help solve the problems of our time not only (nor even primarily) by demonstrating to the diverse peoples of the world that they all have in their several traditions the same identical principles. Rather it must be demonstrated to them that they all—we all—are in the grip and the coercive power of a process which will either destroy us or transform us, that this process in our midst demands certain forms of conduct, that the ultimate sanction and authority of ethical principle is not our several traditions, our aspirations, or our wise men, but is the creative power that sustains us, creates us, and gives us our humanity, that our sufferings and troubles are like those of the fish when it was being transformed into an animal of the dry land, or like the animal in transition to the level of primitive society before "the urban revolution" initiated civilization, that we are on our way to a city that human eyes have not seen and human hands will never build but which may be built by atomic and cosmic power. If anything like this is true to fact and can be so demonstrated to men, ethics will become a power in shaping the course of human life.

CHAPTER XXXII

War and the Human Community

By BAKER BROWNELL

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I Culture Without Context

IT IS "THE VOICE" Barbara Ann leans over the radio receiver as if her fourteen years of life culminated in this bit of listening. Tomorrow a thousand other Barbara Anns will assail the doorways where "The Voice" is scheduled to make a personal appearance. They will swarm across the orchestra, mob the platform, plead for autographs and souvenirs, capture fragments of personal accoutrements. These devotees of "The Voice" are trying to relate its thin significance to other clusters of experience in their world, to bring it home, and because such contextual relationships under these conditions are forced and fragmental, "The Voice" in effect makes for craziness, distraction, and a life of non-relevance.

"The Voice" is not a man singing, except by inference. Barbara Ann does not know him. She has not talked with him. "The Voice" sings on no occasion, except the scheduled hour on the machine, not about anything in particular except in terms of standardized clichés. Though "The Voice" is indeed a sensuous experience, it is withdrawn from the matrix in which it normally would occur. It is out of normal context, detached from the people and the events amid which Barbara moves. It is bare, stripped sound, a Euclidian diagram of sound that lacks the relevance to things, folks, times, places that alone can make it concrete. "The Voice" is characteristic of a culture where a man with a function in the complicated social organization becomes increasingly only that function and no more. A man working becomes solely a "hand" or employee. A man on a farm, as Emerson said, becomes solely a farmer. The waitress,

or the college student, the technician, the banker, or the milkman is an anonymous specialized, operative nucleus and little more

We live in a culture increasingly without context. We face Barbara Ann's dilemma, and though we may mask it in reticence and propriety, we even more than she engage in non-relevant experience. Nor do we have her enthusiasm in trying to give it relevance. "The Voice," the "hands," the "masses," the "face," the "sex," the values of "art," the privileges of "capital," the rights of "labor," an endless list of abstractions is used more and more to substitute segregated function for the rich variation of contextually concrete life. Such abstractions, of course, have always been a necessary part of any structural thinking, and always will be. But when they are treated as remote universals segregated from their relevant detail and concreteness—a treatment common in philosophical thinking from Plato to modern times—they become hardly universal but fragmental, irrelevant bits that have lost their appropriate context.

Whatever the rationale of the interrelationships of these abstractions may be, they are likely nowadays to enter our experience isolated and lonely. They belong to no unified situation, for the unity of life so far as we can appreciate it is less in logic than in context. In effect, they are promiscuous, heterogeneous details of a disordered life. This disorder of experience in association with a massive, logico-mechanical organization beyond the scope of any human being's experience is characteristic of modern culture.

Context is the relevant detail in any situation. It is the clustering of attributes, descriptive data, relevant facts, and interests in so far as a thing having context is significantly in a situation of some sort. It may be the relevance of custom, of emotion, of biology, of accustomed contiguity, or anything else of textual character. So long as there is significant association of some sort and appropriateness in a situation there is context. A voice would normally be, let us say, the voice of a human being, a young man, blue eyed, one's brother talking to his father at dinner, and so on. When it is removed from familiar clusters of relevant detail and is presented alone or amid alien and irrelevant circumstances, it becomes fragmental and abstract. It comes, as it were, without context.

In this sense our culture is without context. The customs of people and the content of living are caught in an increasing flood of things that pour in from many directions. They have no time to lodge in our lives or to be incorporated in a living structure. They drift by in a tumultuous,

Heracleitan river, and other bits and novelties or repetitious fragments of debris, flotsam, sodden leaves, and swirling sand displace them. This lack of homogeneity in the contents of our experience is not unrecognized by modern writers of imagination. What order the modern world may have seems not within life but outside of it. What controls may govern living seem not within our human limits and appreciations but beyond them. From within, living seems compulsive, scattered, disintegrative. Our experience is uncategorized, or so it seems; our world, though more organized externally perhaps than ever before, still comes upon us in jolts and fragments. Its effect so far as the human being, his family, his human community is concerned, is disintegrative. Thus the human enterprise, for many a modern poet, as the earlier Eliot, is a futility, and human society, as for Robinson Jeffers, an increasing madness.

It is true of course that nothing in human culture actually is isolated. The world presents itself plurally, and no moment or bit of being is without companions. These accompaniments, miscellaneous though they may be, are a context in a sense, but they may not be significant context. Significant context contributes to human continuity and value, to the clarity, import, and integrity of the contextual focus. Context thus is significant, and cultural context is in the long run significant of human value.

If cultural context is human in its reference, this human significance in turn depends on organic character or integrity. Context relates to the human being as an operational, personal whole. Though the isolated specializations of operation and experience which mark the modern era usually are embedded deeply in a complex organization of some sort, such as the big government, the big university, the big corporation or business, the big area of research, the army, the labor union, professional or trade association, broadcasting company, church, or baseball league, or the complex pattern of the great city, this large pattern of organization is beyond the limits of concrete, human experience. It is appreciatively irrelevant. Though efforts are made educationally to extend the range to include what would be all relevant material, the race has become hopeless. With limited capacities modern man is trying to incorporate in himself what is really an unlimited, if not infinite field of expanding experience and operations. Or more likely he has given up before a disordered world. In any case the failure of the modern era has been devised in man's

own nature. Until he sees that his valid nature and value lie in these limitations and finds the relevant context of life in the integrity of life itself, he will continue the disastrous regress into disintegration and decay.

Under what conditions has a culture significant context? Three cumulative questions illuminate these conditions. The answer to them will at least indicate the kind and area of cultural life in which these conditions may be found.

Where in the culture are things related to each other in multiple and organic ways? Under what conditions, in other words, are the variegated and multifarious details of a situation integrated? In what situations do they most obviously belong together, with the integrity and coherence in experience which give the context relevance and above all concreteness?

Again, under what conditions is this organic situation brought within the limits of human acquaintance? This refers to the human aspect of cultural context. Not only is it integrated, it is also integrated in a human pattern and relevance.

Again, under what conditions is this context not only brought within human limits of acquaintance, but identified with human interest, value, and pattern to the extent that it becomes human fact? The human being, and for that matter human culture as well, incorporates its context into its own nature, thus enriching itself and giving to a contextual situation the ultimate relevance and concreteness of human reality. "The Voice" in a truly contextual situation, for example, becomes someone's voice, someone seen and known. It achieves, as it were, human concreteness. Where and under what conditions does this identification take place? The answer, at least a major answer, to this and the preceding questions is the hub about which this paper turns. Our culture is without context. What then is conditional to the creation of a relevant and significant context? What shall we do to be saved?

II The Community and Its Context

The answer is the human community. Though no sole nor complete answer is possible in this complex, querulous problem, the community more than any other is conditional to cultural context. The destiny of

the human community—and its survival no longer can be taken for granted—is central in the enrichment and continuing significance of human life.

For the community is, or should be, the social counterpart of the diverse, but organically related functions of the human being. The variegated interests and abilities of human living find in the community coherent pattern. The reciprocal realities of the man and his community, one of which without the other can hardly be called fully human, are bound together in this joint, flexible, but irrevocable compact. It is a compact made in nature. The violation of it, whether in history or in modern, urban, technological culture carries the penalty of disintegration and death.

Man is and should be a general purpose creature, multiple in his interests and functional operations. The community is the way whereby those multiple functions are made organically whole. When Plato says that "human nature is not twofold or manifold, for one man plays one part only,"¹ he lays the ground ideologically not only for the oligarchies, class systems, and slavery of the past, but the sterile specializations, frustrations, and mass organizations of the present. The community, at least as it is considered here, is the repudiation of this tendency in thinking.

It is not enough to define the community, as many sociologists do, as any area of common interest. It is not enough to say, as does MacIver, that a community is "any area of common life, village, town, or district, or country, or even wider area."²

Not can the special interest groups, the clubs, the teams, the trade associations, the professional organizations, the colleges, the classes, the service groups, and so on, be included among true communities. These, it is true, may be displacing the community and even in the rural regions, as J. H. Kolb shows,³ becoming the substitutes for community life. Unless they are able to absorb to a great extent the diverse functions of a whole life, however, they remain special interest groups, not communities. Groups such as the Farmers Union and the cooperatives in some areas have done this, it is true, they have extended their common interest to the multiple functions of life, but this is not the history of most groups of the kind.

¹Plato, *The Republic*, III, 397E.

²R. M. MacIver, *Community*, The Macmillan Company, London, 1917, pp. 22, 107.

³J. H. Kolb and A. F. Wilczen, *Special Interest Groups in Rural Society*, Agricultural Experiment Station, University of Wisconsin, Research Bulletin 84, December, 1927.

The community has, it may be suggested, five essential characteristics⁴

(1) A community is a group of neighbors who know each other. It is a face to face or primary group. What Cooley⁵ said a quarter century ago of the importance of the primary group in establishing moral unity and common ideals is even more pertinent today. Living together, after all, is about the most important thing that human beings do. And living together in a context rich enough and organic enough to guarantee in one another's experience the whole cycle of the days, the years, the decades, the work life, the play life, the adventures, defeats, the expressive life and the recessive, in short the whole living experience, can well be about the only ultimate justification that we have for life. The primary group, and probably that alone, gives human experience its contextual coherence.

(2) It is a diversified group. The limit of diversification is the point where greater diversity, instead of enriching the organic potentialities of the group, tends to destroy them. The community will contain persons of both sexes, different ages, different skills and attitudes, and, up to a point, different cultural backgrounds. Such diversity is required in the development of the normal customs, functions, and progress of life. When the diversity, however, results in incommunicability because of language differences, or spiritual incommunicability because of conflicting religions or greatly unlike mores, traditions, and morals, the community dies or never succeeds in being born. Inner communicability is a condition of all community life, but in and of itself does not define the community or provide the positive thrust that creates it.

(3) It is a cooperative group. The positive thrust is found in the inner cooperation of the community. Such cooperation may have many forms. In every form it is joint action. Mutual aid is characteristic of any society, in the community it is also within the range and recognition and appreciative interest of persons in mutual cooperation.

(4) It is a group having a sense of "belonging" or group identity—a spiritual aspect of the community that is deep in the native values and contexts of human life. Security, "belonging," the life of one with another.

⁴This description of the community was first used by the author in *Life in Montana, As Seen in Lonepine, A Small Community*, prepared by Baker Brownell, Joseph K. Howard, Paul Meadows, The Montana Study, The University of Montana, 1945.

⁵C. H. Cooley, *Social Organization*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1922, Chapters III, IV, V.

give profound significance to man's existence. In subtle ways it is that significance.

(5) It is a rather small group, such as the family or small town, in which people can know each other as whole persons, not as functional fragments. Only in the small community may lives normally be whole, for only here can a person know another as an organic whole with multiple functions and relevant context, and only here can he behave as a whole person toward another. The cultural peripheries as well as the organic center of the community must be within the perceptive and appreciative ranges of its members. These are conditions that lie at the center of our cultural survival.

In the community of this sort, or something like it, is the sanction and structure of human freedom. It is a freedom, to be sure, not of the kind that comes of no responsibility, of social isolation and anonymity, of whim and irrelevant individualism, and of the fancies and desperate excursions into artistic and moral exoticism by frustrated souls. Freedom within the community is the freedom of a rather full functional life where the human being may control with considerable directness the instruments of his living. It is the freedom of the integrated life, not the license of the disintegrated. And with this freedom is associated the security and indeed the value of human life itself, at least as known in Western culture. So long as functional freedom and integrity are of primary importance to men the small community will remain.

In modern large scale organizations there is a powerful tendency to substitute other characters, patterns, and values for human ones. Symbols, abstractions, and other negotiable currencies tend to replace non-negotiable human contexts. In the social structure of great urban regions, in the economic structures of great industries, in the political structures of great states the opportunities for living initiative and control are ever reduced or are centered in fewer and fewer people. The decline of the small community is a critical part of that tendency. As the community declines, human life is broken down, as it were, into various bits, colors, and strands and then rewoven into the great anonymous fabric without a living pattern.

What will be the outcome? Modern large scale organization in its total effect is an attack not on civilization—the great organizations are in a sense our civilization—but an attack on the human being. Continued

attack surely will result not only in the destruction of the community of human life, but of the massive predators that feed upon it ^a

III *Community Disintegration*

The human community in Western culture is declining—in function, in structure, in quantity, in quality, and context. This to be sure is an extreme statement. Perhaps it is wrong, at least we may hope so. But the evidence is there to be observed. It is hard to escape its implications.

This decline refers of course not to the new thousands of forms of human association, around the innumerable foci of interest in modern society that glow briefly and die like the lights of fireflies. The essential human community, whether it be the functional family, the closely integrated occupational or religious group, the living village, the cooperative, open country neighborhood, or the socially conscious small town, is losing out. Its productive functions are declining. Excessive drainage from it of youth and wealth, lowered birth rates, and the diversion of the benefits of modern technology to other fields have reduced its status and influence. The distaste with which most professional men and intellectuals contemplate living there—which Granville Hicks⁶ has pointed out—is an indication that the true community has little vogue.

In some ways, to be sure, the new conditions that came during and after the First World War have integrated small communities, made

^aComment by Ralph T. Flewelling

Two questions arise. Can the small community (in Professor Brownell's sense) continue to exist under the new means of intercommunication? Further, is merger with a world community impossible?

Professor Brownell's reply

(1) The small community can exist only in so far as our technology and administration (particularly business administration) is reoriented (see Section V of the paper). The question is not so much whether it fits in our present large scale methods of administration and technological development, but whether the type of human culture which we consider precious can survive if the small community continues to suffer disintegration.

(2) I do not see that the true small community in any way is antagonistic to the possibility of a greater degree of world unity. In fact, I am very doubtful whether any sound or significant world unity can be obtained except as there is a revivification of the true community and the neighborhood group. This is the essential core of any goodwill or fellowship among men.

⁶Granville Hicks, *Small Town*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1946, Chapters II, III, XI, XII.

them aware of themselves, and through the agency of automobiles, better roads and the like, have made active community life more possible.⁷ But this is not the main tendency of the times. The withdrawal of productive functions from the family and the village to the factory and larger city, the shift in markets and financing, the consolidation of schools, the striking decline of church organizations and the small number of resident pastors in rural regions, the shift from homemade recreational activities to purchased recreation in larger towns, all are marks of general functional decline in the family, village, and open country communities.

In much the same way may be measured roughly the structural decline of the community. Empty bank buildings, schools, churches in thousands of villages, and the smaller family houses, apartments, and the increased hotel living all over the country indicate functional operations that no longer exist. The men and some of the women who would have carried on these functions have shifted to other things in the community or—in larger numbers—become attached to discrete functional operations in some larger centers. Millions of women and youth, on the other hand, have been left as functional derelicts, drifting half submerged, without full significance or responsibility.

Many a recent casualty among the communities of America could testify, if only in a hoarse whisper, that the new freedom of movement of rural people, new marketing methods, new technologies, and new cultural interests have threatened the basic existence of human community itself. The forces which brought about the substitution of a cash for a subsistence economy, forces which tend really to substitute abstract, exchangeable, symbolic currencies for the contextual concreteness of people and things, are not by any means all for human progress. These forces, which range from the demand for improved agricultural methods to the WPA, in spite of their many values, have also helped the larger town both to overreach and undercut the small community.

From this has arisen the great dilemma of modern times. Where the community is strong, wealth and technological development are relatively low. Where wealth and technological development are high, the community is weak and birth rates are too low to maintain the population. This differential is an exceedingly dangerous one. In it the decline of the community is inherent. Thousands of communities have been

⁷Dwight Sanderson, *Locating the Rural Community*, Cornell Extension Bulletin 413, June, 1939.

brought to the point of extinction, either through growth beyond the proper limits of a community or, more often by loss of resources, wealth, and people. From 1900 to 1930, the number of villages in the United States under 2500 decreased⁸ from 73,882 to 56,575; the hamlets under 250 decreased in number from 58,403 to 37,203.

In population the rural areas have been declining rapidly relative to the country as a whole. In a large part of the country the population of rural areas is declining absolutely. In 1910, the rural people were 54.3 per cent, while in 1940 they were only 43.5 per cent of our entire population. Considerably more than half of the 3072 counties of the United States are suffering a net loss in rural population,⁹ while 51 per cent of the counties are being depopulated.

In the contextual relevance of community life perhaps the most serious decline has taken place. The processes of making things have been segregated increasingly from the enjoyment or consumption of them. Once in the family and small community we were at least in some proximity to the productive process. Now mass industry with its over-all, horizontal organization, its assembly line methods, puts emphasis, so far as the human worker is concerned, on the making of fragments.

In the same way the highly professionalized art of the studios and galleries, the literary expressions, the expertly executed music, the shining crafts that characterize modern urban culture tend to remove the consumer or enjoyer from any significant participation in the process of its production. He buys the finished work, the picture, the poem, the right to see the baseball game, the right to listen to the concert, readymade from a distance, if only he has a negotiable currency at hand to make the purchase. In the mass sports, too, and in mass education, the human being is presented with the end products of a process.^b In the process

^bComment by Ralph T. Flewelling

Is it possible actually to show a decreased popular interest in literature, drama, music, athletics, and education under the present "mass" system? By this I mean actual participation in these activities by individuals.

Professor Brownell's reply

Quite possibly since the populations involved are very much larger under the present mass system, there may be statistically more participation of a sort. However, the fact remains that the dominant interest and prestige in all of these fields is only too likely to be the mass presentation for spectators and audiences rather than the participative creative activity of people within the arts or sports.

⁸See N. L. Sims, *Elements of Rural Sociology*, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York, 1944, p. 109. More recent estimates give still lower numbers.

⁹C. E. Lively and Conrad Taeuber, *Rural Migration in the United States*, Works Prog-

itself he has relatively little opportunity for relevant participation. This relevance of participation is the unique contribution of the community. The increasing loss of this contextual richness and meaning marks tragically the decline of the human community in Western culture. It is essentially a spiritual decline.

In the desperate adherence to dead myths, or the deliberate and fictitious resuscitation of them, the effort above all to keep the appearance of life without too much concern about the conditions behind it, is characteristic of religious form without religious community. For religion is primarily and in genesis communal, as Saint Paul says, and the community in turn, as Josiah Royce¹⁰ so eloquently has shown, is spiritual. Religious expression which is not a mark of the spiritual integrity of the community, but serves instead as a mask for it, or an openly divisive influence within it, is an indication of the decline both of the community and of religion.

IV. *The Urban Culture of Aggression*

The profound cleavage between family and community life, on the one hand, and urban life, on the other, has given rise to increasing differences between the two cultures in ideology, in psychological outlook, methods of operation, and in values. Although it is true that rural life in some ways is becoming urbanized and family life takes on the pattern and values of the market, the subway, and the comic strip, the essential character of family and community experience within its own nature is increasingly removed from that of our urban culture.

The urban man, who after all initiates most of the intellectual fashions and fantasies of these complex days, is increasingly indifferent to, or unaware of, the central value of the human community. He often confuses greater size and number with greater importance. His life is scattered across the shattering and complicated machine of the city.

Urban characteristics, says Georg Simmel,¹¹ are sophistication, intellectualism, and a money economy. The three are intimately related in

ress Administration, Research Monograph XIX, US Government Printing Office, 1939, Chapter III, pp. 60, 68.

¹⁰Josiah Royce, *The Hope of the Great Community*, New York, 1916.

¹¹Georg Simmel, *Die Grossstädte und das Geistesleben*, quoted in *A Systematic Source Book of Rural Sociology*, edited by P. A. Sorokin, C. C. Zimmerman, and C. J. Galpin, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1930, 1931, 1932, I, p. 242.

quality and psychic value. Urban minds, if such a generalization be permitted, comprehend a greater range and greater number of things. These things move at greater speed one after another, or simultaneously, through experience. Though this speed and quantity of experiences may be in part illusory, due to the irrelevant diversity of those things, the effect is the same. The mind must resort more and more to broad classifications in order to deal with the crowded situation. Thinking in terms of such classifications is necessary in order to create a workable, though perhaps fictitious order. It is necessary also because only the broadest abstractions, the commonest currency, are suitable for communication amid the extreme diversities and heterogeneities of that world. A money system reduces all things to one common quality and characteristic, their exchange value.⁶ Intellectuality in the same way abrogates the emotional textures, the unique qualities and individualities of things in order to systematize them in a common order. Sophistication is thus, as Simmel says, the acquired indifference of people to extreme diversity of the urban environment.

More important is the inevitable tendency in a crowded world to treat things only as members of general classes. Men become "labor" or "veterans" or "farmers" or "bourgeoisie" or "audience" or "public" or "commuters," or a thousand other class designations. We take them in classes, primarily in order to manipulate or control them in some way, or to adjust them as a group, so far as we can, to our interests and purpose. It is a calculating relationship. It is not friendship, impulsive goodwill, or love, nor is it enmity or anger, it is rational design. We must abstract and condense the massive experience, cast aside its wild and irrelevant contexts and emotional complexities, throw it into conceptual patterns, rationalize it. Our purpose in this is manipulative. Urban man has few or no relationships with whole human beings as such, he can behave only as a manipulator of a class of objects (or in defense against its encroach-

⁶Comment by Ralph T. Flewelling

This statement seems to overlook the benefits of a currency and suggests the return to barter.

Professor Brownell's reply

I do not mean, of course, that there should be no money system. I mean merely that the increasing emphasis upon the money system, as a kind of abstract coordination of all things, leads to the decline of human relationships so far as human beings are related to each other wholly and to the true community. Without a currency, of course, we could have no civilization at all in the present sense, and I for one would not think of abolishing it even if I could.

ments) and his efforts are directed toward the exploitation or use of those objects for the aggrandizement of his own interests.

The urban attitude, in other words, is aggressive. It is exploitative. The personal give and take and the mutuality of community living are replaced by anonymous power.

This aggressiveness is inherent in a money economy and an intellectualistic culture. It is inevitable in a mass society, but it should not be given exclusive emphasis. Our culture is infinitely complex, our society is pluralistic and many grouped, and many cogent interpretations of it are possible. Nevertheless the tendency to reduce human beings to classes of relatively undifferentiated objects, does favor a manipulative, power culture. The wide ranging conceptual continuity and control of the great machine is not in rhythm with the tough variegated richness of the small community. Community life is too slow, too encumbered with imaginative relevance, indeed too human to be "effective" in the mass operations of urban life. It is too human in the sense that the richness of human association and its lack of standardization limits the speed and facility of large scale organization and reduces its dynamic efficiency.

There is little doubt that urban life is restless, nervously unstable, aggressive, eagerly driving to dominance and unmitigated mastery. It is the seat of modern cultural and physical aggression.

The physical aggression of urban life may be remarked in wide areas both of domestic affairs and international relations. Historically the degree of this aggression has been something of a measure of the maturity of cities, but only in the industrial city has it reached the disastrous extremes of this day. These cities were, so to speak, born mature. It is well known that within the city social stratification is greater than in rural districts, that the conditions making possible the true community are rare if not entirely absent, and that the opportunities for the exploitation of one group by another are greater. But the extent to which the city is an agency of aggression and exploitation in respect to the rural regions is less well known—except among rural people.

The concentration of wealth and financial control in the cities, the differential freight rates, the discriminative price basing points, the tariffs, the urban management of national publications, radio systems, movies, chain stores, chain banks, wholesale houses, elevators, the tax structures bearing most heavily on the real estate and the tangible properties of the farmers, the corporation defined legally to the relative disadvantage

of home and family continuity, these need not be dealt with here. There is little doubt that the fifty-seven million rural people in the United States¹² or the seventy million living in localities of less than ten thousand population have lost the large measure of effective power and technological advantage that their numbers justify.

From the rural regions youth and wealth drain into the cities. Concerning this drainage O. E. Baker¹³ shows that in educational subsidies alone the rural districts of America contribute to the cities roughly \$1,260,000,000 each year. This is cost based on the decade of 1920-30, paid by the farmer for the rearing and education of children who leave the farm and return little to it in wealth or production. Other uncompensated costs, including two to three billion dollars in farm estates inherited by city and village people, five billion dollars in mortgage debts paid to non-farmers, and rentals paid to non-farmers, raise the total of wealth transferred from farms to the cities, in excess of that moving the other way, to about twenty-five billion dollars for the decade. This amounts to about one fifth of the gross value of farm crops. It represents inexcusable exploitation of rural life by an aggressive urban culture and economy.

Nor do the benefits in civilization seem to justify these sacrifices of rural and community interests. The dominating urban civilization of Europe and America can hardly be called a success.

The notorious crime rates, the moral delinquency, the terrifying increase in juvenile delinquency, insanity, neuroses, the personal and social disintegration, the excessive rates of drunkenness, suicide, divorce, and abortion are correlated with the increasing urbanization of life. No city of one hundred thousand people or more in the United States, except Salt Lake, anywhere nearly reproduces itself. And those who benefit most from urban culture, the professional and business groups, the commercial, cash farmers, the higher income groups, have the lowest birth rates. Only the lowest income groups and those in general on the poorest lands produce enough children to populate the country.¹⁴ The cycles of

¹²Paul H. Landis, *Population Problems*, American Book Company, New York, 1943, Chapter XIX.

¹³O. E. Baker, Ralph Boisodi, and M. L. Wilson, *Agriculture in Modern Life*, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1939, Chapter IV.

¹⁴Comment by Ralph T. Flewelling.

It might be fairly pointed out that from within these less privileged groups has sprung the greater number of professional, educational, and industrial leaders. There is some-

price inflation, boom and crash, the twenty-five million unemployed in America, the wild waste of resources, machinery, productive instruments, and power, the cycles of war and human misery, mass starvation, mass deportation, mass slavery, the sense of human insecurity, hatred, and doom, are also primarily urban in origin and character

Nor is it clear that urban Moscow is any less aggressive than New York, or London in the long run less aggressive than Berlin or Tokyo. Defenders of the urban pattern of living often assert that this aggressiveness comes from certain unfortunate policies within the system, not from the nature of the system itself. Thus British imperialism is said to be the aggressor, but nationalistic capitalism, though equally urban, is not, or Wall Street's capitalism is said to be aggressive while Moscow's communism is peaceful in intent. But the facts do not indicate these differences. Though the rural people of Russia compose eighty-three to eighty-nine per cent of the population, their representation in the Soviet government is only twenty-seven to twenty-eight per cent,¹⁴ and these representatives, appointed by the Party, in many cases are not peasants. As for the urban aggression of the Russian government, ask the peasant parties of Poland, Serbia, Bulgaria, the farmers of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the rural folk of eastern Germany and East Prussia, if they are any longer able to answer.

Meanwhile in the United States the march of the aggressive city continues. In the southeastern farm areas are 13.4 per cent of the nation's children and only 2.2 per cent of the nation's income.¹⁵ In the north-eastern non-farm areas are twenty-seven per cent of the nation's children and forty-two per cent of the nation's income.

This aggressive culture of urban life is inevitable so long as the city remains to a great degree predatory in nature, dependent for its power times that about the hardships of penury that nurses a great ambition.

Professor Brownell's reply

A society that lays the cost and the burden of raising children upon those least able to bear them is suffering from severe lack of balance and value. The tendency for our population to come more and more from those who are least equipped educationally, financially, and often, too, in health, to educate and train the young, means not that those young are inferior to others but merely that the state must carry more and more of a burden in educating them. Thus in one more way the significance and function of the family and small community decline and the centralized power of the state or of the federal government necessarily increases.

¹⁴Sorokin, Zimmerman, Galpin, *op cit*, III, p. 411

¹⁵Angus McDonald, *The New Republic*, 116, 19, May 12, 1947, p. 42

and cultural domination on what is largely an uncompensated exploitation. Since it has not the resources in itself to survive, nor the capacity to give back to a system as much as it takes out, it must continue to conquer or die. No one can say that the urban capitalism of New York, the urban imperialism of London and the urban communism of Moscow are not militaristic in temper and aggressive in intention. Berlin or Tokyo or London or Rome may be extinguished, but the aggressive culture and the military temper of our age will continue so long as power, production, and social control remain highly centralized in great cities. Final victory of one or another mass society will only intensify internal aggression and domestic exploitation.

In order to exist, the predatory city must expand at the expense of other regions. The competition for raw resources and for markets reduces not only the economy of its own hinterland to colonialism, but drives on into the world economy in a bitter struggle with other urban cultures for wider and wider domination. Mass wars and mass death are the inevitable correlate of the cosmopolitan culture. They may be internal wars of suppression and control or external wars of extermination. Though different in technique, timing, and drama, these wars amount to about the same thing in human consequence.

V Cultural Reorientation

Reorientation is necessary to the survival of Western freedom and culture. This means reorientation in behalf of the true community, and the restoration of the folk to the land in a balanced and stable relationship. Business and political leaders and nearly all of our professional men and intellectuals fail to face it. Often they do not dare face it. They have been seduced by bright, divisive cultures, specialized perfections, and privileges, glittering fragments, gadgets, readymade arts, and importations bought promiscuously without relevance to the basic making-using rhythm that is central in any good life. They live on the loot of a world where action tends to be solely instrumental and enjoyment solely receptive, the values of life and achievement will lie only in acquisition. In a world where the essential cycle of production and consumption is broken, or expanded far beyond the living operational range of a human being, there is decadence. Whether this cycle is broken in the arts or industry, in the sports or in education, or in reproduction and child care, the result

is the same. The fragmentation of these basic functions results in human disintegration and community decay. Only a reorientation in action and ideology can be effective toward survival.

The instruments of such a reorientation are not one but many. No one key reform—except a more general recognition of the problem—is sufficient. The instruments of reorientation are educational, technological, industrial, artistic, religious, social. A review of our entire culture is needed. A new world reinstated within human norms and values must be made. The problem well may be too great to be solved.

Educational reorientation should involve a new emphasis on community centered schools and colleges. Beyond that should be the development of education as a continuous and significant community function for all of the people of all ages all of the time. The school, as Bishop Grundtvig and the Danish Folk Schools have shown, should remain within the regional and occupational contexts to which the students belong. The interweaving of the educational with other functional processes of community life in a mutually cooperative pattern of action is even more important. The failure to use abilities of young people, the tendency to segregate them in the social vacuum of the campus removed from significant participation in the affairs of living, is one reason for the modern educational failure.

In its explicit and formal manifestations scholarship is more deeply involved in urban mentality and milieu than is our culture in general. Much of this cosmopolitanism, such as the free interchange of findings, is of great value in the growth of knowledge and tolerance. Other aspects of it, however, are corruptive. It is questioned in some quarters whether modern scholarship as a whole is good or bad in its effect.

The fragmentation of scholarship and science not only gives rise to sterile arrogance and vanity in many scholars, but makes for social and moral irresponsibility as well. Because they are segregated specialists without responsibility for critical decisions and the applications of their products to an outer world, the scientist, the scholar, and their derivatives, the analyst, the statistician, the research expert, the engineer, have become more and more available for purchase by the highest bidder. The buyer may be a government or a private corporation, a despot or a price racketeer. The new employee in any case does not determine policy. Whether it be an atom bomb or a V-bomb, a new plastic or an economic report to justify twenty-two cent milk, the product of scholarship is likely

to be socially and humanly irrelevant, if not contradictory, to the often stated ideals of scholarship. Scholarship under these conditions is no longer man thinking with the relevance of human aspirations. It is the acquisition of a product and the sale of it. The character and the social impact of that product is determined far more by the purchaser than by the scholar.

This transformation of scholars into hacks is inherent in the extreme fragmentation and specialization of modern scholarship. Through it scholarship becomes an important instrument in what probably are the most powerful aggressive tendencies in all human history. Under these conditions the scholar as such cannot be a man thinking, but only a specialized fragment of a man thinking. We have learned fairly well that a man without thought is dumb and helpless. Modern educators have yet to learn, however, that thought without manhood is vicious and disintegrative.

Reorientation in scholarship should involve relevant and significant experience in the whole of life. It involves new loyalties and new objectives, the one centered in the human community rather than in the individual career, the other based not on acquisition and the fragmentation of data but on the integration of values and the functional control of living. Truth is more than a report; it is an organization of values. Even Lynd's¹⁶ excellent proposals for the reorientation of scholarship do not escape the fatal dilemma imposed by the urban culture which he seems to assume. The dilemma arises from the fact that modern scholarship is not keyed to the human being, and the fact that the scholar, like other men, is limited. The requirements of modern cosmopolitan scholarship are two: an almost infinite fragmentation and specialization of knowledge, and consolidation of that knowledge in an operational whole integrated and relevant to personal responsibility. But the two are not compatible. In his quest of the one, the urban minded scholar inevitably misses the other. Modern scholarship in consequence is largely a failure.

Reorientation in technology is of course closely related to reorientation in scholarship. It involves orienting technology in behalf of the small community as it now is oriented in behalf of the urban centers. This cannot easily be done, and in any case no one in his senses would advocate the withdrawal of all technological benefits from the urban centers. It is their dominance, the lack of balance, the drainage into them of rural

¹⁶Robert S. Lynd, *Knowledge For What?*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1939.

life and resources without commensurate return that is corruptive and dangerous. The proper balance, whatever it may be, will be attained in great part through technological reorientation. That reorientation is now feasible, say engineers and educators such as Arthur E. Morgan, Morris L. Cooke, Ovid Eshbach, and the directors of The Tennessee Valley Authority. In the TVA, centered operationally around highly divisible and flexible electric power and centered spiritually in the folk of the Valley in their families, farms, and communities, the greatest experiment of modern times in the reorientation of technology has been successfully carried out. The gasoline engine, the automobile, the small farm tractor, the modern productive machines for household use, the deep freeze lockers and many more devices favoring a distribution of production and productive property, make ever more feasible a community centered technology.⁶ The problem is made difficult less by the barriers of technology and management efficiency than by the industrial and financial controls now manipulated for rather narrow urban interests. The disastrous conflict between big business and big government arises here. Government sometimes takes the part of the agricultural industry and of the urban worker, but less often of the small community, village, or family as such. Big business supports the interests of the urban financier. It is a battle of giants, but the interests of human beings are trampled under foot.

In the problem of urban aggression this technological, industrial, and political reorientation is all of a piece. The situation is complicated and difficult, and the prognosis either for Russia or for America is not very favorable. The stake, however, is survival. It justifies any effort, however dark the hope.

Reorientation in the arts, religion, and social expression becomes, as in other fields, primarily a problem of making the human community once more central. A powerful folk movement in the arts and to a lesser

⁶Comment by Ralph T. Flewelling

The return to the farm, a movement which should be highly commended and encouraged by the state, still raises the question: Would a return to the farm restore the community of family life of my boyhood? Obviously not, with the presence of good roads, automobiles, the village cinema, and the city an hour away, with the added leisure made possible by the tractor.

Professor Brownell's reply

I do not for a moment advocate return to the farm life of our grandfathers' days. What I am trying to say is that we must attain a greater differential development in which the advantages of urban life are not entirely lost, but in which the central values of the true community and the contact with nature are maintained.

extent in religion has been developed in many areas within recent decades. The modern movement in poetry beginning as something of a folk movement with the foundation of *Poetry, A Magazine of Verse*, in Chicago in 1912, the new functionalism and cleanness of architecture beginning with Louis Sullivan and Frank Lloyd Wright in the Midwest in the decades before and after 1900, the powerful though Dionysian movement in American popular music, ragtime, jazz, swing, beginning perhaps among southern Negro folk and moving up the river, the violence and folk enthusiasm of popular dancing, the new movements in American drama and painting, are at least in part folk movements. Beyond these are less recognized, but fully as significant, artistic and spiritual expressions—the beauty and dance of machines, the operational forms and rhythms of the participative sports, the skilled crafts, the home arts. Though partly rural, partly urban in actual situation, their regionalism, their hospitality to the amateur, their naive power and authority make them source expressions, flowing muddy and mixed but powerful, from human beings and their communities.

Thus in the arts and the expressions of the human spirit, in technology, and even to some degree in industry and education, there are indications of reorientation toward the human being. In the Rural Life Conference of the Catholic Church, in the Friends Church, and here and there sporadically in some of the other churches, there is at least some identification of the spiritual life with the human community.⁶

⁶Comment by Ralph T. Flewelling

The author's criticism of the neglect of human values is to be commended at every point, and I should like him to discuss at greater length effective methods for the decentralization of industry, education, social activities, and even religion, which in general he so justly advocates.

Professor Brownell's reply

I wish that I might discuss more at length effective methods for the decentralization of industry, education, social activities, and even religion. There is work being done in these several fields. The TVA is unquestionably doing important work. Economists such as Robert Brady of the University of California, Doctor Montgomery of the University of Texas, and others are doing work in the theory of economic decentralization. A number of great firms, including Sears Roebuck, Henry Ford, and others are experimenting progressively with possibilities of decentralized production as well as marketing. In the same way, in education the Danish Folk Schools and their modern exponents in England led by Sir Richard Livingstone are doing important work in the development of decentralized higher educational methods. In other activities the same story can be told. Even in the arts there are many examples of powerful folk movements, or, in other words, participative decentralized movements. In all of these fields, however, the tendency toward specialization, centralization, and expertism is still dominant. The revolts against them

These hints and glimmerings of reorientation in Western culture are not enough in themselves to inspire confidence in the future. They may be the afterglow of the sunset or the premonitions of dawn. No one can tell. They indicate at least what must be done, and the way that it must be done, if we would have survival with freedom.⁵

are powerful, but not yet powerful enough to make the necessary changes in our culture if we hope to maintain the values of our freedom and our democratic tradition and above all to maintain a fairly peaceful world

⁵Comment by Henry N. Wieman

It is true that in the small rural community people know one another as whole individuals so far as they know one another at all. But the trouble with people in the small rural community is that they do not respond to one another with diversified sensitivity. A shell forms about each individual, a shell of torpor, routine, and custom, allowing one to respond only to those matters which the tradition of that community has decreed are worth consideration. So people in such a community often live together like turtles, each sticking out his head to attend to matters only when they happen to fall within the narrow bounds of accepted concern. The great city has not only developed a mighty technology. It has broken the shell that narrows human interest.

There are two basic evils, one characteristic of the small community, the other of the city. One is just as bad as the other. It is not enough to have a community where people know one another as whole persons but where the range and diversity of interests are kept within the bounds and forms of a narrow context. The significant context must be widened and deepened. To this end the shell of torpor, routine, prejudice, and narrow concern must be broken. On the other hand, however, it is not enough merely to break it, as the city has done. The context must be an expanding, not a contracting one. This is the problem of human living in all time and in our time.

There are guiding principles and there are forms and other demands that must be met, changing from situation to situation and from one stage of human development to another, if the significant context is to be preserved as it is enriched and expanded. But there may be no limit to this enrichment and expansion. At any rate we do not yet know that limit. Shakespeare seems to have been able to absorb an enormous breadth and variety of experience without losing significant context.

What are the conditions that must be met in order to preserve and magnify the context beyond the bounds of the typical small community? No doubt small communities are themselves necessary and always will be, but they are not sufficient. All the sciences, each in its own area, might study the demands of this creative transformation whereby the significant context grows in range, complexity, and richness. This is our problem, I think, rather than simply the preservation of the small community.

Professor Brownell's reply

I suggest four possibilities which may answer at least to some extent Doctor Wieman's question.

(1) The condition of the rural community which Doctor Wieman points out may well be due to the draining of our rural communities by the overwhelming city. Certainly in our own American tradition many rural communities have not been of the pattern which he describes.

(2) If we consider the entire populations concerned, I am doubtful whether the condition of living in the great cities has in general been superior to conditions of living in rural

regions. If for the moment we grant that conditions of life in rural regions have remained relatively the same as in the past and, at the same time, that the conditions of life in the great cities for the people as a whole have largely improved, then the question of interpreting the reasons for this hypothetical difference arises. It would seem more than probable that the advantages which the city may have in these respects have been due to the fact that the benefits of modern technology, the stimuli that have come from modern methods of education, communication, and the like, have been largely limited to the urban regions although there is nothing to indicate, I believe, that the urban regions, either in terms of personnel or otherwise, have been exclusively responsible for the creation of these advantages.

(3) It may be questioned, however, whether city life as a whole really has any less cultural restrictedness and less torpor than rural regions. The turtle image which Doctor Wieman so effectively uses probably applies to most urban folk fully as much as to rural folk. In using the image, Doctor Wieman really refers to a very small group of highly stimulated urban people. These people are close to the controls, close to the publicity of the press, and the like, but are they proportionately any greater in number, any more engaging or more influential in their neighborhoods than the intelligent and active editor or craftsman, physician or homemaker, lawyer, farmer, or school superintendent that even now may be often found in the small town? From rather long experience in both the large cities and small towns, I am inclined to doubt it.

(4) Except on the verbal non-contextual level of a relatively few urban intellectuals and except for other specialized functions also non-contextual, such as, the comic strips, the movies, professional sports, the radio, etc., in which all urban people are consumers, the life of the city is far more narrow as to basic interests and occupations, I am inclined to think, and far more specialized and isolated than is the life of the village or farm. The factory hand, the store clerk, the office worker, for example, show little more breadth of general interest and probably far less diversity of skill and interest in closer things than the rural person. Stimulating activity and mass reception cannot replace in value the small community of whole people living rather wholly in respect to each other.

I agree with Doctor Wieman that cultural narrowness and stricture are as bad as cultural scattering and disintegration. I do not know whether he would agree with me or not when I say that in modern urban culture the two are inseparably and structurally joined. The one condition in a sense creates the other largely because the human community in which these centripetal and centrifugal tendencies might find coherent form and balance has been destroyed. We have seen it happen in many fields as, for example, extreme career individualism conjoined with a mass culture. The city is organized structurally on the basis of far ranging special functions, not on the basis of human communities. We must face the fact that the city is basically opposed to those communities.

CHAPTER XXXIII

Poise and Passion in Philosophy

By DAVID BAUMGARDT

Consultant in Philosophy, Library of Congress



KIERKEGAARD ONCE SAID that passion is as much the characteristic of a great thinker as of a great lover. In either case, the lack of passion is a sure sign of mediocrity. Such praise of passionate thought is not merely a fancy of Kierkegaard's. The belief in the decisive value of passionate thinking has a very old and venerable tradition.

The Jewish prophets, on whose teaching at least half of our Western civilization is based, were not cool, dispassionate minds. They were not essentially interested in predicting the future or pronouncing any objective, sober judgments on nature and history. They fought desperately, with the weapons of the mind, for the betterment of man. Whatever the meaning of the Hebrew word *naby* (prophet) may be, it certainly does not refer to a man with an impartial scientific attitude toward life and history. It means a man inspired by a higher spiritual passion.

The Greeks, we generally learn, almost for the first time in history, broke away from the ancient belief that wisdom should always be united with strength of emotion. Winckelmann, Herder, Goethe, Schelling, Hegel, Emerson, Walter Pater, and hundreds of minor minds have emphasized, for more than a century, how greatly even in Greek arts and poetry, as well as in Greek philosophy and science, poise outweighs passion. From the face of Aristotle's wise man, every trace of stronger emotion seems to be banned. But even in the field of Greek culture, since the end of the nineteenth century, the "dionysian" elements have been rightly taken far more seriously, the role of ecstasy in Greek mystery cults has found more and more recognition; and the early philosophical dialogues of Aristotle, only recently unearthed, have revealed that even the greatest champion of a merely contemplative, passionless philosophizing was, in

his youthful thinking, one of the most excited and exciting ponderers of antiquity. Something of this emotional strength is still noticeable in his ideal of mastering all feeling. The stoic ideal, too, was in itself equanimity and superiority over the melee of the emotions, but this ideal, again, was preached with violent ardor rather than with cool aloofness. Following the Stoics, Spinoza wanted to understand nature and the emotions of man with as little anthropomorphic bias as possible. But as we have learned to see more and more under the surface of cold axioms and syllogisms, Spinoza's *Ethics* shows a most passionate longing for a higher emotional and intellectual beatitude, for "the *Amor Dei Intellectualis*" which is certainly not a merely intellectual understanding of God, the world, and man. Or to mention only one other example, the critical rationalist Kant, the sworn enemy of all mystical and merely emotional thinking, insisted that in philosophy hardly anything worthwhile could ever be carried out without the accompanying factor of a strong enthusiasm.

Granted all this, however, it is surely not our main problem to ascertain whether the great thinkers of the past have all been men of passion. Our principal problem must be the question as to whether this ancient union of wisdom and feeling should be maintained in the future. Or should this union, in our age of science, be resolutely dissolved, and should the ideal of philosophizing become a complete detachment from emotion, for this attitude of theoretical contemplation has already become the ideal of the scientists who once, too, were nothing but rather emotional philosophers.

Practically all the leading English thinkers—Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Spencer—have indeed been comparatively unemotional intellectualists. The highly emotional Thomas Carlyle is neither a typically English thinker nor in my opinion a specially attractive one. The English language itself marks "getting emotional" as something derogatory. But language itself cannot provide us with sufficient evidence in these highly controversial matters. We must look at the matter itself.

If philosophy is to be limited to epistemology, including the epistemological foundations of ethics, emotion in philosophy would be, in my view, as much out of place as in mathematics, physics, and chemistry. There are contemporaries, and there have been great thinkers in the past two centuries who have—more or less explicitly—advocated a strict

narrowing of philosophy to epistemology or to an analysis of the fundamental concepts of science. Ludwig Wittgenstein, the most influential inspiree of contemporary positivism, quite aggressively stated at the end of his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1922) that "whereof one cannot speak" in clear rational terms, "thereof one must be silent."

This is certainly most valuable advice to the scientist. But would it not be absurd to give the same advice, say, to the poet? The poet is just the man who wishes to undertake, and is certainly entitled to undertake, an expression of exactly those things which cannot be expressed in clear rational terms.^a

If he speaks in merely rational language and no longer in symbolisms and metaphors, he may still be called an extremely able versifier or rhyming instructor, but he definitely ceases to be a poet. And must philosophy be restricted to the philosophy of science, even if moral science is included? Or are there not certain fields of philosophical reflection which can be shown to be legitimately nearer to poetry than to science?^b

The strongest objection to the admission of feeling consists in the fear

^aComment by Swami Nikhilananda

This is an excellent paper. I have only this to say about the subject. The highest Truth—call it God or by any other name—does not require passion or enthusiasm for its explanation to others. It carries its own conviction. The philosopher-saints evince a poise and calmness which is the outcome of their certainty.

I do not agree that deep philosophy cannot be written in poetry. The most subtle Hindu philosophy has been written in most melodious poetry. The Bhagavad Gita, parts of the Upanishads, and similar books, may be cited as examples.

Doctor Baumgardt's reply

I very much regret that Swami Nikhilananda inferred my excluding poetical expression from philosophy. In my opinion, too, the Bhagavad Gita is sufficient evidence of the possibility of expressing profound philosophical reflection through poetry. But if there were any need for further evidence, who could exclude the poems of Xenophanes, Empedocles, and Lucretius from the history of Western philosophy? Even the foundations of Western "rationalistic" ontology have been laid in a poetical form by Parmenides's verses; this seems to me another indication of the largely emotional, poetical character of the "Parmenidean" element in the metaphysics of Spinoza, Schelling, Schleiermacher, Hegel, Coleridge, and Emerson. Moreover, Western poets such as Dante, Goethe, William Blake, and others can also claim to be called philosophers. One of the main tendencies of my paper was to ascribe to poetry a high truth-value and to deprive large fields of philosophy of the false aura of rationalistic and "scientific dignity."

^bComment by Leroy B. Loemker

Poet and philosopher are both intuitionists, but the intuitionism of the latter is inseparably involved in the dialectic of rational analysis and synthesis. The truth of poetic insight is not to be confused, for instance, with its essentially poetic quality, nor the intuitive grasp of human values and meaning patterns with the emotional tone which may accompany and affect it.

that, with the introduction of any—even the finest—emotion, all objectivity of philosophical insight will be swept away. Philosophy, it is passionately maintained, cannot be allowed to sink down to the truth level of poetry, to a nearly subjective play of beautiful pictures, analogies, and figures of speech. Not only epistemology and the philosophy of science but also metaphysics, the philosophy of history, and religion must, it is said, claim to convey objective, generally valid truth.

This whole line of objections, however, seems to me based on two untenable premises. Poetical truth does not rank as low as is commonly thought by scientists and philosophers, nor do metaphysics and religion need to aspire to truth in the same sense as physics or chemistry. I maintain that poetry has a genuine truth and that metaphysics, mysticism, and religion are concerned with a kind of truth which is markedly different from the truth sought and revealed in science. Neither of these two theses can claim to be original. Still, much has to be done to protect them from misinterpretation. I do not aspire to give, in these sketchy reflections, anything like an exhaustive justification. But, in the simplest possible terms, I should like to make an attempt at the removal of a few common ways of misconceiving these theses.

If the Volga or the Mississippi River is considered as an object of patriotic feelings, the truth about the connection of these feelings with the river in no way conflicts with the chemical truth that both these rivers consist mainly of simple H_2O , the same H_2O used not only in Russian or American kitchens but also in Italian and French bathrooms. No book on geography will mention the truth that the Mississippi or the Volga are only ordinary H_2O . This truth would be an almost ridiculous truism in geography or history. And no book on chemistry would mention that, with certain volumes of H_2O , certain patriotic feelings are connected. This truth would not be of the slightest relevance in chemistry. In this way, the very same topic, the same river, can be and must be the object of completely different true statements.^e

No one would infer from these reflections that one is trying to recom-

^eComment by Rudolf Allers

What Doctor Baumgardt says is but what traditional theory of knowledge means when distinguishing the material and the formal object of knowledge. Materially a river is the same thing whether envisioned by the geographer or the chemist, formally, they look at it differently. But this is tantamount to saying that neither the geographer nor the chemist knows all about either of these rivers. That they have a particular role to play in the minds of the American or the Russian people, is part of the whole truth about them.

mend a double standard of truth about a river. But the very moment such simple reflections are transferred to the controversial realms of poetic, metaphysical, and religious truths, the first objection made from the days of the Middle Ages down to Sigmund Freud is that such reflections would militate against the very essence of truth, which is said to be absolutely undivided and indivisible.

Only too often, the defenders of poetical and metaphysical truth couple their statements with the insistence that their insights evidently represent a higher truth than those offered by the physicist or chemist, and this is, naturally and rightly, resented by the scientist. The scientist is entitled to retort that, if metaphysics and the philosophy of religion pretend to have reached a higher truth about reality, they are thoroughly mistaken. They have started to build the house with the roof, and from this lofty height they will never be able to return to the ground on which alone, by direct or indirect reference to the data of the senses, any sound objective truth about the existing world can be built. Moreover, inasmuch as the topics of religion and metaphysics are of far greater emotional concern to us than the laws of chemistry, and as, perhaps unavoidably, emotion has to play a certain part in all metaphysical and religious investigations, the ascertaining of truth in these fields seems to become of necessity even less precise. Truth in these regions is, therefore, said to be either vague or unobtainable, and by no means a higher truth than that available in science.

The proper way to deal with these claims and counter claims seems to me to give up any insistence on higher truths and on indivisible truth. As in the case of the Mississippi River, different truths concerning the same object cannot only be ascertained but should even be explicitly sought. In fact, if metaphysics, mysticism, the philosophy of history, and religion were to insist on seeking answers of the same kind and the same "objective" or even "scientific" character as those sought in science, I should confess to having little interest in this kind of philosophy or religion.

The crucial point seems to me that, in metaphysics and religion, emotion can, nay, even must legitimately enter. If we expect from religion and metaphysics the same kind of knowledge as is obtained in science—as unfortunately certain metaphysicians still do—the scientist is right in informing us that exact, objective knowledge about absolute reality, about the creation of the world or its Creator is not procurable at all.

The acquisition of precise information on these problems is, of necessity, beyond our reach, as, even in the Middle Ages, many of the greatest representatives of the so-called "negative theology" admitted. This kind of metaphysical knowledge is necessarily unobtainable, and epistemology can reveal why it is not an accident that definite "scientific" answers to these questions will not be available no matter how far science may progress.

The scientist who "gets emotional" is certainly a very bad scientist.⁴ But the metaphysician who makes a pose of maintaining the same aloof-

⁴Comment by L. Harold DeWolf

Doctor Baumgardt has persuasively defended the right of philosophers to be emotional. With that contention I heartily agree, though rejecting the hedonism of the final paragraph. However, it may be questioned whether scientific work is ever so unemotional as Doctor Baumgardt seems to describe it. The scientist must have a passion for truth, an eager desire to know what is really so. Secondly, he must have a love of novelty, the explorer's passion for discovering the new. Thirdly, he has a passion for relating ideas, a craving for systematic order. Many a mathematician confesses an exalted pleasure in seeing the ordered structure of an involved mathematical solution. Fourthly, the effective scientist loves honesty. Fifthly, to approach his maximum effectiveness he must have a passion for sharing data and interpretations with other scientists. Sixthly, he must have a specializing passion to screen out data irrelevant to the one all-consuming purpose of the hour. Other passions may doubtless be added to the list. But these will suffice to illustrate the principle.

In short, the truth-seeking task is all of one piece, and emotion is deeply involved in the whole of it. Science is not one whit less dependent on emotion than is ethics. However, the scientist as such takes his scientific passions for granted. The student of ethics critically examines them, along with his philosophical passions and all the rest. It is therefore the scientist who is more naively emotional, unless perchance he be a philosopher, too. The philosopher and the scientist are alike in being emotionally driven in their tasks. They are alike also in needing to spurn wishful thinking like the plague and to judge all else by that systematic coherence which is the hallmark of truth.

Doctor Baumgardt's reply

I certainly did not wish to doubt that the scientist *qua person* is generally animated by emotion. But my question was: has emotion entered the formulas and the argument, *e.g.*, of Newton's *Philosophiæ naturalis principia mathematica*, in the same sense as emotion entered, for instance, Spinoza's *Ethica*? I hold that the meaning and the contents of scientific works such as Newton's physics are in themselves free from emotion. We can, to say the least, completely abstract the subjective joy accompanying our understanding of a mathematical truth, and our understanding in itself will be in no way curtailed by this abstraction. But if we would try to abstract Pascal's passionate self-humiliation expressed in his *Pensées* or the holy anger in Kierkegaard's invectives against the Danish Church of 1854, we would miss most of the meaning of what Pascal and Kierkegaard have to say. We would ignore the "subjectivity" of Kierkegaard's thought on which he himself—unlike the physicists—placed so much emphasis. In my opinion, neither the admission of passion in scientific statements nor the other extreme, the exclusive admission of poise in philosophy, will do.

ness from emotion as the scientist, is in my opinion equally bad as a metaphysician. It is not fortuitous, therefore, that the greatest religious and metaphysical writings of mankind are filled with emotion and even passion, and that Plato's and even Hegel's language comes essentially nearer to that of the poet than that of the scientist.⁶ Hegel explicitly stated

⁶Comment by Rudolf Allers

Emotion—the right sort of emotion—may be helpful in discovering the truth. The acknowledgment of truth remains forever the task of reason and of reason alone. The argument of the author rests, among other things, on the idea that poetry, philosophy, religion, are concerned with “a kind of truth markedly different from the truth sought and revealed in science.” If there are such different kinds of truth, by what criterion can their different nature be recognized? Does it not again become the task of reason to pass judgment on the differences of these truths and their respective fields? Hegel was not so wrong when he claimed that *das Wahre ist das Ganze*.

Even the view of the poet, which so often has proved to be deeper and truer than that of science or philosophy, is not ultimately “emotional.” The emotional upheaval, inspiration, the tremendous outlook which suddenly may present itself to the poetic mind, is but the beginning. Even poetry has to pass through the medium of reason, if it is to be true to its task, namely, to communicate its vision to others.

To be sure, there is passion back of Plato's words, and we feel it in the style of Hegel not less than, occasionally, of Kant. But Kant's passion is devoted to the praise of the non-impassioned attitude *Pflicht, du erhabener Name*. It seems to me that it has always been the endeavor of philosophers, even of mystics, to transform the vision which filled them with emotion into the language of reason. Emotion is not an ultimate and has no criterion of its justification in itself.

The Prophets of the Old Covenant? “The zeal for the house of the Lord consumeth me.” The Lord, however, is the “true God.” His law is the “true law,” and His word is Truth. It is not the same to serve truth with passion, and to see truth in passion. Nor is it the same to seek truth, be it in the poetic vision, with impassioned zeal, or to be struck by its appearance, and to make emotion an *id quo* we may attain truth. To a certain degree we may indeed, but it still pertains to reason to make sure of whether we saw truth or were deluded by—passion.

Doctor Baungardt's reply

Like Doctor Allers I would subscribe to Hegel's saying that *das Wahre ist das Ganze*. But I would not go so far as to adhere to Hegel's teaching that higher truth negates lower truth. I would say with Doctor Allers that reason should “pass judgment on the differences of . . . truths and their respective fields.” However, I do not believe that Pascal's *le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît pas* can be taken as a bagatelle or a mere misunderstanding of matters which can easily be cleared up. Was it really always the endeavor “even of mystics” (including Bernard of Clairvaux and Luther who despised the *stockblinde Vernunft*) “to transform the vision which filled them with emotion into the language of reason”?

I believe indeed—in contrast to Doctor Allers—that the emotion of joy so far as it does not cause any pain “has its justification in itself.” Emotion is, in my opinion, not a mere response to the presence of a value, but the emotional qualities of human experiences are themselves the sources of true value and disvalue—in the same sense in which perceptions are the sources of true knowledge of the outside world, despite all error which may be caused by neglecting the whole of our perceptions and the whole of our emotions.

how little he thought of merely sober thinking in metaphysics. He wittily remarked in his *Logic* that generally sobriety leaves room for some sound and honest thrust. In the second edition of his *Encyclopadie der philosophischen Wissenschaften* Hegel even calls his metaphysical system mystical in a special sense of the word and thinks it in substantial agreement with the highly emotional thinking of Jacob Boehme and Franz von Baader.¹

There is no gainsaying that the admission of emotion imposes special difficulties in distinguishing between sound and unsound feeling in metaphysics and religion.² In setting up satisfactory criteria of intellectual value, mankind has advanced far more in the field of science than in the field of metaphysics, religion, the philosophy of history, ethics, and—not to forget—poetry and the arts. Outside science, the difficulties of securing proper criteria of truth value are enhanced because a knowledge and intimate acquaintance with countless problematical feelings is required whose neglect would be unpardonable, and whose uncritical glorification is, nevertheless, not permitted.

But all these difficulties—and this alone is my topic—give us no right to denounce emotion in these fields altogether. Even such mentally endangered and partly insane metaphysicians as Nietzsche, Dostoevski, Kierkegaard, and Rousseau, have certainly made most valuable and sane contributions to world thought, and these contributions definitely weigh much heavier than many thousands of well poised metaphysical statements made in classrooms or from pulpits—statements which at best

¹Comment by Peter A. Bertocci

I find myself in basic harmony with Doctor Baumgardt's contention that the search for truth must not forego the aid that may come from feeling and emotion. The arbitrary suspicion or dismissal of any human faculty from any area of human investigation presupposes a prior knowledge of the direction and nature of reality, which, it seems to me, is not vouchsafed us. But I am very much troubled by the very difficulties which Doctor Baumgardt recognizes. I should want to insist that the soundness and unsoundness of feelings be determined not by any face value of any feeling as such, even when experienced by an expert (although the fact that an expert testified to the knowledge-value of a certain feeling should make it all the more worthy of note and careful consideration), but by its creative coherence with all the other data available so far, and in the developing future. I should want to plead for a full hearing for as many voices as possible in any area of thought, realizing that emotionalized data might be more prominent in one area and sense data in another, but that the knowledge-value of each was not face value. In every area the total relevant data must be seen in interrelation before we can decide on the degree of probability propositions have.

²*Zusatz zu* § 82 and preface, 1827

sounded very good in their time, but appeared extremely unsound and fantastic to later generations.

The discriminating critic, however, will be quite capable of distinguishing between the sound insights of Nietzsche or Kierkegaard and the pathological range of their thought. Nietzsche and Kierkegaard themselves have even given us extremely valuable information on why their endangered mental status enabled them to gain metaphysical insights not perceived before their time by the lesser sensitivity of intellectual awareness.

Suppose a stone should shout at a man who tosses in fever. "How ugly you look, how insane, how useless and how dangerous you are! Any moment you may infect others and if you die your body will soon be a most dangerous source of infection. Look how sane and poised, how healthy and useful I am!" All we could tell the stone would be that it does not know what kind of values even a sick and suffering human being represents, and that it does not know what it is talking about.

It seems to me an illusion to expect that the wide differences between the philosophies of nations, their "messianic" hopes, their economic views, their religious ideals, their virtues and vices, their neurotic and sound sensitivities can be ironed out by a mere appeal to reason. There are no self-evident concrete rational principles on the ground of which these conflicts could be arbitrated with the inner consent of all parties concerned. The European and American epoch of enlightenment generally hoped that, by allowing poise and cool, sober reflection to get the upper hand, all international and class conflicts could be satisfactorily overcome. In the nineteenth and the beginning twentieth centuries, such periods of rational hope and rationalistic beliefs were always followed in Europe by decades in which the emotional, non-rationalistic drives in men were given far more emphasis. We obviously have entered in America now into such a period of history.

It seems to me, therefore, mistaken and even detrimental to fail to pay full regard to the strength of emotions in fields of thought where emotion legitimately has to play a major role. It is in vain that we invoke here simple rational principles of philosophy to overrule the voices of passion without having given them a full hearing. Only after we have impartially listened to the strangest outbreaks of seemingly irrational feeling can we hope to outride the storms of passion by truly superior and mature wisdom.

The principle which alone can guide the ethical evaluation of all the emotions in question is, in my opinion, the principle of the maximization of happiness and the minimization of fruitless pain. The reference to the ambiguous principles of honor, humanity, justice, and the like, however, would have to be abandoned because these principles dodge a sufficiently clear and direct account of the human emotions at issue.⁸

⁸Comment by Leroy E. Loemker

Doctor Baumgardt's protest is both important and pertinent to our present crisis. Philosophy can regain its cultural preeminence only as philosophers once more become concerned for the truth in human problems in which hope and fear, suffering and resolve, are inextricably woven. Yet it is only by empirical analysis and rational criticism that the truth about emotions and values is to be determined. Doctor Baumgardt's defense of the utilitarian formula is itself an example of this, to establish the formula as valid is possible only by logical criticism and synthesis, but to make it operative requires that human emotions be enlisted in loyalty to it. And this involves an intuition, more or less complete, more or less obscured by inevitable symbols, of its meaning and usefulness. My criticism, in short, is directed at the tendency of the paper to identify emotion with intuition, and to insist too strongly on the divisibility of truth. The former tendency would obscure the continuity of intuition with reason, the latter limit reason to scientific analysis.

Doctor Baumgardt's reply

I fully agree that, in the end, all these remarks are correct and Professor Loemker is certainly right in mentioning that my own defense of the utilitarian formula shows that I obviously put "logical criticism and synthesis" into service to establish the validity of that formula. Nevertheless, in stating only this, the role played by emotion in philosophy seems to me not sufficiently valued. To illustrate this by only a few examples, if the rational, critical detachment of the philosopher would count exclusively in the philosophical treatment of human emotions, John Stuart Mill would have to be ranked as an infinitely greater thinker than Pascal, not to mention Kierkegaard. Christian Wolff's *Vernunftfuge Gedanken ueber Gott*, would, then, be far more valuable than the "one-sided" philosophical and religious thought of Plotinus, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Calvin. Why is all this definitely not the case?

One may, of course, say, with Doctor Loemker, it is essentially not the emotion but the wider range of intuitions which gives Pascal superiority over John Stuart Mill and Plotinus over Wolff. But even if this is granted, it still has to be admitted that these wider intuitions have to be bought by and are accessible only to deeper emotion which is legitimately expressed in the results of the philosopher's truth seeking. *I.e.*, emotion, in the field of philosophy does not only animate the search for truth and does not only form a subject matter of research but—in contrast to any science—some type of emotion may also, legitimately and most fruitfully, color the result of the search for truth in philosophy.

Of course, far more has to be said to protect this statement from misinterpretation. I should, for instance, urge that—though philosophically profounder than John Stuart Mill—Pascal and Kierkegaard do not represent the full truth. They represent only "*das unglueckliche Bewusstsein*," the world of intellectual suffering which has to be put into proper relation to the *whole* of human joy and suffering. No truth can be contradictory to another truth but it can be supplementary to it. The ultimate unity of truth must be preserved at all costs. But the field of truth can and should be methodologically divided and to various types of questions different types of adequate answer are to be granted.

I hope that these assurances about the ultimate supreme power of the rational principles

of coherence and consistency will dispel the doubts of Doctor Bertocci [See Note f.] Certainly all the observations of my paper are in urgent need of further detailed clarification. Analogies and differences between the development of theories in science and philosophy (e.g., the partial "unsoundness" of the formerly absolutely sound Newtonian physics and the partial unsoundness of profound, but emotionally one sided philosophical theories) must be analyzed in far greater detail.

Comment by Brand Blanshard

It seems to me that emotion may play three very different parts in the process of thinking (1) Sometimes it forms an essential part of the motive for thinking (2) Sometimes it forms part of the object of thought, which the thinker must take into account if he is to understand (3) Sometimes emotion determines the course of thought itself, making the worse appear the better reason, as when patriotism makes a man excuse what, in a foreign country, he would condemn.

The first two offices of emotion seem to me natural and innocent, the second needs emphasis, and Doctor Baumgardt has stressed it effectively. It sounds at times as if he would admit the third, too, as legitimate. Metaphysics and religion, he says, involve a special kind of truth, into whose apprehension emotion may enter in a way not permissible in science. Does the illustration of the Mississippi and Volga really serve his purpose? The typical religious or ethical judgment is not, "Conquest of the weak was in fact an object of approving emotion to the Nazis," but, "Conquest of the weak is bad." The former of these statements, which is parallel to Doctor Baumgardt's example, does not seem to me an expression of a special or non-scientific kind of truth, as opposed to a statement of empirical fact. The second does. But how does, or should, emotion enter into it? Doctor Baumgardt evidently thinks it should, and suggests that when ultimate moral differences are concerned, the appeal to reason does not suffice. Yet he holds that such differences can in theory be settled by appeal to the principle of greatest happiness, and is not the insight that more happiness is better than less, itself an insight of the reason, as Sidgwick maintained? Should emotion have a part in determining *this* truth? If it should not, Doctor Baumgardt would seem, after all, to be a rationalist on the essential point. If it should, it would be helpful to have a further account of the way emotion may legitimately enter in.

Doctor Baumgardt's reply:

I certainly agree that "the typical religious or ethical judgment" is "Conquest of the weak is bad." I cannot agree that no emotion enters or should enter into this statement. In my opinion, emotion should enter here in all the three ways mentioned.

(1) "Conquest of the weak is bad," is, in my view, not an unequivocal formulation of the ethical principle at issue. The behavior in question is already, uncritically, condemned by our electing the term conquest for it. As critical moralists we should have asked ourselves first whether the behavior in question should be called conquest, or whether a quite different laudatory term would be justified in this case.

(2) To avoid all ambiguous talk of this kind, like Bentham, I insist that all such seemingly rational principles as "Conquest of the weak is bad," are translated into "the language of pleasure and pain," i.e., emotion. For, by the ultimate reference to pleasures and pains we refer to objective facts and not to principles which are either tautologies or permit quite contradictory interpretations if applied to reality. In this way, the emotion must, in my opinion, enter into a proper analysis of the meaning of the ethical statement, "Conquest of the weak is bad."

(3) But emotions form not only the proper terms of reference in ethical statements. Emotion, I think, enters into ethical and religious judgments in even another way. When

George Fox speaks of an "Ocean of Light" overcoming the darkness, he certainly could have expressed the same with far less emotion by simply stating—without any Quaker trembling—that, in the end, happiness will prevail over misery. But the emotion expressed by Fox, or Jacob Boehme's emotion in painting the "wrath" of God is, I believe, part of their message, part of their philosophies of life. The "same thought" merely expressed in rational terms would be no longer the "same thought" in poetry, the philosophy of religion, or even in certain parts of ethical reflection. Moreover, I should say that moralists who are emotionally one-sided but possess a special sensitivity and are more aware of emotions generally overlooked, have contributed far more to the development of ethics than other ethicists who set up a nice balanced whole of coherent statements but neglected all those emotions which would have made their poised statements incoherent and meaningless.

However, I fully agree with Professor Blanshard that, in this third way, no emotion must enter the basic epistemological questions of ethics. Here the reverence to the basic criterion of the greatest happiness, the reference to the given objective emotions of the people reacting to a certain behavior, the extremely difficult comparison of the degrees of happiness and pain in these emotions, etc.—all these are rational "processes of thinking." I could not say that the greatest happiness principle is the only rationally possible principle of ethics. I would say, in agreement with a Bentham manuscript, that the utility principle is the most plausible "hypothesis" available for ethical judgment. But this is, as I have tried to show in detail, enough to secure the rational character of the epistemological presuppositions of consistent hedonism.

Comment by Harry B. Friedgood

The constructive and destructive aspects of human behavior are overt manifestations of emotional energies. All constructive human endeavors utilize the energy of the "love" instinct. Heterosexual activities constitute only one aspect of the basic love instinct, which has a far greater psychobiological significance for the individual. From a psychodynamic viewpoint, the constructive pretenses of mankind may be expressed in such terms: is scientific discoveries, the creation of works of art, devotion to an ideal or to an abstract idea.

The foregoing is a psychiatric formulation of what I take to be Doctor Baumgardt's thesis. Nevertheless, I am not prepared to regard honor, humanity, and justice as "ambiguous principles," which "have to be abandoned." Ethical distinctions cannot be achieved, nor can the truth or falsity of moral ideas be decided in exclusively psychological terms, although moral concepts, as such, are developed within the province of the superego. The superego reflects necessarily all of the ambiguities and problems of the society after which it is modeled. If a social code involves traits resulting in violent nationalism, such as was the case among the Nazis, the ultimate consequence is the very same destructive attitude that the superego is supposed to hold in check.

Comment by Paul A. Schilpp

Perhaps just because it is hardly ever discussed, the point of view presented by Mr. Baumgardt appears to me to call attention to some very significant facts, and if we overlook them, we shall do so at humanity's own peril. If "without vision the people perish," it is certainly true that without emotions nothing on earth would ever get done. I am, nevertheless, considerably troubled by the very last sentence of this paper. Such principles as "honor," "humanity," "justice, and the like" are—usually—"ambiguous." But are these "principles" more "ambiguous" than "passion" or the "emotions?" There is nothing more individualistic, personal, and subjective than the emotions. Do they, then, not suffer inevitably from the same—or even greater—"ambiguity?"

Doctor Baumgardt's reply

To reply to this objection, it is, perhaps, most advisable to point briefly to the rather different and often confusing ways in which the term *subjectivity* is used in philosophy. Feelings, it is true, are "completely subjective" inasmuch as they are—like perceptions—data of consciousness and not of things, and—unlike perceptions—do not refer directly to things outside the feeling individual but essentially and directly to his mind and his body. As to objective factual givenness however, feelings are absolutely on a par with perceptions. The feelings of every individual are as much part of a given "objective reality" as the perceptions of colors or sounds. There may be no objective reason for my neurotic elevation in the objective outside world or in my objective condition, nevertheless, neurotic feelings are objective facts. That I have this or that feeling is an iron fact. Considered as given objective facts, feelings are not more but less exposed to misinterpretation than perceptions. Perceptions which by their very nature indicate characteristics of the outside world, may be hallucinations and may not be proper indications of anything objective outside. Feelings, however, are always proper indications of what they represent. The doctor may a thousand times assure me that he cannot find any objective physical or psychological reason for my depressed feelings. If I feel truly depressed my feelings cannot be hallucinatory, as some of my good faith perceptions may be.

As to the alleged subjectivity of all judgments concerning feelings, I would insist that no judgment is subjective because it refers to feelings and not to observations of the outside world or to seemingly objective principles which, in fact, allow quite contradictory interpretations. Moreover, only the consistent application of the hedonistic principle, can, in my opinion, free us from the contradictory "subjective" explanations which the seemingly "objective" anti-hedonistic principles permit in ethics.

To the German army the bombardment of defenseless Almeria in 1937 was a matter of honor, to every sincere Christian the same act at the same time was a bestial crime. The anti-hedonistic principle of honor fails, therefore, to provide an unequivocal criterion of morality. However, the hedonistic principle refers to pleasure and pain as unequivocal objective facts (even mixed feelings unambiguously represent objective compounds of pleasure and pain whose elements can be determined objectively and impartially). While the application of the honor principle, thus, does not furnish us with an impartial, objective criterion of morality and immorality, there can be no doubt that the whole Nazi morality stands clearly condemned on the ground of the principle of the quantitative and qualitative maximization of happiness.

Comment by Edgar S. Brightman

Doctor Baumgardt approves Kierkegaard's "praise of passionate thought," and I approve his approval—on condition that the passionate thought be thought, and that it be worthy of passion. If it means that thought generated by thoughtless passion has precedence over thought devoted to truth, then I demur. But any serious theory of value must include the consideration that what thought shows to be important should be felt strongly to be important. *Wissenschaft* is one stage of thought, and a necessary one, but it is not complete thinking, nor is it adequate to human needs in the atomic age. That reason is obligated to give the fact and the voices of passion "a full hearing," as Doctor Baumgardt says, is sound and true. But reason remains the judge.

Doctor Baumgardt's reply

I fully agree with Professor Brightman's comment and would like to add that, of course, reason as the moral judge of the given facts of emotion has a very difficult task to perform. The business of ethics is not finished with the pronouncement of the greatest happiness principle. On the contrary, it has hardly begun with the formulation of that

principle The principle itself needs most careful epistemological justification and has to overcome great, natural difficulties in its application

Comment by Ralph T. Flewelling

I find myself in strong sympathy with this paper, and feel that the author could profitably make his statements in favor of emotion still stronger than he has. The emotional nature of man is as genuine as his mental nature, and the latter needs the former to give it feet. An emotional mysticism is no more lacking in contemporary philosophers than in those of the past. Max Planck, Millikan, Kemble, Swann, Lecomte du Nouy, Eddington, Jeans, and a host of others confess to a final metaphysics which assumes the presence in Nature of a Creative Intelligence as a basic explanation. Emotion inspired by respect for the truth leads the conscientious scientist to die if necessary for the truth, a truly religious martyrdom, suffered in various degrees. The love of truth to the denial of selfish interest spurs the great scientific discoveries, brings the submergence of self necessary to the production of great poetry, literature, and art.

The chief criticism of the paper would be upon the final paragraph. The ethical value of any emotion can be determined in only one way, not by pain or pleasure but by the results it produces in goodness and usefulness for society.

Doctor Baumgardt's reply

It certainly is meant to include the "goodness and usefulness for society," as Professor Flewelling demands. But by expressing all moral goodness and usefulness in terms of greater and smaller happiness, *i.e.*, by direct reference to "objective" human feelings, the principle of the maximization of happiness avoids the "subjectivity" of all those ethical principles which are based on concepts allowing such contradictory interpretations as honor and the like.

CHAPTER XXXIV

Philosophy as a Medium of World Understanding

By RALPH T FLEWELLING

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The world is not governed by what bodies of people do or say, but by ideas, as Plato has said. The man with an idea will master a crowd of a thousand persons with a thousand notions.¹

THE BORROWED OPTIMISM of yesterday persists in spite of the terrors of today. While the storm of war is momentarily lulled, we attempt to patch together the destroyed dwelling. Memory restores the picture of an aged couple in the devastated Rheims of World War I, who, after searching the debris of their destroyed home, were carrying away a tea kettle with a satisfaction which in happier times might have attended the complete restoration of their dwelling. We realize that we must rebuild our world, but we are searching in the ruins of the old for that on which we can pattern the new. Our present state is so neurotic that we are "jumpy" at the suggestion that the old is gone already.

In this awesome interlude of the storm of war it is important to diagnose the situation in the light of history and of such eternal principles as may have a bearing on future events. It has been the peculiar genius of Western culture to face its tragedy rather than to turn from it, and in this spirit let us seek the solution of our problems.

The Sources of Our Discontent

If this present is "the winter of our discontent," it behooves us to inquire into the possible sources of our disquiet.

¹Grierson, *Parisian Portraits*, Swift, London.

The most obvious of the modern roots of disorder is, one can easily believe, the failure of a highly touted materialism to satisfy the human spirit. There has been, and there still remains, a general expectancy that the problems of society can be fully solved by economic processes—enough food, enough leisure, enough work. The methods range all the way from the *laissez faire* doctrine that such questions settle themselves to the Communistic notion that the cure can be achieved only by regimentation, legislation, and economic distribution. Both extremes are materialistic in outlook, are deprecatory of the human spirit, indifferent to the rights and meaning of the person, and blind to the sources of disturbance. An arresting phenomenon of our time, though not peculiar to it, is the frequent suicide of those who are cloyed with the fullness of pleasure and wealth. For more than a century and a half materialism has dominated Western culture, leading its blind devotees from illusion to illusion, promising peace with each turn of the road, and landing man in an ever deepening embrianglement of discontent. The disadvantages have arisen largely from the erection of scientific knowledge into an all-sufficient end, to the disparagement of the artistic, intuitional, and spiritual forces necessary to the complete man. Scientific progress has been so breath-taking that the whole picture of human existence has been thrown out of focus.

At the present moment we are in process of horrified realization of what our scientific knowledge may do to our world if unaccompanied with a keen sense of moral responsibility. We see that the temptations of greed are so subtle that they are not likely to be resisted except by men of profound moral convictions, to whom oppression, injustice, and unrighteousness are sins before God and blasphemies against human nature. The high calling of science teaches those who have a mind to know that the forces of the universe lay severe judgments upon refractory spirits that refuse to keep her laws, and that moral laws have a universal reality that cannot be gainsaid. One of the laws of human personality is that apart from the peace which comes of a righteous following of a Divine and Moral Will and a sedulous regard for the dignity of persons, there can be no peace either for the person or his world. The main question now is, whether we have the moral capacity to avert disaster. In our impatience with any but a materialistic outlook we have, like some Samson with demonic power, unsettled the pillars of society, while we thought to strengthen them.

Among the forces contributing to the progress of civilization has been

increased communication by swift travel, telephone, telegraph, wireless, and cinema. The general result of scientific discovery has been a startling reduction of all classes, castes, and conditions to a common level of interest. This change increases the demand for the rights of democracy without conferring the moral sense by which democracy can succeed. There has been sophistication without knowledge, reverence, or responsibility. A chance statement over the radio may set the world aflame. At the very moment the cinema has helped destroy respect for old moral shibboleths and taboos among so-called backward peoples, it has been destroying the moral stamina of our children by glorifying crime and setting up as models of living those whose personal lives appear in many cases to be devoid of both intelligence and moral sense. By these and many other influences there has come about a worldwide debacle in morals, the upshot of which is destruction of confidence in the pledged word, indifference to moral integrity, a loss of the sense of honor. These conditions have intensified suspicion respecting nationalistic aims, and obscured such common understandings as were proposed in the convention of the United Nations.

To these sources of unrest might be added another—the conflict of incompatible cultures. A world whose divisions have been intensified by isolation, spatial, national, racial, lingual, ideological, and religious, has suddenly blundered into a situation in which isolation can no longer be maintained in any of these respects. An obvious illustration may be seen in India, where for centuries, the system of caste has made possible the living together in a sort of peace, of men separated by race, religion, occupation, and speech. The sudden leveling which Western invention has brought to this social world makes the caste system no longer workable. It was about as effective for Gandhi to attempt to turn the tide by calling for a return to the spinning wheel as it was for Miss Pittington to reverse the flood with her broom.

In like manner, the peace of China for five thousand years was guaranteed by the family system now in rapid disintegration. We have witnessed the darkening faces of elderly Chinese when a wedding procession of the older order with its hundred sedan bearers, accompanied by additional palanquins of waiting ladies, banners, and ancient instruments of music escorting the bride to her future husband's home, has been shortly followed by another with bride and groom seated together in an

automobile accompanied to their wedding by a Salvation Army band in full Western military regalia

Deeper than all other sources making for the breakup of our common world are the inner conflicts of men's minds. The exterior chaos into which the world has fallen is but the replica of a profounder anarchy which afflicts individual souls. To see this, one has but to reflect upon the tawdry, meaningless, and lustful character of contemporary amusement, art, and literature. The social changes in our mental habitat have been so swift that the mind of the average man is a moral and intellectual chaos. He is called upon to integrate a world of conflicting passions when his own soul is a maelstrom of disintegrating loyalties and conflicting ideas.^a The question will be raised as to why this inner integrity is assumed to be at lower ebb than hitherto. The fact seems to be that in spite of their pessimistic outlooks, even the animistic religions assuaged internal conflicts by giving confidence in a priest, a ritual, a protective Being, an order in which the individual has a standing. The need for an inner integration, an undivided self, can be met only by a new and living faith in a Supreme Power that works for righteousness. This obviously calls for new interpretations of religion in accord with what we know of modern science. The great source of inner unity in human minds is a living faith in a living God. Such a faith cannot be merely theological, but a practiced faith in the moral laws of the universe, in man and his spiritual nature, in the participation of the Divine in human history.

The American Revolution

The present situation cannot be properly visualized without taking into account the present revolutionary state of the world. More than half the earth is now engaged in a struggle to cast off the chains of a virtual

^aComment by Harry B. Friedgood

Doctor Flewelling touches a vital point when he refers to the fact that the inner conflicts of men's minds constitute the deepest source of wrong within our disintegrating culture. He does not explore the psychodynamic significance of "the tawdry, meaningless, and lustful character of contemporary amusement, art, and literature," which, he indicates, is a reflection of internal psychological anarchy. One can agree that man is behaving more in accordance with the chaotic energies of his id than with the rational parts of his personality which select, control, modify, and integrate the unrestrained primitive demands and tendencies of the id. [Cf. Chapter XL by Doctor Friedgood.]

serfdom Western Europe and America formed but the vanguards of liberty through the revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The present world upset is only a belated part of that earlier revolution by which America gained her freedom. The inevitable fruitage was to create the desire and impulse for freedom in all other peoples. Russia abrogated her feudal serfdom but yesterday. Should we much marvel that a people so inured to Czarist force should be slow to grasp the meaning of freely expressed opinions?

In China, the revolution reaches new heights. Here countless hordes spend whole lifetimes under conditions of starvation, physical slavery, degradation of body and spirit. The tourist is welcomed to the home of the higher class, admires the artistic beauty and comfort of its appointments, the wise intelligence of its inmates. What the tourist does not often see is the struggle for life of a family that must sustain itself on what in times of better exchange amounted to about three cents a day. The present situation of the poor is inconceivable. Even this, however, does not compass the depth of misery. There is the political robbery, military and taxational, by which these pittance are still further reduced. The impact of Western industrialism and commerce has still further aggravated the situation by cheap competition with the household factory.^b Moreover, we have now for more than eight college generations been educating groups of young Chinese to American standards of living, American concepts of freedom. We have thereby set the fires of social revolution which cannot slumber until a new degree of liberty and of social welfare have been achieved. What has been written of China is in even greater degree true of India. Long British domination there has been the schooling which has made such further domination impossible. This worldwide spirit of revolution is only the returning echo of "the shot heard round the world," fires lighted by the spark from the shoe of Paul Revere's horse.

If the world outside of Europe and America is catching up on its revolutions, this more advanced portion of the earth is at present engaged in

^bComment by Gottfried Salomon Delatour

I am grateful for the attack on bourgeois materialism and Rationalism. It seems to me very necessary to stress the leveling effect of western industrialization and the premature industrialization of the Far East, because in the transition from feudalism to a new society the Far East has to catch up first with an agrarian revolution. In Asia, including Russia, this process is sped up by force. However, what is incompatible with the old wisdom of India and China and their pride in moral achievements is the conceit in material success.

a startling new revolution, symbolized in the atomic bomb, the climax of destruction or of useful energy. The tasks to which the present generation is called are breathtaking in significance and it will be easy to miss the trail. Science has now delivered into the hands of man the means by which all men may reach the goal of decent dignified living. It can be clearly seen that such an outcome can be frustrated only by the moral deterioration of selfish men. Mankind holds within its power the solution of the physical problem that torments it, has it the moral stamina to go forward to conquer the higher problems that face it in the realm of ideas and values? The present abandonment of materialism by advanced scientific thought marks the most portentous revolution in intellectual history.

The Contrasting Gifts of East and West

The difficulties of the present moment are heightened by the disparity of gifts between East and West. These disparities are barriers to mutual understanding but must be overcome. Living long in virtual isolation, East and West have each pursued a way of narrowing inclinations. The East, long lost in meditation, brings to the common menstrium the force of long cultivated ideas. The external results of Oriental intellectualism were quickly seized by the West as the proud ornaments of her own civilization. By this is meant the Eastern contributions to mathematics, astronomy, language, printing, gunpowder, and an all but endless list of other benefits. But the West has neglected the deeper results of Oriental meditation. Out of the differences has sprung mutual contempt on the part of the West with its superiority of mechanical invention, activity, and aggressiveness, on the part of the East, a feeling of disdain for that which is so lacking in intellectual abstraction. Between these two moods there is a tragic incompatibility. The East fettered in the chains of inactivism, struggling above all to preserve everywhere a perfect balance, an unmoved and unmoving harmony; the West making all its advances by a dissymmetry and cherishing a philosophy of dissymmetry, progress, and evolution. The East, with its eyes on the past, hoping to gather from a venerated Golden Age some fragments of supernatural wisdom, the West with face all set toward the future, and a heart full of impatience with the past, self-confident, hopeful, and braggart.

The Search for a Common Denominator

The crisis of the hour hinges upon a *rapprochement* between East and West. The gifts of the Orient to the Occident have through centuries been cultural and spiritual, those of the West to the East have been commercial and political. But in these compatibles is little ground for mutual understanding, neither the imposition of our business organization or our political practices can break down the wall that separates. The first ground of mutual understanding is to be found in philosophy and in philosophy alone. Such understanding is neither simple nor easy. Western philosophy, rampantly materialistic for more than a century, is unalterably separated from any community of feeling with the East, and is, on the whole, proud of its isolation and its air of superiority. Moreover the very movement, to the coat tails of which it has hung as the only means of salvation, scientific materialism, has now vanished, within the area of progressive and advanced science, leaving it without visible means of support.

That time in the history of thought has perhaps come when we should reverse the long cherished Comtean dictum of three stages in the progress of history. Comte assigned to religion the lowest step, followed by philosophy, and culminating in science as the crown of all accomplishment. The theory served a day when science needed for the moment to relieve itself from the fettering dogmas of philosophy and religion, something as a youth must cut the ties of home before he is able to return to that home with a lively appreciation of its true value. Such an order as Comte's does not fit the contemporary age of scientific disillusionment. We now know that science cannot bring the completion of human culture without the constraining influence of values that in effect are religious. Philosophy, likewise, must be seen as valid through its moral implications if it is not as an alternative to appear as "procuress to the Lords of Hell."

Every sign and token of the present hour bears out the conclusion that to avoid world destruction there must come a new emphasis on moral and spiritual values. Yet the man of the street is simple enough to believe that false and dangerous ideas can be met by physical violence rather than by greater ideas. To forbid an idea is the surest way to strengthen and spread it. The fact that wrong ideas can be conquered only by true ones gives philosophy a role of increasing importance in our time.

Our newly established cotton factories in China provide illustration of the widespread repercussions of unrighteousness. Little children of four years are said to toil from dawn to dusk until they fell asleep beside the looms and are kicked into consciousness in the morning to work as long as they last. No portion of society is free from the contamination of such brutality. There are the inroads which cheap labor makes upon the province of our own working men, there is the destruction of the handcraft market so essential to Chinese livelihood, there is the ruin of our own market which will eventually reach our own industrialists. With all these there is a growing hatred and misunderstanding between peoples which loans of billions and political diplomacy can never offset. The impression the ignorant masses acquire concerning us is of a people altogether materialistic, grasping, and exploiting. The chief spot of light in the picture comes through the efforts of Christian missionaries with their hospitals, schools, and technical information. Yet these emissaries of incalculable goodwill we popularly despise and depreciate.

There are no gifts which materialism can make which under the present conditions can exert much power for world understanding. "The gift without the giver is bare." Once we saw a Chinese beggar reach down in the dense flow of traffic, at the risk of his life, to pick up the coin that had been disdainfully tossed him, then run to overtake the automobile from which it was thrown, in order to hurl it with contempt at the giver. Materialism can do little except to inculcate belief that physical force, violence, and seizure are the main implements of our civilization. The result is always to train the weapons of materialism against ourselves. Of all men most conscious of this fact are the outstanding scientists who created the atomic bomb. Among most intelligent leaders, belief in materialism is forever shattered.

To complicate the situation, the scientific discoveries now call for an accommodated social order. Inventions promise to do away with the worst forms of drudgery and to release men and women for other forms of activity. We need, however, to take a sobering second thought to the effect of this new liberty. Conditions of general prosperity have not usually led to higher types of social activity but to orgies of self-indulgence and depravity. What will ignorant, selfish, and criminal men do with their freedom? The threat of explosive power is not the only menace in the atomic bomb. The dangers arising from its peaceful exploitation may raise even more serious problems.

In the face of such circumstances, philosophy must present something more formidable than a belated scientism which the foremost scientists have themselves repudiated.⁶ A philosophy of the Ivory Tower, which overlooks the reality of man himself and denies his spiritual nature, can have no contribution to make to a world that perishes for a revival of moral sense. Nor can any philosophy which loses itself in a maze of dialectic, pondering its quiddities and wherefores, provide a guide book for a world standing over the abyss of destruction. There is a sense in which these contrasting philosophies might be taken to symbolize the counter philosophies of East and West, but both are inadequate for the crisis. Some mediating position between them must be found, and this at first seems as impossible as Kipling's unapproachable East and West, until we recall a later phrase of that hackneyed verse "Where strong men meet there is no East and West." The most obvious obstruction to understanding lies in the incompatibility of materialism and individualism, on the one hand, with absolutism and impersonalism on the other. Any system which assumes that "all that exists is matter and all that occurs is motion," will utterly fail to convince the Oriental mind. No philosophy which sidesteps metaphysics, no philosophy which fails to assume full reality for the spiritual forces that create the values by which men live, will have convincing power. In the first place, these values are basic to any peaceful agreement. Moreover, for permanent results, these must be recognized as a part of the Cosmic Order carrying conviction.

⁶Comment by David Baumgardt

Professor Flewelling's diagnosis of our present disquiet is doubtless correct. On principle, I should like to express agreement with his directives for science, ethics, and religion. But it seems to me essential to qualify these principles. Granted for argument's sake that philosophy and science have been materialistic during the past century, what kind of "spiritual" gain could be derived from the bare *results* of contemporary science? Main differences of the new findings from the old ones amount only to the fact that the physicist now no longer refers to particles of matter ultimately verifiable by sense data and hypotheses, but to other elements of non-spiritual nature ultimately verifiable by sense data and other hypotheses. It seems unjustifiable to conclude that the abandonment of belief in Newton's physics or in materialism would cause any definite encouragement of higher morality. Hitler and most of his followers had obviously adopted a non-materialistic *Weltanschauung*, they believed in astrology and generally in spiritual forces directing the physical universe. But these beliefs did not abate their immorality in any respect.

We can learn very much from the methods of exact science if we do not imitate them slavishly in the field of humanities. But in our fight against moral materialism, the adoption of the physicist's non-materialism will be of no decisive avail. In morals, it is essential to qualify the character of our non-materialistic principles rather than to rely on quite general allegedly non-materialistic principles of physics.

within themselves, and laden with their own penalties if refused. The kinship of the spirit of man with the natural order must become a working principle of action.^d Last of all as the corollary of such recognition, the intrinsic worth and sanctity of the human personality must become the basis of political organization. Only so shall we be able to meet the demands of Kipling's second phrase for a world in which there is neither East nor West, North nor South, race nor physical condition, separating men.

A people, as in the East, whose concept of time is cyclic, can be willing to wait, can be expected to be adverse to change, and to seek the repose of meditation. In such a scheme, one dares not hasten to grasp at civilization, he awaits its rise in his own soul.

Such a concept of time vetoes a Western man's concepts of value for he believes in single, epoch making historical events. His "revolution" is an invention, the breaking out of new historic purposes, and not the revolution of a cosmic wheel which forever repeats. This strictly linear evolutionary idea of time is peculiar to modern man, and the genius of Western civilization, arising first in the philosophy of the Greeks.

India—as Life brooding on itself—thinks of the problems of time in periods comparable to those of our astronomy, geology, and palaeontology. India thinks of time and of herself, that is to say, in biological terms, terms of the species, not of the ephemeral ego. The latter *becomes* old.

^dComment by David Baumgardt

Above all I believe qualification of general principles is needed in ethics. Part of the confusion of modern man is, in my opinion, due to the still widespread illusion that it is sufficient in ethics to point to the principles of love, truth, justice, righteousness, integrity, and honor "as part of the Cosmic Order carrying conviction within themselves." To see the endlessly prolonged torture which every cat inflicts, without any remorse, upon an innocent mouse and numerous similar types of animal and human behavior, can, I think, not justify any simple trust in the domination of righteousness within the Cosmic Order. The eminent biologist, Thomas Henry Huxley, had, after all, some reason for stating that, "Cosmic Nature is no school of virtue but the headquarters of the enemy of ethical nature" (*Evolution and Ethics and other Essays*, D. Appleton-Century Company, 1899, pp. 52f). Moreover, thousands of rather intelligent political criminals and Machiavellians can hardly be cited as witnesses to the alleged fact "that moral laws have a universal reality which cannot be gainsaid." Even under the heaviest moral pressure, up to the last moments of their lives, hundreds of Nazis strictly and sincerely denied that our moral laws have any universal validity, and if such determined malefactors believe in universal moral laws at all, then these laws of "honor" and "right" have to them a meaning exactly opposite to the meaning given these laws in Judaism, Christendom, and Buddhism. To Hermann Goerring the universal law in morals never meant anything but that "the victor will always be the judge and the vanquished the accused."

the former is old, and therewith eternally young
individuals, lives, not of life ²

We think of egos,

To the Hindu the greatness of the whole of things contracts "the burden and delights, possessions and bereavements of the ego, the whole content and the work of the human lifetime," dissolving it into unreality. The religious aim of life must then be to transcend the limits of individualized consciousness, to lose one's self in the Whole, to identify one's self with God by utterly losing all consciousness of one's own individuality.⁶

The problem bars forever any chance that the ruling naturalistic philosophies of the West will be able to affect any reconciliation of ideas. Personalism offers an approach to mutuality and provides a vocabulary for intercourse. The personalist conceives of the highest range of personality not in an egoistic self-fulfilment but in complete abandon to the will of the Divine, holding that finite personality can be completely realized only by the fullest surrender of one's powers, so that one can become the instrument of the Divine.⁷ Doubtless much remains to be desired from

²Zimmer, *Myths and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilization*, Pantheon Books, New York, p. 21

⁶Comment by David Baumgardt

A final qualification applies to the mystical-religious principle of the individual's surrender to the Cosmos, as it is especially taught in the East. Not every type of such surrender can be called morally valuable (See e.g., Nazi war criminal Albert Speer's surrender of his individual fate, described in G. M. Gilbert, *Nuremberg Diary*, 1947, p. 24.) Whether this religious surrender is morally valuable, essentially depends on the character of what is called here God, Cosmos, the One. There have been too many types of blind surrender to a Supreme Creative Intelligence which should not have been called God but Satan.

⁷Comment by Paul A. Schilpp.

Mr. Flewelling's characterization of Oriental philosophic thought (and with it of what he means by Occidental "personalism") illustrates the difficulty to which I call attention in my remarks on Mr. Garnett's paper [Chapter XXXI, note b]. Only the mystic—whether from Orient or Occident—can follow the solution of the problem envisaged by Mr. Flewelling. And I for one doubt seriously whether the mystics will be able to save humanity.

The world of the twentieth century is—by and large (and this is coming to be more and more true even of the Orient)—so steeped in the scientific attitude, method, and process that clamor for a return to mysticism will, in general, fall on nothing but deaf ears. That the *rapprochement* between East and West will have to be achieved on an intellectual and spiritual level, and will never be possible on that of any crass or crude materialism, goes, I think, without saying. But the West will no more be ready to "stoop" to a mere other worldly mysticism than the East will be willing to "stoop" to an equally objectionable and even more dangerous materialism.

It should be possible to find at least a common ground of meeting by recourse to an

both sides, in the way of study, interpretation, and application, but there is no reason, for instance, why a good personalist and a good Vishnayan should not converse in sympathetic accord.

This personal appeal, at which we must ultimately arrive, may not prove so difficult as it seems if we are wise enough to distinguish between individualism and personalism, which properly understood are antonyms rather than synonyms.[§] Individualism lies behind the untoward aggressiveness of the West. The East could have no quarrel with a concept which conceives the completest expression of personality to be found alone in complete surrender of the human will to the will of the Cosmos, the Supreme Creative Intelligence, the Real, the One, or God. From such a concept springs a sense of brotherhood and democracy which cannot come in any other way, and which is basic to enduring peace.

intellectual spiritualism which is even today no longer foreign to the world's foremost natural scientists and which, at the same time, leaves room for the significance and ultimacy of the (at least relatively) free individual moral agent—of the East as well as of the West.

[§][Cf. Professor Flewelling's comment on the paper by Rudolf Allers, Chapter XXVII, note d.]

CHAPTER XXXV

International Polling and International Democracy

By ELMO ROPER and JULIAN L. WOODWARD



POLITICAL DEMOCRACY rests upon faith in the essential wisdom of the common man, it rests upon the belief that the judgment of the citizen is generally good when he has the facts by which to judge. If this belief is sound, then the cure for democracy's ills is more democracy. By providing an increasing opportunity for the common man to get information on matters of public concern, and then giving an increasing chance for his judgments to be made effective in government, the cause of democracy will be best promoted.

Whether the increasing scope of formal education, and the improving media of communication can equip the citizen adequately to judge the increasingly complex issues of the modern world is uncertain. Walter Lippmann long ago pointed out that the original idea of the omniscient citizen, while appropriate to town meeting democracy, was no longer applicable in the modern world where only an expert can fully understand the real issues a government faces.^a The past twenty years have seen a considerable development in the teaching of social sciences in the schools, and the newspaper has been greatly supplemented by the news magazine and the radio. We may, we think, conclude that we are gaining in the race to keep the citizen competent.^b But certainly education is still not far ahead of catastrophe.

^aComment by Alfred C. Lane.

Since retiring, I have done some political canvassing, and find a considerable percentage of people wish to be told how to vote. They feel that as we call up expert physicians and electricians, so there might be expert and trustworthy politicians. If they have a right to choose their expert politician or union leader, is a representative government still a democracy?

^bComment by F. Ernest Johnson.

The initial assumption as to the basis of democracy—"faith in the essential wisdom of

We are certainly showing real progress in making such informed judgments as citizens do have, more effective in social action. We are doing this in various ways, but perhaps most spectacularly through the public opinion poll. Public opinion polling is a young art, and many problems connected with it remain to be solved, but its ultimately great potentialities as an adjunct in "making democracy work" are already beginning to be apparent. It is these potentialities, viewed specially in relation to international public opinion and world democracy, that we plan to examine in this paper.

The time will come, and in the not too distant future, when a properly organized survey will do these things:

- 1 It will give citizens a chance to express opinions on all the important issues that face their society
- 2 It will distinguish between informed and uninformed opinions.
- 3 It will measure, at least to some extent, the strength of feeling and desire back of the opinions
- 4 It will summarize individual opinions together with the knowledge and interest associated with them, and determine the real strengths of publics and of pressure groups

The polls already measure individual opinions for national population samples well enough for their social utility to become pretty well established. The importance of testing the information back of opinions and the desires associated with them is not so well realized. Take information for instance. During the past fourteen years, our organization has made hundreds of nationwide public opinion studies and in many of them we have included questions designed to give us an index of the amount of information—or misinformation—behind the opinion. We have recently analyzed one hundred and sixty-three of these coupled information and attitude questions to see if there was any consistent relation between the responses to them.

One not very surprising but nevertheless important finding is that people who had no information on a subject were likely to have no opinion on it either. Almost all of those with some information had some sort of opinion, while over a fourth of those without information had no opinion of any kind on the subject.

the common man"—is one that is probably going to be increasingly challenged as society becomes more complex and its problems become more and more technical. But it remains a basic operational principle.

The uninformed individuals, when they did have opinions, were more likely to be categorical about them than those who had information to back them up. As might have been predicted, the possession of information seemed to introduce balance and temperateness into attitude formation, qualities that are highly desirable when citizens' opinion becomes the sovereign power in a state.

At present we know still less about people's intensity of feeling on social and political issues than about the information they possess. How much does a particular respondent care about our Greek aid program, even supposing that he knows something about the issues at stake? If he does not care very much what is done, then what weight should be given to the attitude he expresses? Perhaps his answer is cooked up on the spur of the moment just so he will not appear stupid to the interviewer. Perhaps his opinion is long considered but weakly held. Perhaps it has real conviction back of it, conviction not only of its rightness but of the importance that the opinion prevail and lead to collective action. Public opinion surveyors have developed some techniques for sorting out responses of these different types, but they have not used the techniques enough yet to perfect them or to create public demand that they be employed systematically and regularly.

When the polls measure information and intensity as well as they now measure attitudes, polling will become democracy's auxiliary ballot box, much more flexible than the election referenda of today, although certainly not a substitute for them. Through continuous polling a running audit of informed and interested opinion on current issues will be provided. Since it is the majority of *informed* and *interested* opinion, and not necessarily of all opinion, that is likely to prevail in a democracy, the legislator should pay attention to the audit as the voice of his constituents. He *will*, in the long run, pay attention to it, because it will help to free him from the dominance of pressure groups, whose claims of public support now often go unvalidated. He will pay attention also because it is the informed and interested people who will appraise his record and vote on it at election time. While listening to results of public opinion surveys and acting on them, the legislator can still be, in fact will even more be, a statesman. He will be free to disregard the views of his constituency when he knows they are uninformed or apathetic and act instead on his own judgment, but he will also be compelled by true states-

manship to support those views when surveys indicate that they are soundly based and held firmly."

Today the pollsters are learning how to perform the four functions described above, but they have gone only a short way toward integrating them into a single instrument. There is an economic problem to which some solution must be found before the attitude-information-desire survey combination becomes continuously feasible. Surveying a national cross section is not inexpensive and the present tendency is to cram many topics into one questionnaire in order to divide the cost among several articles or releases. What is needed is the one topic questionnaire, with room to come at that one topic from different angles and to include measures of information and intensity of feeling. It may be the government that will have to pay for this service, if private communications media (newspapers, magazines, radio) cannot do so. It would be definitely advisable for the government to conduct its own public opinion surveys along certain lines.

Polls are already proving of great utility in some of the democratic nations. In the United States they now play an important role in the process of government. While congressmen do not like polls, they do pay attention to them, and administrators are finding they cannot get along without them. The United States, as well as Canada and Great Britain, set up official agencies to conduct polls for the guidance of administrators in wartime. One polling enterprise, significant because it was directly aimed at reducing international friction, was in connection with the joint British American effort to reduce tension between American soldiers and British civilians. In August of 1942, the senior author of this paper suggested to Ambassador Winant in London that the growing friction

^cComment by W. Edwards Deming

The real difficulty is mass education in regard to current issues, economics, and sociology, for although it is the "informed" public opinion which will be most helpful to the administrator or legislator, it is votes, informed plus uninformed, that put him in office. This is almost as true of most private officials as it is with public officials. In other words, some doubt may be cast on the authors' assertion that through the use of properly designed polls the legislator will be free to disregard the views of his constituency when he knows (from the polls) that they are uninformed or apathetic. Perhaps the conclusion is that one of the most important uses of the polls will be not only to learn the feelings and intensity of feeling of various segments of the population, but also which segments are uninformed, so that remedial educational measures can be intelligently directed. However slow and cumbersome this process may seem (as education is a slow process) it may be the surest and safest procedure in the democratic evolution.

might be lessened if public opinion surveys could find the basic causes for the unfriendly attitudes that were developing. The Ambassador suggested the proposal be taken directly to General Eisenhower, who instantly saw the possibilities. Within fifteen minutes after the conversation started, General Osborn in Washington had been instructed to send two technicians to conduct surveys among the American Army stationed in England. Brenden Bracken, acting for the British government, was equally cooperative in arranging for surveys among the British civilians.^d

While polling at the behest of government agencies in the United States has been reduced since the war ended, it is still going on in several quarters. The War Department, the Navy Department, the State Department, the Department of Agriculture, the Federal Reserve Board, the Veterans Administration, and the Department of Labor, all have been recently or are now using survey techniques.

In the other democratic nations polling organizations are springing up. France has an established national poll that was created during the German occupation to work clandestinely and report French opinion to the Allies and which now publishes a monthly bulletin of the results of its poll on French opinions. Polls have recently been set up in Belgium, Holland, Italy, Switzerland, and Sweden. There are two well established polling organizations in Britain. The Gallup chain of affiliated public opinion institutes now extends to twelve countries and includes Australia and Finland. Two conferences of polling agencies in Europe have already been held and a European organization of pollsters was set up (headed incidentally by an American who is working in occupied Germany). Recently at Williamstown both an American organization and an international organization of practitioners of the polling art were created. Both organizations aim to devise and administer a set of standards that will provide protection for the public against incompetent or dishonest pollsters. He who attempts to report what the public wants and thinks, and pretends to use the powerful adjective "scientific" to de-

^dComment by W. Edwards Deming.

The authors do not mention the use of the survey technique as an aid in problems of racial, religious, and ethnic origin, right here at home. Many books have been published on such questions but all so far as I know have been pure speculation, none has been quantitative when it comes to measures of attitudes, intensity, and reasons for opinions held. The polling technique is capable of greatly elevating the quality of such studies.

scribe his methods, assumes a great responsibility in a democracy. He should be held strictly to account.⁶

At the Williamstown conference there was no official representation from non-democratic countries, for the public opinion survey simply will not work where there is not freedom. Even viewed as market research for the dictator clique, the poll in a non-democratic state will be a failure, for people will tell dictators only what they think the dictators want to hear. When police states conduct plebiscites the result is so much a foregone conclusion that no informed person credits it as more than a trick of propaganda. The same would be even more true of a poll, since manipulation is even easier and much less expensive.

But if the international use of polling techniques must be restricted to one of the "two worlds," its use in the world appropriate to it can still be of immense importance. If the democratic nations are to protect themselves against the encroachment of dictatorship, they must develop a common body of opinion and an international forum out of which that opinion can emerge. They must also develop ways of measuring accurately the common opinion that does emerge. Both the leaders and the people need to know the issues on which likemindedness exists, the strength of feeling back of it, and the national groups from which the strongest support comes. It is equally important to be aware of the continuing areas of difference. The pulse of the new-born world democratic society may be feeble at first—the more important to keep feeling it constantly, so that fainting spells can be dealt with promptly and the periods when it is firm and strong utilized to move ahead.

Polling is obviously needed in the world democratic society, but there are some difficult problems to solve. For one thing, polling depends on language, it relies on words having a common meaning to all respondents.⁷ Finding word equivalents in different languages, so that a question

⁶Comment by F. Ernest Johnson.

The possibilities of polling as a democratic technique seem to me to be correctly envisaged. I would like to find in the paper some discrimination between the constructive uses of polling and what seems to me the mischievous employment of it during the course of national election campaigns. Is it not the distinctive contribution of polling to politics that it affords an opportunity to test opinions and attitudes on specific issues on which a national plebiscite cannot be had? It seems to me that to make the polls an instrument of campaigning is to degrade an important technique. The arguments to the contrary leave me unconvinced.

⁷Comment by Alfred C. Lane.

The authors rightly call attention to the difficulty of the varying meaning of words. As

can be rephrased and have the same *meaning* in all countries, is a semantic problem that will not be solved without much experiment. Yet until we can ask Italians, Norwegians, Mexicans, and Americans their opinions about what should be done in Palestine and get answers that can be combined into a four nation total, we shall not have the right to speak of a world opinion. The Gallup chain's attempt to ask common questions in different countries is only a first step toward one or more international polls. Too often it is assumed that because the words are the same in English translation the meanings to those actually asked the questions are also equivalent.⁸

The relation between interviewer and respondent is another matter that needs investigation on an international basis. Sound polling depends on a type of rapport between the two individuals which leads the respondent to speak out his very own ideas to the interviewer. Too great a courtesy on the part of the person queried, an exaggerated deference and a desire to please, are almost as fatal to reliable polling as outright lies or blunt refusals. Polling apparently works well in Anglo-Saxon countries, whose citizens tend to be sturdily independent and where political controversy is everyone's game. Whether polls will be equally successful in Latin American nations, where political literacy is confined to the few and rules of hospitality command deference to the visitor, is not yet certain. It is not certain either that polling can be used effectively in India, with its caste system, or in China, where exaggerated respect is paid to the views of the head of the house.

The evidence so far available—and there is now a good deal of it—points to an optimistic conclusion concerning the potential ubiquity of polling techniques. Enough market research has been done in South America to indicate that reliable results can be obtained on many questions with urban samples. The polling experiments by the British and Americans in occupied Italy, Austria, Germany, and Japan have been carried on under difficult conditions but have achieved results that check well with other intelligence sources and have been used in policy determination. American pollsters went to Japan with many misgivings and were surprised to find how easy it was to get honest answers from

my paper emphasizes [Chapter XLIII], that is *always* true, and there will always be a factor of error, which should be studied when testing for information.

⁸[Cf. Chapter XXIV by Clem C. Linnenberg, Jr., for a discussion of some of the difficulties in international surveys for collection of statistics.]

people that had for so long been subject to "thought control" A good many modifications in sampling and questionnaire techniques had to be made in Japan to meet local conditions but these were made successfully without too much difficulty. The same could be said of the occupied areas in Europe as well.

The need, of course, is for much more experiment, not only in adapting polling technique but also in combining the results into an opinion report that cuts across national lines. Some of this experiment will take place through the further work of the agencies already mentioned, or through informal exchanges arranged by the new international organization of pollsters, but the development of many more private polling organizations in different countries is highly desirable. These can cooperate to provide a sort of reporting service on world opinion. Ultimately, if the job is to be done thoroughly, the active support of a world political federation will be necessary. The power to poll opinion in foreign countries is too great a power, and involves too great a responsibility, to be left solely in the hands of private agencies. It has been proposed that the United Nations do polling through UNESCO, but, if an international poll is blocked there by the non-democracies, it will come later. For polling is potentially too valuable an adjunct to world, as well as to national, democracy to be permanently disregarded. It is bound to be used eventually to measure the world opinion that the democracies must create.

CHAPTER XXXVI

Is There a Deficit in Our Prevailing Philosophy of Education?

By F ERNEST JOHNSON

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IN THIS BRIEF PAPER I shall raise some questions concerning the prevailing philosophic temper of American Education in the light of the tensions in contemporary life. I shall undertake no documentation whatever. To do that adequately would require a book, to do it fragmentarily would be invidious, and would direct attention to particular writers rather than to the intellectual milieu. I shall try, as one who has for many years breathed the air of a teacher education institution, read freely, and conversed and conferred at the going rate of exchange, to characterize the general mood of educational thought at the philosophical level and to indicate what seems to me an intellectual deficit, in the light of the problems with which general education is confronted.

Admittedly, there are many cross currents of thought in American education today but I think it will not be questioned that the prevailing temper is experimentalist. In other words, it is of a piece with American philosophy in general. I make this characterization in the indicative mode, without any disposition to argue the validity of the assumptions involved. I believe there is an authentic quality in the emphasis on free inquiry, and in the insistence on empirical validation. If there is to be progress in American educational philosophy I think it will come not by repudiation of the modern mood, but by preserving what is authentic in it and remedying such deficiencies as are discoverable. It is with the latter that I am here concerned. And I propose to look for them in the actual educational situation.

In the period following World War I what has been known as the

progressive education movement absorbed in large part the dynamic drive of American education. It was stimulated by a passion for perfecting the democratic way of life and releasing potential energies of individual growing persons. Its explicit premises had an axiomatic quality and one may almost say that its advance was inevitable. It embodied a revolt against formalism and rigid institutionalism and it fortified itself by alignment with scientific experimentation and discovery. Its watchword was "learning by doing" and the free play of intelligence was its great ideal. Its *bête non* was "indoctrination."

By using the past tense I am not suggesting that this movement has spent itself, on the contrary. Rather, I am characterizing it in the period when its assumptions were relatively unchallenged. In recent years that condition has changed. And before going further I wish to say that much of the criticism of the movement has been superficial, factually mistaken, and due in no small degree to an unwillingness of teachers and parents to accept the responsibility implicit in freedom. But the reaction has other causes and I think they are not far to seek.

The advent of the depression confronted education at its intellectual frontier with the necessity of defining social goals which would make possible the realization of personal values. It was seen that merely freeing the minds of individuals could not create the good life unless a social order were created in which personal freedom could thrive. Educational leaders whose main preoccupation had been the development of critical thinking began to crusade for social change. Under the pressure of the social-economic situation educators sought to incorporate social imperatives in the educational program. Loyalty to ends came to seem no less important than critical examination of means. An over-all concept, democracy, came to be the normative principle. So used, the word was not merely descriptive of sound educative process, it defined a goal to which education was assumed to be directed, and loyalty to which was an educational end.

The late World War climaxed this trend, and devotion to democracy to the point of ultimate sacrifice became as orthodox an end of education as religious faith had been in the early years of the nation's history. A resolute effort was made in many quarters to keep free inquiry alive and to give every point of view a hearing, but the assumption gained ground that in a democratic society some things must be taken for granted—most of all, the preservation of democracy itself. If I am not mistaken

history will record that something profound, something not yet fully sensed, was happening in this stressful period

What I mean is that American democracy, which had developed in a highly individualistic tradition, was facing the necessity of redefinition in a social context. In philosophic terms, the prevailing nominalistic tradition which centers attention on the concrete individual, failed to furnish a conceptual basis for norms of man's corporate existence. There was an abundance of negative precepts, designed to break down restraints upon the individual, but a dearth of universal principles on which to build a viable social structure.² It is to the credit of education that some of its leaders were among the first to note this fault in our tradition, but the real significance of the matter has yet to be made articulate. I think it important that educators, without diminishing their concern for social change, should study the inner meaning of the ferment that has been at work. Certainly, we have a right to expect that those who specialize in educational philosophy shall make an analysis of the situation in terms of the categories of their own discipline—not merely in terms of immediate social strategy.

Students get no end of amusement out of the dilemma into which educators force themselves by deliberately seeking to create a bias in favor of democracy—which I think they ought to do—and at the same time clinging to the notion that all they are doing is stimulating critical thought. The net result in educational practice of the impact of social realities has been good; their impact on educational philosophy has created confusion.

Looking again at the actual situation in which education finds itself, we can locate the critical point in the concept of value. The more education concerns itself with outcomes as well as with process, the more insistent becomes the demand for agreement on a value structure. And since the very idea of a value structure for society has a historical dimen-

²Comment by George B. de Huszar

I agree. It is my contention that some of the basic intellectual and social currents of the past few centuries have been based on the assumption that freedom from Christianity, from feudalism, from the state, from capitalism, will lead to a better society. The Renaissance, the Age of Reason, the Reformation, democratic liberalism, *laissez faire*, and Marxism have been based to a great extent on the assumption that what existed was undesirable and, if disposed of, would be followed by a happier mankind. But after "artificial restrictions" have been removed it appears that man emancipated from traditions is not necessarily free but often just lost.

sion, attention becomes focused upon the cultural heritage. Even a casual inspection of current educational literature discloses this trend. We are in the midst of a movement for a new curricular emphasis on the cultural heritage, as a corrective for what is asserted to be an excessive preoccupation with contemporary interests.

It is a pity that the challenge of neo-classicism has so largely been absorbed in forensics. The movement has highly debatable features, and it has been prolific of generalizations about "great books" and the evils of "vocationalism" which have created legitimate fears that important values in modern education are being imperiled. What is not realized is that the impact of social and cultural forces has made inevitable a revision of experimentalist theories of value as hitherto formulated, if we are to avoid cultural detracation.

The dominant emphasis in progressive educational philosophy in this connection has been upon the continual reconstruction of values. There must be no "fixed points"; all values must be tentatively held. Yet when guidance is attempted with reference to this reconstruction process, recourse is had to the central affirmations of democracy. The reevaluation of values is to take place within an accepted framework—the worth of persons, the right of participation in the decisions by which one is bound, the protection of minorities, and all the rest. These central affirmations of democracy are taken as "givens," and educators are now enjoined to seek enduring commitment to them as a goal of the educative process. This, I think, is precisely as it should be, but it hardly fits into the current experimentalist formula.^b What seems to be overlooked is the fact that

^bComment by Henry N. Wicman

Mr. Johnson is here discussing what I think is the most crucially important problem in theory and practice of education. Historical conditions which we cannot here take space to consider have made it possible, even fruitful, in the recent past, to consider all values relative and transitional, to make the goal of education the critical mind and the release of intelligence, and to equip the individual to find for himself what is best. That period of history is past. We cannot any longer have the individual free to find for himself what is best for him without a substructure of value common and basic to all. In the past this substructure was automatically and unconsciously provided by the local heritage of the people who did the educating. They transmitted it without knowing they did so. In the swift upthrust of technological civilization the chief problem of education was to release the human intelligence from bondage to those parts of this inherited substructure which had become obstructive to that free use of intelligence and power of action demanded by a developing civilization. But if a substructure of value is not accepted, freedom of person, criticism, and inquiry will be suicidal to the individual and to the race. If this basic requirement be not met by education we shall very soon of necessity pass into an

education is concerned with two quite different modes of experience—*inquiry* and *commitment*. These are not contraries, but neither are they reducible to the same terms. They are alternating moods of the mind. Doubtless an intellectually mature person is able to entertain on occasion the most radical questioning of his assumptions, but when he acts at a significant level of purpose he must do so resolutely and totally. Contemporary education is recognizing this but my contention is that in doing so it has to that extent outmoded its best known philosophical formulations.

One can find in the experimentalist classics countless statements that recognize the essential nature of commitment resting on social faith, without any attempt to incorporate this in the analysis of experience. The desideratum is a reconciliation of diverse emphases, a framework broad enough to hold the qualitatively different elements of experience. To continue stressing the "relativity of all values" while seeking to make education a bulwark of the democratic way of life, is only confusing.

The point may be sharpened by reference to the preoccupation of experimentalist thinking with the scientific method. What is the end here sought? It is not merely training in the use of that method, but loyalty to it as a pursuit. This is legitimate and necessary. The scientific method must become an end in the sense that only loyalty to it can support the rigid discipline of scientific inquiry. Many minds intellectually equipped for scientific work never make the grade because of a moral failure to reach the required level of disinterestedness and self-discipline. Thus even within the scientific realm the qualitative distinction appears between the mood of questioning and that of resolute commitment. To support that commitment, the scientist has his fixed point—his faith in the ultimate validity of his method. He is ready for many surprises, but

age of arbitrary and despotic control, because humanity cannot survive with freedom unless this primary prerequisite to human existence be first provided.

The nature of this substructure of value cannot here be discussed. May I be permitted to say, however, that I think it must be the very process of interchange between human organisms which creates the human mind and magnifies it to whatever limit it may ever reach, which transforms the newly born organism into a human being, which is the creative source of all values whatsoever in their human context. Once this basic value is established, individuals and groups can be free, intelligence can be as critical and wide searching as it pleases. But the process which enables us to be human must in all cases be protected and served, released and empowered, made sovereign and imperative over all of human life. What the nature of this process may be is the crucial and imperative problem of education as philosophy, as method, and as goal. We believe it can be known empirically.

not for the discovery of an utter capriciousness in nature. Yet one finds almost no recognition of this important fact in current expositions of scientific method.⁴

My point would be missed entirely if what is here said were construed as a metaphysical argument concerning the nature of ethical ends. My purpose is to indicate something lacking in the prevailing philosophy of education if account is to be taken of the actualities of experience. It is diagnosis I am concerned with, and I am making it under recognized categories.

Now let us pursue the matter another step. A further fundamental difficulty is involved in the assumption that intelligence is an inclusive category under which all values may be subsumed. As a matter of fact, the experimentalist writers are not conclusive on this point, but this very inconclusiveness accentuates the confusion in educational philosophy. In spite of much emphasis on values, as if they constituted distinct ends for the realization of which intelligence is instrumental—which I think is the right way to put it—one encounters again and again the assertion that intelligence is itself the ultimate resource in the discovery of values. This seems to me palpably contrary to fact. Is there any evidence that the best measure of intelligence we possess gives us a measure of a dispositional tendency to seek high ethical ends? Here again, it is not a metaphysical question, but one of the actual relation of intelligence to value attitudes.

My contention is that to make intelligence the *summum bonum* is to throw the educative process into confusion. For in practice we recognize that value attitudes are determined by the impact of the educational environment, and that all good education involves a deliberate setting of the stage to insure socially approved outcomes. In a broad sense, not in the conditioned reflex sense, all education involves conditioning. This is

⁴Comment by Alfred C. Lane.

The question to which Professor Johnson seems to suggest the answer "no" is this: Can a progressive education which abhors indoctrination have propaganda for democracy as a goal?

In his discussion Professor Johnson refers to experimentalism but does not refer to the work which I should think of as experimentalist. Such work would compare the aims and the success of various institutions, *e.g.* the large central schools to which scholars are transported, or the small neighborhood schools, as to the development of intelligence or democratic feeling. Similar studies might be made of parochial schools. Moreover, there are extra-curricular activities which are educative, *i.e.*, the Boy Scout movement, which avowedly has goals of public service and team work. Some studies of an objective character to show what the effects have actually been would involve the scientific method.

as true of democratic education as of any other. The stage is set for democratic outcomes. The person so educated is being equipped with a map of values—of ends—constructed out of the cultural heritage. Intelligence is an instrument by which means are contrived to further these ends. Even the habit of criticism requires support in a social sanction based on its instrumental function in maximizing human values.

These value affirmations are quite unprovable. They may receive useful support in scientific investigation—as in the case of the findings of cultural anthropology in relation to the affirmations of human brotherhood. But the validity of the proposition that men should treat each other as brothers can be neither established nor overthrown by scientific evidence, and to rest it on particular findings of research is as precarious as it is irrelevant. So with the affirmation we make about the superiority of democracy. Historical evidence is far from conclusive as to the viability of a democratic system. All we can do is to bet our lives on it because, no matter what the outcome, we believe it to be good.^d

All this can be abundantly documented in educational literature, but little account is taken of it in the “legal tender” formulations of experimentalist philosophy. May it be that some of the opposition to education of the progressive type reflects this confusion in educational thinking? A good case can be made for an experimental approach to curriculum problems, but it cannot be defended convincingly by vague talk about the relativity of ends and the endless reconstruction of values, especially at a time when social imperatives are assuming startling proportions. It is curious that educators who can be very intense and direct in their pursuit

^dComment by Cecil H. Miller

Professor Johnson's contention, as I understand it, is that with respect to values “evidence” is hardly relevant, and that therefore questions of value have to be settled on other grounds. If Professor Johnson's views as here stated are correct there is, I believe, no escaping his conclusion as to how democracy can be defended. “All we can do is to bet our lives on it.” The question, that is to say, is not a rational but an irrational one. And the same, of course, would be true for the followers of the various other political and ethical “isms.” We would have to recognize the *argumentum ad baculum* in a sort of “warre of all against all” as the sole appropriate method of settling such questions.

This is not to say, of course, that the views here stated are incorrect. But it is a virtue, I think, of the experimentalist approach that it recognizes an alternative. In its opposition to indoctrination, experimentalism assumes that democracy can be appropriately defended by appeal to evidence—and, by the same token can be indefinitely reconstructed and emended in the light of such evidence. This assumption may be false. But it is hard to see how its falsity could be established (despite the tremendous significance it has as a judgment of value) except by appeal to the very mood and methods of inquiry which Professor Johnson impugns.

of social objectives should be so vague and induct with respect to the philosophy of values

Finally, should we not seriously consider whether too much has not been made of differences in general philosophic theory? I have used the word experimentalism to characterize the prevailing mood in educational philosophy. It is, of course, all of a piece with what is commonly known as pragmatism. The crucial matter is the approach to a definition of truth or, more exactly, of the criteria of true propositions. The pragmatic approach is through the means-consequences relationship, and the test of a proposition is found in the observable consequences of its being "true" (This is, of course, an oversimplification, but it serves my present purpose.) Development of this position has been explicitly related to the use of the methods of science. Its validity as a philosophy of inquiry seems clear. But I raise the question whether its relevance is not exclusively to inquiry; whether, in other words, it ever should have been involved in ontological controversy. I find it hard, at the operational level, to distinguish between a pragmatist and an idealist, given a similar value orientation. Sometimes I wonder if the ultimate difference is not, after all, that the pragmatist is indifferent to idealist constructs because he is so very sure that the "consequences" will be what they ought to be! In any case, are not the insights furnished by pragmatism virtually comprehended in methodology without any necessary involvement with ontological categories?

What is suggested in this paper, which is intended only to be "suggestive," is that educational philosophy should recognize the necessity for fixed points of reference in the value structure of a democratic society; the qualitative difference between the mood of inquiry and the mood of commitment, and the functional difference between intelligence, as means, and the ends it serves

CHAPTER XXXVII

Moral Diagnosis and Religious Cure

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THE SICKNESS of modern man stems in part from immorality that once might have been merely amorality. The evidence is overwhelming that one simply cannot adopt neutrality where human welfare and justice are concerned, and keep from slipping over into a position that is definitely harmful. The unmoral person is theoretically neither for nor against the welfare of his fellows. He thinks of himself as one who neither propagates nor sabotages the standards that a society has worked out for preserving and nourishing its social, emotional, and spiritual health. But this pallid neutrality is untenable. It quickly degenerates into advocacy of evil. Where issues for good or ill are concerned, one cannot stop mid-center. Because neutrality *per se* is less than positive, one who adopts this position has already declared against morality.

I suspect that we have been dupes of our too tolerant disposition to discount moral neutrality. For we have practiced excusing the enemies of human welfare by saying that they are incapable of moral conduct. A tyrant who proclaims himself above the code of morality, thereby purporting to be unreachably by moral criticism, may be actually unreachably—but this is due to his having slipped into the deeps of immorality. The Buchenwalds surely have taught us that the evil men with whom we wrestle in this era are not unmoral creatures but immoral monsters. It is they who have infected the world body—but not they alone.

I

Insidious enemies are among us, they spread deathly infection. They are not a Rankin, or a Bilbo, or even a Columbian. These latter are mere

germs. The fateful contagions with which we have to deal are seated in the unmoral, moral man. He is the man who is confident of his morality, though swayed by an unmoral neutrality when confronted by the necessity to meet the conditions for human well being and world sanity. He is the man with the unused vote, the literate worker who never writes his Congressman, the technician engrossed in his test tubes, the philosopher inured to the past, the parson betting on a future hope. This man has awareness without commitment, understanding without will. He is not insensitive to human need. He may even experience humiliation when a Negro is lynched. He grieves when a champion of minority groups takes a political stab in the back. He knows personal sorrow when eye witnesses bring tales of mass starvation.

But this unmoral, moral man has defaulted to futility. He is anemic, unhealthy, possessed of no moral vigor. And because he constitutes so large a proportion of society he induces widespread illness. His neurosis is caused by the pull of justice and the push of custom. Schizophrenia grips him as he is caught between knowing what to do and unwillingness to do it. He is a lonely midget, whispering assurances to himself of his infinite worth, mired in finitude that looks like lava from a hidden volcano. He suspects the eruption has already begun and that he will soon be seared and entombed. Or, to change and make less the severity of the figure, modern man—unmoral, moral man—takes pride in his mind's jeering at the mass mind. His mind is better, he knows, than the mass mind, but it has no utility with which to make the masses reckon. He insists that he is of the people, but he thinks it futile or does not know how to go among them, so he is decidedly less than being one with them. This is the man in the small shop—who can read *Time* and *Life*—whose Bible is the *Reader's Digest*—who can cite the highlights of the United Nations. This is the man in the laboratory—who can calculate to the square foot how the Bomb will devastate civilization. This is the thinker in the lecture room—who can expound the wonder of cultures and delineate the causes of their impermanence. And this is the man in the pulpit—who can unfold the nature and destiny of man, revealing his transiency and eternity.

Unmoral, moral man, literate, mentally capable, can speak well of goodwill, yet is fatefully lacking in will. He is moral enough to wish to advance the cause of goodwill. But he has no moral fiber essential for lifting his inert self into constructive conduct, for working to establish

justice at home and eliminate tensions around the world. In short, he is a good for nothing. And his name—his name is Legion.

Now Legion is, as I indicate, ill. A schizoid can be treated, if he can be isolated and placed within controlled situations. The medical and psychiatric sciences know what to do, and do it—provided the patients are not too numerous. But Legion is rapidly engulfing all of society. His behavior is becoming standard, for he sets the pace.

Legion, be it remembered, relies on his Individual Mind. At least he says he does, but we know that privately he feels doomed. His tragedy rests upon his being viewed as a healing agent, whereas he himself needs healing—healing that is not to be had. For, in the first place, not enough healthy agents are available for this ministry, and in the second place, those that are at work are applying a skin salve while internal bleeding takes place.

Modern man is morally sick, yet the treatment we persist in using presupposes that he is only ignorant. So it is that we set out with sundry schemes and techniques, hugely lettered EDUCATION, calculated to set him free from debilitating custom, releasing him for moral conduct that is to embrace the welfare of humankind.

Fortunately, Legion is not the whole body of humankind. He is a limb, a vital limb, that—though desiccated in part—may be first diastically dealt with and then saved—in part. The desiccation that marks Legion is the direct effect of moral passivity. This passivity is the distortion of natural activity. It is as unnatural for a man to retreat from social action into moral impassivity, as it is for a child—as a bundle of action tendencies—to fail to function. What a man becomes is largely the product of the self interacting with his kind. This interaction is in terms of an autonomous whole in dynamic interrelation with the larger whole—men and the surrounding world.

Human intercourse involves moral behavior no less than physical and psychological behavior. Man is an integer, not a tricompartmental being. As with individual man, so with Legion, Legion is morally withered, because he has failed to act in terms of his whole being. His physical and psychological aspects have combined to smother his moral aspect. The correct diagnosis is moral illness but the only possible cure is religious.

II

But if fateful contagions are seated in the unmoral, moral man, they are also imbedded in the immoral, moral man. He is the positive man—positive in his affirmation of economic justice, human brotherhood, and godly religion—and just as positive in behavioral denials of these ideals. But he is not ill, for all his espousals are merely verbal. In truth he means them to be verbal, nothing more. That is why he is either appalled or incapable of understanding that anyone should expect him to live up to the implications of his public professions. He is not ill, he is mean. Nor is he simply mean, he is criminal.

This is the economic royalist, and the puny money changer—all the large and small shrewd men who trumpet abroad that they spend much money to buy much butter for the philanthropic purpose of enabling the common people to pick up enough purchasing power to grease their bread with lard. This immoral, moral man quite understands the slogan "What is good for business is good for everyone."

He is the Scriptural research artist who refutes brotherhood with the proof text that there will always be "hewers of wood and drawers of water." He is the church elder who delights to serve as chairman of Interracial Week, and is equally pleased to segregate man from man, in church, in community, in business. He is the Christian, who dismisses the homeless fate of the Jew as being just retribution for his forebears having killed their fellow Jew, the Nazarene. He is the Jew, who relegates the Negro to economic and social second class citizenship. He is the Negro, who resorts to snobbery and arrogantly betrays his fellows, thinking them worthy only of their hovels.

Immoral, moral man is no stripling, to be put readily in his place. When he was a tender child, his parents came to the Christening (or day of circumcision) on the verge of naming him Everyman. But modesty prevailed, and they qualified their expectations of the infant by naming him *Popularitas*. *Popularitas* has always been indefatigable in currying the favor of the proper people—properly powerful. A more devoted life cannot be imagined. *Popularitas* is undeniably *most men*, for he essays to be the political spokesman of the world. He is the backbone of our select communities. He is the core of civic pride, the biggest donor to educational and charitable institutions, the very life blood of our religious organizations. In short, he is the most beloved idol in the

land I have called him criminal. And that he is. And he is ubiquitous.

Unlike Legion, who is morally passive, Popularitas is immorally active. Directly or subtly he exerts his potency. If he chooses, he uses his own voice. If he wishes to magnify himself, he buys a chain of newspapers, takes to the radio, extends his force to the halls of Congress.

Popularitas is a builder, a specialist in walls. He got his start, psychologically or actually, in the street by the same name. His first and most lasting experience with a wall came to him in his childhood home where his parents erected an enduring barrier between him and the races of man. And now Popularitas circumvents any disposition of his children to treat all men as brothers, admonishing them not to defy the laws of a Creator Who saw fit to make men different.

As a confessed religionist, Popularitas snoops in the corners of the nation to root out and destroy native communists. And as a patriot, passionately devoted to the pure religion of One World—capitalist and American—he has already started the propaganda war of the Holy West against atheistic Communism. If he suspects that he is precipitating a final global agony, he is willing to take the plunge on a gamble that he will win. Because Popularitas is a potent criminal, he may yet wreck what is left of the human order. Immoral, moral man must be reformed, not so much for his own sake as for the security of all.^a

III

Legion—unmoral, moral man—is ill. He must be healed. His cure depends less on the gradualism of psychiatry than on the jolt of prophetic religion speaking in apocalyptic terms. Popularitas—immoral, moral man—is criminal. He must be transformed. The method called for must be restorative rather than punitive. Education is unequal to the task. But religious education may be equal to the task—if it is the kind of process that stems from belief in a Transcendent Being—or at least from God as hypothesis. National sanity and international goodwill presuppose

^aComment by Stewart G. Cole.

It strikes me that this paper presents an unnecessarily gloomy picture. It is right and proper to call attention to the moral breakdown of the many Americans, who are otherwise good and representative citizens. But is it not equally true that many Americans of high and modest stature are exemplifying a magnificent spirit of devotion to the spiritual principles of democracy? Should they not receive their just treatment in an overview of America?

brotherhood, and brotherhood is meaningless without a common Father. It is at this point that religion is found indispensable. And unless human beings are nurtured—educated—in terms of the brotherhood of man and the Fatherhood of God, demoralization is destined to be complete.^b

Pitted against the pervasive influences of amoral and immoral men are the hopeful but relatively ineffective efforts of intergroup educators who concentrate on children and youth. But these educators find themselves too feeble to block the tides of parental indifference and prejudice. From the Character Education Inquiry, by Hartschorne and May, two decades ago, until the recent study, "The Teaching of International and Intercultural Understanding in the Public Schools of California," by Henry Cooke, we have known why we fail in a gradual effort to free the growing generation from anti-social and anti-religious attitudes and values. Educators who strive to bring up youth actuated by reason and goodwill, without directing their main attack at an infectious adult society, are like medical men who sprinkle powder on patients with scabies, and then return them to their germ-infested bedclothes.

There has probably been sufficient experimentation in intercultural education to warrant the assertion that interracial and international goodwill can never be established by an education that fails to begin with adults. It is not children and youth who are dragging civilization towards the abyss. Legion and Populartitas are at least chronologically adult. It is they on whom our united and concentrated educational and scientific and religious purposes and skills must be brought to bear. In that ancient world antedating August 6, 1945, an educational effort that centered in intercultural experiences in the young was timid gradualism. But now, the continuation of this procedure will be catastrophic.

Someone, writing in *The Saturday Review of Literature*, not so long since proposed compulsory adult education. Whether the writer was completely serious or not, the possibilities are intriguing. But universal compulsory adult education would at most bring people to see the conditions that have to be met, in order to create sanity and goodwill. The

^bComment by Stewart G. Cole

Doctor Fallaw points up the need for religion as a basic therapeutic need of mankind. Many of us would agree, but would question the advisability of presenting a particular ideological interpretation of religion as the right and proper approach to this field. There is an element of arbitrariness and authoritarianism in such an approach, and it invariably leads to doctrinal divisiveness among those who otherwise could be united in devotion to the common human need.

larger problem would still remain—that of causing persons to will to meet those conditions. The sickness of man can only be analyzed and its causes traced by education. Moral health is dependent upon religious cure.

Those who contend that political world stability cannot be established by a defensive resort to arms, but must be realized by a positive fulfilment of democracy, understand the principle that national strength rests upon moral force, and that moral force depends upon religious faith in the inherent superiority of democracy over any other political ideal or social system. Likewise, the health of Legion and the restoration (the conversion) of *Popularitas* depend upon whether or not a few scientists, philosophers, and religionists are willing to constitute themselves as a remnant—faithful to the political concept of democracy and committed to the religious ideal of brotherhood—and dedicate themselves unreservedly to human welfare. If this remnant arises, its procedure will employ religious education. And religious education has a comprehensive purpose, for it dares to undertake the transformation and salvation of civilization.

So do general education at its best, certain scientists, and even some politicians strive to save society. But general education is primarily sociological and psychological, and science is concerned only with observable data, with what it calls fact. Both tend to stop with analysis. But religion envisions more. Religion is primarily concerned with what *ought* to be, with what is ideal, not merely real.⁶ Its major effort is given to tempering and refining the human will. Though religious education is glad to make use of the insights and methods of modern education, and the findings of science, it must—by its very nature go further and provide ethical and religious fervor as it moves people toward man's ideal and God's requirements.

It could be argued that devotion to ethical principles and international morality is all that the world needs. Indeed many people think it sufficient to make their social values into a religion of man. The prophetic voice

⁶Comment by Stewart G. Cole

Few educators would agree with this paragraph. Every respectable educator would insist that he deals with ideals, and some of them are among the most intelligent and successful demonstrators of how ideals can become functional in the common life of man. I think the paper would be greatly strengthened if instead of adopting a formal and theological definition of religion, it were to adopt a functional view. The former lends to controversy and social divisiveness, the latter encourages partnership in democratic causes, however much participants disagree privately in their metaphysical interpretation of what they are about.

with a "thus saith the Lord" is for them superfluous. But this religion of humanism falls down on two counts. It presumes to imagine that man, in and of himself, possesses adequate goodness to save himself and others; and it stops with mere *commitment*. Essentially man's salvation rests in *submission* to a Power greater than himself. Humanism is, in truth, only a shade from being pure arrogance. And that is not the quality which can save men. Reliance on God, the "will to do His will," is of the essence of humility. And that is the quality that can save men. The motivation in that direction, once felt, is overpowering—at least for a saving remnant, for a minority of religiously tutored men and women.

As for the majority of people, soon or late, they will at least glimpse something of the awful threat of cosmic destruction. For the first time in history there is scientific evidence of the possibility of burning the globe to a crisp. To blink this is to ignore the single most potent force for stimulating—and so, teaching—men to live righteously. Sociologists, educators, humanitarian reformers, and statesmen may well use this threat, this fear, in their efforts to bring societies and nations into familyhood. But they are doomed to use persuasion, too much reliance on man's reasoning capacity and on the perfidy of expediency. Without the grace of God—a free gift of God, of peace for the individual and salvation for mankind—they will fail as surely as a light when the current is cut. It is almost a foregone conclusion that these men and the nations they seek to lead will reject God's grace, therefore, if there is to be any salvation of society it must come through individuals and religious groups empowered by divine love and grace.

This is the mission of religious and scientific man. This must at once become the purpose of the individual believer in God. Let modern man thank God and take heart that at long last he has a means of motivation for righteousness equal in power to the assurance which the Biblical literalists have that a physical hell exists. And let us clearly understand that hell threatens, as *condemnation*.

I believe that religious education programs have not evidenced the kind of individual and social salvation which I have been discussing. None will deny that the hour is late. In this crisis man can join forces with God, or he can pursue a course that will crush him. Among nominal believers in God, a minority at least can constitute His saving remnant. It seems clear, from the Hebrew-Christian tradition, that the individuals within this remnant will save their souls alive. Whether they can also

be the means for saving the human order is doubtful. But, by their calling, they can do no less than work as if the redemption of man depends on them.

The Federation of Atomic Scientists now speaks with the prophetic voice of the realists in ancient Israel. But more scientific effort is directed toward the production of instruments of world destruction. Statesmen with a compelling vision plead for One World. But greater political maneuvering is devoted to divisiveness. Religious stalwarts labor for a union of men of goodwill. But most religionists pursue a course of sectarian bigotry or institutional exclusiveness. The atomic threat may be what Chancellor Hutchins calls—in a phrase borrowed from Leon Bloy—"the good news damnation," but educators and philosophers continue, in the main, to ignore the meaning of damnation and salvation alike. Every man and institution avowedly concerned with sanity and goodwill is, in some measure, a defense against the flooding decadence of modern life. But these defenses are not joined, rather, they are set down amid the swirling waters as though men had sought to build a dam by leaving wide spaces between concrete barriers. And the floods of human and cosmic dissolution continue to pour through.

Our separate defenses should be joined at the local community level. Men of goodwill must come together, transfer their main allegiances from church, synagogue, labor, management, university, and laboratory, and vest them in a fresh community design that envisions local moral health and international welfare. Brotherhood under God is the goal and functional religion is the practical method. If men of goodwill unite to achieve common purposes consistent with human needs, brotherliness will ensue. Inadequate housing, restrictive covenants, labor-management tensions, abused civil servants, and poor educational provisions offer but a few issues around which to unite.

For a long time religious institutions have been discredited as discriminatory and exclusive. To a large extent this discrediting has been justified. But in all fairness it must be observed that the individual often excludes himself from the religious body, rather than the body excluding the individual because he belongs to another race or a low economic group. Even though institutional religion may foster prejudices, perceptive persons will realize that it is a corruption of religion that does so. Indeed religion, as a quality of existence that binds men to God, by its

nature detaches and frees them from being bound to the unbrotherliness of their fellow men.

In the community fellowship there will be scientific appraisal of the immediate tasks needing to be done. Rabbi, priest, and parson will learn to count as nothing their little points of variance, in light of their large unity around community welfare and international cooperation. Social scientist, philosopher, and labor leader will discover that their handling of housing and business at home has direct bearing on welfare around the world. The Community Fellowship will allocate service tasks to be done. Forums, adult classes, political action, united relief, will all become means to the end that goodwill may be advanced. This devoted service will be energized by religious faith and commitment.

As the corrective program of the Fellowship emerges it will reveal understanding of how human beings function. It will not expect people to act on what they know, it will expect them to act as they feel. Therefore, religious education will be used to make people feel like brothers—or at least fellow creatures, faced by the common danger of global destruction. Humanity is not confronted by a race between education and irrational conduct, the winner of which is to determine whether the world community is to come into being, or whether there is to be no habitable earth left. But men of goodwill, acting through their local Community Fellowship, must confront the populace with the fact that the truths of religion and science are in a fateful contest with an immorality that has sickened the social order. And the winner of this contest will usher in a world of men more fair than the human order has dreamed of—or will usher the world out in some sudden convulsion.¹¹

IV

We cannot count on general action to follow from the warnings of the scientists, nor from the evident fears of governmental leaders, nor from

¹¹Comment by Alford C. Lane

Professor Fallaw's paper illustrates the propaganda theory of education and scholarship, developing a plea for the importance of adult education. It suggests to me that a study of various adult movements would tend to throw weight on his case, going from the Hitlerism and communism of the present day, and the Buchman-Oxford Group, and the Christian Science movement of my lifetime, back through the days of Moody and Sankey and the "Gospel hymns," to those of Wesley, Luther, and Ignatius Loyola.

the thundered doom of contemporary prophets. There will be no universal turning to heed these warnings, nor to apply healing agents to sick humanity. We cannot expect any mass movement to spring up aimed at saving the world. Nor is there reason to hope that religious and humanitarian agencies will rally. It is to some modern version of the saving remnant of Israel that we must now look. My one hope for humanity rests in the conviction that were men of goodwill to unite and work at their common tasks, their power would prove great enough to cure national insanity and to foster a world order based on moral conduct and religious devotions. If humanity is to regain its health, dedicated men, under the disciplines of science, philosophy, and religion, are the physicians who must initiate and carry through the undertaking

CHAPTER XXXVIII

Mass Education, Idea Communications, and the Problems of National Sanity and Inter- national Cooperation

By EDWARD L. BERNAYS



WHAT TRENDS in mass education and idea communications are making for national sanity and international cooperation? What elements are working in the opposite direction? How can the former be stimulated, and the latter be retarded?

In mass education and idea communications we include radio, press, movies, theater, book publishing, magazines, public relations, advertising, and the tele-communications services.

The subject of mass communication has become increasingly one of major importance in the past fifty years. Simultaneously with speeded communication have come expanding knowledge of the intent, meaning, and effect of words and pictures, and increased study of the social sciences. All these elements helped to produce a conjuncture, significant to the peace and happiness of the world. For, as UNESCO said, wars start in the minds of men, peace must also start in the minds of men.

The problem has not gone unexamined. A critical examination into the use of words and symbols as dynamic social agents has been confined largely to philosophers, theorists, and educators. Alfred Korzybski, a scientist and engineer, introduced a discipline which he terms "general semantics" (1933), in which he shows concern over the fact that our moment to moment behavior and reactions are determined by assumptions embedded in language. Such men as Leonard Bloomfield (1897-), Edward Sapir (1884-1939), and Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942), conducted anthropological researches, confirming the ob-

servation of earlier semanticists that language, more than simply expressing one's thoughts, determines the character of the reality one apprehends

During the First World War, the potency of words gained international recognition through the Committee on Public Information led by George Creel. Creel and his organization reached vast groups of our nation through many methods of thought communication to mobilize American opinion toward winning the war. Behind enemy lines the committee's psychological warfare was so effective that Ludendorff and other high placed Germans later acknowledged it as the cause of their defeat. Words won the war, lost the peace.

In the wake of the Depression the symbols of communication were seized upon by men like Hitler as a means of manipulating public opinion to arouse dangerous mass hysterias.

A continuing inquiry into language with an ever expanding literature on communications has been developing. In the past ten years two important bibliographies have appeared in this country alone. One, *Propaganda*, published by the University of Minnesota Press, 1935, and compiled by Harold D. Lasswell, Ralph D. Casey, and Bruce Lannes Smith, has approximately four thousand five hundred titles. Another, published last year by the University of Princeton Press, contains almost three thousand titles.

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science of March, 1947, was devoted to communication and social action. As an indication of interest in this topic, *Annals* lists on page v, nine sections devoted to it, eighteen additional articles published since 1907 on the topic, as well as ten volumes devoted to related subjects.

Harvard University's Committee on Communication, Yale University's Institute of Human Relations, the University of Chicago's Institute on Mass Communication, Columbia University's Office of Radio Research, Stanford University's Language and Investigation Department, Ohio State University's Bureau of Educational Research, the University of Denver's National Opinion Research Center, and Princeton University's School of Public Affairs, are among the more important examples of scholastic examination into the modern concepts of communication. Similar governmental agencies are contained in the Office of Education, the Treasury Department, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Justice, etc. During the past war these functions were

embodied in the Office of War Information, the Office of Civilian Defense, the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, the Office of Strategic Services, and others. Only recently the State Department and the Voice of America broadcasts became a focal point for major United States interest, and the efforts of UNESCO to do something concrete in the field are well known.

Nevertheless, the wounds of bitter hatred, suspicions, and hostilities among peoples are still throbbing. Racial and religious prejudices are still widespread in the United States. Part of the responsibility lies with the system of communications which perpetuates the myth that America is solely a white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant nation. Books, magazines, radio advertising, and the comic strips give credence to the myth. This fact has been corroborated by the survey of Columbia University's Bureau of Applied Social Research. Such a myth cannot be dispelled simply by listing the contributions of Jews, Negroes, and other groups to our culture. The problem is one of building a reservoir of understanding among the people. It is a problem of turning word and picture symbols into effective instruments for welding a community of brotherhood and peace, both here and throughout the world.

I think it is generally recognized that the problem of world communication divides itself into three parts:

1. The matter of providing abundant, cheap, rapid communications for messages. Physical instruments have already provided, or may soon provide, these means.

2. The matter of eliminating barriers to communications—political, economic, and language barriers. This is being given serious consideration by numerous bodies.

3. The problem of improving the quality of ideas, of words and pictures, of the symbols that pass over these media to bring about the objectives all good and honest men desire. This last problem certainly is the longest, hardest, and the most complex.^a

The various studies mentioned have directed themselves for the most part to meeting the first two problems, but in the last problem lies the difficulty.

How are we to cope with this urgent problem? The answers depend upon three forces:

^a[Cf. Chapter XVIII by Ruth Strang; note b by Robert C. Angell, Thomas D. Eliot, and Doctor Strang.]

(1) The professions and businesses involved (2) The Law. (3) Public opinion.

What can the professions and businesses in communications do? Five activities may be suggested

a Stimulating Education and Training in Communications

The press of our country includes some two thousand daily and eight thousand weekly newspapers; one thousand eight hundred business and professional papers, five thousand two hundred internal and external house organs; countless government publications; hundreds of consumer magazines, news weeklies; thousands of organization bulletins, newsletters, wire services, one thousand five hundred radio stations; thousands of movies and theaters; the huge book publishing industry; the multitudinous advertising and public relations business. All of these are engaged in the daily task of turning out words and pictures.

To fill the needs of this gigantic enterprise there are only thirty-four accredited schools of journalism, recognized by the American Association of Schools and Departments of Journalism, among eight hundred senior colleges and universities in the United States. There are possibly fifty or sixty more schools which may win accreditation in the future. Among the four hundred fifty junior colleges, approximately eighty-five offer two year courses described as newspaper journalism. A few scattered colleges have instituted courses in radio journalism, business journalism, public relations, and advertising. There are sporadic courses on radio technique, a few on magazine writing, practically none on book publishing. To encourage the growth of a group of men and women with talent and skill, who are imbued with a sense of ethical responsibility, the communications industry must devise ways to provide more extensive education and training.

Another stimulant to higher achievement has been the practice of awarding prizes for merit. High ranking in this group are the Nobel Prize, the Pulitzer Awards, the Guggenheim and Nieman Fellowships. Many more exist, in radio, drama, motion pictures, and chiefly in literature. Such recognition serves as a commendable spur to talent and should be increased.

b. Stimulating Research in Communications

There is an omnipresent need for continual research and comprehensive study into the changing forms of communication. This need has been answered in part by various educators, authors, and research groups. *Print, Radio, and Film in a Democracy* (1942) was a notable contribution to the study of mass communications in the public interest, made by Harold D. Lasswell and a group of government consultants, research workers in radio and motion pictures, psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, educators, and library scientists at the University of Chicago's Institute on Communications. The Payne Fund studies on Motion Pictures and Youth (1933-35), sponsored by the Motion Picture Research Council made a scholarly exploration into the "effect of motion pictures upon children, youth, adults, and communities, the effect of current motion pictures upon the impressions that foreign countries gain of the United States, how well the motion picture industry is organized to perform its social responsibilities, what may be accomplished through governmental agencies to control the effects of the motion pictures; and how a campaign of education may be organized to produce socially desirable results." The Yale Institute of Human Relations has continued investigations into various aspects of communication. At Harvard, experiments in the Harvard Psychological Laboratory, led to the publication of Cantril's and Allport's *The Psychology of Radio*. In 1935, Lewin and Herzberg produced *Photoplay Studies and Group Discussion Guide*, resulting in a motion picture series now in use by eleven thousand school and college groups. In 1937, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, with the aid of the Rockefeller Foundation, established the Office of Radio Research in Newark. In the same year, Clyde R. Miller of Teachers College initiated the Institute for Propaganda Analysis in New York with the aid of Edward A. Filene. Many important research projects in communication developed through the foresight of David H. Stevens and John Marshall, Director and Associate Director of Humanities for the Rockefeller Foundation; but the contributions made by these groups have been confined to an academic level.

Possibly twenty good journalism libraries exist throughout the country to supply the needs of research students. The need for encouraging the growth of such libraries in this as well as in other fields of communication is manifest. And the knowledge gained from the results of painstaking

studies should become the property of all the men and women in the communications field.

c Setting Standards

If a man attempted to set up a professional practice as a brain surgeon without adequate training and accreditation, he would quickly find himself confronted by an indignant public and the professional medical associations. Lawyers, educators, and other professionals must meet adequate standards of competence and ethics. Yet little thought is given to the vast number of men and women in the communications field, upon whom the public is dependent for the interpretation of day to day life. Every man or woman who holds a position conveying symbols to the public should be prepared to meet that responsibility by having a thorough grounding in economics, human relations, and the social sciences, as well as a knowledge of the techniques of communication.

d Educating Their Own Professions and Others

Another means of preserving a continuing high level of professional standards would be to continue the educational process after the initial or apprenticeship period has been completed. A school system might be developed for the communications professions to provide refresher training for those who need it, and to introduce new ideas and techniques that have proved practical.

Each new development in the field of communications should be made available to all those who may utilize it. With this in mind, encouragement should be given to national and international exchange of working and student representatives who engage in panel discussions and frequent seminars. The recent initiation of seminars by the American Press Institute is an encouraging example. In this way the fruits of new ideas and improved methods can be shared on a worldwide basis.

e Engaging in Criticism

Criticism is an important element in developing standards and in changing attitudes and actions. There is a need for establishing critical agencies within the various communications industries in order to develop ethical codes and higher professional standards.

The law and public opinion can both play their part in such a program. Law can validate such programs once they have been established by

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maintaining legal recognition of established standards. Public opinion can take its part. This means that men and women, schools, colleges, civic organizations, and the communications media themselves must become articulate in their demands for continued progress in the field.

With the speeding up of normal processes through these three groups—the professions, the law, and the public—the urgent and imperative goals of national sanity and international cooperation may well be achieved in our time.

CHAPTER XXXIA

The Concept of Citizenship

By STEWART G. COLE

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Intercultural Education*



MANY OF THE international tensions that disturb our times are mirrored in the front yard of America. While the details of conflict are somewhat different in the two situations, the patterns have much in common. Corporate groups of people, interdependent technologically, but representing a diversity of racial, religious, ethnic, and socioeconomic interests, have not yet discovered a way of living together that guarantees to all groups relative security and peace. Constituting the membership and the supreme values of these groups are human beings. As persons, they are related in ingroup and intergroup activities that remain so competitive as to frustrate individuals, and thus widen the breach of understanding between them. The way to interpersonal harmony lies in the direction of building up human relationships that secure to the individual and his group a measure of real belonging, recognition, and status in their society.

A look at these problems and ways for dealing with them within America may offer suggestions for meeting a similar situation in the international scene. The fundamental concept in such an inquiry is citizenship. Who is a good and efficient citizen in the social and cultural situation that is America?

I The Problem of the One and the Many in America

One key to the understanding of American society is the culture group. Peoples differ regionally, in vocational pursuits, folkways, mores, institutions and ideals. Immigrants frequently with distinctive ethnic back-

grounds, have transplanted their cultures to America, and perpetuate certain traits of these cultures in family, church, and primary group relations. A variety of religious faiths and cults have taken root in our midst. Besides, every community participates in a socioeconomic status system in which people practice the beliefs and behavior characteristic of upper, middle, or lower class. These diversities of culture groups are interrelated in multiple manners and constitute one amazing aspect of the pattern of American civilization.

The other element in our civilization is the cultural factors that contribute oneness to the American people. If there are striking evidences of manyness in the American way of living, there is as convincing proof of unity. Three centuries of social and political experimentation have resulted in the development of a democratic form of government, and an equity of civic, moral, and spiritual values that symbolizes democracy. There are, for instance, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the Gettysburg Address, and the Atlantic Charter. The separation of church and state is a principle of paramount importance to which all Americans pay allegiance. Our people have come under the tremendous influence of science and technology, with the result that our economy has become increasingly industrialized, making us more and more interdependent. And, in addition, recent world events, including the atomic bomb, have so conspired as to place America in a position where her people recognize their international power, and therefore their world responsibility, in helping shape things to come on a global scale. Such diverse social trends have strengthened the ties that bind our citizens together in cultural unity.

America's political and social achievement may not be regarded, however, as a *fait accompli*. On the contrary, this very situation only highlights the dilemma in which the American people are deeply involved. In order that cultural diversity and unity may operate as an adequate interplay of life interests, there must be harmony among culture groups, and American citizens must see that the ideals and values that have made America sound in democratic principle are honored in the manifold human relationships of our times. These dual responsibilities have not been borne with sufficient care to avoid the emergence of serious breaches in the American way of life.

Intergroup rivalry and intolerance have taken a heavy toll in American life. The conflict between the Anglo-Americans, who colonized the East-

ern seaboard and contributed so much to set the pattern of this country's political, religious, and educational institutions, and non-Anglo peoples who entered America in such great numbers during the nineteenth century, has many facets. Minority peoples are coming of age as American citizens and resent Anglo domination. They are hurt by manifestations of bigotry and prejudice toward so-called "new" Americans; by discriminatory practices in employment, housing, health, education, and the social amenities of life; and also by social and economic forms of segregation. The continuation of the caste system, after two world wars to defend the democratic way of living for all peoples, is a source of bitter experience to the Negro people. The scapegoat practice of anti-Semitism remains a heavy burden upon the hearts of all Jewish Americans. Persons, who because of color, creed, or class distinctions, are subjected to social customs or personal behavior that compel them to compromise their sense of self-respect or to endure a second class status of citizenship, are aggressively countering every manifestation of upper class domination. Such tensions, occasionally reaching the stage of hysteria and violence, are not uncommon occurrences in every cosmopolitan center in the United States.

This intercultural conflict is being matched by a complementary tension within the American citizen. This latter is the more serious seat of difficulty. Every individual born and reared in America meets constantly with a tradition of social idealism, a precious spiritual heritage, summed up in the symbol "democracy." It is recorded in various precepts and codes, and is taught to the child in home, school, and church, it presents the *oughts* of social living. On the other hand, there has sprung up in human relationships a disturbing heritage of man's inhumanity to man. The symbols, "prejudice," "discrimination," and "intolerance," focus those activities that militate against social harmony. These misdeeds are also lodged in the minds of Americans. This psychological tension between what the individual *ought to be*, and in his better moments *wants to be*, as a responsible citizen, and what he *is* as an irresponsible neighbor, is tearing at the conscience of an increasing number of Americans. This is "the decisive struggle" to which Myrdal refers in his study of Negro-white relations,¹ it focuses the issue on the wide intercultural front of American life as well as on the interracial sector. This same struggle with

¹Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem in American Democracy*, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1944, I, p. xliii.

its wider implications has led Karen Horney to refer to "the neurotic personality of our time"²

It is little wonder, therefore, that the responsibilities of American citizenship are being rethought today. In addition to the searching self-analysis to which many individuals are subjecting themselves, social scientists are investigating the cultural implications of "the one and the many" for all Americans. Recognizing the diversity of culture groups and the need for national unity, what disposition of a citizen's loyalties and energies should be made to ensure a due protection of the rights of his ethnic group and, at the same time, a vigorous expression of American culture? A converse side of the inquiry is: How shall an individual enlist his resources of personality in the dual privileges of ethnic group and American culture participation to net him the maximum of moral and social satisfaction as a free citizen?

II *American Experiments in Citizenship*

A review of American history reveals three significant social endeavors to resolve the racial and cultural dilemma. These may be described as the techniques of Anglo-conformity, the "melting pot," and tolerance.

A. The Technique of Anglo Conformity

The people who settled New England, Virginia, and the middle colonies brought their English culture with them. The English language, law, folkways, schoolbooks and instruction, and the English version of the Protestant religion were reestablished in America and served as a foundation for the new world pattern of life. When continental Europeans began to settle in America, they transplanted their multiform cultures—German, Irish, Scandinavian, Dutch, Slav, Italian, and what not—to the new soil where they took root and grew. In due time the strength of the latter began to challenge the priority of the English tradition. Anglo-Americans became alarmed; as early as the beginnings of the nation, Thomas Jefferson feared that the aliens might project into American society "their spirit, warp or bias its direction, and render it a heterogeneous, incoherent, distracted mass".³

²Karen Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time*, W. W. Norton and Company, New York, 1937.

³Quoted by Mable Curti, *The Roots of American Loyalty*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1946, p. 69.

The Anglos took steps to preserve their heritage as *the* American way. They regarded non-white peoples as subordinate classes, non-Protestant religions as secondary in the claim of rights and privileges, and non-English languages and customs as inferior. The members of minority groups were advised in devious ways that they would become acceptable citizens as they imitated the speech, mores, and behavior patterns that characterized the Anglos. Despite these preachments and because they needed to enjoy a sense of group belonging, immigrant peoples segregated themselves in "cultural islands" in cities, established their foreign language newspapers and fraternal organizations, and generally resisted Angloization. From time to time nativist movements sprang up to curb the activities of "hyphenated Americans." Later, immigration quota systems were introduced by Congress. Negroes suffered both the social handicaps imposed on European immigrants, and a caste condition. Americanization came to mean unquestioning conformity to the Anglo-Saxon version of what constituted a good citizen.

This technique of citizenship, in the first place, denied basic principles of the Constitution and democratic practice. It humiliated newcomers and robbed developing American culture of unmeasured loyalties and insights. On the other hand, the method operated on the assumption that the Anglo pattern was normative for all peoples. The net outcome was the arrest of the forces of growth in the Anglo culture as well as of social assimilation. Nevertheless there are still many old stock Americans who cling stubbornly to the practice.

B The Melting Pot

Fortunately, the conformist effort of many well meaning Anglos was unable to control the total process of intercultural mingling. A more subtle influence was working at the center of every community in the land. Human beings have many things in common. Beneath strange languages, appearance, clothes, customs and religions, beat the hearts of persons who were bent on getting along together as neighbors. Friendly attitudes time and time again established neighborly rapport. Folks from many countries, including old stock Americans, learned to work together. They built industries, laid railroad beds, mined coal and ore, expanded cities, formed labor unions, went to the common polling booth, and sometimes attended the same church. This was the "melting pot" at work in America. "We Americans are children of the crucible," ob-

served Theodore Roosevelt. During the First World War President Woodrow Wilson called the attention of his fellow Americans to the fact that "we are a composite and cosmopolitan people . . . of the blood of all the nations that are at war."⁴

The process of "melting" established a different tempo with different peoples in varying communities. The Canadians, the Irish, and the French Huguenots were particularly adept at commending themselves to members of the dominant group. The first two had the advantage of the English language, and the Canadians of a close approximation to the American way of life. The Huguenots, somewhat different in disposition from the Dutch, German, or Scandinavian peoples, yielded their old world individuality with striking alacrity. In the large industrial cities where highly concentrated groups of foreign language immigrants settled, they found it difficult to secure social recognition. However, the public school was one of their best friends. The children of the second generation learned in the class room and from their playmates what was expected of the foreign born in this country. The newspaper, the automobile, mass labor activity, intermarriage, and the struggling, pervasive spirit of democracy aided in the process. As youth grew to maturity, they surrendered many of their parents' inherited folkways, and accommodated their personal adjustments to the needs of the times.

This give and take of "old" and "new" Americans has not resulted in a sterile kind of social merger. Many peoples have assimilated the American way of living. But some have refused to surrender their ethnic or religious distinctions; they believe in the personal worth of their particular cultural differences and want to perpetuate them. Others have been denied the freedom to give up the social limitations they endure due to racial and/or cultural discrimination. The "melting pot" is not a final answer to the cultural dilemma of the American people.^a

C. Tolerance

The limitations inherent in the two procedures mentioned above and the growing disharmony among culture groups in recent years, has led many Americans to advocate tolerance as a means for improving human relationships. Ever since the First World War many minority peoples have been rebellious over their lower class, socio-economic condition, and

^a[Cf. Thomas D. Eliot's discussion of the "melting pot," Chapter XVII, Pt. I D (15)]

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 72

second class citizenship. These peoples have lived in this country two, three, or four generations; their democratic insights have been sharpened. They know that, given equal opportunity, they can do anything on behalf of the defense of this country in war or its nurture in peace, that old stock Americans can do. Besides, they are willing to measure their love for America alongside any manifestation of patriotism of the favored classes. They are, therefore, asserting the rights and demanding the opportunities of *bona fide* citizens.

Many members of the dominant culture group see the justice of these claims. They advocate toleration. They believe that cultural differences should not only be recognized but welcomed in a democratic society. Each group should respect the other and allow the maximum freedom of every group to find its own uninhibited way within the American pattern. This viewpoint, as interpreted by intellectuals, has been called "cultural pluralism."⁵

Despite the popularity of the "tolerance" approach, many citizens strongly oppose it. Eleanor Roosevelt has condemned the idea, and begged for the substitution of love in human relationships.⁶ Ruth Benedict, referring to certain kinds of popular instruction in public schools, remarks, "what we so often intoleraibly named the 'tolerance courses'."⁷ If one asks any self-respecting person if he wants to be tolerated, the fallacy of this principle becomes clear. It smacks of condescension and charity. The term suggests a condition of "armed peace." Perhaps the best that can be said for tolerance is that it may serve as a temporary policy of association when intergroup relations are particularly tense. The worst that can be charged is that it is neither Judeo-Christian nor democratic in spirit. Duplicity may linger beneath the surface and become a less enviable condition than overt intolerance.

III *Toward Diversity and Unity in America*

The problem of effective citizenship in America is in large part a cultural one. How shall a person maintain his ethnic group participation

⁵Horace M. Kallen, "Democracy vs the Melting Pot," *The Nation*, February 18, 1915, pp. 190-194, 217-220, also, E. George Payne, "Education and Cultural Pluralism" in F. J. Brown and J. S. Roucek, *One America*, Prentice Hall, New York, 1944, Chapter XXIII.

⁶*Coronet*, June, 1946, pp. 14-20.

⁷*Americans All: Studies in Intercultural Education*, Department of Supervisors and Directors of Instruction, The National Education Association, Washington, 1942, p. 22.

and at the same time hold paramount his devotion to the well being of the American people? The question resolves itself into an inquiry as to how the diversity of racial, religious, and cultural groups included in the American circle can get along so as to preserve the maximum of self-autonomy of each group and of intercultural integration as an American people. An allied problem is, how can citizens change their behavior patterns to conform more consistently to the kind of democratic society our peoples believe in and desire in their better moments?

The technique of Anglo conformity confirms an authoritarian social hierarchy of dominant and minority peoples. The melting pot tends, where it succeeds, to an undue giving up of cultural differences for the sake of national unity. The method of tolerance suggests a position of armed truce, rather than of understanding and cooperative endeavor.

There is another and a promising approach to this problem. The key is found in the procedure by which Americans met the problem of the one and the many politically in the founding of this nation. From that lead we are in a position to consider (1) what the social functions of an American citizen are, (2) what intergroup rights *and* responsibilities are involved in the present situation, and (3) what interpersonal privileges *and* duties result from these considerations.

A. The Principles of Citizenship

Carl L. Becker has reminded us that "the central problem of all political philosophy and practice [is] the problem of the one and the many—the difficulty being to reconcile the desirable liberties of the individual with the necessary power of government in such a way as to do justice as well as may be to the desires and the interests of all individuals and classes in society."⁶

The framers of the Constitution faced several problems in resolving their dilemma. Basically, it was one of distributing with equality the human privileges *and* obligations inherent in the development of a political democracy. Definitions of balanced roles had to be worked out in three sets of relations: those between the individual citizen and his government, those between the executive, legislative, and the judiciary branches of government, and those between "states rights" and the rights of the federal government.

⁶Carl L. Becker, *Freedom and Responsibility in the American Way of Life*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1945, p. 3.

The means by which these ends were accomplished are well known. The idea of absolute human rights was rejected, a principle of political compromise was substituted. A series of checks and balances were introduced to provide for a fit working relation between the individual and his government and between the various agencies of the government. For instance, an individual must yield a measure of personal freedom in order to enjoy the benefits of a well conceived society, in return for which the government adopted a Bill of Rights as a pledge of protection for its citizens. For every freedom a citizen enjoys, there is a matched responsibility. By way of illustration: if the state confers on a person the right of free speech, he cannot abuse this privilege by slandering another person. If he does, the government will hold him responsible.

Or, one may consider the check and balance principle in the division of functions of the three branches of government. Still other safeguards protect the interests of individuals, and guard the powers of the majority lest they infringe unfairly upon any minority group. Similar safeguards operate as between the states of the union and the federal government.

The democratic principles adopted by our forebears in the eighteenth century political situation can afford guidance to us in the twentieth century social situation. What about a more effective procedure for dealing with the racial and cultural relationships that threaten the democratic way of life today? An adequate method must meet two types of situation. In terms of the multiplicity of culture groups in this country, there is need for an apportionment of group rights *and* responsibilities that guarantee the protection of each subculture, the free interplay of subcultures, and the well being of American society as a whole. On the basis of personal relations within a group, between groups, and as citizens, there is need for consideration of the correlative privileges *and* duties of each individual, of whatever race, creed, class, or national origin, in his own rights as a person, in his enlistment in a particular culture group, and in his association with others to make up the American people.

B. The Balance of Intergroup Rights and Responsibilities

Consider, first, the need for preserving the well being of American society as a whole. Culturally conceived, the end to be sought is "one nation indivisible." It is unnecessary to catalogue the social values that all intelligent Americans devoutly desire. They have been suggested in the Bill of Rights and summarized well in the monograph, *The Purposes of*

*Education in American Democracy*⁹ Take, for instance, the rights of non-Caucasian minorities Ask any Negro, Indian, or Oriental American, who is conversant with the problems of his people, what they want as participants in American democracy Invariably he will reply that they desire to throw off all conditions contributing to second class citizenship They want freedom to compete on an equal basis with whites for jobs, upgrading in jobs, the free selection of place and nature of residence, education, franchise, and so on. They are quick to charge that, if they are to share these rights, the dominant culture group must assume primary responsibility for changing social conditions Such agencies as real estate boards, chambers of commerce, church boards, and conservative political blocs need to loosen conventions, mores, and laws that support discrimination It is imperative that all Caucasian groups join forces with Negro, Oriental American, and Indian groups, and bring every legitimate economic, social, political, and legal pressure upon public opinion to hasten the work of the reconstructive forces of social change Only by such measures can the integrity of the American people be maintained.

What about the rights of culture groups to perpetuate themselves, and their responsibility to engage in intergroup associations that are mutually advantageous? Some minority ethnic groups prefer to yield their identity to the American mainstream of life That is their privilege Others wish to retain a measure of group distinction This trend is particularly apparent in many of the religious groups Such peoples should be encouraged in their endeavor Cultural difference is a major determinant in the vigor of American civilization. Granting this fact, every group must subordinate some of its wishes to the welfare of other groups, and be content to seek a compromise set of social purposes, if all are to function freely in an interdependent social order.

Minority groups have real responsibilities in an intergroup society. If Negroes, for instance, want freer job upgrading opportunities, they must qualify for these rights If the Mexican American group desires to be accepted, its members must learn the American way of becoming acceptable Those people who wish to be desired in any social situation, must needs become desirable persons. The "chip on the shoulder" attitude of some minority group members is not to be wondered at, considering the way that they are frequently shoved around or persecuted, but it is not

⁹Published by Education Policies Commission, National Education Association, Washington, D C., 1938

a contributor to democratic group behavior. Such conduct is not to be confused with well ordered pressure group efforts, which are frequently essential in the improvements of human relationships. It costs the same apprenticeship in self-discipline and in social sensitivity for minority members as for those of the majority group, if either would excel in the human skills of democracy.

Minority groups owe a certain responsibility to the wishes of the dominant group, if these desires are reasonable and democratically supported. The American people have built up a code of social etiquette over a period of three centuries that is quite generally standardized. It is safe to say that middle class Anglo people have set the standard in nearly every particular.¹⁰ Peoples whose primary vehicle of discourse is a non-English language, who cling to old world table manners and folkways, who are not thrifty or attractive in their personal appearance, are *persona non grata* in most Anglo-American circles. The culture of the latter is not going to give way in these particulars. Non-Anglos must make the change if they are to avoid suffering or at least a measure of social handicap.¹¹ There is one hitch in the logic of this position—the “well-behaved” Negro cannot pass—yet!

If a minority group chooses to retain certain social traits that do not conform to middle class American behavior, it should be free to do so. So long as these folkways do not deny the principles of democracy, they should be recognized by the American people. They should even be defended as an aspect of the group's right to be culturally different. If, for instance, orthodox Jews, Mennonites, Quakers, American Indians, Jehovah's Witnesses, Conscientious Objectors, or any other group, wish to perpetuate non-conformist folkways, they should simply count the social cost and act accordingly. Frankness and understanding, which is two way in nature, contributes directly to the dissolution of many sore spots in intercultural relations. They also add to the enrichment of American culture.

¹⁰Comment by Ralph T. Flewelling

This paper presents a brilliant analysis of the tensions in the interracial situation. As I went through the paper making marginal criticisms, I found them all practically answered in the closing pages. With all his enthusiasm for the “under dog” and his hatred of discriminatory practices against “new” Americans, the author is careful to emphasize the necessity for the “new” American to adapt himself to his environment. This is a point which is often under emphasized.

¹¹*General Education in a Free Society*, Report of the Harvard Committee on General Education, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1945, p. 35

Where intergroup conflict persists, groups which are involved must learn how to discipline their members' feelings and bring to the situation *a will to agreement*. Each party to the situation needs to learn how to balance freedom *and* responsibility. If any group resorts to absolute rights, it depends upon coercion and psychological warfare to gain its ends, thus destroying the sinews of the American way. To negotiate in a spirit of openmindedness and goodwill, and to reconcile social differences by arbitration, is a difficult art to learn as all Americans know full well, but it is also a priceless art as American political history documents so convincingly. When Americans adopt such action in any situation involving social tensions, they support the cutting edge of our democratic heritage.

C The Balance of Interpersonal Privileges and Duties

Persons are the responsible members of culture groups. What is their particular role in the social and cultural milieu that is America? Culture groups have rights *and* responsibilities in a democracy, so have their members. This is the cue that promises a way to answer this question.

Human beings are alike in biological and psychological functioning. Every person has certain basic psychic needs that must be somewhat satisfied, if he is to remain a fit member of society. These needs include the desire to belong emotionally to the culture group, the desire to find personal security in the group, and the desire to share in expansive experiences in the group way of living. The feeling of belonging contributes the value of social recognition; security, the values of social acceptance and status; and new experience, the value of a sense of personal development among peers. Stated negatively, every person seeks to avoid aloneness, insecurity, and boredom. These, if suffered long, lead to personality breakdown.

American culture groups afford their members multiple ways of satisfying these basic human desires. The structure of personality in the nature of desires and satisfactions, attitudes and values, beliefs and skills, afford it a pattern as involved, distinctive, and subtle as the network of forces making up the pattern of the cultural group. That is, an Anglo American, Italian American, Jewish American—to name only a few—represents specific qualities of experience and particular traits of personality, in so far as he has identified himself with the way of life of his ethnic group. Subcultures condition the personality of members in terms

of the kinds of interests, beliefs, and activities that give them self-identity and purpose. For instance, an Anglo American acquires feelings, attitudes, and habits of Anglo dominance, a member of a minority group takes on traits of submission, in so far as he and his group yield to Anglo control. The quality of dominance of a person subservient to the Anglo group but favored in his group association above members of the Negro group, let us say, is of a different blend from that of the Anglo; and the nature of the submission trait of the former, who is under Anglo dominance, is distinctive from that of the member of the Negro group. Innumerable illustrations could be examined in the involved social hierarchy of culture groups in America. In brief, Americans are to be understood as "persons-in-culture," to use Robert S. Lynd's phrase.¹¹ They are really persons-in-multiple-cultures and reflect a wide range of cultural differences in attitudes, belief, and behavior.

These acute personality differences are chiefly responsible for the disease of prejudice that is so virulent in this country. Ingroup members look at outgroup members through the colored glasses of chauvinistic group experience. Intercultural conflicts are also interpersonal conflicts, in which the forces of frustration and aggression operate both ways between persons. Individuals learn prejudice from two sources, first, from the American way of living in which certain types of social discrimination have been firmly planted, second, from embittering intergroup and economic tensions that arise in the community, and in which individuals suffer hurt personalities. When the needs for belonging, security, and self-development are not met in conflict situations, persons become thwarted, giving rise to frustration, resentment and the increase of prejudice. Conditions of aggression and counter-aggression due to social prejudice always worsen when racial and culture groups are faced with acute competition for jobs, housing and the basic needs of social survival. These abnormal conditions are characteristic of our time.

One way out of these untoward conditions is for every American citizen to reexamine his own privileges *and* duties as a citizen in the American scene. He will find that this check and balance approach has reference to interpersonal relations (1) within his own culture group, (2) between himself and members of other culture groups, and (3) between himself and his fellow citizens, making up "one nation indivisible." For

¹¹Robert S. Lynd, *Knowledge for What?*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1939.

every right or freedom he insists upon, he will be faced with a corresponding duty or obligation. To regard one without the acceptance of the other is to contribute to the breakdown of human relations. He who accepts both roles paves the way for the satisfaction of his fundamental psychic needs.

For instance, a person who practices cultural dominance needs to evaluate the real outcomes of this manner of behavior, what it does to his own ego as well as to the hurt of less privileged persons. The Anglo American should bring himself to the position where he recognizes the value of diverse personality traits in subcultures, respects these persons for their unique worth and as equals, and wills to cooperate with them *as such persons* for the benefits of the inclusive community. Members of the dominant culture must take certain primary steps of correction before outgroup individuals are free to fulfil their fondest hopes for themselves and this country. This responsibility is particularly apparent in the area of social and economic planning in the community.

Non-Anglos have their ledger of privileges and obligations to balance. It should be said in fairness that many evidences of their frustration, aggression, and withdrawal, will fade out as soon as these individuals are free from discriminatory practices in community life. But they also need to become literate in English, at home in the institutions that make democracy a working social order, and dedicated to the survival values of the American way. At the same time, they should take personal pride in their cultural heritage as vouchsafed to them through family and church. No minority people in our time has given such remarkable evidence of the powers of personal mobility and willingness to make drastic adjustments under the most frustrating conditions in order to preserve this individual American integrity, as have Japanese Americans since Pearl Harbor.

Every citizen has two major social loyalties and corresponding sets of values. These are his attachments to his culture group and to the American people. However strong his affinities may be in his particular ethnic associations, he is not an efficient citizen until his sense of belonging to America and his love for those qualities that make America rich in human values, exceed in vigor attitudes of belonging within his selective group.^c There is ample room for both attachments in every man,

^c[For further discussion of this point, see the paper by Simon Greenberg (Chapter XLI) and Stewart G. Cole's comment thereto.]

woman, and child. An orchestra has its "organic" parts, each of which provides its own particular and inimitable score, but when they play together they furnish a harmony that is more valuable than the sum of the parts and that is the crowning work of the musical creation.

American democracy has still to achieve its finest harmony of subcultures. There are obstacles that every American can help to clear away. The thing-aspects of our civilization need to be brought into subjection to the world of good human relationships. Opportunities for interpersonal associations that disregard racial, religious, ethnic, and socioeconomic differences need to be increased in community life. Such meetings need to be so informal as to make persons of various cultural backgrounds understanding of each other, neighborly, and therefore cooperative in community services. Such individuals as live this way should receive heightened prestige value by church, school, government. Such leaders should encourage a climate of opinion in which citizens will feel self-condemned if they continue to hurt minority group individuals.

There will remain a normal place in this country for dominant and submissive behavior. But it must not continue to follow racial and cultural lines. Dominance *and* submission should become the rhythmic poles of social behavior of every American citizen. An individual functions fitly in a social democracy in so far as he acquires a balance between the exercise of right *and* duty in the diversified roles included in our society. The freedom to be what a person wants to be affords him the privilege of becoming self-aggressive, the responsibility to express that freedom within the restraints imposed by his neighbor's right to freedom poses the role of compromise and submission. This is the priceless opportunity available to the American citizen and it is the golden rule of American democracy.^d

^dComment by J. Stewart Burgess

There is little to criticize in Doctor Cole's statement of aims. The methods of reaching a better set of relationships are, however, couched very largely in hortatory terms. It seems doubtful whether appeal to reason, necessity, and ethical imperatives, are the most effective ways of changing attitudes which are so strongly embedded in custom and so reinforced by emotion.

The personal experience of children in the interaction and response of a democratically organized classroom, the sense of unity derived by those of various races and creeds who, as members of a labor union collaborate in meeting common problems, the enlistment of those of various racial and cultural groups, in community enterprises, would seem to be more potent means of bringing about the unity Doctor Cole advocates, than the very logical insistence on what attitudes the majority "must" modify and what changes of behavior the minorities "must" achieve.

IV *Some Implications for International Unity*

The problem of rethinking the concept of citizenship in terms of a social and cultural approach to American democracy has its counterpart in the problem of citizenship for "one world." If the viewpoint presented in this article has merit, then the following problems present themselves for critical study in the economically, politically, and culturally interdependent world into which all men are being rapidly ushered.

A. If there is to be "one world" for mankind, all peoples must learn how to participate, in a sense of meaningful *political* citizenship in this one world. Such participation, in order that all persons and nations remain free and responsible, should have to be conceived and carried out in terms of democratic purpose and procedure. This would mean that the problem of the one (one world) and the many (many persons and nations) should have to be met somewhat in the manner worked out by the Founding Fathers of the United States of America.

B. If there is to be "one world" for mankind, all peoples must learn how to participate in a sense of meaningful *socioeconomic citizenship* in this one world. This would mean that the forces of social and economic control locally and internationally should have to be so organized as to avoid setting up or abetting class and caste fixities of status for any individuals, social groups, or nations whatsoever, and so as to provide for the freest movement of individuals, groups, and nations, so that they may rise in the socio-economic scale of human relationships as rapidly as self-initiative and democratic social circumstances permit.

C. If there is to be "one world" for mankind, all peoples must learn how to participate in a sense of meaningful *social and cultural citizenship* in this one world. This would mean that the citizens of the world should

The writer of this valuable paper has the same difficulty most of us do—the clear definition of what the essentials of the American Way in 1947 are. Unlike Russia we do not grant complete "cultural autonomy" while dictating the economic and political pattern to which all must conform. There are, however, minimum essentials on which we profess to agree, and areas of individual and group autonomy which we profess to respect. Our practice in both areas is a long way from our professions. Even the definitions of these minimum essentials and the delimitation of the areas of individual and group autonomy under present day conditions are not clear. A satisfactory concept of citizenship awaits these definitions. No doubt the above described processes of group collaboration in school, labor union, and the community, or similar modes of human cooperation, will gradually make clear to us through human experience the essentials of the American Way of Tomorrow.

have to come to an agreement about a World Bill of Rights in which a check and balance system of duties *and* responsibilities should have to be conceded as just and good, and as binding (a) upon all social and cultural groups of the world in their intergroup relationships, (b) upon persons of all social and cultural groups of the world in their interpersonal relationships, and (c) upon all persons and groups in their divers associations as citizens of "one world indivisible"

CHAPTER XL

Medical Education and the Psychodynamic Concept: In Relation to International Tensions

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Introduction

1947 is the fifty-first year of the atomic age—for it was in 1896 that Henri Becquerel came upon the phenomenon of radioactivity in uranium. During this half century, the human race has made unwittingly elaborate preparations for suicide on an heroic scale. At work today is a modern version of the same forces which led to the decline and dissolution of bygone cultures, each of which in turn evolved from the decimated natural and social resources of antecedent eras. The utter tragedy is that this time another civilization is unlikely to inherit what is left of our cultural estate, for the modern atomic weapon of self-destruction can annihilate life in its present form, and virtually disintegrate the physical and chemical organization of our planet.

The universally chaotic state of modern human affairs necessitates a mastery and integration of the sum total of available knowledge in the natural and social sciences. The enormous complexity of the subject matter under consideration is staggering. To deal with it adequately has apparently not been within the ken even of groups of diversely trained scholars. As for isolated specialists, their intellectual insulation tends to lead them, however well intentioned, into the error of reducing the most complicated of problems to the sphere with which each is best qualified to deal, relegating to other aspects of the situation a subsidiary role. Cognizant of this very human tendency, it is appropriate to state a view-

point which may serve as an academic springboard for the critical judgment of my eminent colleagues. I edge even toward this limited objective with trepidation, because of the highly controversial nature of the theoretical considerations upon which my thesis is to be developed.

With the foregoing considerations in mind, may I ask you to waive your interest, only temporarily, in the many intricate phases of our disintegrating culture, so that we may review what is known about the psychological behavior of the human being, who now finds himself in a dire dilemma—a dilemma, which stems not only *directly* from his own current vast misconception and mishandling of the affairs of man, but also *indirectly* from Frankenstein-like forces that have been evolved and multiplied by each succeeding phase of civilization as a byproduct of our social culture itself. This approach to the problem obviously does not seek to minimize or detract from the importance of the catastrophic role which political, religious, and socio-economic factors, *per se*, have played in the genesis of armed or ideological warfare. It is well to remember, however, that wars are fought not only with gunpowder, but also with emotional ammunition. Certainly, the scientific evidence gives one reason to believe that the structure of the personality, the disturbances to which it is subject, and the psychological forces which contribute to its development are structurally related to international tensions. Although the postulates of psychodynamics have been largely accepted outside the field of medicine and psychiatry, they have been twisted to the service of propaganda for the purpose of manipulating the emotions of individuals and masses. They could be applied to educational enlightenment with the ultimate aim of achieving certain fundamental changes in the human psyche (*i.e.*, the personality) that look toward the abolition of some of the causes of human conflict.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, there are well defined limitations to the psychological approach to the problem of international tensions. It is in this spirit, therefore, that the author presents a psychological viewpoint, from which one may study what appears to be an important aspect of the total picture.

This paper is divided into three main parts. The first is concerned with the theoretical aspects of Freud's dynamic concept of the personality structure and of the psychological mechanisms to which it is subject—all of which have been elucidated through psychoanalysis. The second discusses the bearing of these psychodynamic data on war. The third

part attempts to deal in a practical way with the application of what is known about human psychological processes to the problem at hand

The first part of the manuscript has been dealt with *in extenso*. The reason is that relatively few individuals have the opportunity to study Freud's observations with the same scholarly approach that they devote to fields more closely related to their own interests. Moreover, the development of my thesis depends wholly on a comprehensive understanding of Freud's psychodynamic principles. The publications of those who have essayed to interpret Freud's postulates disclose so many conflicting versions that it seems essential to bring his observations into sharp focus at the risk of devoting relatively too much attention to what is merely a prelude to my principal thesis

I

The Psychodynamics of Personality Structure

Observations Relative to the Psychological Aspects of Warfare

Einstein-Freud Correspondence ¹ On July 30, 1932, at the behest of The International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation of the League of Nations, Albert Einstein wrote Sigmund Freud a lengthy letter in which he asked, among other things, "How is it possible for the ruling minority to force the masses to observe a purpose which rewards them only with suffering and loss? Do hatred and destruction satisfy an innate human drive which ordinarily remains latent, but which can easily be aroused and intensified to the point of mass psychosis? And is it possible to modify human psychic development in such a way as to produce an increasing resistance to these psychoses of hatred and destruction?"

In reply, Freud said, in part, "You are amazed that it is so easy to infect men with the war fever, and you surmise that man has in him an active instinct for hatred and destruction, amenable to such stimulations. I entirely agree with you. I believe in the existence of this instinct and have been recently at pains to study its manifestations. . . . when a nation is summoned to engage in war, a whole gamut of human motives may respond to this appeal, high and low motives, some openly avowed,

¹Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud, "Why War?" No. 2 of an International Series of Open Letters, International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, League of Nations, Paris, 1933

others slurred over . . . Musing on the atrocities recorded on history's page, we feel that the ideal motive has often served as a camouflage for the lust of destruction, sometimes, as with the cruelties of the Inquisition, it seems that, while the ideal motives occupied the foreground of consciousness, they drew their strength from the destructive instincts submerged in the unconscious

" . . . Conflicts of interest between man and man are resolved, in principle, by the recourse to violence. It is the same in the animal kingdom, from which man cannot claim exclusion; nevertheless, men are also prone to conflicts of opinion, touching, on occasion, the loftiest peaks of abstract thought, which seem to call for settlement by quite another method. This refinement is, however, a late development . . . There is but one sure way of ending war and that is the establishment, by common consent, of a central control which shall have the last word in every conflict of interests . . . complete suppression of man's aggressive tendencies is not in issue, what we may try is to divert it into a channel other than that of warfare."

Report of Committee on War Prophylaxis In 1935 a Committee on War Prophylaxis, under the auspices of The Netherlands Medical Society, issued a document in the same vein. In part it reads as follows:

We psychiatrists, whose duty it is to investigate the normal and diseased mind, and to serve mankind with our knowledge, feel impelled to address a serious word to you in our quality of physicians. It seems to us that there is in the world a mentality which entails grave dangers to mankind, leading as it may to an evident war psychosis . . . As in all things human, psychological factors play a very important part in the complicated problems of war. If war is to be prevented, the nations and their leaders must understand their own attitude toward war. By self-knowledge a world calamity may be prevented.

Therefore, we draw your attention to the following:

1. There is a seeming contradiction between the conscious individual aversion to war and the collective preparedness to wage war. This is explained by the fact that the behavior, the feelings, the thoughts of an independent individual are quite different from those of a man who forms part of a collective whole. Civilized twentieth century man still possesses strong, fierce and destructive instincts, which have not been sublimated, or only partly so, and which break loose as soon as the community to which he belongs feels itself threatened by danger. The un-

conscious desire to give rein to the primitive instinct not only without punishment but even with reward, furthers in a great measure the preparedness of war. It should be realized that the fighting instinct, if well directed, gives energy for much that is good and beautiful. But the same instinct may create chaos if it breaks loose from all restraint, making use of the greatest discoveries of the human intellect .

Man, within the memory of recorded history, has been at great pains to acquire "civilization." For reasons, which psychoanalysis has elucidated, the more "civilized" he has become, the more loath he has been to admit that in so far as his instincts are concerned he is not significantly removed from the animals from which he evolved. It was in an attempt to understand the nature of these primeval instincts and the role which they play in the structure of the personality and in the relations between individuals that Freud developed his basic postulates.

Status of Freudian Concept in Relation to Present Thesis

The Freudian concept of psychodynamics consists of certain theoretical constructs through which it has been possible to systematize the factual evidence concerned with the genesis and evolution of the personality in health and disease. The methods of psychoanalysis have disclosed a consistent and close coordination of theory and fact. Thus, a few factual observations were accounted for originally by the Freudian hypothesis, e.g., the disappearance of hysterical symptoms after the patient has gained insight into the significance of unconscious childhood traumata. These theories in turn suggested new methods and areas of investigation, which led to disclosure of further data. As a result, Freud and others have uncovered a vast array of scientific evidence, which has validity that is independent of the ultimate fate of certain aspects of the Freudian thesis. As a matter of fact, Freud himself constantly extended and revised his original postulates as newly acquired evidence demanded. As it stands now, his work can be used to advantage as an important point of departure from which to explore the vast unknown area in this field. For our more immediate purposes, Freud's theories are advanced far enough to serve as a firm basis for the elaboration of my thesis.

Hereditary and Environmental Aspects of Instincts and Psyche. If personality and character are determined at conception by ancestral heritage, one is justified in abandoning any effort to improve our circum-

stances. All of the more recent advances in the theory and practice of psychodynamics indicate, however, that the evidence is contrary to this fatalistic view. Freud agrees that man acquired certain innate strivings or instinctual urges somewhere during the course of his phylogenetic history. We know nothing of these hereditary instincts except in the form in which they have been molded through early childhood experiences. Whereas it is clear that these inherited instinctual energies condition the behavior and thought content of the individual, it has been demonstrated amply that these tendencies and their overt expressions are modified significantly by childhood experiences. The behavior of the human organism is determined largely through environmental as well as biological means. These and other considerations indicate that the biological and psychological development of the individual are fused within the personality structure.

Freud's studies indicate that the mind contains fragments of phyletic origin—an archaic inheritance, which charts the organism's ability and tendency to follow a certain trend of evolutionary and individual development, and to react with a specific pattern of behavior in response to a given stimulus. The resulting individual differences in behavior are a matter of common knowledge, and represent what may be regarded as hereditary constitutional characteristics, which include unconscious memory traces of the experiences of preceding generations. Freud does not deny, therefore, the importance of the hereditary factor, stressed by traditional psychologists, but he has added something pertinent to the plasticity of the human psyche—a point which is particularly important for our discussion of the possibility of human change through education.

Dynamic Structure of the Personality

We turn now to a more detailed consideration of Freud's discoveries, which resulted in a practical method for studying the functional organization of the mind, and in our present understanding of the dynamic structure of the personality. Freud distinguished between three functionally differentiated, but intimately integrated divisions of the mental apparatus, to which he referred descriptively as the *id*, *ego*, and *superego*.

The Id Freud conceived of the *id* as a primitive, quasi preindividual portion of the psyche, which is charged with psychobiological energy by hereditary instinctual needs to which it gives expression in a chaotic

fashion. Dealing as he was with functional behavior rather than anatomical structure, he traced the origin of these instincts back to, but not into, the tissues and organs of the body whence they seemed to arise. Psychoanalytic studies of the functional behavior of the id have disclosed that it is comprised of contradictory instinctual impulses, which are not in harmony with each other or with the physical and social realities of the external world. Freud's data indicate that the instinctual impulses stemming from the id give rise to the two main conflicting streams of psychological energy, which are characteristically constructive and destructive in nature. The constructive instincts of the baby are concerned purely with striving after pleasure and self-gratification. In opposition to the constructive instincts are those which are destructive. They manifest themselves overtly during the initial stages of development in unprovoked fury and irrational outbursts of cruelty. Later on in life their existence is generally inferred more indirectly, because of the superimposition of psychological control mechanisms. Freud's observations led him to conclude finally that all instinctual energies precipitate within the individual a state of "tension," which persists until their gratification is achieved. Since the organism apparently perceives a diminution of tension as pleasurable and a rise of tension as painful, the fluctuations in tension create a series of pleasure-pain feelings, which take part in the regulation of all of the activities of the psychic apparatus. The tendency, on the whole, is to keep the state of tension at a low level.

The child at birth behaves essentially in accordance with the function of its id, the instinctual strivings of which seek discharge. Freud believes that the primitive level at which the id functions is devoid of any sense of time and space. In other words, if we were completely at the mercy of the id, we would remain immature and uncivilized and live in a timeless world of immediate sensory gratification or discomfort.

The Ego As the id comes into contact with the outer world through the sensory apparatus and learns something of the physical and social environment, a part of it becomes modified into the ego. The ego constitutes what we ordinarily think of as the self, and in it is generated the phenomenon of consciousness. The ego is the agency which copes with reality. Through it we become aware of space and time. In this capacity it functions as the sense organ of the whole mental apparatus, mediating perceptions of the external world as well as excitations which

originate within the interior of the mind. In the fulfilment of this task, the ego interposes between desire and action the procrastinating factor of thought, during which it sizes up a given situation from the residues of its experience. The result may be that the pleasure principle, by which the id is wholly motivated, is replaced by the reality principle, which promises greater security and success by modifying those tendencies which, if unchecked, would occasion conflict with external reality. In any event, the ego attempts to attain the maximal gratification of the instinctual demands stemming from the id consistent with its knowledge of reality. In short, the ego is that part of the personality and mental apparatus, which by a process of selection and control, integrates and modifies the otherwise unrestrained primitive demands and tendencies of the id. It discharges part of this responsibility consciously and part unconsciously.

The Superego. The functions of the ego are related to and ultimately integrated with those of the superego, which constitutes the highest mental evolution of modern man. The superego is what is commonly known as the conscience, and is the chief force making for the maturity of the individual. The superego is the last of the three parts of the psychological apparatus to differentiate. It exerts a censoring function over the ego, which has to contend with the id tendencies, on the one hand, and those of the superego, on the other. The superego represents the social control mechanism within the individual. It embodies the code of society originally represented by parental authority. The superego comes into being by a process of *introjection* through which the child incorporates the authority of the parents within its own psychological structure. It becomes equipped thus to act in accordance with inner inhibitions and orders instead of external ones. Freud has observed that the superego accounts for the existence in every individual of a self-regulating or self-restrictive force, which is indispensable for maintenance of the social order. The superego of the child is not merely built up out of the behavior and attitudes of the parents, but rather on the model of the parents' superego. The newly developed superego takes over the content of the latter, and thus becomes the vehicle of tradition (or "traditional values"). Factors contributing to the development of the superego are, therefore, of special importance in the study of problems concerned with the education and social behavior of man. Since the inner assimilation

of the social code is relatively limited, the superego becomes only partially independent of external reinforcement in the form of admonition or threats of punishment. It may be inferred that without the fear of punishment, the behavior of the majority of individuals would exhibit more anti-social tendencies than they do in practice. On the other hand, it should be noted that fear of punishment, *per se*, engenders counter reactions of aggression on the part of the individual. The superego reflects necessarily all of the ambiguities and problems of the society after which it is modeled. Thus, the social code which is taken over by the child might involve traits resulting in violent nationalism, the ultimate consequences of which are the very same destructive attitudes that the superego is supposed to hold in check. It follows that the functioning of the superego cannot be identified mechanically with ethics. The superego is the psychological agency through which moral distinctions are achieved, but it does not in itself guarantee the truth or falsity of moral ideas. The latter cannot be decided in exclusively psychological terms.

Dynamic Interpretation of the Conflict Situation

Id, ego, and superego. Although moral concepts, as such, are developed within the province of the superego, feelings of remorse and guilt depend upon the development of tension between the ego and superego. Dynamically there is a constant struggle going on within the personality between the lawless forces of the id, which are solely directed toward the satisfaction of its instinctual needs, and the superego, which represents internalized societal responsibility. The ego adjusts the demands of the id to the counter recommendations of the superego, on the one hand, and its knowledge of the physical and social realities, on the other hand. Conflicts are fought out and won, lost, or adjusted without the awareness of the individual, except in so far as the state of his mental and physical health discloses the end result to him or a trained observer.

"Conserving," love instinct versus destructive or hate instinct. Broadly stated, the Freudian concept of the psychodynamics of conflict within personality is now based on the thesis that human beings are motivated by two fundamental instincts or urges, *viz.*, a "conserving" or constructive force, which Freud terms the love instinct (Eros), and a destructive force, to which he refers as the death or hate instinct (Thanatos). According to this general conception, the love and hate instincts are the

basic sources of psychological energy, which gives rise, on the one hand, to a variety of behaviors that "conserve," i.e., contribute to life, and, on the other hand, to a variety of destructive, aggressive behaviors.

Simmel, Fenichel and others have taken issue with Freud on this point. Apparently, none of the psychoanalysts has denied the existence and importance of aggressive urges. However, Fenichel states that aggressiveness seems to have no instinctual aim of its own, but represents a mode in which instinctual aims are striven for, sometimes spontaneously, at other times in response to frustrations. It appears that the facts upon which Freud based his concept of a death instinct in no way necessitated the assumption of two basically opposite kinds of instincts. From the very earliest period of life constructive and aggressive tendencies are so interwoven that they can never be entirely separated. From this intimately integrated state, Eros and aggression are differentiated later.

Freud's observations suggest that self and race preservation, including all constructive aspects of social intercourse, utilize the energy of the love instinct, whereas hostile or aggressive behavior, including self or race destruction, takes into its service the death or hate instinct. Freud meant to convey the concept of the love instinct by the term *libido*, which refers to a stream of energy primarily expressed by sexual love, but later also through self love, love for parents and children, friendships, attachments to concrete objects, and even devotion to abstract ideas.

Freud's studies of the destructive instinct disclosed an equally broad concept. He found that individuals hated and wished to destroy other individuals almost as frequently as they loved or sought to preserve them. He postulated, furthermore, that individuals entertained not only homicidal wishes, but also suicidal ones, i.e., the destructive instinct might be directed either toward an object outside of oneself, or, in certain circumstances, diverted from such an object to oneself, possibly as a defense against committing homicide. Love and hate dominate and motivate the behavior of the human individual. These diametrically opposite instinctual urges operate within an integrated biological organism that functions as a unit. The biological welding of the Eros and death instincts constitutes an important expression of the Freudian principle of *ambivalence*. Thus, these basic urges fuse and blend, and the personality structure is the result of the struggle between the forces of hate and love.

Psychoanalytic researches have disclosed that behavior motivated primarily by the love instinct has a more or less strong component of th

hate or death instinct and *vice versa*. Consequently, albeit unconscious, not even the most passionate love of a man for a woman is free from a certain amount of the hate or destructive instinct, commonly recognized by the element of aggression. An extremely abnormal example is to be found in certain psychopathological states where the perversion of the erotic instinct results in a sadistic murder. In so far as behavior primarily motivated by the destructive or death instinct is concerned, it is only through its neutralization by the erotic urge that we attack the object of our hatred by pen and ink, for example, rather than by physical violence. It is clear, therefore, that impulses of one kind can join with instinctual impulses of another to share their further experience together.

Concept of the Conscious, Preconscious, and Unconscious

The existence of unconscious mental phenomena was postulated long before Freud by many speculative philosophers, *e g*, Leibnitz, Schopenhauer, E. von Hartmann, Nietzsche and others. Moreover, most psychologists had realized already that the psychological phenomena of transient forgetfulness and of habituation, hypnosis, and multiple personality, required the postulation of mental processes with characteristics other than those of consciousness in the specific sense of the term. However, Freud did more than any other scientist to establish the validity of the concept of the unconscious. He discovered that the topography of the personality structure resolved itself essentially into three levels of consciousness—the unconscious, the preconscious, and the conscious. By *conscious* Freud meant everything of which we are immediately aware, that is, the totality of our manifest experiences. The term *preconscious* referred to that area of the mind from which one could summon readily into consciousness such material as names, dates, memories of past experiences, etc., without encountering any significant psychological obstacles. *Unconscious* material, on the other hand, refers to experiences of which we are not aware, and the existence of which can be inferred only indirectly. The contents of the unconscious cannot be called at will, but may come to mind automatically, usually through free association, or it may be reached through hypnosis. Unconscious phenomena can be imagined as intense forces striving for discharge, but kept in check by an equally strong or stronger force, which manifests itself as a kind of psychological censorship, known as “resistance.” In the unconscious are to be found two types of material, *viz*, instinctual strivings, wishes, and

ideas, which were in the conscious sphere at one time before having been forced into the unconscious; and streams of energy, originating in the id, which have never entered the conscious sphere.

There is considerable overlapping in the areas within which the ego and superego are at work. Since large segments of the ego and superego come within the province of the preconscious and unconscious, in addition to that of the conscious, the dynamics of a conflict situation may occur in any one or more of these topographical areas

II

Psychological Mechanisms Dealing with Conflict Situations and Their Significance in Interhuman Relationships

Repression The mechanisms through which conflict situations are resolved have special significance for our thesis. *Repression* is the major mechanism for the resolution of a psychological conflict which cannot be solved in external reality. By this means the ego may force into the unconscious, wishes which cannot be accepted consciously.

Conversion is the mechanism through which the repressed energy connected with the frustration of the basic drive is converted into the functional symptoms of somatic disease. All cases of conversion first go through a failure of the complete repression of an emotional conflict, followed by the return of the energy to consciousness in the disguised form of physical illness. Conversion is the basis for most cases of what is commonly known as hysteria.

Regression refers to a mechanism whereby the normal sequence of personality development is returned to a more primitive level of personality structure. Childish behavior in an adult may be regarded as one type of regression, e.g., the surrender of sublimation or a socially acceptable disguise of a primitive trait in favor of its more direct expression—first fighting instead of debating. Reversion to an earlier infantile mode of obtaining satisfaction is another type, e.g., the substitution of masturbation for heterosexual activity.

Regression need not proceed to the aforementioned stages of infantilism, as such. For the child, thinking is synonymous with wishing. The child brooks no interferences, displays no need for consistency, exhibits

no responsibility to reality, and attaches no importance to distinguishing fact from fancy. Ordinarily one learns from experience to change from thinking in terms of the *pleasure principle* to that of the *reality principle*. Regression in some individuals may disclose itself through the making of decisions, not in accordance with facts, but in the light of unsolved emotional problems of their childhood. Such people believe that through daydreaming and sheer imagination they can conquer insurmountable realities. The politically powerful statesman, who negotiates for a nation on this level, is obviously a menace to mankind. Mass behaviors may regress similarly. Where they are decisive for the psychological aspects of war, the outcome may be dangerous.

Sublimation By *sublimation* is meant the resolution of the unconscious conflicts by substitution of behaviors which are socially acceptable and possibly of definite social value. Consequently, sublimation constitutes a redirection of basic urges into socially approved channels whereby the individual develops neither the incapacitating physiological symptoms of conversion, nor the incapacitating psychological symptoms of repression. Psychoanalysts believe that the creation of works of art, major scientific discoveries, and the exhibition of constructive behavior depend on this form of resolution. Sublimation is, as it were, the happy ending of repression.

Reaction formation The complete denial of the existence of an unconscious conflict is sometimes achieved by *reaction formation*, i.e., the development of behavior patterns diametrically opposed to the unconscious wish at the nucleus of the conflict. For instance, many vice crusaders are protecting themselves against their own libidinal drives, which the super-ego cannot countenance. These phenomena were known long before Freud, but he interpreted them properly in terms of personality, and applied them to character traits usually not covered by the old concept of hypocrisy.

Rationalization By *rationalization* is meant the invention by the ego of consciously acceptable motives to cover up unconscious motives which are unpalatable. The process of rationalization occurs along with the other mechanisms. For instance, in *conversion*, the individual rationalizes his illness by attributing it to accident or bacteria, and in *reaction*

formation the interest in crusading is rationalized by excusing it on the basis of moral ideas, or the necessity of protecting others. Recourse to physical violence or polemical attack is rationalized as seeing to it that justice is done

Projection. Closely akin to *reaction formation* is the mechanism of *projection*, whereby the ego attributes to environmental objects or other persons characteristics of the personality which are unacceptable to it. The tendency to seek our faults in others is an example. This mechanism can be observed very frequently in politics where strong nations attribute aggressive plans of their own to their weak neighbors

Transference Among other psychological mechanisms for dealing with conflict situations are *transference* and *identification*. Transference refers to the shifting of feelings of love or hate from one object, idea, or person to another. For instance, the hate for one's father may result in an unacceptable conflict, the resolution of which is attempted by attaching the emotion to an innocent counterpart. By means of this mechanism one may develop hatred for an individual or resentment against an idea, without rational cause—a situation fraught with danger for human relations

Identification refers to the mechanism by means of which one person attempts to mold himself after someone else, or believes himself to have some other person's personality. Men, for instance, identify themselves with their leaders, often unconsciously, because they wish to be like them. Moreover, the individuals of a group or nation, whipped into a frenzy of violence by astute, calculating organizers, exemplify, at least in part, the pernicious social effects of their identification with some group imagery from which they derive a vicarious feeling of strength

All of these mechanisms are psychological aspects of processes, which take place not only within individuals, but also profoundly affect the relations between men, and on a larger scale those between social groups and even nations. They are the means whereby unconscious conflicts may become the instigators of irreconcilable differences between men. Civilization, as such, can be regarded to a large extent as the social equivalent of the ego, both with reference to its productive as well as its repressive functions

Social significance of psychological mechanisms, including resistance
We have dealt with Freud's dynamic concept of the personality structure specifically for the purpose of relating his findings on conflicts *within* man to the subject of war *between* men, as was suggested by Freud himself, as early as the First World War. He found that modern man's ability to reason on a higher level than that of his more primitive ancestors has had its drawbacks. Regression to primitive psychological levels has prepared man to pervert the paraphernalia of technological progress to self-destruction in consummation of certain unconscious urges. Because of "resistance," resulting in an unreasoning fear of disillusionment, man has kept himself in ignorance about the source and nature of his primary motivations by practicing a phenomenal form of self-deception. The more psychological censorship has concealed from man his primitive instinctual drives, the more he has been left passively at their mercy. Thus a state of false mental security and pride in civilization has fostered the haphazard practice of muddling through life. By the mental sleight of hand of repression and rationalization an individual may dim or obliterate his awareness of the conflicts provoked by the triangular clash of interests between his instinctual drives, his feelings of moral responsibility, and the demands of reality. Such conflicts, raging within the unconscious of an individual, are of necessity projected externally into the affairs of men as the expression of neurotic behavior, because of an intolerable state of mind from which the organism seeks escape. It is a matter of common experience that nervous tension or anxiety, which are symptomatic of conflict, lead to irritability and explosive behavior. The foregoing observations suggest that overt international conflicts and the unconscious civil war within most individuals have a similar structure. The arsenal of repressed destructive drives that lurk unknown within the minds of men ready them for any rationalization that legalizes what is otherwise anathema to the superego. Only if men are internally and unconsciously prepared to act as mere objects of social mechanisms do they behave as their blind agents in reality.

The twentieth century has made its own contribution to this debacle by failing to realize the significance of the growing incidence of what today is the most prevalent of diseases—masked neurosis. Hatred and fear, greed and discontent, bigotry and intolerance are the social symptoms of this disease—symptoms which nourish the roots of war. Few who are versed in such matters would deny that neuroses constitute the largest

single medical problem in the world. For the most part this has escaped proper recognition because neuroses appear not only in the form of symptoms, but also as deformations of character. More recently, psychoanalysts have aptly introduced the term "character neurosis" to indicate unresolved unconscious conflicts, which do not express themselves in pathological symptoms, but rather through the irrationality of the whole personality structure. Our ways of living, loving, and working, and the relations we establish and maintain with our fellow men, bear the imprint of reflex compromises between unconscious and conscious psychological forces, which are engaged in conflict in every human being from the time of his birth to his death. The world is aflame with neurosis, the world may be consumed by the fire. The fact that man has substituted palatable fiction for the truth about his motivations and objectives is the paradox of the ages, for it may lead to the extermination of human life itself.

The road to doom is well paved and clearly marked. If we could but see, the dim road to peace has been equally well mapped. The point of departure is the realization that, although of a high order, man is motivated by primitive animal instincts. If unharnessed, these instincts will destroy mankind. The more the antagonism between civilization and these instincts increases, the more pernicious the latter are likely to become. Yet, the energy consumed in his destructive drives could be used to destroy not himself or his neighbor, but destructiveness itself—the bigotry, intolerance, and lack of understanding, which have infiltrated and undermined all aspects of social culture—racial, religious, economic, and political, to mention but a few. Psychoanalytic observations indicate that a prerequisite for this change lies in the process of becoming fully conscious of our unconscious destructive urges—in which case the latter lose their sinister power.

Albeit the knowledge is far from complete, we know something about the life history of the instinctual forces that determine our social behavior. The least we can do is to aid in the sound development of the ego and superego, through which one may hope to save the energies of the id from being perverted into mere destructiveness. Since the ego is concerned primarily in becoming conscious of, exploring, and retaining a memory residue of the external and inner realities, we should see to it that it is given an uninhibited opportunity to perform these functions.

III

Practical Application of Psychodynamic Principles to Medical Education

Orienting Viewpoint

The crux of the problem, as it appears from this particular angle, is a new concept of education—one no longer based on preconceived, naive, empirical standards and regulations that circumvent the real issue, the internal organization of man himself as an object for education.¹ For present day education has denied us the right to develop in accordance with our instinctive needs, it has attempted to mold these natural organic phenomena into forms foreign to them; it has sought to regulate by force and taboo the individual's development without reference to the dynamic structure of his psychobiological heritage. The result has been to accentuate our conflicts, not to resolve them, to decompensate the ego, not to strengthen it.

The psychological approach to the solution of the dilemma must be made an integral part of a master plan, if it is to deal realistically with the situation as it exists today. There are well defined limitations to the psychological approach to, and treatment of, international tensions. However, it might be possible to counteract the panic reaction, *i.e.*, the emotional response to such crises, by so influencing the character formation and personality structure of individuals that they are emotionally mature enough, even under the inevitable stresses and conflicts of our culture, to deal with reality as befits an adult.

It should be borne in mind that the most important advances in psychology during the past half century were made by medical men. This

¹Comment by George B. de Huszar

I agree that the internal organization of man himself is the object of education. However, it appears to me that this aim is not new. It is implicit in *e.g.*, Confucius and Aristotle. Recently the Report of the Harvard Committee, *General Education in a Free Society*, expressed the aim of education in the following words: "Education must look to the whole man. It has been wisely said that education aims at the good man, the good citizen, and the useful man. By a good man is meant one who possesses an inner integration, poise, and firmness, which in the long run come from an adequate philosophy of life. Personal integration is not a fifth characteristic in addition to the other four and coordinate with them, it is their proper fruition."²

²Paul H. Buck and others, *General Education in a Free Society*, Report of the Harvard Committee, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1945.

is an indication of the deep interrelationship between medical problems and those which are usually conceived of as social. The everyday use of the term "social disease" is more than a mere metaphor. To advocate the study of psychodynamics as a means of understanding the forces contributing to the structural disintegration of society, does not merely reflect the wish to implant the study of medicine with new highly specialized subject matter. The effort is, rather, to reemphasize in a practical way what is commonly known about the organic relation of medical science to the totality of social life.

Goal of Educational Program

I am aware of the enormity of the task of completely revamping our entire system of public education. None of our postulates is novel, *per se*, but there has never been an attempt to make them the basis for a large scale educational effort. The essential goal of this educational program might be twofold.

(1) To devise ways of nourishing and fortifying the ego, so that it can deal handily with the inevitable conflicts between the instinctual energies of the id and the realities of the external world, on the one hand, and the moral judgments of the superego, on the other. Since the capacity of the ego to fulfil its functions is dependent in part upon the reliability and strength of the superego, our educational efforts should be directed also toward the problems of the latter. These problems are very involved and grave. Not only the psychopath who has failed to develop any superego, but also certain types of individuals with a particularly rigid and "punitive" superego, which is available for rationalizing unconscious destructive wishes, are socially dangerous. Highly prejudiced persons very frequently show this type of superego structure. The *integration* of the superego is more germane to the issue than its fortification. Because the basic preparation for the development of the superego and ego occurs during the first five years of life, its psychologically oriented guidance should be started much earlier than formal education. Later, as soon as the child is in a position to understand the most elementary data about the nature and functional behavior of the human mind, he should be enlightened from a *practical* as well as an academic viewpoint concerning his psychological as well as his physiological processes of maturation.

(2) To orient the current generation of adults with reference to two main objectives: (a) Education in the origin and social significance of the superego, with the intention that they will expose children to a minimum of psychic traumata and a maximum of security; (b) Awareness of the destructive, aggressive tendencies to which they are heir, as well as of their vulnerability to exploitation by propaganda that gives them the opportunity to unleash their aggressions rather than to sublimate them.

Education of Educators

To place this program in operation will entail its acceptance by our foremost civic and educational leaders, as well as the organizations which they represent. If our past record is any indication, one can hardly overrate the "resistance," in a Freudian sense, which will develop against any such approach.

The problem of planning and executing this educational program must be entrusted to individuals whose specialized training in education has been oriented with reference to psychobiology from a psychodynamic viewpoint in addition to the broad aspects of sociology, economics, political science, and history.

Relation of the Medical School to the University at Large

Thus our problem is to educate the educators, for unfortunately, there are no such individuals available. Educational facilities do not even exist for their training. We shall have to organize a college and university program dedicated to this purpose. The medical school might serve admirably as the logical sponsor of such an undertaking, to which, however, all of the divisions of the university should contribute. The medical school has always been an integral part of the university from a functional and derivative viewpoint. Indeed, the basic foundation for a comprehensive program in medicine should stem from the *social* as well as the natural sciences. The conventional curriculum of the medical school, however, consists principally of highly specialized aspects of the natural sciences. In view of the fact that medicine is now clearly acknowledged to be a social science, it is surprising that the social sciences have scarcely any place in the curriculum of our medical schools.

Social Sciences in the Medical Curriculum

The modern practice of medicine is inconceivable without the point of view engendered by the social sciences, which include psychology, sociology, economics, political science, etc. An adequate appreciation of the socioeconomic aspects of medicine depends upon an understanding of the individual's relation to his environment. This in turn demands a clear conception of the psychological forces that have a profound influence on physiological behavior. The dynamic approach to medicine takes the viewpoint that there is both a physiological and a psychological component to every example of human behavior. These may be explored from the psychodynamic viewpoint, *i.e.*, by studying the factors which contribute to the integration and disintegration of the human personality, or they may be investigated by way of so-called organic medicine. Both approaches are essential if one is to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of the human organism.

Psychiatry in the Medical Curriculum

Psychiatry and the problems of mental hygiene have been receiving increasingly more attention in medical school curricula. The need for this was certainly revealed by Selective Service in the incidence of mental illness in our society. Nevertheless, many educational centers still shy away from the psychodynamic concept of personality structure. The pity is that the prevailing semi-disrepute of psychoanalysis among academic medical circles is a barrier to the application of its principles to the problem of coping with human destructive tendencies. The least one can say from an entirely conservative viewpoint is that psychoanalysis now represents the most completely systematized school of psychology. For all other psychological schools the outbreaks of destructiveness, as witnessed in the extermination policy of the Nazis, would be merely phenomena to be registered and catalogued with horror. These ghastly exhibitions of sadism are impervious to rational analysis except through psychoanalysis, by means of which one may at the very least make an attempt to understand the ununderstandable and to contribute to its prevention.

The evolutionary changes now occurring in medical education at large suggest the necessity for taking more active steps to orient the medical curriculum to principles of psychodynamics—principles that are an integral part of all aspects of medicine. The teaching of psychodynamics de-

serves special emphasis also for the opportunities which it provides for correlative teaching in the entire university

Problems in Connection with Psychodynamic Orientation
of the Medical Curriculum

The deficiencies in our current educational system are at least three-fold (a) We lack the facilities to train an adequate number of clinical psychiatrists, who must cope with the neuroses and psychoses that constitute one of the major problems of civilization (b) We have *no* facilities to train academic psychologists for our educational system from the level of the pre-kindergarten nursery school to that of the university (c) While efforts at child guidance are assuming an increasingly more important role in educational circles, much too little has been done to apply what is known about psychodynamics to the rearing of the child from its birth to the age of five

An integrated system of education appears to be mandatory if we are to achieve success in any of these goals. The solution may lie in the establishment of a para-medical curriculum leading to a Ph.D. degree in medical psychology and psychotherapy within the organization of the medical school, and in the expansion of our present medical facilities for the training of clinical psychiatrists.

The development of an integrated medical curriculum, oriented specifically in relation to psychodynamics and the other social sciences, is the nucleus of a more general plan that might be proposed to meet the present emergency. It is an impossibility, as matters now stand, for medical schools to supply the number of clinical psychiatrists that the population needs. Kubie estimates that there are four thousand psychiatrists in the United States, of whom three thousand work in hospitals and only about one thousand in community agencies and private practice. Among the four thousand psychiatrists, there are only four hundred trained psychoanalysts. The situation is changing, however. In New York City, one hundred twenty-five physicians are members of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute, which is training one hundred twenty physician-students at present and has nearly one hundred fifty applications, largely from veteran medical officers, on file for next year (1948). About seventy-five students are graduated annually to practice general clinical psychiatry in this country—barely enough to balance the loss from disability, retirement, and death. Kubie's statistics also indicate that thirty

thousand is a conservative estimate of the number of men and women trained in psychiatric technique, who are needed for clinical medicine alone. If, as has been indicated, orientation in psychodynamics should be an essential part of the training of all teachers, who are entrusted with our children, then the problem of education taxes the imagination. One might well feel helpless were it not for our recent experience with the war effort, when the impossible was accomplished by industry and science. The impossible will have to be achieved by our educational facilities in the face of a threat to the lives of all those who people this planet.

The Pre-Kindergarten Nursery School—One Answer to
Child Guidance and Preventive Psychiatry

To the school of education and teachers' colleges has been entrusted the most vital of all functions of society—that of providing teachers to educate our children in the ways of life. Readin', writin', and 'rithmetic have been the backbone traditionally of educational facilities. To learn how to live with oneself and to cope with the vicissitudes of group living has been left, for the most part, to the haphazard tactics of uninformed parents and the chance influences of a variety of social contacts and pressures. It is high time that our educational program were organized in accordance with what is known about the psychological needs and striving of the individual. From a psychodynamic viewpoint the groundwork for this educational goal must be laid before the child is five years of age. One answer to this social need may be the establishment on a large scale of pre-kindergarten nursery schools manned by psychoanalytically oriented teachers, who will work with parents and children.

A gateway to maturity and civilization. The contemporary trend toward a better understanding of the needs of infants and pre-school children is the result of research in the field of child guidance and maturation. In answer to the disclosures of these investigations, nursery schools were organized and developed slowly over a period of years throughout the country. They represent one of the important ways of supplementing, not replacing, the intimate, personalized help and guidance of parents and home. The idea of the nursery school constitutes a signal advance in the state of our social and psychological maturity, for

it has proved itself to be a promising area for the general social control and emotional development of children during their most formative years

A number of groups of psychoanalysts throughout the country have organized and established pre-kindergarten nursery schools. Superficial examination of their organizational setup and equipment fails to disclose much that differs from other high grade nursery schools not under the aegis of psychoanalytically oriented teachers, but there the comparison ends. Investigation of what takes place behind the scenes shows a breadth of view and purpose in education that transcends the best of orthodox efforts in this critically important field. The total personality and behavior problems of each child are subjected to searching analysis before a program of education is fitted to the individual's needs, rather than *vice versa*. Each step in the child's maturation is given consideration from the psychodynamic viewpoint. Observations of the child in its relations with reality and in the conflict situations, which inevitably develop, guide the teachers in the difficult task of educating their pupils in a way of life that marks a milestone in preventive psychiatry.

For a harried, bewildered nation, disturbed by witch hunts, economic nightmares, and the threatening clouds of international conflict, such intelligently operated systems of pre-school nurseries can be made the gateway to a more mature and civilized future for mankind.

Practical problems in child guidance. One of the main functions of the nursery school is to orient parents and children alike in a sound approach to the problems of social orientation, among which sex appears to be of salient importance. The literature of our whole civilization contains an abundance of material on the psychopathology of love and sex. Freud's special contribution lies in the fact that before him sex had been regarded as a relatively limited sphere of life, whereas he evaluated it as the basic force of the dynamics of the whole personality.

Knowledge about sex has been locked in the innermost secret closet of the civilized mind. It is common knowledge that the beginning awareness of sex is encountered in all small children. Freud does not believe that there is a simple sexual impulse, which from the very first constitutes the vehicle of the impulse toward hetero-sexual union. He conceives of a large number of component instincts, arising from various regions of

the body, which strive for satisfaction more or less independently of one another, and find gratification in something that may be called *organ pleasure*. The genitals are only the latest of the erogenous zones, the pre-genital phases in the development of "sexuality" are known as the oral, anal, and phallic, each of which achieves a specific significance during the course of maturation.

As each of these phases of "sexuality" appears on the scene, the child is faced with special problems demanding resolution. Instead of giving him a chance to develop an increasingly mature conscious appreciation of this fundamental instinctual experience, every social device is brought to bear ordinarily in an effort to screen the child from a complete awareness of the functional importance of its sexual instinct. The child is led to conclude that sex is somehow an evil thing—an obscene manifestation that is repugnant to the "civilized" individual. All sorts of classical myths and embarrassed, extemporaneous, obviously phony explanations are used to perpetrate and perpetuate the fraud that it is becomingly modest to fear, repress, or, at the very least, ignore, the sexual instinct. Freud's studies suggest that the over-recognition and intelligent discipline of the sexual instinct is the way in which to deal with it from the earliest days of a child's existence.

This means that parents need to know about and prepare for their children's curiosity about sexual matters. But more than this, one must regard sex interests of children as only one aspect of their psychosexual development.

The responsibility for a child's sex education lies squarely in the home. The concept of sex education from a psychodynamic viewpoint includes far more than imparting factual information appropriate to the age of the child. Psychosexual development includes the inherent understanding by parents of the importance of the child's body sensations as he develops, and of his natural pleasure in them. The deep satisfaction of a baby nursing at the breast or bottle, which satisfies more than his hunger, the delight of a small child as he urinates or defecates, the pleasurable sensation he experiences as he chances to touch his genitals—all of these in both boys and girls are to be regarded as normal experiences of childhood. These manifestations of the child's psychological growth must be accepted without anxiety by parents, and certainly without criticism and harshness.

The behaviorists enjoyed a vogue, which had profound unhappy repercussions, when they warned of the evil results of fondling and kissing children for fear of spoiling them. We know now that such a view ignores the more basic values in the parent-child relationship. Young children need the comfort and satisfaction of being picked up and fondled, and, as they grow older, of having the opportunity of actively demonstrating their affection toward those they love. This is their first expression of attachment for someone other than themselves, and, unless it is successfully accomplished in these early months, their future capacity to love may be jeopardized. Normal youngsters show soon enough of their own accord when they would like it better if their parents' love showed itself in an interest in what they are thinking and doing instead of in caressing and cuddling.

If the instinctual needs of a child are subject to frustration, particularly in the "sexual" sphere, the inevitable result is conflict. The neurotic episodes of infancy, childhood, and of early adolescence constitute the earliest overt evidence of this unresolved struggle, and represent transitory or persistent periods of ego decompensation. The traditional methods of punishment in the name of discipline, or of exhortation and reward, as a palatable form of bribery to secure the same end, not only fail to achieve their purpose, but actually drive the conflict under cover before its nature can be recognized and steps taken to resolve the emotional confusion occasioned by it. Unless the latter is encompassed, the child suffers successive periods of psychological decompensation, each adding to and exaggerating the residues of the other, so that he loses his capacity, not only to cope with the immediate realities of the external world, but also to adjust to subsequent inevitable periods of emotional stress and strain. If, on the other hand, these neurotic episodes, which are all too often attributed to "mere temperament or tantrum" are treated promptly and intelligently, the individual may actually derive much strength from the experience, and his ego may be in a better position to cope with subsequent conflicts.

Preventive psychiatry for adults. Early psychotherapy in childhood constitutes preventive psychiatry for the adult, in that his conflicts are resolved at the time of their occurrence. Thus, he may have some assurance of attaining an emotional maturity, which is otherwise impossible.

The unhappy alternative is a doomed race of neurotics and psychotics. To face this inescapable conclusion seems more terrifying to me than to face the truth about ourselves, while there is yet hope of altering our circumstances. I am not unaware of the strength of character that the latter entails. The rationalized blavery and heroism of the warrior has an unreal quality compared with the fortitude of the individual, who searches the interstices of his own mind in the face of fear, albeit flinchingly at times, and who conquers his resistance to an analysis of his naked emotions. Such a man learns the truth about his instinctual self, that his patterns of emotional behavior are applicable in principle to all other human minds, and that the knowledge which he has acquired concerning these matters *was* unpalatable to him and *will be* even more violently distasteful to the uninitiated. It is through such researches that we have come to believe that peace among men or nations is not possible until the *individual* achieves an understanding of, and freedom from, the host of unconscious emotional conflicts that bedevil most members of the human race. This point of view stems from the knowledge that an intolerable anxiety and nervous tension are engendered by an unconscious conflict between the psychological forces of the id, ego, and superego, that this chaotic state of mind becomes manifest through projection in the form of irrationally motivated behavior, which affects human interrelations adversely, that malfunction of the psyche leads to amoral and unethical acts of aggression, which are justified by rationalizations and other psychological mechanisms of self-defense and censorship, in order to keep the individual unconscious of the conflict and its psychological significance. The latter circumstance accounts for the apparent naiveté with which individuals or nations say one thing and mean or do quite the opposite.

There are well defined limitations to the treatment of international tensions through psychologically oriented education aimed principally at the child. There is the time factor, for instance, which is particularly pressing because the possibility of atomic warfare poses an immediate threat to civilization. Child guidance and education is being proposed as the basis of a long range program designed to prevent the potential neuroses and psychoses that appear to be etiologically related to warfare. If our culture is to survive, however, we must take more active steps to control overt acts of aggression. Although outbreaks of violence occur between individuals in spite of civic law enforcing agencies, the social

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order is maintained by such conventions. Perhaps the greatest progress toward peace in our time can be expected from specific instruments of international law which are backed by military, economic, and social sanctions to which the majority of nations subscribe unequivocally.

CHAPTER XLI

Education for World Citizenship

By SIMON GREENBERG

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ONE MUST BE BLESSED with inordinate optimism if in the face of the present world situation he looks hopefully to the establishment in our generation of a world order in which human beings will enjoy the blessings of the Four Freedoms. On the other hand, he is excessively pessimistic who denies the inherent possibility of such a world order and rejects as futile wishful thinking the hopeful probability that such an order may be brought into being sometime before man's madness leads to his own destruction. All constructive human effort is based on explicit or implicit faith in that inherent possibility and hopeful probability. Hence, in our day it should be axiomatic that a social institution to be fully justified must be consciously exerting itself to contribute toward the realization of this hope. This refers to all social institutions, whether they be concerned with political, economic, religious, scientific, or esthetic matters.

But if that comparative peace, freedom, and justice is to dawn, it will not be the result of some new clever political alignment, ingenious legalistic formulation, or rigidly enforced economic program. All of these will be necessary. Social, political, and economic techniques will, however, inevitably fail in the future as they have in the past, unless human beings will be fundamentally different in attitude, outlook, and aspirations from the vast majority of mankind of our day. There will have to be a cultural or spiritual revolution equaling the economic and political revolutions in scope and profundity. To be sure, there is ample room for doubt whether man can by his own effort achieve that inner spiritual revolution. It may well be that only God's grace can make possible this

next stage in the spiritual growth and evolution of man. But even those who believe that God's grace is indispensable in this as in all other vital matters in life, have faith that the granting of that grace is not wholly unrelated to our own efforts. Indeed, God's grace has already been shown us by permitting us to envision a world of peace and justice and even to see some paths which promise the achievement of that goal. It must be our staunch conviction that to the extent to which we follow the paths now only dimly seen, our vision will be clarified and the achievement of our purposes become possible."

Of all the means at our disposal to influence the minds and hearts of men, education offers the greatest promise for ultimate success. Hence, educational institutions of all kinds and on all levels must be especially conscious of this overall, ultimate goal and should be more fully committed to it in every aspect of their work than to all others.

But if our educational institutions are to be thus employed, at least two premises must be accepted.¹ We must proclaim and hold firm the proposition that no goal less than a human society dominated by the Four Freedoms has any hope of endurance even if achieved. Hence, any institution which has the power to effect the ultimate goal in some significant manner, yet sets a lower goal for itself, is condemning itself to futility. A society living under the constant threat of a third worldwide conflagration, with atom bombs, bacterial warfare, and V-bombs to add to the chaos, cannot possibly order its life sanely and can hardly set even intermediate goals inherently good and desirable. The fear of an impending world conflict has already had its corrosive effect upon American democracy. The loyalty investigation of the more than two million Federal employees, which permits discharge without the right of appeal to the courts, or the right to confront and cross examine the accusers, and the tremendous pressures to introduce compulsory military service, are

¹Comment by F. Ernest Johnson

I like particularly the insistence that constructive effort toward a better world order must rest on faith in the "inherent possibility and hopeful probability" of such progress. The contemporary discrediting of the idea of progress is too sweeping and is morally unwholesome. But the quandary as to whether man can assure his destiny through his own resources or only by the grace of God is a rather curious one for a theologian to be in. If God's grace is not indispensable, then God is surely "emeritus." Within the bounds of theistic assumptions this issue is between an "immanentist" and an "irruptionist" view of the way God operates in human affairs.

¹ B. Berkson, *Education Faces the Future*, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1943, pp. 5, 8.

but two of the many disquieting evidences that the very essence of the American democratic way of life is being transformed by fear of war.

It may perhaps be persuasively argued that practical exigencies make these and similar steps inevitable as temporary measures to meet an unavoidable crisis. But if that be so, then it becomes all the more urgent for our educational institutions to teach and clarify the larger objectives. Only thus would America and the world be prepared to seek broader horizons once the imminent danger is averted.

Secondly, we must agree that education should have a role to play in the achievement of this ultimate human objective. It appears necessary to stress this almost self-evident proposition. Doctor Berkson stated the issue very pointedly when he wrote that "there still seems ground for the belief that our school program lacks coherence and that a major difficulty lies in the field of educational theory." We are still debating whether or not "the school should help to envisage a social program for the future and participate in the task of building a new social order." Indeed, the need for specific formulation of education's responsibilities is evidenced in the fact that the draft of an "International Teacher's Charter" under discussion by the United Nations Economic, Scientific, and Cultural Organization provides, among other *rights and duties*, that teachers and educators must contribute to "*the growth of world solidarity*."² There is room for legitimate differences of opinion regarding the extent to which a school curriculum should teach any given program of social improvement. Nevertheless, we ought to agree that education is more than "a process and transmission of the social heritage."³ It must have something to say about the implementation in daily life of the ideals and goals of the social heritage which remain unfulfilled.

Educators must view those sitting before them not merely as vessels into which the heritage of the past must be poured, nor merely as bundles of latent possibilities to be developed. The prime business of the educator of our day is to train people to be citizens of the world and loyal to mankind. But how can one be loyal to mankind when mankind is tragically divided into hostile camps? And how can one be taught to be a citizen of the world political order requiring the type of loyalty now ordinarily associated with existing political states? We cannot answer these questions unless we understand "citizenship" to include much more than a

²*New York Times*, July 28, 1947

³Berkson, *op cit*, p. 6

political, legal relationship and "loyalty to mankind" far more than loyalty to the particular men or ideas happening at the present moment to hold power

A citizen of a country is described as good not only in terms of his obedience to the country's laws, but also in terms of his identification of his own noblest personal happiness and highest self-fulfilment with the welfare of the whole country. Thus also, world citizenship and loyalty to mankind imply the greatest possible identification between the individual's noble self-fulfilment and the welfare of the whole of human society.

This goal has been envisioned before and rejected as Utopian. Yet we must constantly reformulate it for ourselves and search anew for means to implement it in our educational process.

Numerous pedagogic techniques have been suggested for the development of a consciousness of world citizenship. The most popular ideas advanced are those of student and teacher exchange and travel in foreign countries. These suggestions have great merit. But only a small fraction of the student population can be expected to spend an extended period in world travel or be taught by exchange teachers. More important, world travel as such does not lead to a sense of human solidarity. It just as often leads to an intensified chauvinistic nationalism. Some globe flyers came back with a vision of "One World." Others returned with a message about "The Wave of the Future." The millions of our young people who spent months and years abroad with our various military expeditions are not noticeably more inclined toward a sense of world citizenship than those who remained at home. If world travel and contact with other peoples are to bring the desired result, they must be the culmination of a rather long process during which the pupil is trained to identify his own welfare and the welfare of his native country with the welfare of the whole of mankind. And only when education will make a maximum effort to teach *all of its pupils* to identify themselves with the whole of mankind, will that comparatively small number who have the opportunity to travel and study abroad be able to utilize their experiences effectively instead of finding themselves isolated in an indifferent or even hostile atmosphere.

There are two levels on which identification of the self with a unit as large as the whole of mankind can be taught. The one is the level of intelligent self-interest. The other is the level of spiritual self-fulfilment.

The level of intelligent self-interest has two essential aspects. The first is our dependence upon our fellow men. Every occasion should be vividly stressed which brings home the all important truth that no human being or human political unit, no matter how large, is sufficient unto itself physically, spiritually, or culturally. Here and there schools are teaching the interdependence of nations in the matter of natural resources. But one can today pass through our whole educational system from kindergarten to the Ph.D. without being made deeply conscious of the extent to which every country is dependent upon the resources and the purchases of other countries for its own economic welfare. Human interdependence might be made the subject matter of special courses in the elementary school, the high school, and the university. But it should in reality be one of the aspects under which every course is presented. Study of the natural resources of America should be at once associated with a study of the resources we lack and the sources we turn to in order to satisfy our needs. American scientific and literary achievement should be thoroughly presented. But with equal thoroughness should we trace our cultural, political, and religious traditions to their sources, and point out our indebtedness to contemporary non-Americans. The contributions made by the early settlers of America deserve all due honor. But those who came later also added their invaluable gifts which should be sympathetically evaluated.

In the matter of political relations it requires little ingenuity to discover the multifarious ways in which the boy growing up on a farm in the Middle West has his life determined by what some despot or crackpot does five thousand miles away. A country which twice within one generation sent its youths to fight on battle fields ten thousand miles away should find a way effectively to teach its citizens that intelligent self-interest requires them to be citizens of the world, deeply concerned with conditions everywhere on this globe.

Secondly, intelligent self-interest can be used to illustrate the folly practiced by the strong throughout the ages in their exploitation of the weak. Our schools rarely take the trouble to impress upon children's minds the corroding influence of slavery upon the master as well as upon the slave, the deleterious effects of an exploiting imperialism and colonialism upon the exploiter as well as upon the exploited. We teach our children to accept unquestioningly the universal validity of the law of gravitation. We might at least indicate to them why it is that there are so many who be-

lieve in the universal validity of the law of justice, that evil cannot continue indefinitely without wreaking dire calamities upon its perpetrators. We need not go to the Bible for that lesson. We need but to use Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address now inscribed on the walls of the Lincoln Memorial in Washington. Let our children really understand what Lincoln meant when he said that the civil war continued as long as it did so that "all wealth piled up by the bondmen's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and every drop of blood drawn by the lash shall be paid by another drawn by the sword."

Would it be too far from the spirit of our day to apply to the collapse in Europe the principle which Lincoln applied to our own civil war? I venture to suggest that it would be historically correct and morally instructive to associate the woes that have come over Western Europe in the past three decades with the three centuries of ruthless exploitation by Europeans of the so-called backward peoples of America, Africa, and Asia. Perhaps the wealth accumulated by Europe at the expense of the labors of Africans and Asiatics also had to "be sunk." Perhaps the pattern of Goldsmith's famous dictum, "Where wealth accumulates men decay," was followed in Europe, whose ill gotten gains through the centuries led to a calamitous deterioration of moral and physical fiber, to a dangerous overpopulation and spiritual haughtiness, and to the inevitable catastrophe.

World citizenship in the sense of identifying one's own welfare with that of the welfare of the whole of mankind has, therefore, a substantial foundation of intelligent self-interest upon which to stand. And it is high time that educators should build that foundation into the lives of their pupils.

But self-interest need not stand alone as the base and buttress of an effective world citizenship. Ultimately, a sense of world citizenship must be rooted in a conception of life which finds noblest self-fulfilment in the maximum development of those qualities which are uniquely and gloriously human. No creature but man has a sense for freedom, mercy, justice, or truth. Education is not intended primarily to make us better animals so that we may eat more amply, live more comfortably, and reproduce more abundantly than animals. It is indeed intended to achieve all that. But if it stops there, its dangers far exceed its benefits. Education in our day must finally see its real purpose in the nurturing of more sensitive hearts and more impartial minds.

For that we must present our children as well as our adults with a set of heroes different from those they have come to know. Men and women like Frederick II of Prussia, Napoleon I, Alexander of Macedon, or Catherine of Russia must not be honored in our text books with the appellation "The Great." We must decide whether we want our young people to grow up hoping to be little Alexanders and Napoleons or Honest Abes and consecrated Pasteurs. We did not need modern psychologists to remind us that the hero fashioned in the child's mind when he is five or ten has greater potency in influencing action than the one he comes to know intellectually at eighteen or twenty-five. We must rewrite our histories. Conquerors of colonial empires must be presented as what they were—robber barons, not Robin Hoods, and world conquerors as cruel megalomaniacs and not benefactors of mankind. Mankind has had true and consecrated servants. If we want to educate for world citizenship, let us hold up for emulation those who have in actuality lived as citizens of the world even before a world political state was even planned.

Education for world citizenship then must stand upon the rock of intelligent self-interest but should be refined and exalted through its constant devotion to freedom, to peace, to justice, mercy, and truth.

In thinking of the school's role in training for world citizenship there are at least three pitfalls which are to be zealously avoided. The first is that of making the school the propaganda channel for any one specific economic or political platform. That would be disastrous to the whole educational process. There is a difference between pointing out to pupils the unavoidable interdependence among all peoples and calling upon educators to "transfer the democratic tradition from individualistic to collectivist economic foundations."¹ It is the school's duty to give direction to the pupil's thinking, to set the spiritual framework and provide the evaluational concepts and standards in the light of which he will learn to make decisions. It would be wrong for the school to bring pupils prematurely to the formulation of a conclusion regarding any specific practical issue in that area of social relationships in which the pupils do not as yet carry direct responsibility, or have that power of judgment which only actual experience and immediate participation can supply. However, that does not mean that the pupils have no opportunity to

¹George S. Counts and his committee's statement, "A Call to the Teachers of the Nation," quoted by Berkson, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

translate ideals into practical acts. They have a society of their own in which they live and in which they should be made to feel as responsible citizens. There is the classroom and that whole gamut of activities which are an intrinsic part of the pupil's life. In that realm of experience it is incumbent upon the school to guide the pupils to decisions.

Thus, instead of advocating some collectivist economic policy which has to do with adult activities beyond the ken and experience of the average pupil even on the college campus, educators should develop techniques to guide students in outlawing from the school life every evidence of racial, religious, or national prejudices. Evidences of bigotry, malice, and greed should be treated at least as seriously as evidences of failure intellectually to grasp the subject matter of any course. A student who is taught that the manly art of beating up his opponent is not the human way of settling differences, that what he gets out of his friends is not nearly so important as what he gives them, offers a justifiable hope that he will make the correct decisions on issues affecting his relations to his fellow men in the economic and social sphere in which he will move after he leaves the school.

The second pitfall is the tendency to set before the student a hierarchical arrangement of his loyalties. World citizenship does not mean that any one of us is expected to make his loyalty to America secondary to his loyalty to any other political unit. To think of world citizenship in those terms is at once to alienate the interest of the average human being who cannot and should not be expected to make his love for his native land second to his love for any other spot on earth. World citizenship and citizenship in one's own native land are not to be set up as rivals any more than love of self and love of one's parents and children are to be thought of as two conflicting loves. What is needed is a deepening and broadening of the concept of loyalty to one's own country. An American's devotion to a world state will be real and potent only if it is rooted in and grows out of his love for America. Only as he understands that America's safety and future depend upon a world state, only as he understands Americanism in such a manner as to realize that a democratic world state does not imply a dwarfing of America but the expansion and the final embodiment of the ideals and goals which are Americanism, will there be real fervor and conviction in his devotion to mankind as a whole.

By the accidents of history we in America have been prepared to as-

sume the leadership in the education for world citizenship. In the first half century of American history Americans were agitated by the question of whether they were New Yorkers first and only secondarily Americans, or whether they were Americans first and secondarily New Yorkers, Pennsylvanians, or Georgians. They discovered that the formulation of this relationship in terms which made it seem an insoluble dilemma was what made it a dilemma. The real question was what it meant to be loyal to New York. The nobler the citizen's concept of New York and the more profound his understanding of what New York's welfare demanded, the more clearly did he realize that his very loyalty to New York made him loyal to America. The creation of the United States of America did not dwarf the significance of New York. On the contrary, New York as an independent state could never have attained the significance, the freedom, and the security it enjoys as a part of the United States. Had New Yorkers not felt that way in 1787 they would never have decided to join the union. Until Americans and citizens of the other countries of the world feel that way about a United Nations they will never be really wholehearted members of it.

In present day America many loyal members of religious, ethnic, or cultural minorities are also faced with what may on the surface appear to be conflicting loyalties. Mr. Stewart G. Cole's comprehensive paper in this volume on "The Concept of Citizenship"¹ discusses this problem in a very illuminating fashion. I agree with his essential sentiments, but I consider as unfortunate the setting of one loyalty against the other, of "love for those qualities which make America rich in human values" against attitudes of the "selective group." It is this type of inner conflict which has occasioned so much of the heartache of adjustment of immigrants to America. The real task that should have been performed in the Americanization of the newcomers was not to emphasize what they have to discard of the traditions of their own group, but rather to emphasize the highest ideals and purposes of their own "selective group" and point out how loyalty to those ideals inevitably implies "love for those qualities which make America rich in human values." Fortunately, mankind has attained a stage in its development where every group within the orbit of the great religions of the world, whether of the East or of the West, has within its tradition the high goals of human brotherhood. Conflicts in loyalties arise when these groups move on a lower level of

¹[Cf. Chapter XXXIX.]

their own achievements. On the highest level there are no real conflicts, there are tensions. These are inevitable in human life. In the normal individual these tensions are the forces that keep him intellectually and spiritually alert. Thus it is inevitable that young people should be torn between love of the rhumba and some traditional folk dance, love of Negro spirituals and current Broadway melodies, love of the English language and attachment to an ancestral tongue. But certainly neither the rhumba nor Broadway songs, nor baseball, nor even the English language represent "those qualities that make America rich in human values." Those qualities have to do with equality, with justice, with human decency. No man, therefore, who is true to the noblest traditions of his own "selective group" can possibly be disloyal to America, and surely no one can possibly be disloyal to his own "selective group" because of his loyalty to America. In that sense it is true to say to a man that the better and more loyal a Jew or Christian, Italian or Frenchman he is, the better American he will be, and *vice versa*.⁴

But even where a group's tradition has traditions of racial and religious prejudice, political tyranny, and authoritarianism, an intelligent concern for the very existence of this selective group should also lead to a love for and a loyal attachment to "the qualities that make America rich in human values," for were it not for those qualities the members of the

⁴Comment by Stewart G. Cole

Doctor Greenberg has cut a deep furrow with reference to a philosophy of citizenship for Americans on a world scale. I believe I am in complete agreement with his basic concepts, and his emphasis upon moral values. I may have left myself open to the inference he has drawn, in which case the criticism is well taken. Certainly I would not knowingly place a set of ethnic loyalties over against a set of political and patriotic loyalties in working with the precepts of democracy.

Comment by F. Ernest Johnson

I like Doctor Greenberg's emphasis on a synthesis of loyalties. We should not attempt to educate within the framework of a hierarchy of loyalties—to "selective group," to nation, and to humanity—between which choice must be made. Rather, the more restricted loyalties undergo, in the process of ethical growth, a transformation, becoming charged with the energies of the broader loyalties. I believe, however, that the same principle applies in the field of *interest* and that in this way the concept of self-interest, which Doctor Greenberg finds of restricted use, normally merges into his "self-fulfilment." The individual self is not static; we see it readily fused with other selves in the formation of "we-groups." Socialization involves the continuous expansion of the "we-group." Social and political equilibrium may be enhanced by a balance of crude "interests," but it is an unstable equilibrium if those interests are not progressively transcended. The transition from nationalism to internationalism must come about not by substitution, but by sublimation.

given "selective group" would not be able at all to live as free citizens in America. That truth is and should be valid not only for Jew, Catholic, and Protestant, but also for Anglo-Saxon, Negro, Irish, Mexican, and other types of minority groups in America. The United States has thus far been the greatest area in which men were trained not to set loyalties one against the other but to see them as interlaced and interlocked, each enriched and enhanced by this relationship. Hence, Americans should be more conditioned than others to understand that loyalty to the ideal of world citizenship and what it represents will enhance rather than diminish their loyalty to their American citizenship and what it represents.

The third danger to be avoided in education for world citizenship concerns the place of religion in the educational process. This subject is of such paramount importance that I hesitate to mention it at all since it is obviously impossible to treat it with any degree of adequacy as a part of this paper. But I cannot complete this statement without referring to it, even if it be only in a few dogmatic sounding sentences. I happen to be among those who believe that living in terms of the highest and noblest ideals of America or of the given religious tradition requires a metaphysical basis and the buttressing of religious ritual and ceremony. But I also believe that it would be most unfortunate if instruction in the metaphysical basis or in the ceremonial buttressing were to become part of the business of the tax supported American school system. We here are in the very fortunate position of having a common American political and social tradition which embodies the highest formulation of the ideals of social justice and personal righteousness growing out of the religious tradition. That common American heritage is sufficient if used properly for the purposes we have in mind. It should be the duty of the various religious groups to supply whatever is needed in terms of metaphysical thought and ritual.

World citizens will not come into being after a world state is created and citizenship papers issued. On the contrary, a world state will never come into being before a sufficiently large number of world citizens will make the establishment of the world state little more than the formal external expression of a revolution which had previously taken place within them. Educators particularly may well take to heart Benedetto Croce's admonition to the moralists to cease busying themselves with "asking the States to change their nature and practice morality." They should instead attend "on their own part to the promotion of moral con-

science and habit in the world at large, in order that the States may always be faced with them and help in serving them, without changing their own nature." We must learn and accept the inefutable truth that "there are no remedies which can take the place of the intellectual and moral conscience, or that can be of help to that conscience unless it can help itself."⁵ The nurturing of that intellectual and moral conscience must be recognized as the most precious privilege and primary responsibility of educators and the most significant contribution that any group can make toward preparing those citizens of the world who will ultimately be able to create an enduring world state and inaugurate that era of world peace and justice which alone can bestow meaning upon the long centuries of mankind's travail and tears.

⁵Benedetto Croce, *Politics and Morals*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1945, pp. 198-99.

CHAPTER XLII

The Classics and International Understanding

By GEORGE B. de HUSZAR

Nelson's Encyclopedia



*Toutes choses sont dites déjà, mais comme
personne n'écoute il faut toujours recom-
mencer*

André Gide

OUR THINKING about world affairs is dominated by a pre-Copernican point of view, which regards Western civilization as the center of the world. The tremendous change taking place in the world requires a revolution in our thinking comparable to that caused by the discovery that the earth is not the center of the universe. The past, the present, and the future of mankind cannot be understood unless we comprehend the role and significance of non-Western civilizations. The remarks which follow concerning the interaction of various civilizations, though known to any student of cultural history, have important implications for liberal education.

I

Greek thought and Christianity are perhaps the most important foundations of modern culture. But behind Greece and Christianity stands Asia. James H. Breasted elaborated the thesis that the Near East lies behind the history of Europe and that our moral heritage has come to us *through* the Hebrews rather than *from* them.¹ He demonstrated that the teachings of the Egyptian sages exerted a profound influence on the Hebrews. *The Wisdom of Amenemope* was the source for a whole section of the Old Testament Book of Proverbs. Psalm 104 had an Egyptian

¹James H. Breasted, *The Dawn of Conscience*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1933.

source, i.e., the Sun hymn of Ikhnaton (2000 B C) The Code in Deuteronomy is largely a degraded version of the *Code of Hammurabi* which through the Old Testament found its way into Western civilization Breasted also thought that the Egyptians had possessed a standard of morals far superior to that of the Decalogue over a thousand years before the Decalogue was written.¹ Furthermore, two centuries before the Christian era, Buddhism closed in on Palestine.² Many of the teachings of Jesus were anticipated several hundred years by Buddha.³

Asia Minor, Egypt, and India influenced Greek development. Babylon furnished the data which became in the hands of the Greeks the foundations of the science of astronomy. No less an authority on Greece than Friedrich Nietzsche, has stated: "Nothing is more foolish than to swear by the fact that the Greeks had an aboriginal culture, no, they rather absorbed all the culture flourishing among other nations, and they advanced so far, just because they understood how to hurl the spear further from the very spot where another nation had let it rest."⁴

India and the West met especially in ninth century B C. Earliest Greek philosophy came into existence in Asia Minor, which was in touch with Persia. Scholars have pointed out the similarity between the Eleatic doctrine and the Upanishads on the nature of reality and between Samkhya and the views of Empedocles and Anaxagoras.⁵ Pythagoras's religious, philosophical, and mathematical views were known in India as early as 600 B C. He was influenced by India and probably became acquainted with Indian doctrines in Persia.⁶ Plato was affected by the Pythagoreans and by Orphic mysticism mainly derived from Asiatic sources. Considerable evidence exists that from a historical standpoint India was the cradle of contemplative religion and philosophy.⁷ Alexander's invasion

¹Comment by Arthur Upham Pope.

In general, Breasted's statement needs to be more or less qualified by a recognition that many of the roots of Egyptian culture are to be found in Asia.

²Comment by Arthur Upham Pope.

One should go easy on the statement that Buddhism closed in on Palestine in the second century B C. Perhaps, but a little more documentation is necessary.

³S. Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1939, p. 173.

⁴Friedrich Nietzsche, *Early Greek Philosophy and Other Essays* (Mugge, tr., Levy, ed.), copyright by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission.

⁵S. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, and Richard Garbe, *The Philosophy of India*, Open Court, Chicago, 1897.

⁶Theodor Gomperz, *Griechische Denker*, Leipzig, 1896, p. 99.

⁷H. Stutheld, *Mysticism and Catholicism*, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1925, p. 31.

of India in 327 B.C. started a closer interchange of thought between India and the West. The contacts between Oriental people and the West were frequent in the period of the Roman Empire^c

For four centuries during which the European mind was deeply sunk in ignorance, the intellectual leadership of the Western world belonged to the people of Islam.⁷ In the Middle Ages Muslim philosophy and science from Spain influenced Europe. Islam influenced medieval mysticism and through Arab works Oriental philosophy entered the Church. The universal philosophy of Muhy'iddin Ibnu 'I-'Arabi elaborates a doctrine of Logos which brings together Christian, Neo-Platonic, Gnostic, and other sources. Algazel performed a role in Islam comparable to that of Thomas Aquinas in Christianity. Doctrines of Islamic origin can be found in the *Summa* Averroes, the Arabic Aristotle of Spain, was one of the sources of the scholasticism of the thirteenth century.⁸

Avicenna's *Canon of Medicine* had a great influence on Oriental medicine. Alhazen's *Optics* influenced Roger Bacon, Leonardo da Vinci, and Johannes Kepler. The Arabs made algebra an exact science and were the founders of plane and spherical trigonometry. The zero was known two centuries earlier to the Arabs than to the West. Al-Khwarismi's *Algebra* and the scientific works of Thabit ibn Qurra of Harran were of considerable importance. Omar Khayyám's *Algebra* was more advanced than works by the Greeks on the same subject.

The first book printed in England was a translation of a collection of remarks of ancient philosophers which was compiled originally in the eleventh century in Egypt. Some students have maintained that Muslim cosmogony, old Persian legends, and Arabic philosophical ideas and imagery have entered into the *Divina Commedia*. Arabic poetry had some influence on the earliest Provencal poets and on Old French romances. A close analogy exists between Arabic romances and a German *Rolandslied* and other tales of the North. Between 1250 and 1400 the

^cComment by Arthur Upham Pope.

The problem of India's contribution to some of the basic concepts of Western civilization is a very difficult one. One problem comes from the question of contacts. While I think we have not overestimated the richness and depth of Indian philosophy, it would be easy to exaggerate its originating role or its temporal priority. After all, Indo-Aryan civilization was a little primitive and derivative. But this does not indict the paper's main thesis in the slightest degree.

⁷Herbert Fisher, *History of Europe*, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1939.

⁸E. Renan, *Averroes et l'Averroïsme*, Levy, Paris, 1882.

chief foreign influence in Spain was Arabic. A synthesis of Moorish and Spanish culture formed the background of important influences in modern European literature. The modern novel was born in Spain,⁹ and has been influenced by Oriental literature. Even Cervantes was influenced by the Arabic culture in Andalusia. Arabic and Indian influences affected the Spanish drama, including Calderon's *La vida es sueño*. Spanish drama forms the background to a large portion of the French drama.¹⁰

The Renaissance emphasized the Greek and Roman elements in Western culture. But with the Ottoman attack on Europe and with the great voyages of discovery in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, European civilization established a contact with all parts of the world which became more and more intense as the decades went by.

One of the most important figures in the contact between the West and the East was Leibnitz.¹¹ He envisaged the attainment of a universal civilization based on various cultures. He outlined a plan which would bring about intellectual harmony between the East and the West and was interested in creating a universal language. He also insisted that in order to understand man's development it was necessary to study Chinese and Arabian history. Leibnitz was especially interested in China and believed that Chinese philosophy was an alien counterpart to his own monadology. It was his conviction that the Chinese would profit from Christian revealed theology and that Europe would profit from Chinese moral philosophy. In the Jesuit mission he saw the beginnings of an interchange between the culture of the East and West, and a method of bringing about international harmony.

In the eighteenth century, Oriental thought influenced Lessing, Montesquieu, and Voltaire. Voltaire included in his cultural historical works discussions of Arab, Chinese, and other cultures. A translation of the *Arabian Nights* appeared in 1704 and had, together with other Oriental tales, a considerable influence on European literature. Although the actual extent of direct influence is controversial, the romantic movement is indebted to Oriental influences. Heider, Friedrich Schlegel, August Wilhelm von Schlegel, and others were influenced by Oriental literature.

⁹D. Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo, *Orígenes de la Novela*, Madrid, 1915.

¹⁰Gillaume de Houszar, *Cornille et le Théâtre Espagnol*, Paris, 1903, and *L'Influence de L'Espagne sur le Théâtre Français des XVIII^e & XIX^e Siècles*, Paris, 1912.

¹¹The following remarks on Leibnitz are based on Donald F. Lach's "Leibnitz and China," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, October, 1945.

Schopenhauer's thought was profoundly affected by the Upanishad.

In the twentieth century two historians, Spengler and Toynbee, made considerable contributions to the study of world history. The first historian who definitely moved outside the Western scheme was Spengler. He attempted to construct a morphology of world history and borrowed from Goethe the conception of morphology. While Spengler stresses the isolation of cultures, Toynbee emphasizes their interaction. But both historians approach history from a world point of view. They also agree that the state is not the fundamental unit of historical analysis, and that history must be approached in terms of broader concepts. Spengler's frame of reference is "culture," Toynbee's is "civilization."

Mankind has entered a period where the contact between Western civilization and the rest of the world will be of paramount significance.¹² Recent decades have demonstrated that a nation which is not completely European, Russia, and a non-white nation, Japan, are perfectly capable of developing technology to a high degree of efficiency. Japan presented an unprecedented event: a non-white nation adopted Western technology and attacked the West with it.

Toynbee has called attention to the important fact that the Russians have taken up a Western secular philosophy, Marxism, and transformed it into something of their own which they are now shooting back at us. He sees in this move the beginning of a counter offensive on the part of non-Western civilizations against the West. According to Toynbee, the great event of the twentieth century is the impact of Western civilization upon all other living societies. We are still in an early chapter of the story of the contact with civilizations of the Hindu world, Mexico and Peru, Orthodox Christendom, Islam, and the Far East. Toynbee believes that the Russian counter discharge in the form of Communism will be probably less significant, in view of the long run effects on Western life of India and China.¹³ The dream of world unification on a purely Western basis will be impossible. The expansion of Western techniques, nationalism on a worldwide scale, and deep lying cultural forces excludes the possibility of the whole earth's becoming a large colony of

¹²The present writer has pointed out the significance of the fact that technology and Western techniques are becoming common property. "Regional Approach to the Study of the Contemporary World," *Approaches to National Unity*, 5th Symposium, Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, New York, 1945, p. 692.

¹³Arnold J. Toynbee, "Encounters Between Civilizations," *Harper's Magazine*, April, 1947, pp. 291-293.

the West. The success of the peace effort will depend on adjustment between world cultures. An international organization will be merely a shell unless it is based on understanding between members of contemporary cultures.

II

Though liberal education aims at developing intelligent and responsible persons, most of its exponents seem to forget that a primary prerequisite of this is the ability to think in terms of world history and world trends. Perhaps no civilization has been so arrogantly ethnocentric as ours. We have simply mistaken it for the only civilization.^d In spite of the existence of many excellent institutes dealing with non-Western cultures, the great majority of college students are not given an opportunity to learn about the religious, philosophical, scientific, and artistic tradition of non-Western cultures. If we are to escape the charge of ethnocentrism and cultural illiteracy, a liberal education must provide a survey of the heritage not only of the Western but also of other cultures.

As we cannot fully understand the development of the West and its present predicament without some comprehension of non-Western cultures, we cannot hope to arrive at an adjustment with non-Western cultures without having some notion of their fundamental ideas and ideals.^e How can we ever understand China without knowing something of Confucius? How can we hope to grasp the problems of the Moham-

^dComment by Pitman B. Potter

The current effort to broaden the cultural views of those who have inherited chiefly Central and Western European culture is of course a sound corrective and it may have a beneficial effect in facilitating international or world cooperation. On the other hand, there seems to me to be a tendency to overcorrection, even to imply that Eastern culture and thought are certainly superior to Western. We should, of course, react violently against any implication that Western culture is greatly and completely superior to Eastern, but the contrary is also the case. As a matter of fact, I find more dogmatism and intolerance in Oriental thought than in Occidental.

^eComment by Pitman B. Potter

I should like to put forward the proposition that one of the objectives of political science and statecraft is to facilitate social harmony and cooperation, at least on the minimum level, even in the absence of the understanding among people which has preoccupied in recent and more remote times de Huszar, Northrop, Rao, and Alexander the Great. Arranging for such cooperation when understanding exists is a much simpler task for the political scientist and the practitioner of the political art, whose job is even more necessary in advance (or pending) of the development of a greater social unity. Experience has, moreover, shown that such achievement is by no means impossible.

medan world without reading the *Koran*? Without knowing something of the *Bhagavad Gita*,¹⁴ which is studied and repeated daily by millions, we cannot understand the mentality of India. Much of our misunderstanding of non-Western civilizations is due to the fact that we merely pay attention to political and economic problems instead of the more fundamental ideological and cultural issues. Such misunderstanding is also due to the fact that we often view non-Western cultures in terms of the ideals and ideas of the West.

Moreover, we cannot properly evaluate philosophical, religious, and artistic works unless we are aware of the contributions made by the non-Western cultures along these lines. If we take into consideration the classics of the East, some of the books which we naively accept as outstanding may suffer by the comparison. The *Wisdom of Amenemope*, which is dated ten centuries before the Old Testament, may be considered a superior work. Humboldt thought that the *Mahabharata* is perhaps the only true philosophical poem of all literatures. Schopenhauer rated the Upanishads above the theology of the Hebrews.

A truly liberal education should include such classics of the East as *The Book of the Dead*, *Wisdom of Amenemope*, *The Code of Hammurabi*, *Koran*, *Zend-Avesta*, Khayyám's *Algebra*, *Arabian Nights* (Near East), *Rigveda*, *Bhagavad Gita*, *The Pitaka Texts*, *Laws of Manu* (India), *I Ching*,¹⁵ *Shu King*, *Liki*, *Analecís of Confucius*, *Book of Tao*, *Book of Mencius* (China).

Recently some persons have organized an effort to make people read the "Great Books," as they call them. The movement started at Columbia University and spread to the University of Chicago. The curriculum of St. John's College is based on the "Great Books." The *Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc.* will publish, under Mr. Robert M. Hutchins's editorship, in 1948, a fifty-four volume set called *Great Books of the Western World*. The Great Books Foundation, set up in Chicago in June, 1947, intends to organize "Great Books" discussion groups throughout the country.

¹⁴This work "can be regarded as the focus of all Indian religion." Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, *Hinduism and Buddhism*. Philosophical Library, New York, 1943, p. 5.

¹⁵Father Bouvet believed that the *I Ching*, the oldest Chinese and perhaps the world's oldest work, was the primary source of Chinese science and tradition. He found in this work universal symbols invented in order to present the most abstract principles in all the sciences. Leibnitz hoped to strengthen Father Bouvet's theory that the *I Ching* was a key to all the sciences.

The brochure of the University College of the University of Chicago states that the aim of the program is "to reach for the best wisdom of all the ages" and to make "the truly fundamental and perennial problems of human life and society focus our knowledge and direct our thinking." Thus it is assumed that the East has not contributed to "the best wisdom of all the ages" and to the "truly fundamental and perennial problems of human life and society"¹⁶ Furthermore, the "Great Books" project cannot be justified from a historical point of view. The above mentioned brochure states that the prerequisite for the intelligent reading of one great book is the reading of other great books which form its intellectual background. The great authors are engaged in a "conversation with one another across the centuries!" But this "intellectual background" goes much further than Western civilization. Thus according to the argument presented by the Great Books project itself, the books which are offered cannot be read intelligently.

The "Great Books" do not help to understand the rest of the world or to create a world community.¹⁷ The brochure of the Great Books Foun-

¹⁶Even the presumption that the *Great Books of the Western World* includes the classics of the West is open to criticism. Not a line of Leibnitz, Helmholtz, Lessing, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, or of the French dramatists and novelists is included in the four hundred and thirty-two titles.

¹⁷Comment by F. Ernest Johnson

If Western culture has drawn so heavily on other than Western sources, may it not be contended that an intensive study of our own culture brings the student into contact with the more viable elements of other cultures which have left their deposit in ever evolving culture patterns? The meaning of history is found in what it has produced. An understanding of culture comes not from surveying its history but from conscious involvement in a historical conception of cultural elements. The more intensively we study our own culture the more understanding we have of the sources from which it sprang. This consideration, however, does not detract from the importance of studying divergent contemporary cultures with a view to lessening antagonisms—particularly with respect to Eastern Europe and Asia.

The "Great Books" idea is, of course, open to criticism on grounds of educational theory, but this is another question.

Comment by Henry N. Wieman

May we carry a little further the figure of speech referring to the Ptolemaic and Copernican views of life. One might pass on from both of these to the Einsteinian, and in such case find in any culture (the Western included) the medium by which to pass to another with a means for understanding. This common basis must be the process of interaction between individuals and groups which generates and enriches that scope of appreciation which characterizes culture. If we can understand this creative interchange between individuals and civilizations, if we can give it free play and shape our habits and institutions to meet its demands, rather than merely to meet the demands of the content achieved to date in any one or several cultures, we might do more for the continuous and ever

dation states that some may find "an active stimulation by their participation in the great conversations which have been going back and forth across the ages, across all the seas and boundaries, and across all the barriers, psychological no less than geographical, which separate men." This statement is a gross exaggeration inasmuch as only Western thought is studied. Mr Hutchins has declared that "if we want peace, then, we must work for a community which shall embrace all men. What is the common bond that can unite us, what is the common tradition in which, whether we know it or not, we all live? I should like tentatively to endorse the suggestion of the delegate from Lebanon to the United Nations, who said that the common bond and the common tradition were most clearly revealed in the great works of the human mind and spirit. He suggested that, if all the peoples of the earth could unite in the study of these great works, a world community might arise. I do not say that the Great Books program is the only answer to the problem of working out the education the world needs. I do say that it is directed to this end and that it seems promising."¹⁷

Inasmuch as the "Great Books" project is concerned only with Western books, it will not promote the creation of a world community. On the contrary, the "Great Books" project creates cultural isolation by emphasizing the ethnocentrism of the West. Millions of Americans will get the impression that theology, philosophy, science, and literature are mainly Western products.¹⁸

renewed understanding of one another than can be achieved by concentration on any selected set of great books.

We are not rejecting Mr de Huszar's proposal. But we are saying that the study of Great Books, whether selected from one or all cultures that have great books, will not solve the problem unless this study is made incidental to a larger purpose and more deep searching project.

¹⁷Robert M. Hutchins, *The Good News of Damnation*, A Human Events Reprint, Henry Regnery, pp. 7-8.

¹⁸Comment by Arthur Upham Pope.

It was with profound satisfaction amounting to a certain excitement and real jubilation that I read this able statement. I particularly liked the challenge to the provincial illiteracy of the Hutchins plan for the great world books, really a piece of cultural impudence.

Comment by Stephen Duggan.

There is no question at all that we of the West judge all civilizations by the standards of the West. To one who is aware of the remarkable contributions made to the heritage of mankind by other civilizations, this of course is a great mistake.

The emphasis placed upon the one hundred best books, both by President Hutchins and Stungfellow Barr is wholly unjustified. Moreover, the attempt on the part of Mort-

Volumes 1 and 2 of the *Great Books of the Western World* are an "Ideas Index" prepared by Mortimer J. Adler. It will present systematically the development of philosophic ideas in the light of the contributions made by all the "Great Books."¹⁸ *Time* magazine has already referred to it as a "cross-index of the world's great ideas and idea-men." This, of course, is false inasmuch as only Western thinkers are referred to in the *Index*.

If the classics of the East were included in the Britannica volumes together with the classics of the West, the *Index* would become a tremendously significant contribution to the understanding between the East and the West. The *Index* would consider the development of ideas in the light of contributions made by the classics of *all* cultures. Such an attempt would be difficult but it would help us to realize that fundamental ideas possess a certain similarity in all cultures. An effort along this line would have to consider similarities such as

a The similarity between Yoga as a physical and mental discipline, the Chinese doctrine of *wu wei*, Pythagoras's *theoria*, Aristotle's contemplative life, Christian *contemplatio*, and Spinoza's *amor Dei intellectualis*.

b The similarity of the distinction between immortal soul and mortal body in Brahmanism, Plato, and Christianity

c The similarity of Confucius's, Plato's, and Aristotle's conception of the role of music in education

d The similarity of the definition of mystical unity in Eckhart, Abu Nasr al-Sarraj, and Ibnu 'l Farid. Mysticism is singularly uniform (not identical) in all times and places, the similarity between Plotinus, the Mohammedan Sufi, and the Christian mystic is striking.¹⁹

e. The similarity of the conception of social hierarchy in the *Laws* of Mer Adler to direct us daily to the medieval period and the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas in order to solve our spiritual problems, is hopeless

Comment by Ananda K. Goomai swamy*

I have often referred to the provincial limitation of Hutchins's position. But these people are almost immovable, as I know from correspondence with the Dean of St. John's College and the Editor of the "Great Books." In contrast, my own habitual method is to treat the terms of the common universe of discourse in worldwide contexts.

¹⁸It is interesting to note that the ancient Chinese, who are excluded from "the best wisdom of all the ages," possessed the *Eshya*, the earliest Chinese Thesaurus, a help to the study of ancient classics, grouped according to ideas.

¹⁹W. R. Inge, *Freedom, Love, and Truth*, Longmans, Green and Company, New York, 1936, p. 25.

Manu, Plato's *Republic*, and Nietzsche's theory of the order of castes.

f The similarity between the unanimous agreement of Hindu and Buddhist thinkers that intellectuality produces a cleavage in our life and the views of Schopenhauer, Dostoevski, and Kierkegaard. According to all of these thinkers, intellectuality produces self-consciousness and self-will, which in turn leads to anxiety.

Although similarities in fundamental ideas exist in Eastern and Western thought, the difficulty of understanding another culture must be kept in mind. It is difficult for a Western man to understand fully *The Brothers Karamazov*, or for a Chinese to comprehend fully *Thus Spake Zarathustra*. Spengler has emphasized this difficulty and has perhaps overemphasized it: "What can Tolstoi who from the depths of his humanity rejected the whole Western world idea as something alien and distant—do with the 'Middle Ages,' with Dante, with Luther? What can a Japanese do with Parzeval and 'Zarathustra,' or an Indian with Sophocles?"²⁰

Spengler emphasized the fact that there is no humanity, no mathematics, no painting, no philosophy, but that there are as many of these as there are cultures. According to him the Egyptian, Indian, Babylonian, Chinese, Classical, Arabic, Occidental, and Mayan cultures had their own individual characteristics. Although Spengler's views are challenging, there is considerable evidence that all cultures have some fundamental ideas in common. Historians of cultures may approach the problem of similarity from the point of view of several hypotheses. It may be assumed that there are certain ideas with which the mind of man is naturally concerned in all cultures.²¹ Or it may be assumed that fundamental ideas "originated" in certain cultures and through the process of diffusion spread to other cultures. Variations in ideas and ideals may be partly due to this process of diffusion. Cultural anthropologists and linguists are well aware of the fact that words, ideas, ideals, and techniques often undergo a transformation in the process of diffusion.¹

²⁰Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1929, p. 24.

²¹Evidence indicates that the ancient Mayan civilization developed on its own, without influence from the rest of the world.

¹Comment by Alfred C. Lane.

This is an especially valuable study in stressing the importance of the Near East contribution to our culture and the meaning of words. As the meaning of each word differs somewhat for each individual according to his experience, so the general meaning of the word and its development and shift in meaning depend on the experience of mankind.

Conclusion

In order to bring about international understanding we need to concentrate on comprehension among various cultures. Formal and adult education must emphasize the understanding of non-Western cultures. Unfortunately, the "Great Books" project will not contribute toward this end. An excellent opportunity has been missed to make a unique contribution to the cultural *rapprochement* of the East and the West. Fortunately, numerous institutions are attempting to provide an understanding of non-Western cultures. It is encouraging to note that the "Invitation to Learning" has recently included Oriental books in its program. Professor Sunder Joshi of Indiana University is giving a course for the University College of the University of Chicago, entitled *Great Books of the Orient*. The Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion itself contributes to the interchange of the ideas of various cultures.

A real value of the "classic" educational course, Eliot's "five foot shelf," and the proposed "great books," and the study of books like the Bible, is that by a common experience educated men get an acquaintance with the meanings of words as they have been used and an appreciation of the change in their meaning and application, meanings which are embedded in their origin and derivation and should not be lightly changed.

CHAPTER XLIII

Some Common Aims of Science and Religion

By ALFRED C. LANE

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IN JULY, 1946, I picked up on my doorstep a little flyer, *Destiny of the Earth*. The same day in the mail came my copy of *Sky and Telescope*, published at the Harvard Observatory, which displayed on the cover the words, "The End of the World." This coincidence led me to think: What are the common aims of science and religion?

I went to the advertised meeting and found a group of "Watch Tower" people listening to a discourse based on verses from the Book of Isaiah. It was much like an ordinary religious service, but a lady told me that they were dead against religion. I was surprised, but I have lived long enough to know that words have different meanings. In particular any word which becomes a slogan or a shibboleth is likely to have widely different meanings.

I have heard a speaker say that "democracy has nothing to do with voting. It is a way of life." That was very different from the conception with which I was brought up or which one might obtain from the derivation. I can remember that over thirty years ago a Jesuit professor was telling us how communistic the Jesuits were. That was before communism was a party name.

The lady who addressed me evidently had the idea of religion as some sort of ecclesiastical machine, but as I look up the word in the dictionary, I find this definition, "Religion is belief in an invisible, superhuman power, conceived after the analogy of the human spirit, upon Whom man is dependent and to Whom he considers himself in some degree responsible." Or, to put it after a phrase of my own teacher, William James, "There is a God or gods with Whom we have dealings."

On the other hand, I have for years defined science in a way accepted

by many of my fellow scientists. In this definition every word counts. *Science is the social systemization of shareable knowledge*. For shareable I should perhaps say communicable or repeatable. Modern Science with a large "S" is the result of cooperation. It is a social phenomenon. Alchemy became chemistry when the veil of secrecy was dropped and men began to pool their knowledge.

However, the definition would be somewhat too broad for certain writers. I quote from Clarence R. Skinner (*Christian Leader*, September 2, 1944, p. 525) a phrase taken from Bertrand Russell that Science "deals with judgments for which unanimous assent may be obtained from qualified students of the subject concerned." This seems at first like a reasonable definition, but it opens the door for disagreement as to who is specially qualified. There is a human tendency to consider that people who do not agree with us are not specially qualified, and unanimity has not been so popular since the organization of the United Nations. How this "assent" may be obtained is also left open.

Perhaps this problem can be best treated after we consider what we mean by knowledge and by shareable knowledge. When we are considering the sharing or communicating of knowledge, I use it as referring to a state of mind. In the phrase, "sure thing," the assurance is not in any "thing" but in the mind, and knowledge is such a degree of certainty that we cannot help acting upon it.

In talking of shareable or communicable knowledge, we are talking of verifiable or repeatable knowledge communicated in words, of them some words are common nouns without capitals and *every such word implies* a number of things. It implies that we have repeated experiences which are so much alike that we can lump them together and speak of them with one word. We speak of light and of the sun. This implies experiences which we have and which we share with others.

When we want common action we are likely to fail if we try to get extreme precision. C. P. Curtis, Jr., in his recent book, *Lions Under the Throne*, has suggested that even in the United States Constitution there are phrases which are definitely ambiguous, because the Fathers of the Constitution could not agree on certain points and therefore found a phrase which would cover differing points of view.

Systemization in science is the attempt to make large, general statements, which means the use of common nouns to express knowledge and experiences which we all share or may be thought to share. These are to

be as precise as we can make them for the purpose of being able to foretell what the experience of the future may be expected to be from the accumulation of past experiences. Both science and religion want to foretell the future. We wish to face the facts that are and are to be, so that we may adapt our conduct thereto. To that end we wish to know and impart truth.

Role of Precision

Precision is an asymptote, a general statement approaches the precise fact as a hyperbole approaches a given line without ever meeting it, or an infinite series approaches a definite sum. We do not reject a statement or say that it has no value because it is not precisely true. Yet precision is not to be scorned. Our streets are ablaze with neon light because someone became critical of the exact atomic weight of the nitrogen of the air, and the result was the discovery of minute traces of rare gases in the atmosphere. It was a triumph for the third decimal place.

We may classify the staircase of scientific knowledge and precision somewhat as follows:

A hunch is an induction or general statement from one experience which may almost at once be connected with previous experience but suggests a broad statement which may lead to a common noun of wide range. One may say that Newton had a hunch, when he saw the apple fall, that there was a gravity (a common noun) which was universal in its range. Maupertuis's principle of "least action" was a theological hunch, supported by relatively few facts, compared with those which have made it important in modern physics. The hunch becomes a hypothesis as other facts are built into the general statement. The hunch and the hypothesis may be purely individual and there is no definable percentage of probability.

The hypothesis becomes a theory when it is confirmed by other experiences and by other observers. The probability of its application to future experience becomes greater.

The natural law is a theory which has been verified so often that we are incredulous when we hear of an exception, which may, however, occur rarely. There is a tendency to ignore or doubt the exceptions, and also to refine our expression of the natural law so as to be absolutely precise. Yet I am inclined to favor the position of my colleague, Ellsworth Hunt-

ington, as to the importance of the middle way. It is not scientific to doubt everything (It is, perhaps, philosophic.) A scientific man should not be so credulous—or so incredulous—as not to investigate. A reported exception to a natural law is a subject for investigation, if you have nothing more important to do.

Simple words like *light* and *sun* express experiences repeated to all who are not blind, accordingly, we make general statements, more or less precise in their phrasing, which sum up experiences in the past and may be used to foretell the future. If one says that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west, that is enough in helping scouts to keep located. Science largely depends on such statements, and you will notice that it assumes what never can be absolutely proved—that from the past one can foretell the future. But as we do this we extrapolate, just as from a bit of a line or a curve we may infer the rest, the farther the extrapolation the more uncertain we feel.

Take the statement above: The sun rises in the east. That is not precise. Just where it appears to rise depends on the time of year and the latitude. Does it rise anyway or does the earth turn around? Clearly we can find fault with that statement and we can make one that is more precise. Or take the word *light*. Try to define light so that a blind man will really know what we mean, or so that it will have scientific precision.

That any difference in the results of an experiment which is expected to duplicate a previous experiment, is due to a difference in antecedents, is a postulate of scientific work. But it may be not outside of, but within the observer and recorder. It is not a necessary postulate for all knowledge, that is—a real individual knowledge. There is such knowledge. What I see when I shut my eyes I can never fully describe to anyone else, and yet I *know* myself that I see very interesting patterns. Certain effects of complementary colors have been found to be shareable, but others are not.

A colleague told me that blue had a different shade with one eye than with the other. I was much surprised, but as I have grown older I have found, myself, that a sheet of white paper has a different tint in evening light with one eye than the other.

A friend can wiggle his ears. That he can wiggle his ears is a scientific fact which others can observe, and Darwin has some pages on the muscles which enable the ears to be moved, but how it feels to wiggle his ears he cannot tell me because I cannot wiggle mine.

On May 6, 1947, I spent the afternoon at the Harvard Observatory at a symposium discussing the "cosmic timescale"—whether in speculations on the life history of stars one should go back billions of years or trillions. At the same time the papers were full of the approaching eclipse of the sun in Brazil the following week, which occurred at the time and place predicted, with an accuracy of eight significant figures or more. There is a limit to the precision of the prophecies of a total eclipse, though it may require special apparatus to discover the difference between the observed and predicted fact. But both cosmic time and eclipse were subjects of scientific interest, though the precision and the probability of error were very different. Scientific work is not prevented by the fact that we cannot obtain absolute precision.

In popular use words do not have exact definitions. Our words involve summaries of our experiences. Our experiences are all different. We therefore realize that we only say what we mean in a general way, that the larger the range of the objects which we denote by a common noun, the harder it is to give a precise definition, and the more likely it is that the hearer will include or exclude in the range of meaning some objects or characters that we would not.

Shifting Meanings in Words

In 1877, my father, the Honorable Jonathan A. Lane, gave to us boys a small book by Nordoff on *Politics for Young Americans*, on the flyleaf of which he had written "To my sons, that they may be politicians of whom no man need be ashamed."

My father thought he was a politician in a small and local way—representative and senator in the state legislature, member of the governor's council, presidential elector. Yet he would have been surprised to have it stated that "politics is a full time occupation, employment, or business." I think it formed no appreciable part of his income.

The idea then was that all citizens were interested in politics, and that the career of an elective office holder was not one to be followed unless one had sufficient sources of income to carry him through those times when, if he were true to his convictions, he would be on the unpopular side. With the growth of the complexity of modern government, however, and the knowledge required to decide in such matters as the transportation and power system of a city, problems have arisen which seem

to require special knowledge and training. It would be interesting to hear the ideas of some young men to compare with those of J. A. Lane as to who were denoted by the word politician, and what was their characteristic behavior.

Just at present, dictators are denounced. But the original dictator was an officer of Republican Rome, with limited powers, and a *short* term of office. Words that I have seen become derogatory epithets are propaganda, collaborator, communist.

On the other hand, the word *democratic* has become complimentary, since the days when it was associated with "copperhead," "anti-Lincoln," "rum, Romanism, and rebellion," a flavor distinct in my youth.

Large changes in meaning, when a word becomes slang, or a slogan or shibboleth, often mark or produce dissension. A slight change may produce friction or unity. There must be some allowable latitude in the meaning of words, just as machinery will not work if the fit is too exact. But the clearance should be small.

A modern science like geology has elaborate rules of priority in nomenclature, description, and publication, preservation of types and co-types, etc., to fix the meanings of words. Yet even in such a science our enlarged experience and knowledge bring up problems as to the precise meanings of words.

A case has recently occurred in my own experience. My names for formations in Michigan have been very well treated by my successors. Fifty years ago I named the top beds of the Silurian known to me in Michigan "Monroe," the beds above in the Devonian "Dundee." Beds of which I knew practically nothing were later discovered in sinking a shaft for salt in South Detroit, and for a while Grubbs and workers following him, myself included, classed these "Detroit River Series" beds as an upper division of the Monroe in the Silurian. But recently an excellent report from Ann Arbor would class them as Devonian and may well be right.

Yet in organizing geological excursions, symposia meetings, or planning campaigns of research in oilwell drilling, we can use the terms Monroe and Dundee without raising the question of their precise meaning, because there will be a large area of common meaning in any case. It is in the fringe or boundary line of its use that disagreement may become important in close oil well correlation. The lack of certainty or degree of it may have little to do with preventing action. It may stimulate it. When controversies arise there is a well recognized arbiter—common experi-

ence, arranged to throw light on the disputed points, if possible by mutual consent.

Can this be also a common aim with religion? Is the "knowledge of a God or gods with Whom we have dealings" only a part of Science as we have defined it, or how does it differ?

Both science and religion wish to foretell the future. They do so by framing statements called truths, which sum up past experience and are believed to apply to the future. The laws of science generally apply to those sources of common experience which we call matter. But some, such as Gresham's law, apply to the behavior of men. There are other laws such as those connecting suicide and the weather.

While both religion and science aim to foretell the future by general statements applicable to future as well as to past, the religious man believes as a truth that man's actions can and should be affected by the plans of a superhuman power or powers. Matthew Arnold spoke of it as the "power not ourselves that makes for righteousness." As soon as one speaks of this power as doing something "for," one may use the commoner, less precise term, God. Anatole France is quoted as having said that the future takes pains to fulfil the dreams or visions of poets and prophets or philosophers. A future that "takes pains" may be what others refer to as Divine Providence.

In connection with this "power" there are various points of view.

(1) It may be thought that there have been especially gifted people, founders of religion, seers, prophets, to whom the divine will was especially revealed, who were guided by it and could tell what it was, and more or less foretell the future accordingly.

(2) It may also be believed that this especial direct access and guidance may be attained by all people.

(3) It may also be believed that not only all people may, but actually do have direct messages from the "higher powers apart from our material senses," that, as Theodore Parker quoting his mother said, Conscience is the voice of God in the soul of man.

(4) A position, sometimes called that of the deists is that just as the plans of friends appear from their actions rather than words, so the ordinary course of nature indicates a plan. This was the theme of William Paley's *Natural Theology*, the Boston School edition of which my father studied in 1836. Charles Darwin spoke highly of it, though it seemed to him that while in a large way nature revealed mind, it did not in details.

Paley is out of date, but so are other text books, and the larger the range of our generalizations the less precise they are. The great Dutch astronomer de Sitter said that our theories change from month to month, I might say from week to week, but a good observation lasts. The observations are the experiences, the stones in the temple of science. While Paley is out of date, many modern scientists like Jeans and the Comptons and Millikan think they find signs of intelligence in the physical universe.

It is also true that through the ages there are those mystics and saints who have claimed a special knowledge of the superhuman plan. That these people existed, that the history of religion is a course in many colleges, that there are societies for psychical research and talks of telepathy, that William James wrote a book on *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, all these are well known facts of common and scientific experience.

That in some of these ways truth though not scientific truth as we have defined it, may be obtained by some or all individuals, should not be hastily denied, and statements regarding God which may not seem to us precisely true, may nevertheless be in such a general way true as to be a bond of united action.

The mystic has to deal in metaphors, the scientist also. The electrician talks of waves, but whether these waves are like those cast by a pebble in a pond or the waves of population surging from the city in the subway, he is using a metaphor. Just so Jesus did in speaking of God as a spirit (*Pneuma*), literally the wind or atmosphere, which is all about us, without which we cannot live, which we do not see but know from its effects. So when the psalmist said, "The Lord is my shepherd," or Jesus referred to "our Father Who art in heaven," they were using metaphorical language. "Without a parable spake he not unto them," may not be literally true, but it is true always when one of large experience speaks to one of limited experience.

It has not been too common either in science, or religion, or philosophy to emphasize the inevitable lack of precision in any statement. But hymns and stories and parables like Aesop's fables and Jesus's parables are bonds of fellowship. Even if we do not understand them in precisely the same sense, there is a large bond of agreement. The two commandments in which Jesus summed up the law were taken from lawbooks much older and recognized by Moslem and Jew as well as Protestant and

Catholic The creeds have been bonds of unity for which men would fight and die As shibboleths, they have been causes of division, when one discusses their precise application

We can be more united in singing "America the Beautiful," and standing at attention when we hear the national anthem than in defining the "American way" The American way and the scientific way is to have a great many sects, to give them all a fair show and find out what they can do in successful cooperation in our national life

If a religion gives its followers a belief in a God Who is interested in them, Whose plans are for good, they will want to do what He wants them to do and will serve Him freely They will be free and still play on the team Is a man less free when he joins a team? Is a man less free if he is reliable? Is a nation less free if its sovereignty is accompanied by a willingness to self-limit its authority by agreeing to cooperate with others, and live up to treaties?

Science and religion can cooperate if each will grant a certain lack of precision in stating its common aims

CHAPTER XLIV

A Religion for One World

By NELS F S FERRÉ

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RELIGION is a force in history which either divides men or drives them together. It is hard to overestimate its potential power for good or ill with respect to our achieving one world. Some religions have often been, and actually are now, sources of conflict. It has been proposed that the abolishing of religions is a step toward concord among groups and nations. There is obviously a strong element of truth in this suggestion.

But can religion be abolished? History testifies that man is rather generally an incurably religious animal. A man's religion is his basic relation to the universe. Religion is what to a man is most worthwhile in view of what he considers to be true. All men are religious in their way, for to be religious means to respond meaningfully to the world that we find.

We cannot abolish religion except by destroying human life. What we do is to find what is universally good for us in this actual world. The main fact under consideration is the oneness of our world. This is obviously true geographically, politically, economically, and intellectually, but this is not equally true in terms of common interests and faiths.

We need a world faith, a community of universal interests and ideals. This can come imperialistically, as one faith does to death the other faiths in a long struggle. In this case, religion adds to the world's conflicts and confusion. For this crucial time, at least, it will drain men's energies and destroy their will to universal cooperation. Or it can come by the method of free inquiry ever rooted in the concern for the common good. In this case, the concrete religions, even while seeking universality, will implement whatever general goodwill may already be found. The second approach is ours.

I

A Religion for One World Must Be Based on Truth

This must be a beginning from which we must never depart. Naturally, each religion will have to start where it is. We know no presuppositionless thinking. Universality must be an expanding edge, differing according to the capacity of each religion to meet man's deepest, permanent needs. Only the future can tell to what extent a basic universality can be freely combined with the relative elements which characterize human understanding, preferences, and choices. If any religion is sure of its intrinsic universality, it ought the more readily to consent to free inquiry and concomitant cooperation.^a *Some sort* of democratic pluralism of many religions, or of one, seems altogether probable as a result. This does not preclude a universal aspect and orientation common to all.

If free inquiry is to find the fullest truth of religion, it will find it a grounded faith. What is *most important and real* cannot be proved in terms of what is *more important and real*. The fullest and clearest use of our reason should find us seeing that religion cannot be reduced to reason without reducing whole life to part life. Not understanding this, teachers have often quashed vital religion by means of false criticism. In doing this they have helped to injure the root of creative civilization.

That religion must be based on truth means that it must use reason fearlessly for the full facts, and for all the reasons that can identify and clarify truth. Yet vital religion *uses* reason, it *lives* creatively and courageously beyond what can be proved in terms of what now is. How else could it help to improve the world? How else could faith have any power for the good which we want to see actualized?

Religion should make the fullest use of philosophy, but philosophy cannot become a substitute for religion. Philosophy is basically concerned with knowledge. It can be concerned with creative and living

^aComment by Ralph T. Flewelling

I like the assertion that a religion which is certain of its universality ought to consent to free inquiry and cooperation. We are met by this paradox that theoretically Judeo-Christianity is the most universal religion, yet is perhaps the least cooperative and tolerant. We seem to need the drive of fiery conviction and the universality of tolerance. But how can these be brought together? It seems to me that this is the point at which philosophy can be useful. But only by the recovery of a philosophy with spiritual vitality, which is metaphysical and includes spiritual ideas, *i.e.*, proceeds from the affirmation of the reality of values.

knowledge. But when it becomes the full faith of life it has to that extent gone beyond its proper discipline. If the philosophy of the good life is made a vital life decision, it constitutes the content of faith. It is religion. Commitment is the very nature of religion. Disinterestedness is good as a method, for a part of life. Full life requires creative and concerned interest.^b

In his extensive survey of history Toynbee comes to the conclusion that "when philosophies and religion meet, the religions must increase, while the philosophies must decrease."¹ The reasons for this are obvious. "The fatal and fundamental weakness in philosophy, from which all derive, is a lack of spiritual vitality."²

If man is to have a full rounded and well working societal situation, he must thus have a universal faith grounded in truth.^c "As political

¹Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Study of History*, Oxford University Press, London, 1939, V, 5, p. 557.

²*Ibid.*, p. 558.

^bComment by Swami Akhilananda.

It Professor Ferré identifies philosophy with discursive, rationalistic, and empirical knowledge of the objective world, discarding total knowledge of the Reality, then he is right that philosophy is not complete and has no connection with creative and total life. But the Hindu conception of philosophy is quite different. The word that is applied to philosophy in the Hindu school of thought is called *darashana*—experienced truth. Knowledge is divided into two types: relative knowledge, including science, literature, art, etc., which satisfies man's rational and esthetic values, and supreme knowledge, which leads one to the realization of the Ultimate Reality. It also means that philosophy should lead one to the realization of Eternal Truth. The primary duty of philosophers is to make one realize the Ultimate Reality. According to them, it cannot be realized until or unless man's total nature is integrated. So long as the mind is full of conflict and confusion, it cannot perceive the "thing in itself," or Truth, or the Ultimate Reality, God. The prerequisite of the student of philosophy is thoroughgoing mental discipline. So philosophy not only gives us empirical, objective, coherent knowledge but it also leads us to the knowledge of the Ultimate Reality or God. Now Professor Ferré will permit us to say that philosophy in the highest sense requires ethical training, mental discipline, and consequent realization of the Truth.

Professor Ferré's reply.

I have defined philosophy as rational empirical knowledge, in order to avoid some saying that I am using philosophy to support religion. If philosophers want to include "the intuitions of eternity" and the discontinuities which necessitate faith, I am delighted to enlarge my definition of philosophy.

^cComment by Alfred C. Lane.

Probably Professor Ferré and I agree more than it would seem, and I agree that what he calls "cooperation," what I call "teamwork," is the way toward oneness. But his definition of religion is quite different from mine. So far as I can see, it might be the same as that of the Swamis, but their experience being different, and their climatic background,

philosophy derives its sanction from ethics, and ethics from the truth of religion, it is only by returning to the eternal source of truth that we can hope for any social organization which will not, to its ultimate destruction, ignore some essential aspect of reality."³ The truth which can help us to improve our present situation must be had previously through faith, and must therefore be basically self-evident and self-verifying. Yet since reason is a part of life without which it cannot be whole, truth must always be confirmed by reason.⁴

Historic religions accumulate much debris of which they must be cleansed. Within is some kernel of truth. Primitive man thinks in terms of pictures. For that matter, depth-thinking is mostly analogical with us all. Hence we get myths which are meaningful to the whole man. There

the expression and the meaning of words is different. So with his use of the words truth and true I am not quite sure what he does mean by such an expression as, for instance, "organically true," but I am pretty sure that is different from my idea of truth as a general statement which applies to all experience within the scope of the statement.

Professor Ferré's reply

Naturally unity of discourse is necessary for the most meaningful communication, and common experience is a necessary element. My own feeling, however, based on much reflection, is that the human situation contains a common *basic* environment, physical, social, and spiritual, that needs clarification, to be sure, and good will to erase barriers of prejudice and tradition of interpretation, but which is, nevertheless, accessible to any sincere and competent inquirer. The relative is not *basic* to the human situation, but the complicating surface condition. Truth is "organic" when it involves the relation between man's deepest needs and the environment which has produced and answers those needs, including the need reliably to know.

Professor Lane's definition of truth as "a general statement which applies to all experience within the scope of the statement," I accept as one test of truth inclusiveness—but I cannot stop with it as adequate to our complex problem of knowledge.

⁴Comment by F. Ernest Johnson

I have some difficulty with Doctor Ferré's discussion of the rational and non-rational elements of religious experience. Religion cannot, he says, be "reduced to reason," yet the confirmation of truth by reason is essential. It is an old problem and it seems to me Doctor Ferré leaves it less than clear.

Professor Ferré's reply

To me this position is a necessary transcript of our actual situation as knowers. Reason can prove something valid only in terms of something more valid. Since God is the *most* valid truth and reality that can be found, by definition, else were He not God, nothing *more* valid can logically be found to prove Him true, else were that God. Nevertheless, since God is truth, and reason is from God, that only can be right religion which squares with the truest use of reason, reason itself being constantly under the correction of Reality.

³T. S. Eliot, *The Idea of a Christian Society*, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, p. 64.

is something primitive about religion in the sense that it seeks language that speaks to the whole man. Creeds are mostly rationalization of myths. A problem arises because of the fact that reason tends to make life conform to its language, to logical abstractions, which satisfy only a part of man. Myths and creeds, on the other hand, tend to avoid the light of facts and reasoning and thus keep the whole man from being satisfied, with the demands of reason left out. Somehow the eternal in history which forms the heart of myth must be related to knowledge as a whole.

In doing this, some pose faith against reason, and some reason against faith, and both sides are that far wrong. For man to be whole, for religion and reason both to be strong, both must be satisfied according to their proper proportions. Religious thinkers can rationalize myths so as to satisfy the demands of most minds, but often also so as to destroy their primitive power. Or they can choose to cleanse myths in terms of the demands of reason as such and thus leave man in the long run with impotent philosophy. You cannot extract the heart of myth and keep it a power in history. *We must work with concrete religions.* Religious thinking to be sound must primarily be within the context of faith, yet a faith strong enough to be self-critical with regard to objective facts and reasons which check or challenge its claims. In this way the heart of religion is not hurt even though change and growth become part of its inner life.

If human hearts meet at a deep enough level, their heads will always find the thoughts and their hands the acts of cooperation. Religious thinking is involved thinking, involved with the depth-decisions of life out of which issue both our reasoning and our rationalization. The objective facts of science and the coherence of philosophy should furnish data for religious thinking which suck it into its deeper life of living commitments, or its anguished problem solving, and weave it into a living language which speaks to the whole man. Not to observe such facts and reasonings is to make religion defensive and isolated from the full life in the world. To reduce religion, on the other hand, to such facts and reasonings is to kill its reality and effectiveness, as authority and motivation.

The final confirmation of religion by thought is within the context of the whole of experience. Religious truth, by the nature of its inmost reality, is experiential. It is operational, in the full sense of the term. To reduce the efficacy of the operational method to certain areas of sense

data or formal thinking is to do violence, even if not deliberate, violence to the fuller truth of experience. All over the world educated mankind is wistfully longing to return to a faith that will give meaning and zest to life without doing violence to intellect. Spengler may be right that we shall find nothing but "a morbid inner life, bringing a touch of warmth to wizened souls." If so, the reason will be that we cannot get away from the part-experience of reason to the power and satisfaction of whole-experience, including reason. We may perish from our own peculiar kind of ortho-differentiation, the overdevelopment of the frontal lobe, to the neglect of the even fuller development of the life of the spirit.

But this need not be. The cross-fertilization of cultures and religions can lead to *the birth* of an adequate religion for one world, or to its acceptance, if now present in principle.

II

A Religion for One World Makes Cooperation Central in the Discovery of Truth

We are not thinking, of course, of some general consensus nor of some deification of the average understanding or attainment of man. Religious faith always points to the future. Truth, that can help us, draws, rather than pushes; it beckons, rather than stands where we are.

Yet religion is a personal affair. Faith arises from within, in response to a situation. A faith for the whole world must spring out of the situation of the world as it appears true to the individual believer.

No religion now is adequate for man except it exhibit, in Amos N. Wilder's terms, "responsible freedom." Responsible freedom includes free thought. Where thought is curbed, religion cannot be at its authentic best. Differing religions can find larger areas of understanding and cooperation only on the basis of truth. There must, therefore, also be freedom to differ, even on basic matters. If this is not given, faith is forced. As such it may survive and be organizationally strong, but not fully satisfactory to the groping mind. Yet freedom must ever be responsible. It must be for the common good. Religions cannot differ either on the right to differ or on their duty to find increasingly the fuller common truth. Though faith cannot be forced, it must be free only within the growing truth.

Responsible freedom involves the implementing of religion in life

Freedom for the common good is also faithfulness. Religion is not first of all thought. Nor is it first of all worship. It is first of all fellowship. It is first of all responsible living.

We cannot start with freedom, and then go on to fellowship. The community is a given fact. Man's natural bent to self perverts his community life. Individualism is an abstraction. The fact is not that the individual wants to live for himself by himself, rather he wants to live for himself by means of, and in terms of, others. We cannot choose isolation, as individuals or nations. We must, rather, choose the kind of relations which we are to have.

Naturally cooperative living will involve social, cultural, and religious pluralism. There is no way that we know that religions can come together over night. Threatening disaster may hasten the process. Yet even so, the background and traditions of the separate religions are necessary as an emotional basis, at least for a transition period.

Exchange of thought should not be forced persuasion. The method must be neither aggressive nor defensive in an insecure sense. No religion should have externals which either separate or are the occasions for superiority. Each religion must rather be a struggle with the common problems and for the common truths, and the patient and humble sharing of each other's seeing, until the truth which is adequate for one world can be established. It is hardly thinkable, and very likely not desirable, anyway, that a religion for one world should exhibit uniformity in features and approach. It very likely would be a cooperative inquiry and sharing of faith. It is to be hoped, however, that eventually a common general ground in ultimate truth, and a consequent universal ethos, can be attained.

As the world works, this is naturally an ideal picture. Much struggle will be imperialistic and of a crude nature. Externals will separate and men will identify superiority with security. Actual religions represent to a large extent cultural lags. Yet intelligent and devoted leadership, sensing a common threat and a common opportunity, can serve as bridge-heads over which pass such elements of the common truth as may erupt *in history's own way* in whatever faith is built, or comes to be built, on the fullest truth to satisfy man's deeper need.

Working together for common ends is a good prelude to a common faith. The more work for a cooperative world consciousness is done, in public opinion, in tough politics, in economic realms, in education, in

culture and travel, the more the presuppositions for a religion of one world are wrought out. Truth is both external and internal, both objective and subjective. Cooperative conditions depend upon cooperative consciousnesses. Cooperative spirits also need conditions conducive to cooperation. The part-truth perverts. *Religion should help to make mankind socially sensitive.* It should give man the vision and feeling of one world. Yet such sensitivity becomes sentimental and thwarts one world unless it issues in concrete actions that create the conditions for cooperation. Here Whitehead is right in maintaining both that religion is what an individual does with his own solitariness and that religion is world loyalty.

The point is that we cannot construct a religion for one world rationally. It must be born, not made. It will be called forth out of the womb of man's enlarged needs.^e What we can do is to help develop the needed world consciousness of responsible concern, both by including one world in worship and in thought and by working for it together, as different, concrete religions, all the while letting there be a sincere search for, and surrender to, the fuller faith as it grows into universality extensively and intensively. If this religion will not be born, or at least until it is, all religions should cooperate to prepare for and make effective a world politics, economics, and culture.

III

A Religion for One World Will Find that Cooperation Is Itself an Essential Part of the Truth that We Need

Organic needs point to the kind of universe which has produced them. Things are not true because they are desirable or because they are needed,

^eComment by Ralph T. Flewelling

I like the suggestion that cooperation is essential to the discovery of truth, though we have to work with concrete religions. The fact that faith rises in response to a situation, should give some hope of the birth of a new understanding out of a threatened world-wide catastrophe. The situation is no longer "the restoration of the kingdom to Israel," nor the restoration of the kingdom to hierarchies or dogmas, but the restoration of cooperation among men of all beliefs to the end of righteous living, world peace, and neighborhood.

Perhaps we need for this

- 1) a general recognition of the intrinsic worth of each man,
- 2) the possibility of his reception of Divine revelation,
- 3) that religion includes as its least common denominator the good life, of righteousness, justice, and love, and that the presence of these in any life or religion is an evidence of Divine inspiration and validity.

but they are desirable or needed because they are organically true. Things are not most deeply real because we crave them, but we most deeply crave them because they are real.

Needs even now witness to their environmental counterpart, to their organic origin. Humanity is inexplicable in origin, nature, and function, apart from the larger environment within which it is but a part. Man must not be split off from nature. His origin and needs tell us something truly about his being and operation. The effect hails back to the cause; the product, to the larger process out of which it springs, human purposes to the Purpose which preceded them long before they appeared in history at all. Human purposes cannot be accounted for by any purpose less than themselves. Even our intellectual need to know, for itself, and in order to do, reflects on the nature of reality.

In this world, we need to cooperate. Cooperation is thus an essential aspect of reality and of true religion. Our historic actuality becomes fashioned according to the way in which we use our freedom to cooperate with this positive aspect of reality.

But cooperation is thwarted by narrow interests, defensive suspicions, and selfish seeking. Fear, ignorance, inertia, and illwill stand in the way. What we all need is simple and straight-forward trust in the Source of the Ultimate Good for each and for all. We need to see that only such faith will transcend both inner and outer barriers to the larger concord and cooperation. Such trust involves responsibility, beginning with the fear of the consequences of evil in this kind of universe, and rising through the call of duty, until it reaches the point of gratitude for the fact that this is the kind of world where evil brings destruction and good is the prerequisite for satisfactory living together.

IV

The Basic Task of a Religion for One World Is to Make Real the Truth of the Inclusive and Cooperative Consciousness

Actually this now depends on religion as an aspect of our concrete religions. They cannot prepare for fuller unity without common world concerns, without the feeding of the hungry, the caring for the homeless, the fighting for freedom. What the religious bodies are already doing along these lines, however, is amazing and deeply encouraging.

Yet the task goes back of such concrete acts to the educational pro-

gram of each religion. In spite of our present political muddles and obstacles we must teach our children *and adults*—for this is urgent—in terms of the enlarged perspective of our one world. To think in world terms along religious lines is to think in terms of a cooperative consciousness, where individual freedom is responsible, and where community life respects individuality. The enlargement of our modes of community must not mean a return to primitivism, where the individual has little value. It must mean the growth of social sensitiveness to every individual need and minority expression. The more creative each one is, and each group, the richer is the community. Thus the teaching of world loyalty involves *the teaching of democracy* at home—in race, economics, culture, politics, and religion. Nor can such teaching be effective of the cooperative consciousness unless it is *lived*. True teaching is the creative acting out of the cooperative life.

Behind effective education lies vital religious experience. For it, there is no substitute. What is worthwhile needs to be rooted in truth. No rationalizing will do. Meaning must melt the mind, if it is to mold character. Disinterestedness chills life.[†] The warmth of religion becomes con-

[†]Comment by Henry N. Wieman

It seems to me exactly the opposite is the case. Disinterestedness does not mean lack of interest; it means exclusion of those interests that are irrelevant to the problem under consideration, as for example concern about one's personal status. If disinterested be as we have stated, it cannot chill life. Life can have integrity, self-forgetful and absorbing devotion, only when disinterested, *i.e.*, free from self-interest.

The same kind of criticism applies to many themes much more central to Doctor Ferré's basic problem, *e.g.*, the place of reason in religion. Reason, as I understand it, applies only to propositions. It is that order which statements must have in relation to one another to display the true character of propositions, to be intelligible, to escape confusion, ambiguity and contradiction, to make sense. Life is made up of events, events are never reason, although reason can be used to describe a few of the characteristics pertaining to events like breathing and so on. But breathing is not reason. I do not know of any use of "reason" which would make it include that automatic reflex called breathing. It is impossible for any man to live and not experience breathing which is outside the bounds of reason. The same with sleeping, eating, loving, hating, and so on, indefinitely. Doctor Ferré is saying. The consequence of reducing religion to reason is to force life into that small part of whole life which is reason alone, here called part life. But this is no more of a possibility (hence no more of a danger) than that men should suddenly find themselves living on the other side of the moon. Even scientific inquiry cannot be reduced to reason, because one must breathe and do all the rest. More particularly, scientific inquiry always includes two parts: reason and observation with experimentation. But observation and experimentation are concrete events, *e.g.*, moving the eyes, focusing attention. Indeed scientists never use the word proof when speaking precisely. They only say that probability is sufficient to justify affirmation.

Faith can never be identical with reason any more than breathing is. Faith always in-

structive in thought and life in so far as it is absorbed into life from the central warmth of Cosmic Concern. Hocking has well stressed the idea that righteousness must be conceived of as a cosmic demand. When the moralism of demand, however, is transcended into the free cooperation

cludes, among other things, decision. Decision is a concrete event, it is not reason. Also when one decides to commit himself to anything whatsoever that is actually going on in the world (concrete events), he is committing himself to something vastly more than reason in the sense we have already indicated. But it that to which one commits himself does not display any characteristics which reason can describe and defend as being better than any other alternative to which one might give himself in faith, the decision of faith is evil. In this evil sense faith must never go beyond philosophy or reason.

Professor Ferré's reply

I am sure that on the main line of my paper we agree thoroughly: the need for a reasonable faith that is inspired by, and results in, a concerned cooperation, uniting personal freedom with social faithfulness, and anchored in the very nature of things. Professor Wieman objects to my saying that an adequate religion must abandon scientific disinterestedness and be fired by faith, if it is to have working power.

The issue goes profoundly into modern thought and culture, yes, into the spiritual depths of decision. Disinterestedness has been used by our scientific era in connection with external evidence deciding the issue, without the need for personal commitment or emotional involvement. We have extolled "the cool light of reason." Professor Wieman has himself written that "accurate thinking demands *cold*, abstract terms." Religious thinking, however, is by the whole man and involves organically the full and right use of the emotions. Any thinking where the reason can be *cool* is simply not religious. Religion is man's response to his inevitable involvement in the universe and includes man's whole being. Thinking can be cool legitimately only in the factual realm where no personal vital interest and involvement are at stake. Man is irretrievably and existentially involved with all his religious thinking. He can never be objective in the sense that he transcends the situation. In the realm of science he can gain such objectivity, he can be thus "disinterested." But in religion man cannot basically say, "I am disinterested," meaning that he has no stake in the outcome, that no personal, and even passionate, self-interest is involved. Such self-interest is as deep as life itself. In science man can act as a *referee* over objective experiments in which he is free from self-interest, but in religion man is under the constant pressure of decision. He is not basically the judge, but rather he is being judged. As a matter of fact, what is being judged is the nature of his *self-interest*.¹ That can be broken through, redirected, but never, while life is vital, basically abandoned.

There is no question that we should use reason as fully and critically, yes, and as creatively as possible. There is no question that we are not allowed to take any shortcuts to religious knowledge. Emphatically, however, we have no right to evade the basic metaphysical issues which underlie our presuppositions.

Faith is not optional, it is not hortatory. Faith is unavoidable, a faith that makes decisions beyond what can be fully proved from within our perspective of process. Every normal human being is actually making such faith judgments every time that he makes a basic decision concerning truth and value. The deepest set or direction of his life which is constantly with him, is a depth decision, a faith judgment which is primary beyond any full rational verification. The only question is whether this primary faith judgment is as intellectually adequate as possible while also adequate for the whole of life and to the full knowledge situation which man confronts.

of fellowship, life's authority and motivation are quickened accordingly into fear freed effectiveness

It is hard to tell what will happen to our actual religions. One world will, of course, put a premium on universality. The cross-fertilization of cultures in intensive intimacy will enrich and enlarge any religion that is creative and vital. A world fired by the passion for truth will melt down innumerable idols, myths, superstitions, magical elements, within the fierce heat of the crematory ovens of scientific knowledge. Unless our civilization itself perish by its own hands, many traditional theologies will also be melted down by our passions for knowledge. Some fear that this means necessarily that life will become devoid of deeper meanings and wither, seared, if not burned up, by that heat.

Out of the ashes of past religions, however, may arise the truth that cannot be destroyed. Out of an age of transition like this can come at least a new synthesis of faith and reason, deep enough to command life as a whole and intelligent enough to compel the mind. Several religions may converge creatively along the lines of our world needs. Or one religion may stand out as having anticipated, by its inherent universality, the oneness of the world. Civilization will be creatively harmonious, in any case, only when it participates in both faith and thought in the unity demanded by the universe.⁶ Judging from the past, we have faith that

¶Comment by Swami Akhilananda

Professor Ferré is advocating that religion can alone establish one world. We agree with him that basic understanding of oneness of existence and life can alone establish one world. We would like to comment lest there be some misunderstanding that we are advocating uniformity of religious conception and methods. Professor Ferré is also explicit that he is not advocating that uniformity. What we suggest is that diversity will always remain in the methods of attainment of that oneness of Reality, as there is diversity in the very human constitution. Mistakes are often created by many outstanding thinkers in their appreciation and devotion for their own method by forcing that method on all persons. This attitude has always created conflict, tension, and destruction in the name of religion.

Professor Ferré's reply

Religious truth is anchored in the absolute, but can be apprehended and expressed only in relative terms. There is no one exhaustive method to religious reality. "The ways of God are as many as the souls of men." This does not mean, however, that no absolute has entered history, nor that it cannot be known, but rather that all such incarnation and knowledge must take on the relativities of all historic occurrence. Nor can it mean that all methods, being relative, must be *equally* true, for that would effectively abolish the concept of truth as real and efficacious. The *trick* of truth is to see in the truest possible perspective the relation between the absolute and the relative, as aspects of historic occurrence.

such a religion, or such a common aspect of all religions, will develop out of our needs. Most likely it will come in ways that we cannot see. However much we think that we can see the absolute, we cannot see it absolutely. History never stands still. We can all, at least, cooperate in creating the conditions necessary for its right arrival by a common concern for the truth, cooperatively sought, and by finding cooperation both a way to and an essential aspect of reality.¹

The world consists of innumerable small things and small people, like ourselves. Our task is to convert our own corner to a world consciousness, in concerned help and imaginative vision. Even "one world" is a world of countless individuals. Religions must stretch out to world methods of cooperation, but their first and foremost function is ever the enlightening and motivation of the individual. Thus alone can we effect responsible freedom and faithful fellowship. When terms like these melt the mind by their meaning for the whole man, abstract thought will have begun to find the fuller truth of far deeper man.

A religion for one world must teach trust—in thought, life, and community—in the spiritual Source creative of cooperation. The world is no larger than its gods. Only when God, however, is larger than the world, is there help beyond present attainment for our hopes for a better world.²

¹Comment by F. Ernest Johnson

When a distinguished theologian, unfrightened by the idea of religious syncretism, seeks a basis for a world religion, the effort is noteworthy. Doctor Ferré holds that religious systems are historical concretions in experienced reality. This makes him hospitable to "religious pluralism", also to "cooperative inquiry and sharing of faith," since cooperation is an "essential aspect of reality." But this developmental approach is maintained in a framework of philosophic idealism and in a way that allows for the possibility that "one religion may stand out as having anticipated, by its inherent universality, the oneness of the world." It is a very stimulating argument.

²Comment by Swami Akhilananda

A religion for one world must not only teach us what Professor Ferré gives us in his concluding paragraph, but it must produce a dynamic personality. Our suggestion is that one world cannot be attained until and unless men and women of different groups sincerely struggle to integrate their lives, basing them on supreme values—namely, attainment of God or the Ultimate Reality. It is not merely concern for one world nor mere conceptual knowledge of it that will do the job. The dynamics of religion should transform men and women, and these transformed personalities can alone disseminate the same dynamics to others.

Professor Ferré's reply

Naturally I want to stress that religion will never be adequate until it is recognized and accepted as a personal relation, *the* primary personal relation for every individual. World religion can never come except through the vision, faith, and dynamics of personal religion.

A religion for one world will rise out of the personal and social concern for the needs of a new world. Vital religion transcends human life but includes all of it in freedom and faithfulness within the common life. Creative civilization depends on creative souls. Our predicament is that we are confused and nearly baffled as to how to go about "regaining the use of a spiritual faculty which we have been doing our worst to sear and sterilize"⁴ Creative concern for the common good, *raised to its ultimate dimension*, is the womb of the creative spirit. The answer to our problem lies thus in cooperation with regard to both cosmos and conduct.¹

⁴Toynbee, *op cit*, V, p. 459

¹Comment by Edgar S. Brightman

The insistence on the impossibility of abolishing religion and on the need of a world faith is sound. But the demand that religion for one world be based on truth presupposes too much. We can no more abolish difference of opinion about what truth is than we can abolish religion itself, and Professor Ferré's seeming refusal to prove religion in terms of reason will awaken sharp differences already, although most would agree that philosophy cannot become a substitute for religion. There is, however, vacillation in the idea that truth is self-evident, yet must be confirmed by reason. Reason here seems purely ornamental.

Ferré is right that we should not wait for some "general consensus", that we need whole experience, and that cooperation must be central. He is even more sensible when he insists on religious pluralism, but he might have pointed out more explicitly that a truly cooperative religion rests on respect for differences.

With the last part of the paper I can express only the fullest agreement.

Professor Ferré's reply

Naturally I do not mean that we shall wait for truth to be universally accepted and appropriated, but rather that we must have real confidence in truth as the bottom basis of true religion. Particularly is this true with regard to the truth of cooperation as the cosmic basis of religion. Faith in the reality and power of cooperation does not discredit reason, but reason is made a part of Reality, and a way to it, rather than the whole of it and the final judge of it. Only by disowning resolutely our pride of reason shall we be able to find Reality, as creative and cooperative concern, and be able to live humbly and creatively with one another, respecting our constructive differences and correcting our limiting, and strife provoking differences.

Comment by Edgar S. Brightman

Everyone would agree, I am sure, that reason is not the whole of reality, this is no special contribution of faith. But almost every philosopher would insist that reason is the final judge of reality. Whatever man says about the world or about God, man says either reasonably or not reasonably, and only what he says reasonably may rightly be deemed to be true. It is hard to see why preference for reason encourages pride. Pride of opinion is very different from loyalty to reason. Loyalty to reason is humble, generous, and social.

Professor Ferré's reply:

Doctor Brightman is disturbed because I refuse to make man's reason the final judge of all reality. He knows very well, however, that I believe in using reason to the limit,

formally speaking. We ought to use it as critically and as creatively as we can. But we cannot legitimately go beyond what the facts warrant. For reason has to have concrete content. The content, moreover, cannot be its own self as form.

The present state of the world does not smoothly guarantee that the reasonable is the true. The coherent interpretation of this actual world shows that the reasonable can be true only in so far as our process is part of a larger Purpose which is being worked out. Those awake to the threatening debacles of freedom, and to the fears and confusion, plus the depths of sin, in this actual world, surely have to appeal to faith as the only legitimate accompaniment of the best grounds for hope. Any adequate religious judgment as to the ultimate nature of things has honestly to humble itself by admitting that it is only partially confirmed by reason, and that its most important claim, namely, that there is a Power and Concern available to change this world in saving directions, is the most open to candid doubt. In fact, part of this claim depends upon the experience and the vision of the knower.

Reality is not smoothly reasonable as *actuality*, at least, that is, as the historic content of process open to our inspection. Reality is, rather, dynamic and contains the irrationalities of sin, ignorance, and, above all, of that part of process which contains the discontinuities of decision, characteristic of freedom. Thus our genuine history cannot be known through any smooth objectivity in terms of the continuities of coherence, but only through that dynamic existential whole thinking which includes all elements of reason which are open to its specific choices in any particular knowledge situation.

I only wish that I could believe that the knowledge situation was as simple and clear as Professor Brightman holds it to be. With his desire that reason be used by goodwill I agree, and that, in fact, is the heart and center of my Conference paper. That goodwill is inherent to reason is a value judgment, definitionally justified in the realm of essence, but only partially verifiable in the realm of existence.

Comment by Edgar S. Brightman

In reading Doctor Ferré's rejoinder to my reply, I suddenly perceive what ought to have been evident long ago. When he talks about reason he is plainly talking about something very different from what I mean by that word.

Reason, he says, has to have concrete content. Yes, I add, and the content is essential to the reason. But Doctor Ferré says, somewhat darkly, that "the content cannot be its own self as form." I take this to mean that concrete reason and abstract reason are not the same thing. But it is clear from later statements that when Dr. Ferré speaks of reason he means always and exclusively abstract reason, the reason of pure logical necessity, the reason of formal logic and mathematics. To me, this sort of reason is on a relatively low plane of thought as compared with concrete reason, which is the consistent, systematic, inclusive, and experimental judgment on experience.

If this interpretation be correct I can see why Doctor Ferré thinks that the reason works "smoothly," why he thinks he goes beyond reason when he speaks of the relations of reason to a "larger purpose," and why he dwells on the fact the faith is only partially confirmed by reason. It is true that abstract reason is "smooth," lacks interest in a larger purpose, and falls far short of confirming faith. But concrete reason is rough and "tough-minded," is by its very nature in appeal to all the facts and specifically to "larger purpose" so far as such can be discerned, and is admittedly incomplete in its demonstrations. Concrete reason is obligated to take into account the "irrationalities" of sin, ignorance, and free decision, on which Doctor Ferré lays so much stress. In my own case, it goes even further and includes the non-rational element of The Given in God.

I therefore object to Doctor Ferré's idea that he goes beyond reason when he uses

concrete reason I object to calling concrete reason "smooth" I fail to see how with his right hand he can reject the "continuities of coherence," and with his left hand grasp "existential whole thinking" which, if it means anything, means coherence, for "the true is the whole," as Hegel has so well said

In thinking my view to be simple and clear, Doctor Ferré may well be ascribing to me an abstract and purely deductive view of reason and coherence against which I have been contending for the past thirty years or more. I agree that what he calls reason is inadequate, but I insist that what he thinks is adequate, really is concrete reason.

CHAPTER XLV

Human Nature and the Quest for Peace

By BEN ZION BOKSER

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BEHAVIOR IS, in some respects, an outgrowth of nature; and to comprehend the reactions of any creature in the world, it is necessary to refer to the properties inherent in its being. Man's behavior cannot be understood without reference to his ultimate essence as a person. Seeking a clue to the ways in which man acts, we must always go back to some conception of human nature.

Is There Any Hope for Man?

What is man that he behaves as he does in the world? We are especially concerned with his tendency to wage war. Wisdom he has, and he can probe into the mysteries of the universe to master her secrets. Skills he has; and he can contrive the machines which help him harness the elements. He has even wrested the secret of the atom and won a source of power, vast and staggering to the imagination. Despite all his advantages, however, human life is in constant peril. Repeatedly man has loosed against himself the violence of war which has made a mockery of all that he knows and all that he has.

Given a new war, waged with atomic weapons, what is likely to be left of us and of our civilization? Yet, as we watch the widening gulf between nations and between social systems in our day, such a new war faces us as a grave possibility. What is responsible for this folly of man? And is there any hope that he will ever be cured of it?

The Uniqueness of the Individual

The most significant fact about man's nature is that he is a unique individual. The Creator Who formed man performed the great wonder

of pouring into each person differentiated capacities and talents. The individuals who live in this world, though they have much in common, remain unique centers of being, unique perspectives from which to see the universe. This is perhaps the only element of equality among human beings. As the Talmud observed: "A man strikes many coins from one die and they are all alike. The Holy One, blessed be He, however, strikes every person from the die of the first man, but no one resembles another."¹

Human differentiation is reinforced by environmental factors. The emergent pattern of personality reflects the contributions of both the endowments of nature and the pressures of environment. And as men finally develop, they face one another, in some respects as total strangers, who for all the ties that bind them together, must nevertheless remain alien to one another.

The Sources of Tension

The uniqueness of the human individual is a source of the tension and conflict in the world, for it tends to particularize the individual into a kind of private world, where his experiences may touch upon the experiences of others, but can never be fully shared by them. The encounter between different individuals necessarily produces tension. The tension may be mild or violent, depending on the temperaments of the individuals involved, and upon the issues at stake. But in some form tension is the inescapable law of all human relationships.

Tension is Universal

This tension operates on all levels of life, and in most cases it works its way out without violence. Most human fellowships have achieved stability, despite the divergent pressures from their constituent membership. The family is not the only community where people have learned to make up after they quarrel. Indeed, the ties that link them into a unity become deepened after each successful resolution of controversy. As the tree becomes toughened with each storm it withstands, so does every society. But the calm which follows the storm is always a temporary calm. Indeed, the very covenants by which men resolve their conflicts, become

¹*Sanhedrin*, 38a

the subjects of new disagreements. When Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall disagree at Moscow on what was agreed upon at Potsdam, there is the possibility that they are both sincere. Their disagreement may flow from their differentiated perspectives in viewing the facts.

The uniqueness of individuals carries over to the groups they fashion. Families, fraternal groups, trade unions, learned societies, cities, nations—all reflect the qualities of the people that form them. And despite all that they may have in common, they will in a multitude of subtle ways represent what is shared by no one else. And out of these divergencies will flow misunderstandings, conflicts of interests, and judgment. They will each assert their particular point of view with the forcefulness of persuasion, deliberation, and argument, appeals to the mind and the heart. When these fail, they may even seek to employ coercion.

Tension as the Dynamism of Progress

The tension of individuals and groups is, despite all the disadvantages which flow from it, one of the principal assets of human life, for it is the dynamism by which man rises toward an ever greater perfection. Life, in its most universal being, is like that ball of light which is refracted into many varied colors, they are all different and they are all true. Each is a thread in the pattern of the whole. It is only blindness which begets the illusion that differences mean incompatibility.

The fact that differentiated lives face each other with aggressiveness is a guarantee that the riches of individuality shall not be lost. Aggressiveness is the necessary pressure which a particular person or society requires to assert itself in the face of the large assemblage of mankind that might otherwise drown out its voice. When it overreaches itself it will evoke a corresponding reaction in others. This action and reaction constitute the recurring stimulation which makes for continuous creation in life. As Rabbi Obadiah Seforno observed, God separated mankind into distinct nations following the effort to build a tower reaching the heavens, as a means of curing men of their primitivism. The play of differentiated group experiences was to stimulate their growth toward the vision of a universal God.²

²*Commentary, Genesis, II 6*

The Human Problem

The human problem then is not that there are disagreements in the world, and they who direct their efforts to the total elimination of tension are engaged in a futile enterprise. Nor would the realization of this dream be a boon to human life, for it would destroy the dialectic which keeps life aglow with vitality and creativeness. The assertion of each individual self with all its concomitant aggressiveness, has every appearance of evil. But it is of such evil that God builds the kingdom of the good. A Rabbinic parable tells the story that the *Yezer ha-Ra*, the evil spirit, was once imprisoned in order to liberate life from its thralldom. But in place of liberation there came inertness, and all the creative forces in human life came to a complete standstill. The *Yezer ha-Ra* was released so that life might go on.¹

The problem is that so many tensions explode into violence. How can we, while respecting individuality, secure a transfer in the expression of antagonisms from violent to peaceful forms?

The problem meets us especially at the frontier of the national community. Not all subordinate communities have learned the secret of peaceful release to conflict. Witness mob violence and race riots, industrial clashes, and family break ups. Nevertheless, as we reach the national community the threat is much graver. The danger of international war has become the danger of collective human annihilation.

The Lesson of Humility

The transfer in the expression of human tension from violent to peaceful forms is achieved through a growing humility which teaches a man the wisdom of knowing his true place in creation. Every ray of color refracted from its central source represents both the presence and the absence of some unique elements of light. Each ray must amplify itself by the other colors in the spectrum to achieve its wholeness. Refraction only aids us in experiencing the depths of light's reality, which we miss in surface vision. And the uniquenesses of personality are, similarly, distinctive aspects of a totality in which all are included. In a universe wrought by one universal God, all particularities must necessarily harmonize in a comprehensive wholeness.

¹*Yoma*, 69b

It is only blindness that begets the illusion in particular individuals that they are not a part, but the whole. Thus they seek to absolutize themselves. They see no mandate to respect another life form, no less sacred than their own, and they surely see no reason to regard another life form as a means of their own amplification and growth. Out of that blindness flows the pride of fanaticism and imperialism.^a

We do not deny that there is an infinitely wide gulf between truth and error, and that some doctrines must be combated as false. But the essence of falsehood is that very blindness and pride which exaggerates something authentic in experience and attempts to carry it beyond its legitimate scope. It is the old sin of idolatry, which raises a man or any other particularity of existence to the level of God.

Since God has created a plurality of persons, with distinctive individual selves, each capable of unique experiences, it is for us to allow for a plurality of life forms. Why can we not permit a pluralism of economic systems to function, without threats of mutual extirpation? The threat of war in our day has become menacingly great because some men can see only an economy of so called "free enterprise", a collectivist economy suits their ire, and they are ready to battle for its extermination. On the other side, the collectivists see only their doctrine as true, and if they could, would not hesitate to impose their way on the rest of the world. Much of today's tension between the East and the West is compounded of this pride and blindness, which has its practitioners on both sides of the fence. Economic pluralism, as every other form of pluralism, is bound to engender tension, for neither system can operate in isolation from the other. But given peaceful expressions to this tension, there would be a mutual stimulation and growth, which would make for the continued perfection of each. The road to progress, on all levels of life, is in the open encounter of free individuals and free societies; it is in the free market of ideas.

^aComment by Ralph T. Flewelling

I find myself in hearty accord throughout this paper. If Judaism and Christianity lived up to their professed principles, the problems that vex us would be solved. Perhaps the condition we face has been due to an overemphasis of our peculiarities as a means of salvation rather than to a recognition of what we have in common and its superiority to all forms, rituals, and doctrines.

Dawn Is Made Amid the Darkness

Is there any hope that men will learn humility? A Rabbinic parable, speculating on God's occupation after the work of creation, suggests that He is presently engaged in matching couples, decreeing who should be married to whom. Jewish teachers accepted this as a worthy enough enterprise for God, and one sufficiently difficult to merit His own solicitude. Rabbi Judah Loew of Prague suggests, however, the deeper insight that God's activity consists in the general process of harmonization, of overcoming the exaggerations of blind individualism, of forging unities among diverse and seemingly incompatible realms of being.⁴ Like the dawn which is being made while darkness still reigns, peace is being born even while strife's thunder is heard in the land.

Thus We Are Being Healed

The medicine by which we are being healed works subtly. It consists of an idea, which is reinforced by experience. Principally through Israel's prophets God has revealed the vision of Himself as the universal Creator and Redeemer, Who cares about all His creatures, with man as the center of His solicitude. Implied in this vision is the moral imperative to fashion the kind of world order which will give a maximum play to each individual, in accordance with the unique facts of his being. This idea is reinforced by peaceful human relationships. Every democratic society, from the family to the nation, illustrates life's enhancement. And each such society is a challenge calling for the enlargement of freedom and peace, which must finally include the entire family of the world's national communities.

Experience reinforces this idea on another level, too, for a coercive society cannot long maintain itself. The aggressiveness by which individuality is ultimately safeguarded, will assert itself in the victims of coercion, and they will rebel against their fate. In the ensuing explosion those who wield power become finally involved, even as are their victims, and the vision of man's sanctity as a child of God becomes vindicated through the tragic consequences which follow its denial. The frightening prospect of an atomic war thunders, to men who might

⁴*Beer ha-Goleh*, pp. 79-81.

otherwise not listen, its mighty warning that men had better act as brothers.

Ideas Are Seeds

Men learn slowly Ideas are like seeds cast into the ground, it takes time for them to germinate and to yield their precious harvest And man, endowed with free will, must make his own decisions In our own day we have witnessed the great idea which holds the promise of man's ultimate liberation rejected in favor of various competing ideas The blindness of human pride is amply represented by the current ideologies in which value is centered in some parochial community, the race, the particular nation, or the particular social class Some have even asserted that man is the measure of all things, and that values are subject to the prevailing tastes of individuals But as events unfold they reveal the final quality of the ideas which inspire them, and man will in time pluck out the weeds in the garden of life, in favor of the health bearing seed which grows among them.

The creation of peace and freedom involves the surrender on the part of certain people of inequitable wealth or power, and they are diffident in making what they believe to be a sacrifice Possibly the Dutch sympathize with the feelings of the Indonesians, but if eliminating the gains of colonial exploitation would seriously impoverish Dutch economy, there is the tendency to resist the pressure for a proper revision in the relations of the two nations Occasionally we may be deluded by a temporary advantage in power so that, in considering the threat of war, we feel confident of victory But history has its own dynamism, we know only where events start, not where they will take us The way of coercion has invariably spelled tragedy Moreover, the destruction of any life, including the life of the antagonist, is a permanent loss to all mankind

Will we learn this lesson, and will we learn it ere it is too late? Or will our generation have to taste again of the cup of bitterness in new war? Some children must burn themselves repeatedly before they learn to be careful with fire God, in the metaphor of Jeremiah,⁵ is the great Potter, Who discards every imperfect vessel wrought, that out of the same clay

⁵Jeremiah, xviii 1-6.

He may build anew toward a greater perfection. If we are found wanting, God will seek out a worthier generation of men through whom to achieve His purposes. But the opportunity is ours. We are summoned to organize life equitably, to give every unique individual and group its proper place within a universal community of life.

As Arnold Toynbee has generalized from his own study of history: "The shuttle which shoots backwards and forwards across the loom of time in a perpetual to and fro is all this time bringing into existence a tapestry in which there is manifestly a developing design and not simply an endless repetition of this same pattern. This is a message of encouragement for us children of the Western civilization as we drift today alone, with none but stricken civilizations around us. The divine spark of creative power is still alive in us, and, if we have the grace to kindle it into flame, then the stars in their courses cannot defeat our efforts to attain the goals of human endeavor."⁶

⁶Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, abridged edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 1947, pp. 253f.

CHAPTER XLVI

Religious Culture and Integration

By SWAMI AKHILANANDA

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THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD is full of individual and collective tension, every thinking man cannot help but be serious about the situation. Naturally we ask ourselves if our own particular discipline can be of any use for the removal of the conflict, confusion, and tension.

It may seem that the claim of religious culture for the removal of disturbances is contradictory to the existing conditions of religious groups. Though it is claimed that religion is the most cohesive element for the integration of different individuals, yet in the name of religion there have been considerable bloodshed and war. Therefore, many scientific and rationalistic thinkers have come to the conclusion that it is a hopeless task for religious people to establish harmony in this world. Many of them are antagonistic to religion, they think that it not only exploits people but also creates ignorance and superstition. Many modern psychologists and others seem to believe that religious ideals are creating tension in the mind by repression and conflict. They often advocate that social sciences of various types should step in to remove the problems of society. Some feel that the physical sciences have advanced far beyond the social sciences, and they want to develop the social sciences in order to find the solution for tension. So we have to clarify what we mean by religious culture and how it can effect social stability and harmonious interpersonal relationships.

Mere observance of rituals, ceremonies, creeds, doctrines, and following of traditions do not constitute religious culture. From the Vedantic (Hindu) point of view, religious culture must bring out the best in man. Swami Vivekananda—"paragon of Vedantists," according to William James—declares that religion is the manifestation of the divinity that is

already in man. He also tells us that the primary objective of religion is the conquest of the lower empirical self and the manifestation of the higher divine Self. This does not mean that we do not see the importance of rituals and ceremonies, what we do mean is that they have only secondary value in helping one to achieve the goal of religion. As such, they have a definite place in religious culture.

We are firmly convinced that religious culture can integrate the individual and, consequently, society. Religion, in the first place, emphasizes the manifestation of divinity as the supreme objective of life and, in the second place, it helps a man to reach that goal by subordinating all other activities to the ideal. It is often argued that religion, especially the mystical type, is "world and life negation" (Albert Schweitzer). Mr. Schweitzer and other such thinkers seem to think that believers in Oriental religions like Hinduism, and even Christ Himself, advocated "world and life negation," in order to achieve the supreme goal of life—eternal happiness. A critical scrutiny will reveal that these charges are unfounded. On the contrary, religion gives us a proper understanding of many activities and aspirations of human life. This may be seen from the Vedantic conception of the four objectives of life. They are (1) achievement of eternal bliss, (2) following of moral codes, (3) pursuit of happiness in the world, and (4) proper training and discipline for such pursuit. The supreme goal of life, namely, abiding bliss or the manifestation of the divine Self or eternal life, is regarded by religion as the primary objective. Following of moral codes, the pursuit of happiness, and proper training and discipline for the attainment of happiness in the world, are considered secondary. So we find that religious culture provides guidance, so that one can gradually reach the supreme objective of life. Thus religion gives all life a purpose.

When a man forgets that the ultimate goal of life is the manifestation of the higher Self through conquest of the lower propensities, often known as "natural tendencies," he then becomes egocentric and selfish. The egocentric attitude is bound to create conflict in interpersonal relationships. This very attitude also generates the spirit of competition and rivalry. Some thinkers seem to feel that selfishness and competition are the basis of growth and achievement. It seems to us, however, that they ignore the evidence of history. We have all had the experience that moments spent for the good and happiness of others were the happiest moments of our lives. The greatest builders of civilization have been the

most noble persons Jesus, Krishna, Buddha, and other great personalities were at the crest of different cultural waves and they inspired civilizations and removed tensions because of their utter unselfishness. The secret of such personalities is that they completely conquered the lower self and manifested what the Hindu teachings of the Vedanta call the higher Self or divine Self.

Individual tension created by apprehension, anxiety, and frustration is the direct result of the egocentric attitude and competitive spirit of life. Mental conflicts cannot be overcome unless an individual is thoroughly established in the higher spirit of religion. Many attempts are being made by different schools of psychology and psychiatry through "psychoanalysis," "self-analysis," and "insight." These are, no doubt, noble attempts; yet we suggest that, in spite of amelioration of some tensions, these methods cannot remove tension altogether without deeper understanding of the ideal of human life. Although abnormal religious attitudes often cause conflicts, it is a mistake to think that religion necessarily creates disturbances. As long as man remains egocentric in his pursuit of pleasure and achievement on this plane of existence, he will seek the greatest pleasure for himself regardless of others, however the social sciences may like to advocate the necessity for the improvement of the social instincts in man. We suggest that social improvement can be achieved only when man tries to manifest his "divine" Self and finds expression of it in all. This conception may be put by different religious groups in different ways, such as "children of God," "expression of God," or "manifestation of God." Unless men accept this fundamental religious philosophy of life, there is no possibility of satisfactory and harmonious living or attainment of happiness.

Merely scholarship of the intellectual type, as it is commonly known, cannot remove inner tension unless scholarship is backed by emotional integration. Unfortunately, the modern educational system does not furnish the methods for emotional integration. The great scholars of today do not yet seem to realize fully that the scholarship which is merely intellectual becomes a tool in the hands of interested parties. The lesson of the atomic bomb has not been learned. Even though we may hate to admit that intellectual and esthetic ideals can be used by people enamored of physical and material success, yet contemporary history proves that this happens unless scholarship is thoroughly supported by emotional and religious integration. We admit that intellectual culture has the pos-

sibility of removing prejudices and consequent interracial and inter-group tension. Yet mere scholarship or intellectual achievement does not seem to penetrate the emotional reactions of individuals. Social sciences based on hedonism, however well meaning they may be, can hardly touch the core of the problem. We suggest that the pursuit of social sciences and intellectual scholarship should be inspired by the supreme objective of life, as already described. The modern educational system should take into consideration that basic religious ideals are to be inculcated in young scholars so that they will work for the pursuit of happiness as a means to the manifestation of the higher or divine Self in man. They will then find the real basis for social welfare. Social sciences also will furnish a strong background for the removal of tension. Psychologists and psychiatrists can then find a basis for the removal of inner conflict and frustration. Sociologists and anthropologists may find a common aim for their social cooperation and coordination in understanding the different members of society as "children of God," or manifestations of the higher Self, on different levels of development.

Karma Yoga (work in the spirit of service and consecration, as advocated by Sri Krishna in the *Gita* and by Swami Vivekananda), if applied in interpersonal and international affairs, can remove tension from human society. The spirit of *Karma Yoga* means that we are to feel the presence of the higher Self in all and then work for the good and happiness of all. This is in harmony with the spirit of "love thy neighbor as thyself." We propose that one can hardly expect to love his neighbor unless he loves God. That is to say, from the rational point of view, that when one tries to understand and realize the higher Self and feel the divine presence, then one can serve his neighbor and have the spirit of cooperation. Interpersonal and international relationships can be stabilized and harmonized only when individuals work for the pursuit of happiness in the spirit of consecration, with a view to the attainment of the supreme objective, namely, realization of the higher Self or eternal life.

We make bold to say that interpersonal or international tension can be solved alone by integration of the individual. We do not minimize the importance of social welfare work, but this in itself will not solve the problem unless the activities are conducted with the spirit of consecration based on a changed philosophy of life. We have seen time and again that many well meaning persons start social welfare work of various kinds

and then lose the spirit of "love thy neighbor" because they forget the importance of "love thy God." So we feel that individuals must be stabilized and integrated emotionally in order to carry on the work of cooperation.

CHAPTER XLVII

Causation and Conscience

By BUELL G. GALLAGHER

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THIS PAPER TAKES its stand in the twilight zone between several disciplines, and attempts to speak to each out of the findings of the others. It addresses theology from the standpoint of the social sciences, speaks to the social sciences in terms of social philosophy, and suggests that the truths needed to relieve present world tensions will be the more readily discovered if all three listen to each other.

The writer realizes that the subject is far too ambitious for a short paper, and he therefore will use summary statements and generalizations which will appear quite dogmatic to some readers, while others will regard the paper as inconclusive. Not a few readers will consider the effort as presumptuous or as ludicrous. This pair of possibilities grows out of the fact that the paper is concerned with one of the oldest, probably the dumbest and certainly the most thoroughly aired of all controversies in theology, philosophy, and natural and social science—the controversy over Freedom and Determinism. Any man who presumes to shed light on this ancient question does so at his own peril.

Nevertheless, the attempt must be made. As I hope to show later, certain basic errors of thought and action which stem directly from unsatisfactory resolutions of the antinomy of Freedom and Determinism are the stuff out of which the most volatile and dynamic tensions of the present world have been constructed.

It is my purpose (1) to indicate the manner in which a basic component of the tensions now threatening the world is a false line of thinking which imprisons much (if not most) of current political, economic, and cultural life, (2) to suggest a line of thinking which does not repeat the ancient errors, and (3) to suggest what might become possible in the

resolution of international tensions if the basic antimony between Freedom and Determinism no longer tyrannized over thinking and vitiated action. For purposes of economy of statement, I shall consider the second of these objectives first, discussing the first and third together in the second section of the paper.

What our generation needs—and what it has got to have without delay if it is to win survival—is clear and unequivocal guidance in the making of moral decisions. The present essay is an attempt to clear away some of the undergrowth of many centuries of inconclusive debate, so that we may get on with the job before it is too late.

I

Freedom and Determinism

The Position Stated

It is customary in most theological circles, in many philosophical circles, and in the majority of circles where social scientists gather, to regard Freedom and Determinism as contradictory opposites. It is the thesis of this paper that the two are not contradictory opposites, but rather are essentially symbiotic, coefficients of each other, mutually essential, absolutely interdependent.

In studying this question, I have personally derived more help from a contemporary sociologist than from any other source. And while I am not now suggesting that theologians and philosophers must turn to social scientists today in the same manner that their predecessors in the nineteenth century looked to the natural scientists, neither ought they to reject a notion merely because it originates with a social scientist rather than a Biblical scholar. (I would similarly suggest that social scientists may well refuse to follow a quondam stereotype which plugs the ears of some to the voices of theology and philosophy.) My indebtedness is principally to Professor MacIver, and particularly to his notions set forth in *Social Causation*. I am also aware of important facets of thinking which I have assimilated from Professor Northrop, whose persuasive writing in *The Meeting of East and West* has been of principal value in stimulating my negative reactions to his treatment of the problem of Freedom and Determinism. For the record, I wish to make clear that I am not subscribing to all notions of social thinkers. Specifically, I dis-

sociate myself from the conceptions of Freedom and Determinism elaborated in the writings of Vilfredo Pareto, Herbert Spencer, Karl Marx, Oswald Spengler, and Pitirim Sorokin

What I have to say in stating my position is put into ten theses, with brief comment and illustrative materials on each

1. It is improper to speak of the world of physical things using the words "free" and "unfree"

The natural sciences may (if quotation marks are used) speak of "laws" which all things "obey" But these laws are not in any sense coercive or restraining edicts which compel things to violate their proper natures or inclinations These "laws" are not imposed on things They do not restrain the nature of things and make them any less "free" They merely describe the nature of things as we observe them

To cite a common error of speech which glosses over a dangerous lapse in thinking: we often use the expression, "free as the wind" But the wind is neither free nor unfree The wind does not blow where it listeth, for the very good reason that the wind does not list There is no conscious choice of alternatives, no conscious purpose or preference, in the whole of the non-organic world Neither is choice a factor in the organic world below the level of consciousness

- 2 On the other hand, "free" and "unfree" are terms which do have meaning when used with reference to the conscious life

We are constantly meeting refusals and permissions in life We are permitted to stay up until nine o'clock on reaching our eighth birthday, or we are refused permission to travel in the occupied zones of Germany without proper credentials While a stone does not pine away and grow wan and pale because another stone does not roll its way, a boy or a girl will give all the manifestations of frustration and perplexity when rebuffed by the desired companion In human experience, we know the meaning of "free" and "unfree" as data of our own lives.

And precisely in the same sense these words apply to human life in relation to the conditions under which it exists. If human life is lived within a closed causal system which permits no election between alternatives, then humanity is unfree But if men actually do choose, the concept of freedom has meaning What that freedom may or may not be—whether illusory or actual, and if actual, what its characteristics are—is a matter we come to shortly All I am now saying is that the only proper

use of the words "free" and "unfree" is with reference to the decisions of conscious human beings.

- 3 From these first two theses, it follows that we can understand the area of human consciousness, particularly the matter of moral freedom, not by analogy to the physical world but by analysis of the social.

This is one of the points at which many thinkers, not only theologians, but social philosophers and social scientists as well, have gone astray. For example, both the dialectical materialism of Karl Marx and the working philosophy of our contemporary school of "Welfare Economics" (the latest masquerade of *laissez-faire*) work principally from analogy to biological and physical science in constructing their respective notions of determinism. Since the social sphere, human life, has in it the element of human choice, this makes invalid any description of social causation based on analogy to a sphere in which consciousness is not present. We here anticipate the next thesis.

- 4 Human freedom of choice appears to be a datum of experience.

Human beings are constantly making choices, buying new hats or automobiles according to the latest styles and readiest purchasing power. They are choosing in the realm of ideas as well. Men make choices as though they were free in the choosing, and the fact that they act thus becomes a part of the choice itself.

In this thesis, we are not asserting the truth or falsity of the apparent datum, we merely state that freedom of choice appears to be a part of human experience.

Let the extreme case prove the point. Karl Marx elaborated the idea of dialectical materialism, according to which all choices of men are determined by the prevailing mode of production. According to his theory, ideas play no important part in social change—with one exception. When an idea is radical enough, it takes hold of the proletariat and thus operates through them as one of the materialistic forces determining the course of history. This *idea* of Marx's given sufficient credence, chosen as an article of faith by the Bolshevik movement, and thoroughly organized in a tight knit and effective Party, changed the whole course of the history not only of Russia but of the entire world. Thus, the *idea* that ideas are of no effect, with a single exception, has proved to be one of the most revolutionary causes of the exercise of human choice in the entire history of the world.

5 The options of choice at any moment of history, for any particular group, nation, race, class culture, and for any person, are not infinite.

The options of choice are limited to a particular moment. In 1918, the president of the United States could not choose whether to use the atom bomb; that choice was possible only in 1945. Choice cannot anticipate the moment of opportunity. Neither can it recall a past moment. Abraham Lincoln could not choose to be elected president of a United States in which there was no slavery and in which there had been no Missouri Compromise, no Dred Scott Decision. The situation always confronts us with choices which are imbedded in historical process and are strictly limited to the exact terms of the moment of choosing.

A second form of the conditions of choice is involved in the dependability of consequences. Causation replacing creation, cosmos replaces chaos. A man cannot choose to make himself invisible, or to reverse the movement of the earth.

A third form of the conditions of choice is involved in the fact that human personality itself is a product of its heredity plus its experience, and the kinds of choices will therefore vary from person to person. Whatever else freedom may mean, it does not mean the violation of the character of the choosing agent.

With these clear conditions upon our choosing, some will conclude that freedom is an illusion, that choice is completely determined by the situation, the personality reacting to that situation in the light of its own development, and the causal nexus which brings the consequences of the choice. Let me make two comments.

(1) We must never for a moment forget the critically important fact that new insights and ideas can and do enter in and radically alter the predisposition of the personality so that, suddenly sometimes, more often gradually, profound changes are brought to pass in the character of the choices made. The whole record of conversions and transformations of outlook which history relates, from a fanatical Palestinian Jew on the Damascus Road, to the preponderance of the people of the Soviet Union since the October Revolution, suggests the character of these transforming experiences. The shifting of the propaganda line during warfare is a deliberate use of the truth that ideas affect choices.

(2) Today's choices, entering into the determining of today's event, become a part of the conditions which are tomorrow's options of choice. The process is cumulative, often mixing retrogression and progression.

in succeeding events, or even in the same event; but the choices of one moment are clearly a part of the conditions of choice in succeeding moments. Social movement can be cumulatively effected.

6 Human freedom of choice is in no way independent of the causal nexus. On the contrary, this choice is itself included in the causal nexus.

This is the crucial thesis of the series. It is not claimed that human freedom operates independently of the connecting of event to event through a direct causal relationship. To be independent of the causal nexus would not be the guarantee of freedom. It would be the denial of responsibility for the consequences which follow from choices.

Here it may be useful to refer once more to the similarities and the differences between physical and social causation. In both sequences, one thing leads directly to another through an unbroken nexus of causation. However, within the causal nexus of physical events there is no element of choice, whereas there is an element of choice in an historical sequence.

7 The inclusion of freedom within the causal nexus does not destroy or violate causal determinism.

On the contrary, it is only through the exercise of conscious choice that causal determinism could function at all in human affairs. If the determining sequence could operate independently of human choice, it would be a physical, perhaps mechanical, operation. It would have the same relationship to human affairs as do earthquakes, the rotation of the seasons, the alternation of the tides. Men may (and do) choose what to do in the face of these phenomena. But the volcano, the tide, and the seasons do not depend upon man's choices for their operation.

Not so with the events of human history. An assassin's bullet catapults a poor white into the presidency, thereby determining the choices before the nation in its Reconstruction period. This historical sequence would have been impossible without a John Wilkes Booth who chose to fire the gun in Ford's theatre. The human choice was thus an integral part of the determining of history. The inclusion of freedom within the causal nexus, far from destroying determinism, is the actual means of its operation.

8 The inclusion of freedom within the causal nexus means that determinism cannot be thought of either as mechanistic or automatic, or as in any other way predetermined.

Since conscious human beings, as single persons, as groups, and as societies large and small, are themselves dynamic participants in the sequence of event-action-event, it is not permissible to impute to the determining process a fixed and immutable character. Instead of speaking of determinism, we ought properly to speak of determining, as a more nearly accurate description of what actually happens.

Determining, in social life, is thus seen to be in part a matter of choices consciously or non-consciously made. Thus, history is indeterminate in the sense that it is not predetermined or foreordained, but it is also determinate, in the sense that the causal nexus is never broken through the instrumentality of a choice made outside the causal nexus. In short, determining itself is a dynamic process, not a fixed matter, in human affairs.

9 But the fact that choice operates only within the causal nexus, never independently of it, means that freedom can never become irresponsibility.

Only if human freedom were able to operate independently of causal connection could human choice ever be made with irresponsibility. The fact that the options are finite and that consequences flow from every choice—this double fact not only expresses the character of freedom, it also eliminates the possibility of irresponsibility.

This thesis is another way of stating the fact that freedom is moral in character. Man's actions are always the choices of a responsible participant in the causal sequence. What is popularly called the "irresponsible" act is thus rightly to be described as the immoral act, for it is impossible to escape the causal nexus in which every choice entails its own consequences.

It is at this point that we glimpse something of the enormity of an alleged social science which denies that it is concerned with moral values. We also glimpse something of the prudish irrelevance of an alleged theology which denies that God is active in history. And with this bifocal insight, we can welcome the emergence of a social science which includes values as part of its realm of study, and the emergence of a theology which is directly relevant to the course of human history.

10 Determining and Freedom are not rightly to be opposed to each other, but are rightly to be seen as functions of the process of social causation, inseparable from it or from each other.

This is the conclusion toward which our nine theses have been moving.

Determining culminates at any moment of history in a choice between alternatives. That choice is determined by the personality (including the ideas and values of the personality) in the light of the situation and its alternative options, with an assessment of the probable consequences. Personality thus operating determines the choice and at the same moment describes the freedom.

There is a Chinese proverb which says, "You can't applaud with one hand." It is possible, however, to analyze the process of applauding using a dialectic which says that it consists of setting the two hands in smart opposition to each other, and holding that applause is consequently a paradoxical and contradictory thing. But it is also possible to look at the two hands as they are brought together as a unified and concerted expression of the purpose of the applauder.

Let this imperfect illustration suggest, not by analogy but by suggestive analysis, the character of the dynamic act of human choice within the causal nexus. Freedom and Determining are rightly to be thought of as mutually interdependent, essential to each other as components of a single act—an act which both describes the character and expresses the conditions of moral freedom.

A Negative Word

If it be objected that this point of view still leaves unanswered the question of Freedom *versus* Determinism, the reply is that that particular question is unanswerable. It is not a legitimate question because the two are not opposed: they go together. The question is precisely at the intellectual level of the old conundrum of the immovable object and the irresistible force. Pure intellectual abstractions, these questions derive their peculiar fascination from their teasing approximation to sane reality, at the same moment that they violate all the canons of logic and of empirical fact.

To put the matter positively: when one sees the togetherness of freedom and determining, a symbiotic interrelated interdependence, he is then able to speak of the character and conditions of responsible choice. That is what might properly be called "moral freedom." It is neither the immorality of Determinism nor the irresponsibility of Freedom. This "moral freedom" is the only kind of freedom which *is* freedom. It is the only kind known to man or conceivable as being known to God.

Some Semantic Difficulties

With these theses before us, we turn now to examine the difficulties of language which have sometimes served to obscure the issue. The proper opposite of determinism is not freedom. It is indeterminism, when we speak of the physical world. It is coercion, when we speak of the human level of consciousness.

In the physical world, if there were no determinism, there would be not freedom, but the chaos of indeterminism. Therefore, in the physical world, the proper antinomy is Determinism *versus* Indeterminism. But at the level of conscious choice, where we may properly inquire whether there is "freedom," what is its proper opposite? Determinism? No—coercion. The unfree act is the coerced act.

Coercion carries with it the notion of absolute, unlimited power, of tyranny which owns no limits either of dependability or of reliability. Its essence is caprice, fancy, whim—in brief, moral irresponsibility. A bully coerces, an absolute monarch coerces; a God Who was absolutely sovereign would be a coercive tyrant. The absolute dictator is freed from all moral restraints and obligations, to do as he pleases. He is unpredictable, which is the precise meaning of "indeterminism." Thus, coercion and indeterminism are joined together in moral irresponsibility.

In the same fashion, freedom and determining go together in a bond of moral responsibility. If either one is qualified, limited, or removed, both are destroyed. Take away determining from human life. Do you get freedom? No, you get chaos, a chaos in which, since nothing is predictable, no man can be free to perform the simplest act with assurance. Moral choice would be impossible. Man would be coerced by an indeterminate world, bullied by accident, dragooned by miracle. Or, take away freedom from life. Do you get determinism? No, you get its proper opposite, coercion. Life would then be lived at the level of a cosmic concentration camp. If God were thought of as the coercing agent, then such deterministic lack of freedom for man would spell indeterminism and moral irresponsibility for God. If, instead, the world view be non-theistic, then to ascribe to some form of mechanistic, organismic, or cultural determinism (including economic determinism) the final control over destiny is to commit the identical error without the excuse that is offered by the deterministic theist when he retreats behind the Unassailable Mystery.

There are many qualifications to be added to this simple assertion that the morally responsible choice is possible only within a context in which freedom and determining are functions of each other. For example, it cannot be assumed that any one man can successfully predict all the results of his choice. The imperfections of human knowledge, the frequent interruptions and corruptions of moral purpose, the choices of other human agents, and many other factors make the hazards of prediction prodigious. But for our present purposes, let the statement stand as a proximate suggestion of the direction in which we may look for the right kind of questions to ask.

The Dimension of Time

History is a one way street, a tunnel from which man is continually emerging into a partly novel and wholly irreversible experience. This fact permits us to distinguish between the determinate—that which has already happened, become a part of experience—and the not-yet-determined—that which has not yet happened. The difference is a difference of time sequence, nothing else.

But that difference is important. In each moment of time, the not-yet-determinate is becoming determinate. It is precisely here that the morally responsible choice is made. That choice is made as between the actual options of the moment, in the light of the values which prevail in the personality of the chooser, with a view to the probable consequences. And that choice thus becomes an intrinsic part of the causation itself.

Arnold Toynbee has given us in his *Study of History* an unforgettable picture of the precipitous upward climb of mankind to new levels of culture and civilization. One may be permitted to suggest a similar figure to express the meaning of the determinate and the not-yet-determinate. It is as though man at any moment had behind him the entire solid ground of all experience, and ahead of him a completely blank void in which there is nothing, either of form or color or substance, quantity or quality, or of meaning and value—not even emptiness itself. But each moment of experience in time finds man stepping out into that void and finding his feet planted squarely in the experience of the emerging moment. The dependability of the causal nexus is a description of that fact. The direction in which he steps actually determines the course of the movement of history from one moment to another, just as the length

of his legs determines the distance he will go, and the point he starts from limits the end of the leap. Within this picture, the crucially important factor is the direction of choice. That direction is properly to be understood not in terms of space or of time, but of a fifth dimension, quality.

The Dimension of Quality

It is at this point of the argument that the necessity of dealing with the whole of experience becomes clear. Some social scientists, taking a false cue from a position which the natural scientists have long since abandoned, or misapprehending the alleged "objectivity" for which science labors, shy away from considering problems of value. But matters of value are as much a part of the making of conscious choices as are physical matters. To disregard factors which are actually operative within the causal nexus is not to be scientific or objective. It is merely to be myopic.

The values may be matters of symbolic meanings attached to objects, rites, acts, institutions and the like, or they may be values of preference expressed in abstractions or concepts such as "justice," "equality," "love," and the like, or they may take many other forms. Many values are buried beneath layers of custom and imbedded deep in the habitual patterns of personality. They are then all the more importantly to be borne in mind in analyzing social causation, because the unquestioned values operate in directing choices in a semi-autonomous manner. Both those values which are accepted without question and those which are subject to reexamination become important qualitative parts of every decision.

It is for this reason that the qualitative dimensions of social analysis become of critical importance. Since preferences with which men make choices between the options of today actually describe through their results the conditions of tomorrow's choices, the definitive point of attack in social control is in the conjuncture of these preferences of value with the options of choice in the moment of choosing."

This being the case, the interrelationship of religion and the social

^aComment by Ralph T. Flewelling

A vital point in the discussion of choice is the relation of the creative imagination to choice and to moral values: as the point where control can be most successfully exercised action begins in dream or imagination.

In the realm of the imagination is also the place at which there is contact between the human and the Divine. The recognition of the potential sonship of God present in every human being is what justifies the assumption of intrinsic worth in each person, and condemns the individualism so rampant among Christians.

sciences becomes unmistakable. It is the job of religion to wean the attachments of personal and group preference away from less desirable values and to attach them to more desirable values. That job can be done in part through changing ideas, in part through changing habit patterns. In the end, it can be done only by affecting pretty much the whole of the person. To this end, the manipulation of environment, the redirection of the learning process, is an important contributing factor. And a part of the environment which can be most readily laid hold upon and redirected is that part which is made up of all the ideas, concepts, symbolic meanings—what Mumford calls the “idolum.” The selecting of the preferable values is another matter, lying beyond the scope of the present paper. But this much is clear: if the present analysis is to any degree correct, we have a means of bringing to focus in man’s conscience the concerns of judgment which will make tomorrow’s options of choice better than those which today presents.

II

The Relief of Tensions

The argument of the first section of this paper has been that a false antinomy between Freedom and Determinism needs to be corrected by seeing the proper symbiotic unity of the two in responsible choice in the causal nexus. Addressing ourselves to the international tensions of today, we are now to inquire whether the resolution of this basic error of thinking may not provide a leverage for destroying the sources of such international friction and dissension.

In several crucial areas, the assumed opposition of Freedom and Determining contributes to international tensions: in economics, in the conflict between capitalism and communism, in politics, in the warfare between totalitarian and democratic procedures, in the international scene, in the intransigence of nationalism as it is expressed in international anarchy. All three of these come to focus in the East-West tensions of the present moment.

We do not, of course, assume that to discard the basic antinomy is to assure an automatic resolution of the epiphenomenon. But to approach these tension areas with a symbiotic rather than an antinomous or paradoxical dialectic would subject them to controls not previously used. And if there is any hope at all in this approach, the increased potential of

atomic and bacteriological warfare suggest that we try it. The time is short. Finally, since the problem is present as an incarnation of false thinking, it is peculiarly a task which scholarship ought to tackle.

East versus West

Look behind the smoke screen of controversy to see what it is that the two hemispheric colossi are fighting about. I do not mean merely the things which we all recognize at once—the rival imperialisms, rival nationalisms, rival economies, rival political systems, rival ideologies. The surface tensions cannot be resolved without treating the fundamental disorders which they express.

This essential fundamental analysis is not being offered from religious quarters. The lingering remnant of the Social Gospel and the shining knights of the New Fundamentalism called Neo-Orthodoxy are equally prevented by their own presuppositions from doing the job. The Fundamentalists have never presumed to undertake it, while the Humanists lack the tools. Until religion can do more than condemn profit, inveigh against pride, sigh after heaven, or strain at bootstraps, men of religion will not discover the fundamental conflicts of East and West.

Neither is the necessary analysis coming from social and political scientists who refuse to consider problems of value and of morality. No social science which shies away from considering the full dimensions of social relationships can expect to do more than fiddle while Rome burns.

Underlying the conflict between East and West is a deep dichotomy of such long standing that it is usually overlooked. Or, when it is considered, it is usually accepted as inevitable if not desirable. We cannot expect to ease the tensions between East and West unless we go deeply enough to remove the causes, which lie in the basic presuppositions of modern civilization.

"Individual" versus "Social"

One of the most pernicious of modern doctrines is that the human being and human experience can be separated into two distinct and autonomous entities called "individual" and "social." When men begin by saying that the two are separable, they conclude by declaring that the two are contradictory. In social and political philosophy that means that

they wrestle with the stuffed dummy which Herbert Spencer dressed in *The Man Versus The State*. In religion and in theology the same kind of squirrel in a cage chase has claimed the attention of thinkers.

Here is posed the question of the *ought* as well as the *is* of the relationship of the one to the many, and both the *ought* and the *is* are usually included in a single framework and posed as the problem of Authority *versus* Freedom. This is a special instance of the false dichotomy between freedom and determining, presented in the economic, political, and international fields as the problem of individual liberty *versus* social coercion.

This separation of what is called "the individual" from what is called the "social" is based on a false mental abstraction which runs contrary to human experience. At the very best, *individual* and *social* are adjectives, not nouns.¹ We can see this at once if we try to use *social* as a noun. Aside from the quaint and quondam basket socials of rural America, no one talks about "the social." There is the same lack of justification for speaking of "the individual." To be sure, there is a useful abstraction, "individuality," corresponding to another useful abstraction, "society." There are ways of speaking of the characteristics which mark a particular person, and of describing the relationships prevailing in groups. But when properly used, both *social* and *individual* are adjectives, denoting or describing aspects of human experience and of human being, not nouns delineating autonomous entities. It is bad grammar to say "the social." It is equally bad grammar to say "the individual."

It is also bad logic, because it is logic without benefit of empirical reference. Every human being is at once social and individual, both the individual and social aspects of experience depend upon the continuous existence of human beings, and neither the social nor the individual aspects are separable from the human beings or from the entirety of experience.

The prevailing patterns of social relationship have no existence apart from human beings. As Henry George pointed out, if mankind's successive generations were separated instead of overlapping, there would be no civilization, no culture, no "society." Each generation would begin in complete barbarism, and few would survive to adulthood. No patterns of relationship would carry over from one generation to another. It is the continuing of relationships between an unending and overlapping

¹On this point, I wish to acknowledge my own indebtedness to Professor Dewey for his article in the March, 1946, *Commentary*. He there provides the basic tools of intelligence for destroying this false dichotomy.

succession of human beings which makes up the continuity and development of social patterns. Every social relationship exists as a function of two or more human beings. Men have ideas about these relationships, and these ideas profoundly affect the choices which they make. But these ideas are possessed by men, and even though written in books and expressed in statutes, they have no existence apart from the minds that hold them, no functional operation apart from their expression in the choices made by men. The word "social" is therefore merely a shorthand way of expressing the fact that all human beings have relationships with other human beings, and that these relationships take place within developing and continuing patterns of relationship into which each man is born.

In much the same way, "individual" is a shorthand expression meaning that human personalities differ from each other as do snow flakes, and that human consciousness is localized. So far, so good. But to go on from that and to say that "the individual" somehow is separable from "the social" is to deal in error and false abstraction. Aside from the theoretical "individual" on the theoretical desert island, "individual man" is not found. The very fact of self-consciousness depends upon the differentiation of self from others and from things—selfhood is dependent upon sociality. And in human experience, personality is never found, except as both the social and individual aspects of human beings and human experience are found. Personality development in its dynamics underscores the truth: both individuation and socialization are aspects of human growth and of the maturing personality.

Now see what happens when men are permitted falsely to distinguish between what they call "social" and "individual," then to erect their mental abstractions into seeming realities, with a capital *I* to Individual and a capital *S* to Society, and then to go on to concoct ideologies and systems of thought and action to defend and buttress these false abstractions, calling them Individualism and Socialism. The result is the terrible and destructive conflict between these two parts of experience. Having denied the integrity of man's personality, and therefore now denying the integrity of the historical process, these movements attempt each to glorify and exalt one or the other aspect of human experience by denying the validity of the assumed opponent. It is as though each Siamese twin were scheming to administer a lethal poison to the mate with whom he shares a common blood stream. Schizoid man is about to cancel himself

out of life via the atomic bomb route, finally releasing the tensions which the false dichotomy has established

HISTORIC ROOTS

The historical roots of the present crisis can readily be traced, revealing the process through which Individualism (under the guise of capitalism in economics, democracy in politics, and finance imperialism in world affairs) and Socialism (under the guise of communism in economics, totalitarianism in politics, and expansionist imperialism in world affairs) now threaten to hurl their atomic warheads on the hapless billions of mankind

In its earlier phases in our Western World, what we now call Individualism was a movement of release from the tyranny of religion and government. No name shines more brightly in the roster of those who waged that struggle than the name of Desiderius Erasmus. But the movement known as Individualism which resulted was a monstrosity which Erasmus would look upon with horror, revulsion, and totally astonished unbelief.

Two and a half centuries later, Adam Smith, penning the charter for capitalistic Individualism assumes that each man, as he pursues his own self-interest, is guided by an Unseen Hand so that he automatically serves the national welfare. The effort to break the controls of Mercantilism and to shake off the shackles of Scholasticism is the essence of the new Individualism. And this movement, as it rides the crest of the Industrial Revolution to success, takes no account of the need for creating new social relationships and controls to express these new liberties and keep them within the framework of moral responsibility.

Old traditions and institutions, which had largely been oppressive as capitalism struggled for emergence and the nation state came into being, were discarded in this new day. On the whole, there was gain in that. But liberty was thought of as cutting loose "the individual" from "the social," not as liberating the whole man for accepting responsible choice. Out of this battle for human rights came a tremendous confidence in something called "the individual," with the assertion that the rights of this "individual" were absolute. They were his because he was born with them. This doctrine of the absolute and irrevocable rights of individual man got itself embalmed in the basic documents of American life which

were written at that moment in history in which the doctrine of the Rights of Man had reached its zenith of popular acclaim. That individualistic notion has controlled these nearing two centuries of our legal development.

Now, in the short run, the emergence of Individualism was a great gain, as the propagandists of the Right never tire of reminding us. Politically and religiously, human beings were free from the confining restrictions of social relationships which had thwarted the development of the new social structure appropriate to the aims and methods of the emerging middle classes. The new Individualism which had many of its roots in economics, as R. H. Tawney has shown, reached its apogee in the Rugged Individualism of America before the 1929 crash.

Back of this development lay a fatal mistake in religious thinking and acting. Religion—Protestantism in particular—insisted that each "individual," as an inherently singular soul, had an intrinsic and necessary relationship with God, while he had only an extrinsic and derivative connection with other men. Religion stressed the Fatherhood of God, the value of each soul, but it neglected to stress the brotherhood of men, the value of relationships. Luther, Calvin, Zwingli, Beza, and the other giants of the Reformation rightly insisted that no church or priest could stand between men and God. Also, without exception, these reformers insisted that religion must necessarily have complete control over man's relationships with his fellows.

But there was no necessary functional connection between the theology and the ethic of the reformers. Today, men gladly repeat that each person stands in direct relationship to Deity—they like the individualistic Protestant theology. But they have a strangely eloquent silence to greet the restatement of the economic teachings of the reformers—they resent the ethic. And while the reformers cannot be held responsible for using the best tools they had at hand, it would be foolish in a later generation to repeat the error from which their vulnerable ethical position stems. Without exception, the reformers assumed that freedom and determining stand in opposition. With the notable exception of Calvin's teaching on usury, the reformers emphatically defended the economic strictures of the canon law—and, as in the case of Luther, in their strictest form, not as modified by centuries of casuistry. Nevertheless, an economic ethic inherited from the Middle Ages was inadequate to the task of bringing an ebullient capitalism to heel—especially when the theological founda-

tions of that earlier ethic had been brought into question. The result is that succeeding generations have been able to accept the liberation of reformation theology while rejecting the strictures of reformation ethic. That is the religious tradition out of which Individualism in politics, economics, and human relations generally has stemmed. It is the tradition which made possible the emergence of the absolutely sovereign nation state which considers itself subject to no superior law.

For the roots of this process, we must go back at least to Origen, whose notion of an immutable God became the backbone of both ecclesiastical and secular social controls. From the days when Theodosius I, by edict, established the status of every man in a fixed social system, in a vain attempt to bolster a tottering Empire, the Church accepted the philosophy of status as its own and the State used the idea of status to control all men. The social aspects were relegated to the sphere of the spiritual world. In the canon law, and in the structure of the feudal period, this idea of fixed status dominated. The sin of *ambitus* (literally, "moving about") was added to the list, to control the lower classes. The intricate system of minute regulations by which the Church through the Middle Ages attempted to fix on an emerging capitalism the doctrine of the Just Price and the Prohibition of Usury, succeeded only in filling the record with a constantly shifting casuistry which details the story of gradual retreat and final rout. The massive, monolithic structure of medieval Catholicism, based on an erroneous conception of the character of moral freedom, provoked the counter movement of Individualism.

And Protestantism, in its turn, has likewise contributed to the bifurcation of individual and social, by alleging that the so-called individual is free to establish his own relationships with God, having only a derivative reference to his relationships with other men. As R. H. Tawney has clearly demonstrated, it is historically inaccurate to say that the Reformation sired capitalism, but as he also shows, there is little question but that the movement within Protestantism in the direction of individual liberty helped immeasurably to promote capitalistic development, because the new Individualism was unaccompanied by any attempt to fashion new patterns of social control and of mutual obligation to fit the new situation. And since the old ethic did not fit the new situation, the dynamics of emerging capitalism burst the seams of ecclesiastical and moral control. Eventually, capitalism, like a fat spider, spun a new web of self-secreted ethic out of her own innards. What the medieval Church had con-

demned as the sin of *ambitus*, Protestant Individualism has made a cardinal virtue, under the name of Ambition

To keep the record straight, it may be well to add that the movement in religion which culminated in the Individualism of the Puritan tradition was in part stimulated by the avaricious desires of the emerging middle classes. And the landed classes and the nobility in general relied on the conservative powers of Church and State to throw up dikes against the rising tide of social change. At least one of the reformers, Luther, lived to denounce the doctrines of freedom when the peasant classes acted upon the fact that he said they were all children of God, endowed with human rights.

No one will deny that the new Individualism has resulted in many great benefits to mankind, and even greater benefits to some of mankind. The release of the powers of inventiveness and discovery, powers which are peculiarly associated with the individual aspects of human experience, is readily granted. Without the destruction of oppressive controls, the whole development of modern industry, finance, and science would have been impossible. We readily grant the good effects of Individualism. And since history is a one way street, we would not vainly sigh for the Golden Age which our contemporary Neo-Thomists recall with acute nostalgia.

What is not as readily admitted in some quarters, however, is the bad effects of this same Individualism, as it has erupted in Totalitarianism. The direct result of Individualism has been that conflicts, uncertainties, and fears have made it appear necessary for Socialism to step in to correct the excesses of Individualism. The whole process of social control which has characterized this century grows directly out of the excesses of Individualism. Because Individualism gave a corporation the right to combine with other corporations to restrain trade and exploit the public, Socialism (back in 1890) passed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Because Individualism gave an employer the right to hire and fire at will, and some employers exercised that right freely, moral indignation and common decency passed the Wagner Labor Relations Act. And most recently, because organized labor in its suddenly found strength has followed the accepted patterns of Individualism—using its power in strict accordance with the accepted doctrines of Individualism as stated by Adam Smith—a conservative Congress has enacted, over presidential veto, an essentially socialistic move, away from Individualism.

Because Individualism at the nation state level has led to a crescendo of bigger and better wars, the continuing effort that stems from Henry of Navarre (or, more accurately, the Duc de Sully) and Hugo Grotius and comes to us through the Hague Court, the League of Nations and the United Nations organization, has been called forth. World controls for national irresponsibility are evoked to check the rampant individualistic immorality of nations.

History shows us, then, that Socialism is a direct result of Individualism. Or rather, history shows us that both Socialism and Individualism are unconscionable aberrations, both based on the false and vicious bifurcation of experience which separates the individual and social aspects of humanity.

In becoming absolute, Individualism stood above the moral law, answering to no one, subject to nothing except the counter pressures of other individualistic efforts. When it became apparent that this Liberty resulted in successive waves of industrial depression and international war, the demand for social controls became vocal. In the England of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, these demands rose in a ground swell to produce the mild British Socialism of the twentieth century. That same ground swell is reaching America half a century later. In other parts of the Western World, the movement against Individualism has proceeded less gradually, and has erupted in Leftist Totalitarianism—where it has not been arrested by Rightist Totalitarianism. Fortunately for us in America, the political tools were not immediately available for the solidifying of this demand for social controls, either from the Right or from the Left, into the monolithic mass of a Totalitarian state. In other countries, where people were accustomed to depend upon a superior political authority, the "road to serfdom" promised them stability and security, and thus Totalitarianism was born.

I regard it as no accident that all the totalitarian countries have professed to be "socialistic." They have said that they were defending their peoples against the evils of Individualism. But the dichotomy which sets the individualistic and the socialistic in stark opposition was not invented by Fascism or Communism. It was the direct inheritance from that phase of our common history which championed the right—the absolute right—of a monstrous thing called The Individual. So-called Free Enterprise was taken to be the essence of Liberty, by those who stood to benefit from the opportunity to disregard the demands of social morality. When labor

now exercises these same "unalienable rights" to disregard social welfare, the defenders of Free Enterprise become bellicose advocates of social control. One of the co-authors of the Taft-Hartley Bill says that Congress is now merely applying to labor the social controls which the Wagner Act applied to management. In other words, social controls are necessary whenever Individualism actually begins to operate.

The point of all this is seen in sharpest focus when we concentrate on the international scene. Today, climaxing centuries of development, the Nation State stands as an absolutely sovereign Person subject only to the counter pressures of other equally sovereign individual states, with war as the final arbiter. Edward Shillito aptly spoke of *Nationalism Man's Other Religion*. The inclusiveness and pervasiveness of Nationalism, with its rites (flags, salutes), holy days (holidays), its calendar of saints (patriots), and its absolute oath of allegiance, with its powers extending over the very lives of its citizens, express in a congeries of attitudes, institutions, and practices the basic belief that in the nation is found an Individual who stands superior to all outside controls. It was this absolute individualism of Nationalism against which the Third International launched the counter movement for world revolution to create the single Socialist World State. The amazing thing in the contemporary situation is the manner in which the Communist movement in Russia and the bordering nations has now become intensely nationalistic. The Communist Party now attempts to utilize the individualistic heritage at the international level as a means of preventing the non-Communist world from becoming solidly united against the Soviets. And, with equal astonishment, we witness the former individualistic nations now pushing hard for world cooperation leading to world controls. No clearer demonstration of the falsity of both the individualistic and the socialistic positions could be given than this contemporary evidence of the manner in which each is attempting to use the doctrines and dogmas of the other in an effort to maintain itself.

As these lines are being written, news reaches me of the collapse of the Paris Conference on the Marshall Plan. It would seem that the USSR wishes to block any movement which promises to bring unity to a Balkanized Europe, because Soviet hopes rest on the expectation that the individualistically separated nations can be peeled off from the capitalistic world one by one like the leaves of an artichoke. It would also seem that the United States of America wishes to block this Soviet expansion-

ist tendency by creating at once the world controls which will prevent any nation not now within the Soviet orbit from being attracted—which means, according to the Truman Doctrine, that the United States must intervene with money and military advice in every quarter of the globe, in an all out effort to knit together an individualistically disintegrated world. If our only choice lies between the totalitarian Nationalisms now being sponsored by the Soviet Union, and the capitalistically supported international totalitarianism which alone could muster the strength to offset that movement, we are limited to the old choices between two aspects of life, each of which is false in its fragmentary character.

In short, bankruptcy leads to foreclosure, in the world of ethical values just as certainly as in finance. The denial of the integrity of human experience, a denial found in the false positions both of Individualism and of Socialism, leads inexorably to the atomic Armageddon.

My conclusion from this brief excursion into history and the contemporary scene (which must be recognized as too broad and sweeping in its generalizations, and subject to numerous qualifications in details) is this: the separation of *individual* and *social*, even though it brought temporary liberation from the tyrannous controls of Church and State as formerly expressed in Catholicism and feudalism, has in our time brought the far greater tyrannies of political and economic totalitarianism. Just as we earlier said that it was bad logic and bad grammar to separate the social and individual aspects of human experience, so now we conclude that it is bad policy.

The Question Before Us

I do not conclude, however, that since Individualism has led to disastrous consequences, we ought now to shift to some form of collectivism. There are more ways to flee from a lion than by embracing a bear. One of the errors committed by Karl Marx, and by many others who use the Hegelian dialectic, lies in the assumption that each thesis has one antithesis, and only one. Usually, life presents multiple choices. A man does not choose merely between marriage and bachelorhood. He is also choosing between philandering and constancy under either pattern. He may choose polygamy in serial form through the divorce courts. And the choices of others are involved at every point of decision. Finally, each choice becomes a part of the determinate conditioning of tomorrow's

choices. The options are never (or very seldom) two and only two.

So in this matter before us, our choice does not lie merely between Individualism and Socialism, nor are we limited to the acceptance of the totalitarian forms of either of them. Look at Fascist Italy, Falangist Spain, Bolshevik Russia, Nazi Germany—not to mention the rash of lesser dictatorships which the Second World War for democracy has created, and see that the swing from one pole to the other does not correct the evil. And look at the United States of America, to see that the evil is not corrected by hugging it. In castigating both Individualism and Socialism, we are not advocating that either be retained.

We can, as responsible moral agents, choose to reject Individualism both in its capitalistic and its fascistic forms, without at the same time putting our necks under the yoke of a socialist totalitarianism. This is true because both Individualism and Socialism, in their current economic expressions in capitalism and communism, and in their political expressions as democracy and totalitarianism, rest on the fundamental error which separates the individual and social aspects of experience and then sets the separated aspects in opposition. This error, in turn, stems directly from the assumed antinomy of Freedom and Determinism. Under the conditions of this separation and opposition it becomes impossible to realize the fruits of moral freedom for human life.

The rules of the game under capitalism negate the working of empathy and fellow feeling; corrode the affirmative affections of men, and exaggerate the egoistic tendencies, making economic life tend constantly to become a sort of sanctified cannibalism. The rules of the game under Socialism present the reverse side of the same tapestry, seamy side up. As Lewis Corey puts it in *The Unfinished Task*: "What is wrong in Soviet Russia is not that managers manage, but that there is no economic or political freedom and no free labor unions."²

Just as American capitalism exalts liberty at the expense of mutual aid, so Soviet communism denies freedom in the attempt to get equity. The fault, in both cases, lies in separating a partial virtue so that it becomes a vice. Both liberty and equality are vices when taken by themselves. Neither actually exists as a virtue except in the symbiotic relationship of fraternity.

These two movements which now stand eying one another belligerently in the middle stages of an intensive psychological warfare, will, if

²Lewis Corey, *The Unfinished Task*, Viking Press, New York, p. 141n.

that warfare is persisted in, probably plunge us into the destruction of another atomic war. Each feels *rightly* that it must destroy the other if it is to live. The basic principles of each are not reconcilable to those of its opponent; and the world is too intimately crowded in its technologically shrunk proportions for the two to co-exist in enmity. I am unimpressed by the suggestion from some quarters that a pluralistic answer can be found. Pluralism is possible in certain areas, only when the basic unity of the whole social relationship is founded upon generally accepted and ruling principles. In the United States, religious pluralism and a certain degree of economic heterodoxy are possible because the political structure is founded squarely upon the Lockean notion that the purpose of the state is to protect private property. In Soviet Russia, racial and religious and national pluralism are possible because all these are strictly contained within the overarching orthodoxies of dialectical materialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the rule of the Communist Party. To argue, as Reinhold Niebuhr does in *Christianity Takes a Stand* (p. 36) that the world community can be based on economic pluralism because some nations have embraced cultural pluralism and religious tolerance, is to overlook the fact that neither Russian Communism nor American Capitalism can anticipate an indefinite future in which there is no clash of interests. The surface reason lies in the expansionist demands of capitalism for world markets and the equally dynamic security demands of communism. Closely attached to these matters of surface dynamics is the matter of raw materials such as oil and metals. The deeper reason for the antipathy that makes pluralism impossible is that error cannot tolerate error. Only truth is secure enough to be tolerant. The only possible answer is therefore one which resolves the difficulty by removing both Individualism and Socialism, as expressed in the economic tensions of communism and capitalism, in the conflicts of totalitarianism with political democracy, and in the clash of American financial imperialism with Russian cultural irredentism.

The real question before us is how we are to gain time to gain an inclusive outlook which insists on the integrity of human experience as both social and individual. A beginning at resolving the problem can be made if we discard the false premise of a dichotomy between the social and individual aspects of life. That false premise describes the perimeter of error around which both capitalistic individualism and communist totalitarianism rotate in a closed circle of conflict. That false

premise holds both at radius length from the central notion of community. To discard the falsehood is to make possible an approach to this central notion of community, no longer denying one segment of truth in order to affirm another.

Postscript

Basically, the discovery of and building of world community is a religious problem, because it deals comprehensively with the whole of life at the level of practical action. It is not merely philosophy, not merely theology, not merely social theory, to which we must look for an answer. It is to all of these as they contribute directly to practical solutions of practical problems that we must turn. Where do we discover a sense of community strong enough to swallow up the destructive antagonisms of Individualism and Socialism? Where do we discover religious resources which are not confined by the false antinomy between Freedom and Determinism?

These resources might come from a reformed Catholicism which cast off its ecclesiastical totalitarian tendencies. The fact that Catholicism has once gone through a reformation more profound than the one which now confronts it—the shift from Plato and Augustine to Aristotle and Aquinas—demonstrates the flexibility of Catholicism, and indicates that, given the desire and motive, another fundamental reformation might be carried through. They might come from a reformed Protestantism which dissolved its unhappy and adulterous marriage with a licentious Individualism. The fact that Protestantism was born in a reformation movement means that the completion of that arrested process—which might conceivably amount to a liquidation of the Reformation—should be a live option. They might come from a reformed Judaism which cast off the strictures of national particularism and expressed its universal genius. The fact that Judaism has for so many centuries held to its ethical monotheism in the face of odds paralleled in Christian experience only by sufferings under Diocletian and Shapur II, suggests that this tenacity of spirit could be useful in attacking the moral relativity and ethical pluralism which are expressed in the international dynamics of the mid-twentieth century. These obstructions, in all three cases, are formidable.

On the other hand, the clear fact is that the crisis of our day so emphatically demonstrates the ethical and religious bankruptcy of the

Western World that radical transformations of religious thought, institutions, and actions become possible. Our job is to make these transformations probable, and to do it in short time. There may be reason to doubt whether professional theologians of any of the three great religious communities of the Western World will be able to transcend their vested interests in present commitments so as to give constructive answers to the present problems. But there is an equally grave doubt as to whether the necessary ethical and religious insights will come from any other quarter. And in the meantime, mankind waits, while time and the atomic armaments race do not.^b

^bComment by Henry N. Wieman

I wholeheartedly agree with Mr. Gallagher's major propositions as I understand them and I find them very stimulating. My criticism will be an attempt to carry further the analysis of the basic concepts which enter into the context of his discussion, because I do not think these are sufficiently clear to render his very excellent proposition as usable as it should be either for theory or practice. I esteem very highly the way the problem is formulated and the way it is treated, otherwise I would not make this comment as extensive as it will be. I shall try to analyze and clarify each of five concepts fundamental to the discussion.

1. Concept of Value

Plainly the idea of value is central to Gallagher's whole problem and discussion. Freedom, according to him, is attained only to the degree that we appraise correctly the consequences that will issue from the alternatives of choice when and if they should be chosen. But appraisal is evaluation which can be correct only if one has a sense of value in such form that it can be used to compute or otherwise distinguish the greater and lesser goods to be found in these consequences.

The question at issue is, what is the true nature of value (good and evil, better and worse). Theories of value are many and diverse and I hold that any theory is true, *if* it identifies value with any one of the several different determinants of choice which are always present in every situation where choice occurs. To list these determinants necessarily present in every situation where choice occurs is to list the various defensible theories of value. Some of these determinants with which different theories of value are respectively identified are as follows: pleasure, happiness, satisfaction, any object of any interest, some indefinable quality that remains after one has carried analysis as far as it will go, the intelligent computation and adaptation of means to ends, certain timeless principles or forms, the total situation meaning all the different determinants taken collectively that modify choice in any instance of its occurrence, personality, the universe so far as it is organic and bears upon the choice, God in some of the various uses of that term.

The problem is not to select one of these interpretations of value and reject the others as false. In actual fact every one of these elements chosen respectively by the different theories of value to bear the honor of the label "value in its true and essential nature" modifies choice in every instance of its occurrence and so might be legitimately selected as the guiding thread in judging what is better and worse. It is impossible to demonstrate that a theory developed to put the label of "value" on one of these determinants rather than another is false. But it can be demonstrated that one determinant present

in every instance of choice serves more reliably and effectively as a guide to the greater good *no matter which of the different accepted theories is taken to define the nature of this greater good*. In other words, one can define the nature of the good or the better according to any of the recognized theories, still it can be demonstrated that one particular interpretation of value will have to be used if one is to be particularly effective in achieving the good as defined by any of the other theories.

I propose to set forth this one particular interpretation of value which must be used for practical purposes no matter what other theory one may prefer to take as the true one. I myself consider them all to be true within the limits noted, but only one to be useful.

With these reservations I defend the following theory of value as being superior to all others because of its utility⁹.

Value is of three kinds: intrinsic, instrumental, and creative. Intrinsic value is qualitative meaning. Meaning is any structure of interrelatedness whereby events and their possibilities are so connected that when one of these events impinges on an organism, the organism can apprehend how other events and possibilities are related to one another and to this impinging event. For example, a sequence of sounds are so related to a chain of organic reactions in my organism, and also to happenings in the world round about, and to possibilities, that when I hear those sounds I know they are footsteps. I know they are the footsteps of Mr. Jones and that he is coming to tell me the outcome of the fight between his dog and mine. In some cases I can even feel the qualities of the events that entered into the dog fight, these events being distinguished and connected with one another by way of that structure of interrelatedness which we call the meaning. These qualities are sound, color, excitement, expectation, triumph, chagrin, joy, sorrow, and all that infinity of qualities for which we have no words.

When I cannot only know the order of events but can also feel the qualities of these events as they are distinguished and connected into a system by the structure of interrelatedness called the meaning, I have a case of qualitative meaning. When I cannot feel the qualities but can know the order in which the events occur and can guide my conduct by that knowledge, I have a case of instrumental meaning which is not qualitative.

We have set forth intrinsic and instrumental value in terms of meaning. But what is creative value? It is the process of transformation whereby is developed that intricate system of reactions in the organism relative to happenings in the environment which enable the individual to experience meaning. From the day of its birth the human organism begins to interact with the environment in such a way as to acquire more meaning. The touch of the mother's breast, the sight of the bottle, muscular pressures, and touches of those that care for the infant, all these events become connected with other events and possibilities in that way which we have called meaning, so that when they happen to the infant he is aware of certain possibilities that are likely to happen, yielding qualities pleasant or unpleasant, as the case may be. This is meaning.

In time another kind of event begins to take on meaning for the child, namely, those events which we call spoken words. This is a momentous attainment of tremendous importance, because it enables the child to inherit the meanings accumulated through history by millions of other men and women, and to gather up by way of the dragnet of society meanings otherwise inaccessible to him. No longer is he limited to those events which can be distinguished and connected and ordered into the structures of meaning by his own physiological interchange with the physical world. He can acquire through communication the meanings created in the lives of innumerable other men in situations which he

⁹For fuller exposition of this interpretation of value see *The Source of Human Good*, by the present writer.

himself could never enter. Not all communication generates new meaning in the participants and their appreciable world. Much of it does not, much communication merely brings to attentive awareness meanings already known and previously acquired. But new meanings are acquired through communication and the amount is really enormous when we consider how much we can know and feel in the world that would be wholly inaccessible to us, were it not for creative communication.

This transition from meanings created by physiological interaction with the environment to meanings created by communication, lifts the infant to the level of what is distinctively human, because the world created in this second way is the world that can be expanded in scope and enriched with quality beyond any known limit. It is infinite as compared to the temporal and spatial and qualitative limits of any world attainable without communication of this sort. Also this world alone can take on the order of logic and reason because logic and reason apply only to linguistic meaning.

What, then, is this peculiar kind of value which we call creative? It is (1) that transformation of the reactions of the physiological organism and the environment relative to one another which generates and magnifies meaning at the nonlinguistic level and then (2) lifts to the linguistic level and there creates meaning extending perhaps infinitely in scope, complexity, and richness of quality. Of course this transformation is always social. It could never occur between a single isolated human organism and its environment. Always it must be associated human organisms and their physical environment which provide the context in which this creativity occurs. The individual in isolation can of course develop the resources acquired when in association and indeed should have isolation within limits to this end. But if he is too long separated from others of his kind, degeneration and impoverishment set in. The richness and scope of meaning which the world can have for him diminish.

We propose that the only guiding thread that can lead on with assurance to the increase of human good is this creative process.

Here, then, we have the standard for judging which alternative is better when responsible choice evaluates the open options and decides with wisdom and intelligence on one course as over against all others. One alternative is better if the consequences flowing from it establish conditions more favorable to the release of this creative transformation whereby meaning grows. Why is friendliness better than enmity? Honesty than deceit? Health than sickness? Cooperation than strife? And so on through a long list of alternatives. The first term in each of these dualities is not necessarily and always better, but it is better in many cases, because it provides the conditions under which creative communication can occur and the transformation of a less meaningful world into one more rich with meaning can occur. All the different social sciences, and all the other sciences also for that matter, in conduct inquiries that will reveal in complicated instances what alternative will better promote this creativity which creates us and progressively transforms us when required conditions are present.

All we have done here is to try to lift out and set forth with more precision one of the basic requirements of freedom, if freedom is understood to be what Gallagher says it is. Freedom as causation in the form of conscious responsible choice is not fully exposed in its true character until we are clear on what is the most reliable criterion for evaluating alternative courses of action.

2. Personality of the Human Individual

If an organism is to be human, the events that occur within it (its reactions) must be so connected with events occurring in other associated organisms and in the world round about, and these all ordered in such a way, that it can be the bearer of meanings at

the linguistic level. An organism becomes more of a personality, becomes a greater person, to the measure that (1) he has that kind of sensitivity and responsiveness to others whereby meaning can be created for him and for them and (2) thereby attains a vaster richer world of meaning. A personality is great to the measure that he can, otherwise stated, feel what others feel, think what they think, and thereby multiply manifold the scope and richness of the appreciable world.

Only as the individual undergoes this kind of transformation and acquires such a system of meaning, does he have what we call a human mind. Only as he acquires such meanings is he able to predict consequences and evaluate them as better and worse. Hence, only to the measure he is thus transformed can he exercise freedom as interpreted by Gallagher. Only as the individual undergoes this kind of transformation can he predict and evaluate consequences as good for himself *because* they are good for others, and good for others *because* they are good for him.

Some may ask whence comes the uniqueness and originality of the individual person if the vast preponderance of his meanings (ideas, feelings, content of consciousness) are derived from others. The answer is plain. Uniqueness and originality is the unique and original integration within the individual of the meanings derived from others through communication. Einstein's innovating theory arose in this way precisely, so also with all the other great history making innovations of the human mind. Important originality never arises by ignoring or being ignorant of what others think and feel, but in exactly the opposite way, providing there can also be periods of isolation and incubation.

Under some circumstances creativity can occur progressively. The individual undergoes creative integration and brings forth a new meaning built out of meanings derived from others. This new integration may be communicated to others who assimilate it into a wider and richer integration by merging with it resources uniquely accessible to them, and so on, from man to man and age to age. Of course all this can be blocked and new creation (along with the old) can be destroyed faster than it is produced.

3 Causation and Determinism

Causation is any predictable and retro-predictable sequence of events. Retro-predictable is a sequence that can be traced back into the past. Predictable does not mean actually predicted, but it does mean what could be predicted by the individual organisms concerned if they conducted the proper inquiry. This in turn requires that these organisms have been subjected to creative transformation to the point where they are capable of having the kind of meanings enabling them to distinguish and relate events after the manner of the predictable order.

Causation is one kind of meaning. It is a basic and necessary ingredient in all meaning. Linguistic signs could not be ordered and used to symbolize meanings, if language did not display the principles of causation. If contractions of the larynx did not produce sounds and if these sounds did not vary in precise correlation with changes in the vocal organs, there could be no language. Neither could linguistic signs represent wide ranges of events with their possibilities, if these events did not conform to the principles of causation, because we could not otherwise know that these events would hang together in the order represented by our language. The kind of established order called causation makes possible that reliable ordering of events and possibilities which is the essential nature of meaning.

Causation itself, so far as we can have anything to do with it at all, is the product of the creative process above described. It is the consequence of that transformation of the organism on the one hand, and the environment relative to the organism on the other, such that reactions in the organism can be so connected with events outside, that pre-

diction and retro-prediction along with causation and meaning become realities. Order, meaning, causation, and determinism are all symbiotically related, to use Gallagher's term. No one of them could exist or have being without the others. They are all aspects of the same thing and could be reduced to the same principle as Einstein has reduced many different laws to the same comprehensive law. Without causation or determinism we could have no minds, no world, no values, no meanings.

The appreciable world with its order, meaning, value, and determinism can expand in scope and become more rich and vivid with qualities. It can also diminish in scope and become more impoverished and pale in quality. Whether it expands or contracts, becomes more rich and vivid or more drab and meaningless, depends preeminently in this age of human power on whether we exercise our freedom to evaluate alternative courses of action in such a way as to defend and extend those conditions under which creativity can do its work among men.

That choice is better always and everywhere which provides more surely and amply the conditions under which the creative process of transformation working in human organisms, between human organisms in association, and between these all and the physical world, can generate a richer and more inclusive world of meaning, order and appreciation.

4 History

History is the rise and fall, the release and the blocking, of the creative process above described. History in this sense is creative of the human world. Without history in this sense there could be no humanity and no world having the form and quality which human beings can apprehend and appreciate. The world of meaning and appreciation, of order and causation, of prediction and control, is the creature of history.

It is not true to say that the human person lives through history. History creates him or destroys him progressively. To the measure that the human person is identically the same from day to day and year to year, there is no history, because history is precisely the transformation of the human person for better or for worse. Only as one becomes different with the passage of time, either through the increase of that system of meaning which is his personality, or the decrease of it, is there any history.

So likewise history creates and destroys society. When there is no creation or destruction of it, there is no history. Therefore it is not correct to say that a society continues through history. When there is history, the society ceases to continue as it was. It becomes different because history is precisely this becoming different in respect to range, form, and content of meaning. Any change in institutions, any change in the way men interact with one another and with their physical world, is significant only as it releases or obstructs the creative process. When there is no creation or destruction of the appreciable world accessible to the minds of men, there is no history, even though changes without significance still go on. In such case, time and change continue but history is dead.

If we are to be precise, we must say that creativity never ceases while man endures, because infants are always developing minds and personalities and new meanings are always emerging in society, integrating with the old, and enriching life, while in other areas the reverse occurs. But these significant creations and obstructions may be so hidden or so small that the historian cannot perceive them, and so we can say figuratively that in such a time history is dead. But if history truly died, man would disappear.

5 Freedom

We now come back to the problem of freedom with the concepts of value, personality, causation, and history more fully developed for interpreting it. We accept Gallagher's

statement of its nature, namely *Choice exemplifies freedom* when it is determined both by the past and also by correct appraisal of alternative courses of action

The past determines free choice by establishing the conditions under which choice and action can occur and must operate. Also it determines what alternatives shall be open for consideration. Furthermore, the past endows the individual with that personal equipment of meanings without which he could not predict the consequences of choice nor evaluate them, the scope and correctness of his prediction and evaluation can reach no farther than his meanings can reach. Lastly the past determines choice by determining what standard the individual shall use in evaluating the good and evil, the better and worse, of alternatives open to him for consideration.

But free choice is not only determined by the past in these several ways. It is also determined by evaluation. Evaluation determines choice by determining which alternatives shall be chosen by reason of the greater good it promises.

We can now state the nature of freedom in still another way. Choice is free to the measure that it is determined (1) by what the creativity of past history has produced, and (2) by correctly evaluating and choosing that course of action which will most fully release creativity for the future. Choice is free to the measure that it is determined by past creativity working through history to provide (1) conditions most favorable for deliberate choice and consequent action, (2) alternatives relevant to the problem of the greater good, (3) meanings wide in range and rich in quality for making predictions and evaluations, (4) a reliable standard for distinguishing good and evil, better and worse, at those levels where life is most profoundly determined in one way or the other. In sum, a man is free to the measure that he is most completely determined by creativity and most effectively serves creativity. A man is free to the measure that he gives himself over into the power and keeping of the creative event, to be transformed by it in any way that it may require and to serve it above all.

The problem of fostering freedom can be broken down into components as follows:

1. How enable the individual to develop the widest range and richest content of meanings with which to appraise alternative courses of action?

2. How enable the individual to acquire the most correct standard for appraising alternatives open to him?

3. How develop that state of society and physical nature that will enable the individual to follow the guidance of his own meanings and apply the best standard for evaluation. This last can in turn be broken down into the following:

(1) The individual must not be unduly intimidated.

(2) He must have access to the pertinent facts.

(3) He must have the required leisure, health, peace of mind, etc.

(4) He must have the desire, impulse, and guiding principles required to exercise the kind of choice that is free.

(5) He must give himself in faith to be determined by and to serve that creativity which we have seen is the source and the goal of all action that is free.

The various components within the problem of freedom as we have analyzed it, reveal the tasks that fall to the various departments of human life in promoting and exercising freedom. Guarding the individual from undue intimidation is the work of social theory and organization. Giving him access to the pertinent facts is the responsibility of education and all the sciences. Leisure, health, peace of mind, and the like will depend upon the organization and conduct of industry, economics, agencies of social welfare, clinical psychology, etc. The desire, impulse, and guiding principles for exercising freedom are the responsibility of morals. The last requirement falls to religion. Most religion as we find it in the world today works against freedom and does more harm than good. But

religion that takes the form of absolute commitment of faith to this creative transformation which we have been describing, magnifies the meaning of the world and is basic to any freedom now possible or to be achieved

Freedom can be increased to any marked degree only by way of history, which means a sequence of generations exercising responsible choice in such manner as to provide for that creative transformation of man and his world which magnifies meaning. Often the conditions for this creative advance must be built up gradually for many years and during this period until the required set of conditions is complete, there may seem to be no progress. Even the opposite may seem to occur. But when at last the required set of conditions have been completed under which creative transformation can occur, we have one of the splendid ages of history. Whether Periclean Athens and Elizabethan England are the best examples, I must leave to men more competent than I in the field of historical evaluation.

It may be that our age of frustration and confusion and destruction will issue in a time of splendor. But such a time is never endowed with that kind of comfort, ease, and complacency which Americans have come to identify with the good life. Creative transformation of individual and society is often painful, difficult, dangerous, and humiliating. Until we learn to accept it on such terms, an age of splendor can never be ours. Comfort, ease, and complacency go best with stagnation preceding breakdown.

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CHAPTER XLVIII

Religion and World Fellowship (A Hindu Viewpoint)

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PEACE THROUGH WORLD FELLOWSHIP has been a cherished dream of rational human beings from an early period of the world's history. Men's efforts to achieve that end have covered various fields—the political, military, economic, scientific, and religious.

Alexander, Julius Caesar, and Napoleon embarked on their conquests with a view to bringing the whole earth under one rule so that all men could live peacefully like brothers. The British Empire and Commonwealth of Nations is a continuation of the same ideal with a different administrative technique. The dream of the military despots ended with their lives. The British experiment is far from a success.

Europe wanted to eliminate war through the device of the balance of power. For several centuries political relationships were determined by it. But the very effort to preserve such a balance often precipitated war. The modern device of blocs and spheres does not hold a better prospect for world peace.

Since the Napoleonic wars the statesmen of Europe have thought of settling disputes through arbitration. The concert of Europe and the Hague Arbitration Court were established. Later a similar experiment was made through the League of Nations. But not any of these could prevent a strong nation from attacking a weaker one. The tiger was permitted to devour the lamb, only the table manners were criticized. The present United Nations deliberations have not yet inspired us with the prospect of peace.

It has often been thought that wars were the outcome of the greed and lust for power of kings and potentates. According to this view the people hate war. It is they who suffer most from its consequences. Further, the common people are endowed with sound common sense. They do not have the ambition of the leaders. When they meet in normal times, they act like the best of friends. Through their unsophisticated nature they soon realize that what is good for one man must be good for all, no matter where they live. So it was thought that the growth of democracy would usher in an age of universal peace. But unfortunately two world wars have shattered any such pleasant illusion. When a war breaks out, whatever may be its cause, the people keep it going. They find in it an outlet for their suppressed emotions, a release from the boredom of a humdrum life. Through clever propaganda they are taught to hate people whom they have never seen. During the past war men have been heard to describe with total callousness, and sometimes with a ghoulish joy, how, from a high altitude, they wiped out at night a populous area with its hundreds of fellow beings. For many people war is still a psychological necessity. Even today two great countries, both claiming to be ruled by the people, are fast transforming themselves into huge barrels of powder which, if ignited, may very well reduce to ashes many cherished features of our civilization. No, democracy has not yet been proved to be the solution.

Other panaceas have been suggested, such as the growth of commerce. It is often said that as countries are linked by trade, the chances of war are minimized for the sheer fear of dislocating the economic equilibrium of the world. But how ironical has been the laughter of God at this fond hope! The great wars of our times have been fought mainly for economic reasons. Mineral deposits, raw materials, and a ready market are some of the potential causes of modern wars.

One hears, now and then, powerful voices asking for the increase of armaments—especially weapons of the most destructive kind—as a guaranty of peace. We are told that this is an effective means of scaring a potential aggressor. The assumption is that the heavily armed nation will never start a war nor will participate in war except in self-protection or in support of a weak and helpless country. And yet all wars in history have been fought on the specious plea of righteousness, claimed by victors and vanquished alike. Again, if all the great nations are armed *cap-a-pie*, so the argument runs, the knowledge of the havoc and holo-

caust that can be produced will act as a deterrent. This argument, too, is weak. In both world wars the belligerents knew of the dangerous weapons possessed by each.

A war, we are inclined to believe, is caused by men who are in a temporarily demented condition. Otherwise, how can they—who are generally kind, unselfish, considerate, and endowed with many ethical virtues—plan with absolute coolness the annihilation of their fellow men, whom they loved and honored before and will again love and honor after the war is over? Perhaps psychoanalysts will someday make a thorough investigation into the causes of war, from the standpoint of their particular science. But it can be said that when a war breaks out, men and their leaders rush down the precipice to self-destruction like the Gergesenean swine, possessed with the devils of hatred.

Today, in the parade of peacemakers, the leaders of religion, who in olden times generally formed the vanguard, bring up the rear. With lofty condescension toward mundane things, they proclaim that religion alone can establish peace on earth and goodwill among men. The animal instincts of selfishness, greed, and lust for power, they say, can be suppressed or sublimated by such virtues as love of God, kindness, friendship, and unselfishness. The ideal of religion is not the kingdom of earth but the Kingdom of Heaven. The brotherhood of men and the Fatherhood of God, it says, are the surest foundation of peace.

Cynics, however, are not convinced. The Fatherhood of God or human brotherhood are matters of faith and not demonstrable truths. Further, brotherhood is a fragile bond. The past history of religion does not inspire faith regarding its future role as a peacemaker. One would like to know whether any secular cause has been responsible for more hatred, passion, and cruelty. In the world today there are enough religions to help men hate one another, but where is enough religious spirit among them to help men love one another? In the past two wars the major belligerents professed the Christian faith. Japan owes allegiance to Buddha, the Prince of Compassion. Jews are shedding blood in Palestine in the name of religion. Religious strife among the Hindus and Moslems in India has made that unfortunate country a butt of ridicule in the outside world and has been inflicting untold suffering upon the Indians themselves. And all these religions preach peace and brotherhood. While statesmen, economists, and scientists are realizing the interdependence of men, religious organizations have hardly changed their parochial out-

look During the past war, ministers of religion sometimes blessed submarines and bombers. Churches sold war bonds It is no wonder that people are becoming opposed to religious institutions and, what is worse, indifferent to them^a

Yet the cause of the present world malady is a spiritual one and its remedy also is spiritual Political, economic, social, and moral tensions are the symptoms of a deeprooted disease created by man's spiritual ignorance and maladjustment. Lust for power, greed, vanity, selfishness, and the desire to dominate cannot be removed by moral suasion, military power, political slogans, or economic adjustment. Man's evil tendencies can be removed only by educating him about the true nature of his soul and its destiny, his relationship with the universe and its Creator Nothing else can fundamentally change human nature

But before human nature can be changed, a reorientation of religion is necessary Religion should not be based upon mere belief in a set of dogmas or creeds It is not merely "ethics tinged with emotion." The foundation of true religion is experience Through religious experience men resolve the contradictions of the outer life and see the whole universe as the manifestation of an indivisible Spirit

Hinduism gives a spiritual interpretation of the universe and man. The universe is a projection of the Godhead All objects are filled with the Divine Spirit and are essentially not different from it It is like the ocean, the waves, and the foam, the essence of these is the same stuff—water The notion of Nature as "red in tooth and claw" is based on a partial truth. Competition may be the method of evolution at a lower stage, but the law of cooperation and consecration functions at a higher level. In the experience of the mystics, the universe without a spiritual foundation is illusory, transitory, and "the abode of suffering"

Man also is a spiritual entity The soul of man, the Atman of Hindu philosophy, is totally different from the body, the senses, and the mind.^b

^aComment by Ralph T. Flewelling

In view of the criticism of the churches and religion for their peace propaganda, it seems hardly appropriate to charge them with "bringing up the rear" in advocacy of peace No other organizations, political or social, began to declare for peace as did the churches In general, the writer sums up the shortcomings of the non-religious and charges them to religion

^bComment by Ralph T. Flewelling

In view of the preceding affirmation that "All objects are filled with the Divine Spirit and are essentially not different from it," this statement seems an inexplicable paradox How can any two things be both identical and different at the same time?

It is Spirit—eternally free, illumined, and pure. Unlimited by time and space, and unaffected by causality, it is infinite, all pervading, and immortal. Birth, growth, old age, and death refer to the body alone and not to the soul. Man's actions and thoughts do not really affect the soul. The Upanishad says that the soul does not expand by virtuous action nor does it contract by its opposite. By wicked action a man stains his mind and so does not see the glories of his true self. Righteous action removes the impurities. On account of the inscrutable cosmic ignorance—called *maya* by the Hindu philosophers—the infinite soul identifies itself with body, mind, and senses, and becomes finite and individualized. Thus we have a Hindu or a Christian or a Jew or a white man or a black man. The finite soul becomes a victim of the pairs of opposites, such as life and death, good and evil, pain and pleasure. Then it engages in various activities to shun the evil and enjoy the good. In order to reap the fruit of its action, the individualized soul reincarnates itself in the relative universe. It feels now and then a nostalgic yearning to regain its transcendental and immortal nature. Disillusioned by the experiences of the world, and instructed about truth by an illumined teacher, the individualized soul practices spiritual disciplines and in the end attains to freedom through self-knowledge. A free soul sees himself in all and all in himself. This is the basis of the Golden Rule of religion. A Hindu proverb says: "Only a small minded man thinks that this person is his friend and that person is his enemy, but to the truly wise all beings are his kith and kin." Further, a free soul sees God in all and all in God. The outer forms are only masks through which the inner Spirit shines. This is the real basis of freedom and democracy.

The Godhead is One without a second. It is Spirit and Consciousness and the unchanging Reality behind all names and forms. It has neither beginning nor end. It alone exists. The wise man sees the Godhead, the universe, and living beings as identical with one another. Devoid of all attributes, It cannot be described by words or comprehended by the mind. It is the unrelated Ground of the universe. As the mirage cannot exist without the desert, so also the universe cannot exist without the Godhead. Things appear to be real because the Godhead forms their inmost essence. The same Godhead manifests Itself in time and space as the Personal God, the Creator and Preserver of the universe. The Gods of the different faiths—Allah, Jehovah, the Father in Heaven, Siva, or Vishnu—are but different names of the Personal God. God incarnates Himself as

a man whenever virtue subsides and vice prevails in the world. For the protection of the virtuous, the chastisement of the wicked, and the establishment of righteousness, He was born in the world as Moses, Christ, Buddha, Krishna, and other Divine Incarnations. And there will be similar Incarnations in the future. God becomes man so that man may become God.

According to Hinduism, religious disciplines cannot be standardized. The discipline of unselfish action is prescribed for the active person, the discipline of love that seeks no return, for the emotional, that of discrimination, for the philosophical, and the discipline of self-control and concentration, for the psychic and introspective. All paths lead to the same goal of God-consciousness. The purpose of discipline is to purify the heart. The pure hearted at once see the self-luminous truth and become free from the bondage of the world.⁴

Fanaticism, exclusiveness, and the spirit of intolerance are the drawbacks of organized religions. These are noticed particularly in those faiths which hold the Personal God to be the highest spiritual experience. Directly and indirectly they preach salvation through a particular discipline. Thus a historical religion is apt to encourage bigotry. But from the standpoint of ultimate experience, all faiths are but diverse manifestations of one true religion which is God Himself. Faiths differ only in non-essential matters due to external conditions, such as climate, soil, people, and tradition. But they all agree on essential matters, such as unselfishness, love, purity, goodness, inner life, and contemplation. The aspirants of all faiths should find a common ground in their aspiration and sincerity. Religious leaders should urge their followers to make an individual effort to realize the goal, which is not confined within the narrow limits of any church. A great Hindu mystic once said that a man should be born in a church but he should not die in it.

Nothing wonderful would happen to the world if all the people were converted to Hinduism or Buddhism or Christianity or Judaism, because the followers of these various faiths have not proved themselves to be very wonderful. But something definitely wonderful would happen if only a few people set themselves, heart and soul, to realize truth. Like

⁴Comment by Alfred C. Lane.

If the references to Hinduism by Swami Nikhilananda do not seem to fit with those one has or would gather from such a book as Hawkrigge's *Indian Gods and Kings*, one must remember the different experiences of the writers. Part of education should be to give an experience that is shared as a basis for understanding what is said.

goodness, beauty, and love, truth is not the monopoly of any sect or cult. Art, science, religion, and philosophy are all paths leading to truth. "It is a mistake," wrote Doctor William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury, "to suppose that God is only or even chiefly concerned with religion." Lecomte du Nouy writes in *Human Destiny*: "Independent of any rite, of any church, there has always existed in the world a religious spirit, a desire to believe, a desire to adore without restriction, a desire to humiliate oneself in total veneration, a desire to elevate oneself by approaching a conceivable but inaccessible ideal. It is this desire which is of divine origin, because it is universal and identical in all men."¹

Nevertheless we need organized religions. Suppose a dictator like Kemal Pasha or Lenin destroyed all churches, temples, mosques, synagogues, and other places of worship, suppose he burned the Bible, the Koran, the Vedas, and all other sacred scriptures—very soon civilization would disappear and human beings would lapse into the state of beasts. Churches are necessary. Even dogmas and rites are helpful to those who cannot appreciate the abstruse philosophy of religion. If properly used, these disciplines open a devotee's vision to the Infinite, but if improperly used they can keep him down on the earth.

Here are a few concrete suggestions as to how organized religions can promote human fellowship. First, in the theological seminaries the principal religions of the world should be taught and discussed. A religion should be taught by one who belongs to it or at least has a warm affection for it. A living faith which is regarded by a large number of people as a means of salvation must be entitled to everyone's respect. Second, a minister should frequently quote from scriptures other than his own to explain the reality of God and spiritual values. Deep spiritual experiences are universal and have been shared by all faiths. Third, a church should celebrate the holy days and sacred occasions of other churches. This broadens our perspective and promotes human fellowship. Toleration is not enough; a genuine devotee is loyal to his own ideal and at the same time respectful of the ideals of others. It can never be overemphasized that different faiths are necessary to suit different tastes and temperaments.

All religions are based on ethical foundations. If they should disregard ethics they would become tools of cruelty and oppression. Though a

¹Lecomte du Nouy, *Human Destiny*, Longmans, Green and Company, New York, copyright, 1947, by Lecomte du Nouy.

mystic often transcends ethics, yet by no means is he unethical. As he sees God in all beings and all beings in God, he can never injure anybody. The basis of ethical disciplines such as love, sacrifice, and self-control is the unity of existence, which is a spiritual experience.

Like ethical disciplines, social service is also a means to the ultimate end of God-consciousness. Unless a social worker sees God in those whom he serves, his activity may become mechanical or merely a means to kill the boredom of life or to earn name, fame, and power. Three conditions must be fulfilled before a man may aspire to become a genuine social servant. First, he must truly feel the suffering of others. Second, he must find out the right means to alleviate human suffering. Third, he must be totally unselfish. There should not be any motive of personal gain or power behind his social service. A man who sees the Divine Spirit in all can be the true servant of society. To him work is the same as worship.^d

True religious experience does not contradict science, technology, politics, economics, or other branches of human knowledge. All forms of knowledge are uplifting. The laws of science are also manifestations of the divine law. A scientist in his research is impelled by a mystic urge. In the building of a well integrated and enduring culture, spiritual knowledge and material science can work hand in hand, as testified by the great achievements of the Buddhist and Hindu civilizations. In the development of Western culture and American democracy, religion made a vital contribution. Only for the past fifty years have the intellectual leaders of the Western world come under the spell of science and technology and become indifferent to religion and morality. And at what cost! Ruthless competition, intense selfishness, unbridled greed, and unquenchable lust for power have in one generation well nigh destroyed the foundation of Western society. As the future religion of the world must not contradict the scientific method, science also, to be the benefactor of society, must be imbued with the religious spirit. Science gives men power which, if used by those who are emotionally at the level of primitive savages and intellectually at the level of children, cannot but create havoc.

The essential problem of today is that of changing human nature. When the leaders of society are endowed with righteousness and nobility,

^dComment by Ralph T. Flewelling

This paper is admirable in calling attention to the ethical and spiritual values which all religions seek in common and which might become the basis for common understanding or at least for cooperation.

then science, technology, politics, art, law, and all other branches of knowledge can promote human fellowship. All these tools are needed to bring men together and make them realize that they are members of a common family. This righteousness becomes natural and spontaneous with those who have the exalted vision of the reality of God, the divinity of the soul, the unity of existence, and the harmony of religions. Genuine human fellowship is a spiritual experience.

CHAPTER XLIX

Nationalist and Internationalist Tendencies in Islam

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THE UNIVERSALISM of Christianity has never dogmatically been identified with the destiny of any one nation. The universalism of Islam on the other hand has never severed its original connection with the destiny of the Arab world. The fundamental contradiction between the universal mission of the Prophet Mohammed, sent to bring the one and only truth to all of mankind, and his more special mission to the Arabs, to whom he was expected to convey that truth in their own language and in a sense adapted to their own special needs, has never been healed by later theology.

What Mohammed felt he had been elected to do was to bring to his people, hitherto neglected by prophecy, an Arab version of the unalterable verities contained in the heavenly book of which the Jewish and the Christian scriptures had been earlier "copies," falsified in the course of time by the malice of vested priestly interests. Mohammed's preaching succeeded in bringing about the unification of most of the Arabian peninsula, and, willy-nilly, in a missionary spirit his successors spread at the same time the rule of the Arabs and the rule of Islam. Less than one hundred years after the Prophet's death his religion and the empire to which it lent coherence stretched from the Indian border to the Pyrenees. The Arabs, possessors of the scriptures and of political power, succeeded in attracting the political and religious loyalties of a majority of their subjects, but adoption of the ruling faith, while establishing, theoretically at least,

complete equality before God, did not imply social or political equality.^a

The national factor, membership in the Arab nation, was for a long time to remain decisive in determining a man's position and possibilities within the empire. The older nations, partly kept together by religious ties, developed a vigorous reaction against their Arab overlords, and movements of clearly nationalistic character grew up during the eighth and ninth centuries. Heterodoxies helped to rationalize the antagonism of the non-Arabs against their masters, but after a few generations' struggle it became evident that in spite of the recession of Arab supremacy, the hold of Islam remained unshaken and that the civilization which gradually had come to unify the area was to continue in an Arab form, that is to say, using the Arabic language for all religious and learned pursuits and allowing even the most successful nationalism, that of the Persians, only a limited cultural isolation.

Thus the unity of the Islamic civilization outlived the unity of the Muslim empire. The prime loyalty of the medieval Muslim, one might say, belonged to Islam and not to a particular political unit. The Arabic Book, whose translation was strictly discouraged by the consensus of legal authorities, as well as the voluminous theological, philosophical, and scientific literature which had grown around it, kept the identification of Mohammedanism and Arabism effectively in the minds of all Muslims. In this sense Islam successfully preserved a sense of supernational unity in the Near East while safeguarding a feeling—for centuries unsupported by political realities—of the superiority of the Arab race. Muslim civilization outside of Persia thus continued to present itself in an Arabic garb long after the majority of creative personalities were recruited from non-Arab stock. And to this day the curious uniformity the Muslim world shows to the superficial observer is due in large measure to the universal acceptance over many centuries of Arab forms of expression on the higher cultural levels.

The nineteenth century saw a conscious attempt of the Turkish monarchs to counteract the disruption of Islam due to the development of national states which had led to the establishment of two hostile Muslim

^aComment by Swami Akhilananda

If there is any real universality in any society, it is in Islamic society. They do not recognize a caste or class system, although it must be admitted that non-Islamic people have no place in the scheme of the vast majority of the Mohammedan groups. We must say, however, that the Sufis and Ahmadiyas of India are considerably liberal to other religious groups.

power centers Persia, where a heterodox form of Islam had become the state religion, and the Ottoman Empire, which continued orthodox Sunnism. They did so by reinterpreting the concept of the caliphate. Originally the caliph (literally, deputy or successor) had been nothing but the administrator of the Muslim Empire, whose laws had been determined once and for all by revelation and whose constitution he was not in any way entitled to change. Prompted perhaps by the Western misunderstanding of the caliph as an Islamic pope, the Turkish sultans, working to restore the balance of power against the encroaching West, developed and propagandized the idea of the caliph as the spiritual ruler of all Muslims regardless of their political loyalty.

For a while Pan-Islamism seemed to grip the Muslim masses, and an international empire appeared to be spreading invisibly, as it were, across political borderlines. However, when the Sultan's summons in 1914 to all Muslims to rise in a Holy War against the foes, failed to stir the Muslims outside his border and did not even affect the attitude of his Arab subjects to any considerable extent, it became evident that in Islam, too, the strength of national consciousness had overcome that of the religious consciousness as the prime motive in political behavior. The general realization of this fact placed Islam in a peculiar defensive position. The postwar world was organized, theoretically at least, strictly along national lines. The right of self-determination implied the decision of the individual national groups to organize themselves into independent states. While not all national aspirations came to immediate fruition, those aspirations were always stated in terms of national rather than religious rights.

The Muslim world gave rise to a renewed Turkey containing only the largely Turkish parts of the former Ottoman Empire. It gave rise to Arab states in Egypt, in Iraq, in Arabia proper, and it prepared ultimate independence of Arab states in Syria and the Lebanon. Persia underwent a revival along nationalistic lines, and even backward and conservative Afghanistan experienced a movement of reform based on what must be considered Afghan nationalism. Representatives of the more strictly religious outlook were forced by popular opinion to endorse the nationalistic independence movements, although they were undoubtedly aware of the disruptive consequences of full nationalist success. The immediate consequence of this apparent change of heart on the part of the orthodox was the leveling off of sectarian antagonisms. The Wahhabites of

the Arabian peninsula, who had been fought for generations with weapons both temporal and spiritual, but who had recently succeeded in unifying the peninsula and injecting added strength into the front of the Arab states, came to be considered in a more conciliatory spirit, and their orthodoxy no longer was impugned with the traditional emphasis.

Had Islamic orthodoxy still exercised the controlling influence over the minds of all the Muslim peoples, it would have been more than questionable whether the alliance of Sa'dabad (1937) between the Turks, Persians, Iraqis, and Afghans could ever have been concluded. The Treaty of Sa'dabad tied together at least the foreign policies of four states which, although all of them had practically no non-Muslim subjects, represented three incompatible attitudes toward the Islamic religion as such. Turkey had emerged in the 20s as a purely secular state strictly divorcing religion and civic life, Persia was still officially committed to Shi'ism as the state religion, while Afghanistan and the governing class in Iraq followed the Sunni orthodox tradition. It would be a fallacy, however, to conclude from this and similar developments that Islam as such acts at present as a decisive force amongst the various nations of the Near East.

The situation can perhaps be clarified by the parallel phenomenon of Catholicism in our Western nationalistic world. Catholics of different countries do doubtless cherish a sense of community and spiritual intimacy. Nevertheless, Catholicism no longer can be considered the prime motive force of the average citizen of the average Western national state. Even countries where non-Catholics constitute a negligible minority are in their political views no longer primarily motivated by the fact of the religious preponderance of Catholicism. The history of the past ten or twenty years has demonstrated that a Catholic bloc of nations is no longer politically feasible despite the strength of the church and of church feeling in say, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Austria, and Ireland. Had Marshal Pétain's favorite project of a Latin bloc materialized, it would have had to draw on the kinship feeling of Latin nationalisms rather than on the community feeling of Catholicism. With all this the super-national binding force of Catholicism cannot be underrated, nor should the super-national feeling of unity conveyed by Islam be played down. Nationalist battles in the Near East are fought under nationalist slogans by the leading strata of society, but it is very largely under the banner of religion

that the populace is willing to struggle and die for the cause.^b When the demands of the Arab nations are articulated to the Western world it is almost always done in nationalist terms. In the domestic propaganda, however, the Muslim and therewith the internationalist note is much stronger.

Thus it is fairly obvious that Islam as such does not at present promote large scale political aspirations directed toward a restoration of the ancient caliphate. The struggle of its leading representatives goes toward preservation rather than expansion. Spiritual unity is to be maintained across the frontiers of the several independent Muslim states. As long as the struggle for effective independence of those states is not completed, overplaying of the more specific Muslim line would clearly be hurtful to the attainment of this immediate end. It would endanger the cooperation of the Christian Arab groups, more specifically it would make extremely difficult the position of the Lebanese Republic, whose singular position

^bComment by Swami Akhilananda

It is evident that most of the Islamic groups and some other religious groups feel that there is only one way of religious development, so they become very rigid in their national and religious attitude. This has created tension all through the centuries. The religious groups who do not recognize the validity of different methods for realization of the Ultimate Reality would necessarily try to force their method, however great that may be, on others. There is infinite variety in human nature, consequently, there will be variations in the understanding of the Ultimate Reality and in its realization. The more these religions recognize this psychological fact, the less they will create tension.

Comment by Ralph T. Flewelling

In international understanding Islam seems to be about the hardest nut to crack, since it is founded in deep emotional convictions that can yield only to a broad and neutral type of education. Perhaps the most we can do is to promote a kindly interest and a recognition of the truly spiritual elements in Islam. My only contact with this faith was in China, where I found their religious service to be deeply spiritual and devotional, the Mullahs to be kindly and saintly, and their primary school to be armed with all the kindergarten equipment and methods of the West. My friend Mr. Lyman Hoover of the Young Men's Christian Association had a deep place in their affections by reason of his many kindnesses to them and his knowledge of Arabic. He was even allowed to have a photographer present to take pictures of the worshipers in the mosque, and I myself was granted permission to take moving pictures of the priests themselves. Only love and mutual respect can break down the wall of partition.

Comment by Alfred C. Lane

It might be considered whether certain obvious, but perhaps not vitally essential practices (or are they) such as the call to prayers, the abstinence from intoxicants, and the observance of Friday serve as shibboleths.

It may also be suggested that scholarly research such as that of the Oriental Institute of Chicago may serve as a bond, but how far does nationalism permit it?

as the only Near Eastern state with a Christian ruling class makes its situation within the Arab League at best appear slightly precarious. It is well known that the Lebanese government has felt compelled to bolster the Christian majority by generous grants of citizenship to Christian but non-Arab foreigners. Islam, therefore, is in the practical policy of the Arab states confined to informing as much as possible of the attitudes and actions of the individual states, much as Catholicism does in the Western world. There is a definite possibility of a Muslim bloc in the United Nations, especially with Pakistan in the United Nations as an independent state. It is, however, not too likely that the operations of such a bloc would be inspired to any considerable degree by an expansionist program of religious coloring.

There are few signs to indicate that the initial antagonism within Islam might be overcome in the foreseeable future. Islam as a unifying force, at the basis of a feeling of cultural kinship, will act as a powerful factor in the configuration of the coming civilization of the Near and Middle East, but will have to make its peace with the non-Arab nationalisms on its territory and to tone down its implied claim to Arab political leadership.⁴ It will have to be satisfied to see the cultural leadership in Islam of the Arabic speaking world continued. The maintenance of this leadership, incidentally, will in all likelihood become increasingly difficult with the emergence of independent intellectual movements in India and in Indonesia. The present situation is characterized by the curious antinomy that makes Islam on the top level a hindrance to full unity, especially within the Arab world, while on the popular level it continues the strongest force in support of those nationalist aspirations which in the last analysis are its most dangerous enemy.

⁴Comment by Swami Akhilananda

We are not sure that the internal tension which has been described by Professor Von Grunbaum is due to the Islamic emphasis on the Arab group and culture. It seems to us that the very emphasis on the narrow view of religion is the basic cause of this tension.

Intellectual, ethical, and spiritual culture of the Islamic groups will certainly remove tension. It is refreshing to note that some Mohammedans in India are definitely against the narrow viewpoint of Islamic culture and the Pan-Islamic Federation. The dynamic religious power of these leaders can remove international tension to a great extent.

APPENDIX I

Three Discussions of Contemporary Art and the Churches¹

Summarized by
GEORGE KUBLER

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THE CHURCHES TODAY neglect or avoid the artists who in this generation may be assimilated to Giotto, Brunelleschi, and Michelangelo. Such men in turn as Courbet, Rodin, and F. L. Wight have been indifferent to the churches. Hence we have no distinguished religious art today. Its absence from the churches is all the more striking in that the fact is rarely noted or discussed, although at least since the mid-nineteenth century the alienation of churches and artists has been an accepted and normal condition in Western society.^a Three main questions arise from the contemporary relation between art and religion: 1) Is the statement a correct description? 2) If so, what does the condition signify and forecast? 3) What are its causes and remedies?

I

The members of the seminar, each from his special point of view, gave an affirmative answer to the first question. The instances are few in which the churches of today have patronized the most gifted living

^aComment by Friedrich Engel-Janosi

I think that this problem is only part of a larger one, that certainly would include the attitude of the churches toward contemporary music.

¹Held during January-April, 1947, as a seminar on art and religion for the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion. Participants: Mehmet Aga-Oglu, Alfred H. Barr, Jr., Moshe Davis, Louis Finkelstein, Edwin R. Goodenough, George Kubler, John LaFarge, S. J., Jacques Lipchitz, Paul J. Tillich, Julian Whittlesey.

artists. Catholics may confide esthetic judgments entirely to their priest, whose judgment thus becomes normative. Protestant and Jewish congregations usually entrust such matters to a committee, whose esthetic standards are subject to a majority vote, often unsatisfactory. In both situations the cases of wrong or uninformed judgment are far more numerous than in the past when religious expression and the art then "modern" were more nearly identical.

This past harmony of religion and art, furthermore, is no longer perceived or understood by the vast majority of churchmen and laymen. Paul J. Tillich has suggested that some relaxation of the close bond between the church and the visual arts occurred as early as the thirteenth century. And as Protestantism was an urban phenomenon among peoples whose mercantile and later industrial interests absorbed their best energies, the neglect of esthetic activity in North European civilization became critical. Among Jews, custom and doctrinal objections of long standing inhibited the medieval and post-medieval development of a vigorous figural art. The Catholic Church, in turn, with its immense inherited treasure of buildings and cult objects, failed to continue its patronage of the great living artists as early as the eighteenth century,^b when indeed secular changes undermined its old authority. Hence in all confessions events led to the divorce of religion and art, a divorce that left the churches either without images, or without meaningful form, except in rare situations such as that of the South German provinces under the Weimar Republic, where an exceptional revival of interest in significant religious art developed briefly. But this revival was due to the energy and intelligence of a few secular personalities associated with the intense reform of design in Republican Germany, more than to churchmen themselves.

The alarming truth seems to be that with few exceptions, churchmen today are unaware of the resources of art, whether past or contemporary, and that living artists are either indifferent to the churches, or are ignored by the churches. Is the reason to be sought in the condition of modern

^bComment by Friedrich Engel-Janosi.

I would not consider this statement correct. For instance, in South Germany and Austria this very period developed a religious Catholic art of special intensity and significance, a Baroque art which produced great religious artists in architecture, as well as in sculpture and painting.

According to the little information I have, I still would consider a contemporary artist like Rouault in France as evidence that we should beware of sweeping statements even for our own period.

religious feeling, or in the internal developments of artistic form, or in neither of these—but in some general, recent revulsion or antipathy toward figural art of religious character?

II

The second meeting of the seminar gave attention to this third question, disregarding for the moment the first two. In general, the discussion centered about the phenomenon of iconoclasm. In the materialist interpretation, iconoclasm derives from movements of simplification and centralization in religion and government, from Ikhnaton to the Russian Revolution. But iconoclasm also takes an idealist explanation: the proliferation of material images debases spiritual perception to such an extent that to redeem spiritual experience, the physical images must all be canceled. There is no necessary opposition between these two interpretations, for common to both, although in distinct spheres of experience, is the fear of excessive multiplication among the objects of attention.

In any event, it is apparent that the anti-iconic movements of the past were deeply concerned with esthetic experience. People destroy or prohibit images only when the images are taken seriously in profound fear of idolatry and polytheism. And it is not possible to take images seriously without submitting to an extremely intricate process of esthetic experience. The images capable of arousing anti-iconic fury are therefore images incorporating a rich and intricate experience. Iconoclastic movements, whether Byzantine, Puritan, or non-objective, may be anti-figural, but are never opposed to esthetic experience and activity as such. On the contrary, a recurrent trait of iconoclastic movements is the sudden transformation of energy from one mode to another. With the Byzantine Iconoclasts, liturgical music was intensively developed. The New England Puritans cultivated an esthetic of homiletic and of architectural proportion that manifests extreme preoccupation with pure form. Within the field of these transformations, furthermore, it is likely that the new modes of esthetic activity are even more energetically pursued than the old iconic ones. Iconoclasm cannot reasonably be identified with the processes that characterize modern mass expression in the realm of esthetic experience. An older iconoclastic attitude, however, as in the case of Puritanism, may have regrettable esthetic consequences. The Puritan protest against the power of images has perhaps conduced to

the degradation and rupture of contemporary popular taste in figural art (Alfred H. Barr, Jr.)

The situation described in the opening paragraph therefore excludes an interpretation in terms of iconoclasm. No drift or tendency toward such serious attitudes as the iconoclastic fear of images is evident. Among the majority of the population in this country, indifference to esthetic experience prevails. The current images of advertising and popular art are anodyne, banal, and trivial. The general temper of people is "anesthetic" rather than anti-esthetic. It is only among highly educated groups and in a small circle of *avant garde* artists, that the modes of esthetic experience are matters of profound concern. The churchmen tend to share an anesthetic attitude with the majority.

III

The members of the seminar agreed that general improvement in the secular understanding of esthetic activity and appreciation has been remarkable among educated groups during the past forty years. The public performance of music, and the great development of the public museums are notable instances. These and other manifestations, however, are secular rather than religious. A parallel development in regard to religious art has been lacking. Hence the incoherence between established religion and artistic expression is observed on two distinct levels. The churches have not participated in the historical experience of past art that characterizes the public museum, nor have they affected the production of significant contemporary art.

In this connection an important issue arose. Religious experience may tend toward an expression that is "translucent" and unrealistic. These terms identify a figural style that encourages the mind and eye to look beyond the shapes and forms of the work of art to another reality, perceived by the artist, and suggested by his forms, but not described by them. The obvious examples are medieval stained glass or Byzantine mosaic, in which the metaphysical properties of form are more prominent than the description or enumeration of sensory experiences. If this "transparency" is a critical quality of religious art, then such art forms as the film, or the many experimental modes of modern painting, can have little or nothing to do with religious expression, unless their content is radically revised.

To this view members of the seminar objected that the work of many profoundly religious artists would have to be rejected as religious art; and that religious awareness can accommodate innumerable varieties of form to the needs of metaphysical speculation. The problem is therefore not one of adapting art to religion, or religion to art, but only of finding the common ground upon which contemporary artists may develop religious expression, and on which the churchmen may once again return to the modes of esthetic activity for the affirmation of religious experience.^c

The procedure for finding this common ground is already available. Professor Tillich reports that at Union Theological Seminary, his open house meetings, stimulated by the discussions of this Seminar, were attended each two weeks for several hours by nearly fifty students. The meetings were concerned with the religious art of the past, and the intention is to stimulate a renewed awareness of the immense resources of the visual experience of religion. It may be hoped that through the ministry popular indifference to religious art may be relieved and oriented anew.

In the next stage the clergy may stimulate the interest of contemporary artists in the program of building and decoration that faces every congregation. The way is suggested by the conference of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations on June 22, 1947. The meeting was attended by Ely Jacques Kahn, Marc Chagall, and Jacques Lipchitz, and one hundred and fifty rabbis, architects, and lay members of building committees from congregations in the eastern states.

Through such meetings, in which the artists, once isolated from the

^cComment by Paul A. Schilpp

It does not seem to have occurred to any member of the seminar that art may have religious significance and profound spiritual meaning without necessarily being transcendental or other worldly. Personally I am not so sure but that some of the paintings of such a great contemporary artist as the Mexican Diego Rivera have a deeply religious meaning. So, it would seem, does any art which has a profoundly social significance or attempts to portray the ultimate unity of human beings everywhere. In at least one Protestant sanctuary in the United States the beautifully carved figure of "the Man with the Hoe" stands right alongside of such figures as Justinian, Dante, and Michelangelo, as part of the *reredos*.

Perhaps great artists are not putting their ability into the service of religion today because religion today itself is not truly "great," but too often is missing the boat of appealing to the reason as well as to the spiritual sensibilities of the twentieth century scientific man. In other words, if religion itself would become great, it is hardly to be doubted that great artists would inevitably portray such great religion.

needs of their communities, learn of the possibilities of an expression that is communal as well as individual, the alienation between art and religion may be healed, and the esthetic sensibility of the congregations restored. The churches are in a position to assume the vital responsibility of encouraging contemporary esthetic activity in religious expression. This responsibility is one that the public museums are on the whole unwilling or unable to assume. The artists themselves lack access to such commissions. The churches have in their gift the most striking opportunities for a twentieth century art of enduring content. These opportunities are not transferable. Unless churchmen make use of them, an accelerated disintegration of religious community may be expected.

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APPENDIX II

The Problems of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization^a

I. The Program of UNESCO for 1947 and 1948

By RICHARD P. McKEON

*Distinguished Service Professor of Philosophy and Greek,
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ONE YEAR AGO (1946), the delegates of forty nations—thirty of whom had already completed the steps prescribed for membership in the new international organization—were being selected for the first annual session of the General Conference of the UNESCO. Assembled in General Conferences in Paris a few months later, they voted a budget for the first year of UNESCO's operation, formulated rules and regulations to govern its organization, elected a Director General and an Executive Board, and approved a program.

The problems which will face the delegations now being chosen to attend the second annual session of the General Conference of UNESCO are the same in form and character as those of a year ago, but the fund of data and experiences which can now be brought to bear on them is very much enlarged. In the first place, UNESCO has been in operation for almost a year; many of the projects approved in the 1947 program are well under way, many difficulties have been encountered that were not anticipated, and some possibilities of action have been opened up in directions only tentatively explored. In the second place, a popular interest and enthusiasm for the purposes and program of UNESCO has been

^a[In addition to the papers in this appendix, the following chapters refer, incidentally or at length, to the work of UNESCO: Chapter I by Herman Finer, Chapter III by Robert A. Graham, S. J., Chapter V by Louis Wirth, Chapter XXIV by Clem C. Linnenberg, Jr., Chapter XXXV by Elmo Roper and Julian L. Woodward, Chapter XXXVIII by Edward L. Bernays, and Chapter XLI by Simon Greenberg.]

discovered during 1947—at least in the people of the United States of America—that indicates the possibility of widescale effective action and also, because of that interest, the urgent need of a program directly related to the mass of citizens and to the common man. In the third place, the problems arising in international relations have come, more and more, to turn on issues in which educational, scientific, and cultural considerations may be of decisive importance.

The center of the problem of UNESCO is still the program of UNESCO, but the future program of UNESCO depends, on the one hand, on how the program has developed at UNESCO House in Paris and, on the other hand, on what has been happening in the world. Decisions concerning the program are also decisions concerning the nature of UNESCO and the manner of its operation. To present the problems involved in the program of UNESCO for 1948 it is necessary therefore to consider the program in three aspects: first, to relate the program briefly to other problems which the Secretariat must face in carrying out the program, second, to expound in some detail the scheme of the program proposed by the Executive Board for 1948, and third, to explore some of the implications of this program on the ways in which UNESCO may hope to achieve the purpose set for it in its charter, the maintenance of peace through understanding.

The execution of a program depends, in the first place, not merely on formulating the program itself successfully and setting up the projects approved in the program, but also on resolving problems of budget, organization, and personnel. These three problems are indeed inseparable aspects of the determination of the program, and although progress has been made in their resolution during the nine months in which UNESCO has been in operation, final decision is still in abeyance in all three pending the final and definite formulation of the program for 1948. In discussing the future development of the program at this time (summer, 1947), it is particularly important to bear them in mind, for budget, organization, and personnel are more fluid now than they can be after January, 1948, and program decisions can be made to determine budgetary practices, organizational structure, and effective personnel more easily now than will be possible at any future date.

In a strict sense UNESCO is still without a budget. A gross sum of \$6,000,000 for the year 1947 was approved by the First Annual Conference, and by far the greater part of that sum has now been collected

from the governments of the member states. That sum was not broken into parts and assigned to specific uses, however, until the Executive Board at its April meeting approved a very brief scheme of allotment of funds to sections, purposes, and projects. No detailed budget has yet been prepared for 1947, nor indeed has any statement of expenditure of funds for any portion of 1947 been examined by the Executive Board. The budget and the financial statement for 1947 are to be submitted to the Annual Conference in Mexico City. Moreover, a detailed budget for 1948 will have been drawn up on the basis of the experience of 1947 and will be presented at the same time. This budget will be related to the program both in its total appropriation and in its specific allocations. The Executive Board approved, at its July meeting, the recommendation of a budget of not less than \$8,000,000 and not more than \$9,000,000. The United States delegation had opposed last year a larger budget for the fledgling organization of 1947, on the grounds both of the greater efficiency of a more cautious beginning and of the mounting total costs of membership in the agencies of the United Nations. The United States position, as expressed in July, was that the size of the budget to be recommended should be determined by the value of the program and the estimation of costs of carrying it out, with due consideration of the burdens put on member states by contributions to the various agencies of the United Nations. There is every indication that the people of the United States will support the larger budget and that Congress will therefore approve America's contribution to it, if the program is good. As a means of determining needs and allocations for particular projects, the program proposed by the Executive Board for 1948 was submitted to the newly established Financial Committee of the Executive Board to estimate allocations to the projects approved in that program. The program will be submitted in final form to the Second Annual Conference with budget estimates for each project and activity.

No precise organization chart could be drawn for UNESCO as it now operates. The present organization is in part a reflection of the program approved for 1947 and in part a construction to meet the administrative problems of the first year. The program submitted to the First Annual Conference by the Preparatory Commission was conceived and organized largely in terms of subject matter or functional "sections." The Conference in Paris set down principles of priority by which to judge the importance of projects and their pertinence to the purposes of UNESCO,

and it urged the importance of intersectional and inter-subject-matter co-operation and projects. The Executive Board during the year 1947 approved, first, three "UNESCO-wide" projects in February and then added a fourth in April, and finally in July the Executive Board proposed the program for 1948 in terms calculated to integrate the various interests of groups and disciplines in a more unified program. In terms of the principles approved at the First Annual Conference, the practice of the first year seems to tend to a division of the organization into a permanent staff concerned with continuing functions of "stimulation" and "service" and a more transitory staff of experts, scholars, and scientists associated with UNESCO for the execution of specific "projects" (with the assistance of permanent members of the staff assigned to them for that purpose) bearing directly on the purposes of UNESCO. Whether or not this is actually the direction in which organization is forming and whether or not it should be continued, is a decision which must depend on the character of the program approved for 1948.

Decisions concerning personnel, like decisions concerning organization, will reflect the character of the program which the personnel and the organization are to carry out. The personnel policy of UNESCO has been very cautious during its first nine months, and there is already indication that that caution has enabled UNESCO to avoid some of the personnel problems in which international agencies are frequently involved. It has seemed unwise to sign any long term contracts until adequate efforts have been made to satisfy two principles: (1) that every device has been used to find the man best equipped to fill the post, and (2) that every effort has been made, consistent with securing the best man, to achieve geographic and cultural distribution. This policy of short term contracts is necessarily temporary. January 1, 1948, has been suggested as the date after which longer term contracts will be issued, but a later date will probably be advisable to permit time to canvass the world field for new candidates and to test present incumbents. In the search for personnel the national commissions can render an important service, and the Personnel Committee of the United States Commission has already made many recommendations bearing both on individual cases and on general policy.

The personnel problems of UNESCO have some of the peculiarities of those of a government agency and some of those of a university. The early stages of the operation of its program have already made it clear

that the personnel problem falls into two parts. In the first place, a new kind of international civil servant must be developed for UNESCO: this is a question not only of developing a corps of trained workers who are able to view international problems from a world point of view, but also of developing workers, expert in particular fields and disciplines, who are nonetheless able to bring their techniques into broad relationships with other fields and disciplines and to see the bearing of education, science, and culture on the problems of maintaining peace. In the second place, a machinery must be developed by which to bring together teams of experts, composed of the best minds of the world, to work for short periods on projects calculated to relieve tensions conducive to war and to create relations which will associate men in peace. The first task can be accomplished only by careful selection and training, the second by the prestige that should be attached to the work of UNESCO and the consequent pressure of public and learned opinion.

Problems of budget, organization, and personnel thus depend on the solutions proposed to problems of program, and therefore the program proposals for 1948, built on the experience and developments of 1947, must constitute the central problem of UNESCO. UNESCO is primarily its program, for ends, means, needs, and probable effectiveness can be discussed most concretely in terms of program. The program should be considered, therefore, in its own plan and structure. It has already passed through several stages. The first stage was the program prepared by the Preparatory Commission: large, inclusive, amorphous, organized under subject-matter heads—like natural sciences, social sciences, humanities, philosophy, creative arts—and under heads of agency of transmission and preservation—like media of mass communication, education, libraries, and museums. The second stage was the program approved by the First Annual Conference which was largely a simplified version of the program of the Preparatory Commission: principles of selection and priority had been formulated, projects of intersectoral and interdisciplinary cooperation had been set up, projects had been eliminated, other projects had been given high priority; and many projects had been associated in groups. The third stage was the program that took form during the first seven months under the operation of the Secretariat and the supervision of the Executive Board: the program with the execution of which the Secretariat found itself charged when the First Annual Conference rose in December, 1946, was still too large to be carried out.

in its entirety within the budget approved, portions of it were vaguely formulated and inchoate, some of the sections which had been thought to be of greatest importance to the program of UNESCO were without program; some of the projects which had seemed clearly formulated could not be staffed, implemented, or interpreted; and some of the operating projects had no discernible relation to anything else that UNESCO was doing. The Secretariat and the Executive Board therefore worked to clarify the program by relating the approved projects to the end set for UNESCO in its Charter, and in that process they were impressed more and more with the interrelations that could be found among the projects. The fourth stage, therefore, the program for 1948 proposed by the Executive Board at its July meeting, sets forth the entire program under five main headings, determined not by subject matter or medium of transmission, but by the world situation and the application of education, science, and culture to the problems of peace.

These efforts at unification and correlation on the part of the First Annual Conference, the Secretariat, and the Executive Board during the short period of UNESCO's existence were the consequences not of an academic desire for neatness and cross-references, but of the need to provide principles by which to select, out of the indefinitely large number of projects that were proposed and had strong support of particular groups, or that were of interest and importance in themselves, or that were innocuous and traditional vehicles of goodwill in the intellectual world, or that might in the long run contribute to understanding and peace, those projects that were of immediate importance and of indubitable pertinence to the ends of UNESCO. Various principles of selection have been invoked at various stages of the evolution of the program of UNESCO, for UNESCO may have taken, and may still take, many forms, and the determination of the ways in which it will seek to achieve its objective depends on the principles used in the selection of projects and formulation of program.

The principles of selection and priority approved by the First Annual Conference to serve as guides to the sub-commissions of the Program Commission depended on the differentiation of three levels of activity. On the highest level are "projects" which UNESCO will undertake itself, concerned with problems which constitute immediate dangers to the peace of the world or with bonds which might be forged to bring the world to greater unity of purpose and action by means of fuller under-

standing and more equitable insight the work of executing these projects was to be carried out by scholars, scientists, and experts associated for that purpose. The second place is occupied by "stimulating" activities, in which UNESCO lends its support to other agencies, when such agencies exist, or to the creation of international agencies, when none exists, to carry out tasks of a continuing character related to the peace, in which UNESCO will wish to be associated but for which it should not continue to assume responsibility. In the third place are the numerous "service" activities essential to the tasks of UNESCO and other agencies engaged in international educational, scientific, and cultural work—furnishing information, facilitating exchange of persons, materials, and ideas, preparing bibliographies, exploring possibilities of abstracting, publishing, and distributing handbooks—which might easily absorb a disproportionate amount of time unless the effort of UNESCO in respect to them is related to the ends of UNESCO and unless the chief responsibility for their execution is distributed among cooperating bodies.

In addition to this set of principles, it has been suggested that the organization of the program proposed by the Preparatory Commission contains the germs of another set of principles. Some of the sections under which that program was classified were subject matter sections and some were sections concerned with the means of preservation, dissemination, and use of knowledge—the suggestion is that every project of UNESCO be examined in terms of three sets of questions: (a) what knowledge and what subject matter are needed in the program? (b) what media of communication and transmission should be used, and how would that knowledge be translated most effectively into a program in that medium, *i. e.*, formal or informal education, exhibit, reading program, pamphlet, book, report, article, press release, film, or radio program? and (c) what active personnel will carry out the program and what recipient personnel will be affected by it?

Finally, a third set of principles played a prominent part in the meeting of the United States National Commission a year ago—that set depended on the differentiation of three processes that are important in educational, scientific, and cultural pursuits: (a) the acquisition of knowledge, (b) the preservation of knowledge, and (c) the dissemination and use of knowledge. Of the three, it was decided that the last is the immediate concern of UNESCO, the other two being justified as they are shown to bear on the communication and use of knowledge.

It would require a subtle inquiry into intellectual history to determine how explicitly these principles have operated in the determination of the program, but then use at various stages of the development of UNESCO does serve to underline certain growing convictions about the program of UNESCO. In the first place, it is clear that the program of UNESCO should not be restricted to scholars, scientists, and experts, either in the sense that they alone will participate in the execution of its program or in the sense that the purpose of the program is to facilitate their work. The purpose of UNESCO is not to improve the resources or the instruments of education, science, or culture as such, but to use those resources and instruments in the interests of peace. However technical the basic ideas in which it originates or on which it depends, each project must affect the common man and should involve his active participation. In the second place, the dissemination of knowledge should be directed not merely at the reduction of ignorance in any field whatsoever, but should have a recognizable bearing on the use of ideas, attitudes, and communications in the ideological warfare which is now the greatest threat to the peace of the world. In the third place, despite the importance of international understanding, understanding is not in itself a panacea and the increase of understanding will not necessarily bring peace, but education, science, and culture must also be used to remove real threats of war, where mere understanding might accelerate conflict, and to create new relationships more likely to be conducive to peace. The three purposes, suggested in the recognition (1) of the broad popular base which UNESCO must seek, (2) of the use of understanding for the maintenance of peace, and (3) of the insufficiencies of understanding alone unless it is used actively to change the existing situation, provide means by which the numerous projects of UNESCO can be related to its single and simple objective, and they serve to bring out the rationale of the five headings under which it is proposed to organize the program for 1948.

In any program in which instruments of education, science, and culture are used, one set of problems is to be found in the existing situation in materials and personnel. The first chapter of the new organization of the program, under the title, "Raising the Standards of Education, Science and Culture," therefore, deals with the need to raise levels in various parts of the world, in the world in general, and in various subject matters or groups of people. Three distinct sets of problems fall under this head-

ing. In the first place, the devastations of war have set the immediate problems of educational, scientific, and cultural reconstruction and rehabilitation, which must be accomplished as soon as possible to bring the war devastated areas back to a level at which they may again participate fruitfully in the world community. In the second place, the program in Fundamental Education is designed, in the conviction that the world cannot continue at peace if it remains half literate and half illiterate, to determine the minimum of education essential to participation in a world community and to examine the means by which that minimum may be achieved.^b The pilot projects which have been established thus far are concerned with the problem in "underdeveloped" countries and consequently, with the development and spread of literacy in the strict sense. It is recognized however, that literacy alone is not enough—or rather that there is a higher literacy which consists not merely in the ability to read and write but requires also the ability to judge critically the grounds, implications, and consequences of what is read—and further developments of the program in Fundamental Education will involve the whole problem, with all its sociological and philosophic implications, of a minimum education in the "developed" countries and for all mankind. In the third place, the levels attainable by particular groups of people, the accessibility of particular subject matters and kinds of education to qualified persons, and the use that is made of education, all present problems of equalization of educational opportunities. A vast number of projects have been and can be assembled under these heads, first to remove the insufficiencies and inequalities caused by war, second to introduce a universal equality of minimum level of education such as is requisite for peace, and third to provide maximum accessibility to education for all who can profit by it and thereby contribute more fully to the maintenance of a peaceful world community.

A second set of problems is determined by the need to provide or improve means of communication among the various nations and cultures of the world. The second chapter of the program for 1948 is therefore concerned with "The Free Flow of Ideas," and under that heading are included the numerous projects for the improvement and use of channels of communication, which are made possible by, and in turn contribute to, the higher standards essential to a peaceful world. The first means by which to further such communication and to facilitate the

^b[Cf. Chapter X by Irving D. Loige and Chapter XVIII by Ruth Strang.]

meeting of men and minds is the program for the exchange of persons to be set up and administered by UNESCO's newly established bureau for the exchange of persons. The second means is to be found in direct treatment of technical aspects of the problem of communication, first in attacking the grave problems of removing the obstacles that stand in the way of the free flow of ideas across national boundaries, second in improving the facilities for the dissemination of ideas by fuller use of, and more adequate provision of the materials and instruments essential to modern techniques of communication, and third in investigating and developing programs and a more adequate use of radio, press, and film, as well as such instruments of education as public libraries, museums, and adult education to contribute to the ends of UNESCO. Under the third heading of this part of the program of UNESCO are grouped the numerous projects intended to stimulate and assist the preparation of bibliographies, abstracts, manuals, and the various publication projects that have been referred to the attention of UNESCO. Finally, since the channels of communication and the exchange of ideas, persons, and materials were all formulated on the supposition that international understanding and a world community of purpose and endeavor could be established without reducing the world to a dead level of identical culture, a fourth group of projects is concerned with the interchanges that are possible and profitable among the cultures of the world, in the various fields of philosophy, the humanities, arts and letters, the social sciences, and the natural sciences. Such interchanges are means not only of fostering an understanding of the differences and the basic identities that underlie differences, but also of enriching the various cultures individually and of promoting the peace and well being of mankind in general.

Whatever the standards of education, science, and culture that exist or could be achieved, and whatever the channels of communication and education, the use of those channels on those levels for the furtherance of international understanding presents a new set of problems. These problems are grouped together under the third chapter of the proposed program, which is concerned with "Education for International Understanding." They are the object of numerous projects, many of which are well under way in the program for 1947, directed to the various means that promote or that may impede international understanding, ranging from formal education (which is the object of interest in the projects to improve text books and teaching materials, to collect information con-

cerning materials available for use in teaching international understanding, and to build on the basis of the experience of the Summer Seminar for teachers held this year at Sèvres) through the devices of informal education (like youth groups and international relation clubs) to adult education (the use of the media of mass communication), and to the publication of the results of specific inquiries (such as the symposium on the philosophic bases of human rights)

Finally, the instruments of education, science, and culture may be used in the interests of peace not only by producing greater understanding among men, cultures, and nations, but also by contributing to the resolution of problems crucial to peace imposed by man's cultural, social, economic, and natural environment. The dangers to peace do not all arise from misunderstanding, and they will not be removed by mutual understanding of the cultures, histories, and circumstances of peoples. Attitudes, emotions, fears, and insecurities have other than intellectual bases and they are sometimes based on genuine inequities. These bases, real or imagined, must be removed if the danger of war is to be obviated with any certainty or permanence. In this sense the fourth chapter of the proposed program is concerned with "Man and the Modern World." Under that heading is placed one of the central projects of UNESCO, the study of tensions conducive to war and of bonds crucial to the maintenance of peace. Preliminary studies of the scope and possible directions of this project have been undertaken in 1947, and it is already apparent that the project may profitably take the form of a continuing activity of UNESCO under which various sources of tension or possibilities of cooperation may successively be the subject of investigation. More specific selection of the first lines of activity has been delayed by the need to find a director for the project. In addition to this group of problems in which instrumentalities of education, science, and culture may be used to relieve tensions or promote cooperation, there is a second group of problems involved in the effects of education, science, and culture in the modern world. Assumptions concerning the nature and source of these effects are to be found as unexamined presuppositions in the reigning ideologies and theories of history that influence the practical work of the modern world. The vast increase in the spread of education among people and in its diversification among subjects is a modern phenomenon, but its effects in endangering peace or in facilitating its maintenance have been little examined, science has changed all aspects of life, but the

rationale of a world revolutionized by science is the construction and creature of hazard, conjecture, and philosophic predilection; the cultures of nations have been affected by, and have resisted, social, economic, technological, and intellectual changes, but the cooperation of cultures in a peaceful world and a world community is only beginning to be the concern of anthropologists, sociologists, and philosophers. Finally, a third set of problems turns on the study of the environment as a basis for cultural life. Some progress has been made in determining the fashion in which UNESCO may be able to cooperate with the Economic and Social Council and appropriate specialized agencies and organizations in the furtherance of such projects as town and country planning and the conservation of world resources.

These four chapters constitute the organization within which it is proposed to plan and carry out the continuations of numerous projects approved by the First Annual Conference and those to be approved by the Second Annual Conference. This reformulation is more than a convenient system of classification. The implications which it has in the final determination of the budget, organization, and personnel of UNESCO have been pointed out. Its effect on the program is to break down divisions originating in differences of subject matter, technique, or group interest and to bring into prominence, in each project, the direct relevance of the work undertaken to the ends of UNESCO. The importance of this reformulation may finally be seen in its effects on a third group of problems which bear on the very nature of UNESCO as it has thus far evolved and as it may further be planned and projected. Some of these implications are treated in the fifth chapter of the proposed program for 1948 under the heading "Action Through Government and People," for it has become increasingly apparent during the first months of UNESCO's operation that its end can be achieved only if it recognizes fully its responsibilities and makes full use of the cooperation of other organizations and agencies. Its responsibilities are to the United Nations and the group of other specialized agencies of the United Nations of which it is a part, to the Member Governments of the Organization, and ultimately to the peoples of the world. Its opportunities are to be found in the National Commissions of the member states, in governmental and non-governmental international organizations, in the experts, scholars, scientists, artists, workers—and in general in the peoples of the world—by whom the program of UNESCO must be carried out. What kind of

organization must UNESCO become to assume these responsibilities and to develop these opportunities?

To be effective, UNESCO must steel a difficult path between two opposite dangers. At one extreme is the danger that the advance of some aspect or technique of education, science, or culture may be supposed to constitute in itself and because of its own importance part of the ends of UNESCO. Any theory of any subject—biochemistry, sociology, linguistics, or theology—may seem to its advocate to afford the unique key to peace, any international meeting is a contribution to international understanding; and the facilitation of research, the availability of information, and the extension of training in techniques and subject matters are all objectives deserving effort and costly in time, money, and personnel. But they are not of immediate importance to the mass of mankind in the maintenance of peace or the securing of that well being without which peace is impossible. At the other extreme, is the danger that the use of ideas and the devices of education, science, and culture may be made, or seem to be made, a screen for political action. This is a danger which must be kept particularly in mind in all American participation in UNESCO activities, for however pure our intentions and however generous our contribution of funds, material, and personnel—indeed almost in proportion to our disinterested participation—there will be the suspicion of “cultural imperialism.” The path between these two extremes is, not the avoidance of politics, but the use of ideas for the achievement of what is a political end, the maintenance of peace through understanding. It does not involve merely the use of ideas, the advocacy of a theory, or the advancement of a cultural ideal, but rather the discovery of how men may cooperate despite differences of theory, culture, and predilection in the achievement of a common end essential to all other pursuits.

What UNESCO must be in each of its three constitutive parts is determined by this emerging delineation of UNESCO's task. UNESCO is, according to its Constitution, the General Conference; the execution of the program approved by the General Conference is placed by the Constitution in the hands of the Secretariat, the supervision of the execution of the program is delegated by the General Conference and by the Constitution to the Executive Board. The continuing success of UNESCO depends on the care with which the members of each of these three groups are selected. The success of UNESCO will be seriously

compromised if the members of the national delegations are chosen exclusively or even largely from members of the national diplomatic corps resident in the city in which the Annual Conference happens to be held; the political interests of the nations should be represented on the delegations, but the delegations should consist primarily of scholars who are competent to judge the program and experts who can bring the program of UNESCO to the various influential groups and eventually the people of each nation. The Secretariat must be built of a personnel consisting in part, of a new kind of civil servant, trained in the instrumentalities of education, science, and culture, and dedicated to an international ideal and, in part, of the great scholars, scientists, artists of the world, the experts drawn from all fields and associated in the execution of projects. The Executive Board should consist of men who are chosen for their ability to judge the success of the execution of the program approved by the Annual Conference and for their political insight into the bearing of actions of UNESCO on the agencies of the United Nations, on the interests of member states and on the peace and welfare of humanity.

If this emerging pattern can be fixed and be put into operation, UNESCO may serve as a spearhead for the operations of the United Nations. UNESCO is not another university research institute, teachers' college, or university press, nor is UNESCO another governmental agency. It is an organization by which education, science, and culture may be used to further the ends of international peace and world community. An American philosopher has observed that the task of constituting a democratic society is basically an intellectual problem, it consists in finding the way by which the modern instruments of communication can be used to bring to citizens the knowledge which they must have to function as members of a democratic public. UNESCO can perform that task on a world scale. Without such understanding the United Nations and its specialized agencies will not be able to transcend nationalistic and party interests to achieve the international political purposes for which it was established and those economic and social improvements which are essential to peace and justice on a world scale. The achievement of such understanding may be a prelude and accompaniment to the work of the specialized agencies—the improvement of world health, of the resources of food and agriculture, of the conditions of international labor. It can contribute to the resolution of the numerous problems—such as human rights, freedom of information, and the removal of

social and economic injustices everywhere—with which the Economic and Social Council is concerned. It is, finally, essential to the resolution of the political problems with which the United Nations is concerned in the maintenance of peace. UNESCO may facilitate action by understanding brought to bear both on the specific question at issue in all of these problems and on the quality and climate of international understanding which is the condition of the possibility of all international action, and in so doing it may become the important organ in the constitution of a new world.

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2 *The Arts, UNESCO, and International*

Understanding

By W G CONSTABLE

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There has been much talk about the arts as "bridges to cultural understanding," as a language which expresses ideas and emotions common to all men, as a potential means toward universal brotherhood

UNESCO, is (to quote Doctor Julian Huxley, its Director General), "the first international agency expressly charged with concern for the arts" The constitution of UNESCO lays down the general purpose "of advancing through the educational and scientific and cultural relations of the peoples of the world, the objectives of international peace and of the common welfare of mankind"; and to realize this purpose it is

- 1 to collaborate in the work of advancing the mutual knowledge and understanding of people through all means of mass communication
- 2 to give fresh impulse to popular education and to the spread of culture.
- 3 to maintain, increase, and diffuse knowledge

Under each heading, more specific means of attaining the stated end are given

To give further precision to these aims, a preparatory Commission, working through Committees dealing with special subjects, presented in September, 1946, a detailed report on a program for action This report has been reinforced by Doctor Julian Huxley in a long pamphlet, *UNESCO Its Purpose and Its Philosophy*, which was prepared in connection with the author's work as Secretary to the Preparatory Commission, though the views expressed are not necessarily those of the Commission or of UNESCO itself

In both report and pamphlet, the dominant impression is one of unreality, as though the writers had little contact with works of art or with those who make them The statement in the report that art, "helps to

give men and nations that intimate knowledge of each other as human beings, living within different conditions, but bound together in one human experience," seems so little related to the facts, that action based upon it is likely, at best, to be useless.

Evidently, misgivings came upon the writer, and led to the introduction of such remarks as, "The arts make it possible for individuals and groups to develop their personality and to enrich the world with a stimulating variety." How this variety is to merge into "one human experience" is not explained. Doctor Huxley is more clear headed, when he says, "Since each work of art is by its nature an individual creation, it can never simply be pooled with others, and accordingly, variety and multiplicity must always be encouraged. Thus, what UNESCO must here aim at is not the promotion of a single movement, but the orchestration of diversity."

Whether UNESCO can achieve that "orchestration of diversity" is another matter; but Doctor Huxley at least begins under no illusions. Fortunately, too, he and the report are at one in separating the creative aspect of the arts from their aspects as objects of learned study, a vital distinction when it comes to action. Also, UNESCO has not fallen into the trap of limiting the concept of the arts to the so-called fine arts, but extends it to the non-visual arts and to the whole range of the so-called applied arts.

Activity concerning the arts falls into five main groups

- 1 Creative activity, including the training of artists
- 2 Patronage, by private individuals, by industry and commerce, and by public institutions
- 3 Collection and exhibition mainly by museums, galleries, and libraries to serve a. The general public b. The learned world
- 4 Study, publication, and criticism by the learned world and others.
- 5 A subject in general education

These different types of activity are explicitly or implicitly distinguished in the UNESCO proposals concerning the arts, but the possibilities and limitations of each as a means of international understanding do not seem to have been adequately studied, nor is sufficient stress laid upon what is already being done in various fields. UNESCO has specific power to cooperate not only with national commissions formed for the purpose, or with interested national bodies, but with specialized inter-governmental and non-governmental international organizations. An

International Council of Museums has been formed precisely for such co-operation. Thus, UNESCO has the power to utilize, if it can, a wide range of knowledge and experience.

In any action concerning the creative arts, it is essential to realize that though art incorporates the ideas and emotions of its maker, it is also a product of the community in which he dwells. Not only do the desires and needs of the community directly shape the form of the work; but the artist himself is shaped by the community. Instead, therefore, of the artist's language being universal, it is often extremely difficult to comprehend outside the community in which it was produced. It is certainly possible for a Westerner to experience and to enjoy certain qualities he finds in, say, Chinese or Equatorial African art. But that he can come even within measurable distance of realizing its full meaning, is most unlikely, save in the rare case of those who are impregnated with the outlook and traditions of its makers. Indeed, it is arguable whether this inevitably superficial contact is not positively misleading, by causing Western ideas and concepts to be read into the work of a Chinese or African artist.

That indeed is the danger of a UNESCO proposal to try to safeguard the arts of so-called primitive peoples and of non-industrialized countries. Into these arts certain qualities and purposes will be read, which have no relevance. The maker of an object serving religious ritual will be told that he has expressed himself; and he may then easily become self-conscious and his work lose the conviction and inner fire that derived from its being directed to a purpose outside the artist. This is a far more subtle form of corruption than the danger which Doctor Huxley notes, of fossilizing the art of non-industrial areas by standardizing them and so divorcing that art from life.

No one seems seriously to have asked why we want to preserve such arts. Merely to preserve the arts of non-industrialized areas as they now exist, implies halting all other kinds of change in those areas, and reducing them to the category of museum specimens. What is in fact needed is a study of the basic conditions that made the art what it is, so that those basic conditions can be established elsewhere, and help to produce an art, not the same, but equivalent. This, however, implies such a fundamental reconstruction of Western society, with such a wholesale conversion of politicians, preceptors, and pastors, that it seems beyond even the dreams of UNESCO.

Indeed, this solicitude for the arts of non-industrial areas is in conflict with another aim, that UNESCO "will take such measures as are open to it under its Constitution to protect and defend the freedom of the artist whenever it is put in danger." This is nothing but an echo of nineteenth century Romanticism, which arose from the divorce between art and life, largely due to the Industrial Revolution and its consequences. In any society where the arts are integrated with life, artists are no more and no less free than plumbers and lawyers and engineers. Serious artists do not want more freedom than anybody else; what they want is to ply their trade.

It is perhaps with this in mind that UNESCO proposes to undertake various investigations concerning supply and demand in relation to the arts. On the supply side, reference is made to methods of training artists, including steps to enable them "to participate more actively in social developments." In view of the mess into which the whole Western world has got over the training of artists, it is terrifying to think what might be the outcome of well intentioned international action. But if UNESCO can persuade its individual members to look into the problem and to realize that the training of artists is primarily training people to do a job that somebody wants done, then something will have been accomplished. The whole question of training the artist, however, is inextricably linked with the demand for his services. When we know what we want artists to do, the problem of training them will almost automatically be solved, as will their position in the community.

So, proposals to look into the matter of public and private patronage of the arts, and the opportunities of the artist in commerce and industry, rest on firmer ground than most. Yet one wonders what can be done beyond drawing up another report. Minimum wage scales for artists are hardly practical. Some merchants and manufacturers believe in art and employ artists, others do not. Is UNESCO proposing a campaign for better business methods? There is perhaps more hope in persuading governments, both central and local, to give a hand in patronage of the arts. So much that surrounds us in daily life, from national parks and public buildings down to postage stamps, is under government control, that there is a great opportunity to stimulate the use of the artist. Working through National Councils and other bodies, UNESCO might find a field for action, always so long as no attempt was made to impose, say, an international mail box on the world. The resolution that UNESCO

should concern itself with maintaining high quality in all creative activities which it undertakes or sponsors, such as its publications, is admirable; though so far it has not been put into practice. Also, was UNESCO consulted about the United Nations headquarters? If not, the United Nations seems to have robbed its own offspring of a great opportunity to prove itself.

On the whole, however, the business of making works of art does not seem to offer UNESCO much opportunity to realize its aims. The exhibition field seems more promising. Here, the report states that "one of the first of all UNESCO's tasks must be to spread ideas of what museums and galleries might be." Presumably, this evangelizing mission will be chiefly directed toward Asia and Africa, since in other continents there is a reasonably general awareness on the subject. The trouble in most cases is lack of money. If UNESCO does not propose to stimulate appetites without satisfying them, it must either provide subsidies, or stimulate central and local governments into more liberal support of museums. In other words, it had better begin with politicians.

Another proposal, made in view of the uneven distribution of museums and their possessions, is to "study gaps in services and give positive aid in filling them." As part of this line of action it is proposed to study the problem of exchange and loan of exhibits and of redistribution. It would be interesting to know the full implication of the term "redistribution." Are three quarters of the contents of the museums of the United States to return to their places of origin? Or out of the wealth of Western Europe, are the Balkan States to be the beneficiaries? Here and there, no doubt, transfers could be made. Reasonably good groups of second grade material could be formed out of the reserves of the larger museums, and handed over to others, though probably the museums concerned would prefer to benefit smaller institutions in their own country. The only truly practical suggestion I have heard is the reconstitution of dismembered masterpieces. The facts here have been studied, and with reasonable goodwill, certain great altarpieces, sculpture groups, and so on, could be reconstituted, especially if for some part surrendered, the receiving country gave something in exchange.

Exchange and loans of exhibits, on the other hand, could certainly be developed, though loans would play the more important part. Yet, any thought of having masterpieces go to museums where conditions of exhibition and guardianship are defective, would have to be abandoned.

Moreover, there is reason to doubt the value of all this in developing international understanding. Many of the exhibitions sent from one country to another are little more than national propaganda, and the receiving institution is apt to regard itself as making a generous gesture to the lender, by letting him show what he can do. Such exhibitions can be of value to students and to the learned world, by enabling them to see what might otherwise be inaccessible, and it is on this ground that they must be justified.

Connected with proposals for exchange, loan, and redistribution are those concerning war damaged collections. One of these is that UNESCO should assist in handling redistribution of works stolen by the Germans. As matters stand, UNESCO has missed the bus. The redistribution is going on slowly but systematically. Another opportunity that seems to have been missed is to assist in the restoration of war damaged monuments. The Allies in Italy, in the West, and in Japan set a precedent both for safeguarding the cultural heritage of the past where possible, and for setting in motion the picking up of the pieces, when damage had been done. That work is now being carried on by the countries concerned, with the aid of volunteer committees and of individuals, notably in the United States and Great Britain, and is bringing people of different nations together in a joint enterprise of international concern.

In this connection, it is to be hoped that the much publicized idea of "reparations in kind" is now dead. Fortunately, UNESCO gives no support to it. A more effective means of rousing national passions and creating illwill it is difficult to conceive. If limited to such things as books, which can be reprinted, it has considerable justification, but proposals to compensate for destruction of a twelfth century building by handing over a mixed selection of paintings, are quite impracticable.

More practical and useful than attempts at redistribution would be making easier the visits of students and the learned to museums and galleries in other countries. There they could see the art of the country in the surroundings in which it was produced, and would have means to strengthen understanding of the people of the country concerned. Equally, proposed exchanges and visits of museum and gallery officials would be valuable, especially if it could be arranged for the visiting officials to take part in the daily work of the institution.

Of the same nature is a proposal to secure access to archaeological sites. In recent years, the technique of archaeological exploration has been

rapidly developed, especially in the Western countries; while the study of early cultures has become a matter of international interest. The situation is analogous to that in astronomy, where under the aegis of Harvard University the Milky Way is being studied throughout the world by organized groups, who think and talk on a world basis. Action on archaeological excavations and research is all the more desirable, as there is a tendency for nationalist sentiments to restrict access of foreign scholars to archaeological sites, at a time when native resources are not always adequately equipped to deal with them. There is, moreover, some precedent for action, since the Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, established under the League of Nations, did some useful investigation concerning archaeological methods; and UNESCO is empowered to continue the work of certain sections of that organization.

Another promising field of action is opened in what is called "assistance to museums in maintaining library and documentation services." Here again, UNESCO can continue the work of the International Museums Office, which was one of the constituent parts of the Institute of Intellectual Cooperation. The danger here, indicated by past experience, is the manufacture in the blessed name of coordination of vast card indexes which very few museums either want or can use, and the issuing of hortatory pamphlets as to museum duties which have no relation to possibilities. It is too often forgotten that the first duty of a museum is to serve its local community.

Nevertheless, international action can sometimes be useful. Encouragement and assistance in the issue and circulation of catalogues could be undertaken. Suggestions as to the arrangement of such catalogues, and the minimum amount of information to be given about each object, would make for a useful degree of standardization, encouragement and help in the photography of objects would add to the value of such catalogues. Similarly, suggestions as to methods of labeling would be of service. These may seem small matters, but they would in no wise restrict museum freedom, would place no impossible burden on their staffs, would yield a considerable return in growth of knowledge, and would facilitate international contacts.

More important, and even more practical, would be action concerning the conservation of works of art. In this, the International Museums Office did good service, notably by calling a series of conferences and publishing reports. The most important result was the establishment of

personal contacts, from which developed a lively interchange of views and development of new methods. Today, the conservation of works of art is more serious and urgent than it was twenty years ago. Quite apart from the stresses and strains set up by the ruthless moving of works of art throughout Europe and Asia, war conditions prevented the steady and continuous attention which works of art need, while research into such matters as optimum conditions and methods and materials of treatment was held up. Not only is there a great deal of conservation work to be done, but active study of methods and materials is urgently required, especially exploitation of substitutes for materials now in short supply. Moreover, there is a serious shortage of trained men and women. A small conference of those trained and experienced in conservation (not a conference of museum directors and presidents) would be an indispensable, easy first step. Many of these people know each other, and in conference could exchange knowledge and experience, state immediate needs, and quickly prepare a program of research and of recommendations concerning immediate practice. Subsidies to certain institutions already equipped for research would probably be the quickest way of getting that kind of work under way, while recommendation on practice could with reasonable ease be distributed over a wide area.

This may be called a small matter compared with some of the projects mooted by UNESCO. But at least it goes to the root of the matter—the welfare of existing works of art; and it is something that can be done, at comparatively small expense. The value of action in the museum and gallery field is that much activity is already afoot, on levels where it can be intensified and extended. International understanding can be based on the sure foundation of a community of interest and of action.

Lying behind all proposals for action, however, is the problem of awakening everywhere a greater understanding of the part the arts can play in enriching human life. This gives particular importance to the UNESCO proposals to work toward strengthening the place of the arts in general education. Yet those proposals are far from clear. For example, there seems to be no clear distinction made between training in the arts as a means to develop and enrich personality, and as a means of making artists. Both are indispensable, but to use the methods of training artists as an instrument in general education is to ask for trouble. Again, the oft repeated reference to the teaching of “art appreciation” ignores how ill defined that subject is. Then, the whole problem of the relation of the

arts to other elements in a curriculum needs careful consideration. The tendency today is to turn it into a "subject" which you take or do not take, while it could be made into an all pervasive influence. Likewise, little serious thought has been given to the place of museums in the educational structure. In short, save in rare cases, and those mainly among young children, the problem of the arts in education has not been seriously tackled, and until it is, proposals to extend the blessings of art to general education are not likely to come to much.

Even if this serious initial difficulty were surmounted, the problem of how and where to preach the gospel of art in education remains. Is the slogan to be, Picasso for Papua and Cézanne for Ceylon? The aim presumably is to encourage in communities throughout the world sensitivity to works of art, so that these become a permanent influence in daily life. Presumably again, those arts will be local arts, with their roots in the ideas and traditions of particular places, which brings us back to the starting point of this paper—that the creative arts are by nature and origin profoundly individualist and local, and therefore unlikely to provide a common speech or basis for a common understanding among men. Doctor Huxley realizes this when he says

In the world of today, in which nationalism is in dangerous conflict with itself and with internationalism, art provides the most important of those outlets for national feeling which can be regarded as permanently legitimate and indeed desirable.

This conclusion may disappoint idealists, but it seems to fit the facts.

3 *Is There a Philosophy of UNESCO?*

Original, French English Translation

By JACQUES HAVET

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Is there a philosophy of UNESCO? Could it, and should it, exist? The question could easily be answered in the negative, if the word "philosophy" were used only in the narrow, technical sense UNESCO could promote free discussion and a closer acquaintance between philosophers, as between mathematicians, without taking sides in their disagreements.

But UNESCO must also interpret *philosophy in its broadest sense*—that is to say, a clarification of the ideas and beliefs which govern human life. Every man has a philosophy; his ideas, his feelings, and his conduct are the outward expression of a general conception of the world and of life. But this conception is often half embedded in a matrix of half-realized prejudices, the result partly of custom and partly of obscurantist egotistic reflexes. The other component parts are religious teachings, a few scraps of scientific knowledge, usually insufficient, collective notions reflecting the conditions of men's lives and their efforts to be free of them; an historical and philosophic tradition which might be said to have been absorbed by infiltration, some knowledge of art and literature, personal experiences, of which the subject is often unconscious, and in particular the affective experiences of childhood and youth, on which Freud has turned a searchlight. Finally, we must not overlook what should be the principal element, but too often does not emerge from the chrysalis stage, namely, coherent attempts at judgment and reflection.

Philosophy in the narrower, and philosophy in the wider sense, are not entirely independent of one another. The second contains, often in a stratified and fossilized state, the abstract concepts of the great philosophers of the past.

Now clearly, for an organization such as UNESCO, philosophy in the wider sense sets a serious problem. UNESCO proclaims the principles

of the dignity of man, the solidarity and equality of mankind, and the values of culture and truth. Education, Science, Culture, and the principal media of information fall within UNESCO's sphere, only in so far as they are instruments in the service of an ideal—peace, and its corollary—human happiness.

Thus the preamble of UNESCO's Constitution contains the summary outline of a philosophy, and UNESCO cannot disregard the different interpretations to be put on these very general ideas, which were only acceptable because they were left somewhat vague. At first sight, therefore, it seems that UNESCO should define its own philosophy in the light of experience, helped by the disinterested advice of enlightened minds among the peoples of the democratic countries, and that this philosophy should guide its acts and help the free peoples to overcome their ideological difficulties.

But this idyllic picture cannot hide the danger inherent in such a plan. To adopt an "official UNESCO philosophy" entails the risk of choosing between existing philosophic trends, of seeking to foster one philosophy, to "direct" thought, and to give the world a new creed. This would be unrealistic (for no one would follow UNESCO); and it would contradict the principle of freedom of conscience and of respect for the variety of national or regional cultures.

Even the principles of the preamble were not accepted without important reservations made by the representatives of Yugoslavia. These were set out with intellectual force in Mr. Ribnikar's speech at the First General Conference, the idealistic terms of the preamble, veiled and discreet though they were, appeared to be in conflict with the premises of historic materialism, according to which economic factors are the essential causes of wars. And even so broadminded and flexible an attempt as Doctor Huxley's to define the philosophy which he thought should guide UNESCO, raised a great deal of discussion.

Thus the answer would seem to be clear. *UNESCO cannot have its own exclusive philosophy*, it cannot hope to secure agreement on principles between all the people of all nations. Its attitude can only be one of respect for diversity, a conscious pluralism.

However, it appears equally evident that UNESCO cannot accept those philosophies which deny the principles of human dignity, of the equality and fellowship of mankind, and of the value of culture and truth, which deliberately oppose the ideals of peace and happiness for

all mankind—that is to say, the fascist and imperialist doctrines against which men have fought with brain and sinew

If UNESCO's attitude is tolerant and pluralistic, how can it arrogate to itself the right to ban certain doctrines? In point of fact, the philosophies which UNESCO rejects scarcely deserve the name of philosophies, for they hold in common a denial of the concept of humanity. Here the reference is not only to humanity as that which makes men "human," but also to the physical concept of humanity as the whole company of mankind. The philosophies which UNESCO seeks to reject are those which deny the right of others to live according to their own lights and to free self-determination. *The effect of this is to give a positive content to UNESCO's tolerance and pluralism.* From this point of view, UNESCO certainly *has* a philosophy, namely, the philosophy of mutual respect.

The men of today wish to live together in the same world, but they are aware of the dangers to peace. After the hopes following the First World War, the awakening was rude, beneath the surface today, the material conditions of national life are big with the seeds of future conflicts. The danger of fascism and of war is still widespread.

It is because they realized this undeniable historical fact, that men created the United Nations in the political, and UNESCO in the educational, scientific, and cultural fields.

The general problem of coexistence, where the penalty for failure is the possible destruction of civilization and even of the human species, includes the more limited problem of the coexistence of different schools of philosophy. Philosophies are part of ourselves, factors in our daily lives. In a way they are an expression of their disciples and of those societies where they are held in honor, of whose mental attitude and practical action they are at once the explanation and the justification. In other words, the coexistence of philosophies is intimately linked with the coexistence of societies.

In the circumstances, the *problem may be defined as follows: Agreement can be reached on particular steps to be taken in common, but it is a practical impossibility to agree on the principles underlying them.* Why then should an international organization seek to bring out into the daylight philosophic disagreements which it would be far wiser to leave in the shadows? It will be argued that there is a risk of setting up an intellectual Babel by drawing to the surface philosophic principles

which are necessarily different, that such theoretical discussions might condemn a body like UNESCO to sterility or even make of it an instrument of discord

At first sight, this argument appears convincing. At the same time, do what we may, whenever there is discussion on measures to be taken philosophic viewpoints conflict. It is dangerous to let philosophies clash in an atmosphere of confusion and misunderstanding, and a clarification of points of disagreement allows of their reduction to their true proportions and importance

Again, even when agreement on measures to be taken seems to have been reached, this often proves to be no more than agreement on formulae and words, and differences reappear as soon as the time comes for action. From this point of view also, it is better to work in the light, provided all keep constantly in mind that the ultimate aim is to live together and to share in common in a constructive work for the benefit of man.

It is therefore necessary to begin by clarifying principles as a basis for common action

What form should be taken by the pluralistic and tolerant attitude of an organization such as UNESCO toward different schools of philosophy?

As regards the philosophers themselves, they should be invited to join a common analysis and comparison of their principles. They should be asked to define exactly the points their philosophies have in common, which, incidentally, are both more numerous and more comprehensive than often appear at first sight. The joint action of the Allied Nations during this war would have been impossible without common ideals. We are not aiming at superficial agreement on the basis of ambiguous formulae, nor asking philosophies to emasculate and stultify themselves for the sake of a vague syncretism. Nor can we hope for total agreement. What is important is to arrive at the clearest agreement on certain common premises or deductions.

It is important also that philosophers should know exactly what are their points of difference: first, what are the different processes by which they sometimes arrive at the same answer, second, what different deductions they make from premises held in common, and as a result of what differences in method and point of view, finally, what are the irreducible differences in their ideas.

Considered thought on points of difference is far from useless, pro-

vided we have fully understood our opponents' point of view. For by understanding others, we understand not only wherein they differ radically from ourselves, but also how far their intellectual approach is human and humanly possible, what is its tendency, how far it is valid in the best sense of the term. In other words, the other man no longer seems an incomprehensible monster, but simply a different man with whom we have to live and work.

To turn now to UNESCO's attitude toward the public, the Organization does not of course pretend to impose any moral dogma; this would be contrary to the ideal of cooperation between free peoples and would create legitimate antagonism. The first step is simply to clarify people's minds and make them aware of their philosophies. Awareness provides an escape from mental inconsistencies, does away with contradictions and fallacies which have always been implicitly accepted (*e.g.*, the arguments on which the Nazi racial doctrines were based), it curbs the impulses of egoism, which is often strongest when unconscious. Lastly, as analytic psychology has clearly shown, awareness of the true bases of our opinions rids us of our prejudices, it is the first step toward self-criticism. Self-knowledge is therefore a factor of peace.

But that is not all. UNESCO must see to it that men of any one culture or society are enabled to perceive the value of convictions and principles other than their own. The various intellectual civilizations, should not amalgamate or become estranged, but simply understand one another. This mutual understanding would not only advance the cause of peace, but, much more important, would enable each civilization to develop its individuality in full awareness of its originality, and thus achieve its true authenticity.

Differing ways of life, social conditions, and types of mind require different philosophies. It is, however, most important that each of us should know exactly what his attitude implies and realize the relativity of a great many of our ideas, as well as the right of other men to their opinions. There must, above all, be such clear understanding that no one can plead either pressure from outside or the sway of passion or insufficient thought, as an excuse for denial of individual personality.

Every man must, therefore, be free to choose and reconsider his own beliefs. But he must also have the intellectual means to do so. No doubt the ordinary man has far more intelligence, common sense, judgment, and kindness than he is often credited with. But man is also highly

vulnerable, by reason of the instability of his existence and his lack, not only of the peace of mind requisite for clear thinking about the meaning of that existence, but also of the intellectual ability so to think. The existence of such monstrous cults as the totalitarian ideologies does not show that men are sheep, devoid of reflective powers and moral sense, it shows, on the contrary, that their reflective powers and moral sense are restless and unstable, in danger of being led astray and perverted. UNESCO must help to destroy the forces of corruption and perversion. Other organizations may try to achieve tranquillity and a feeling of safety for the future, the dignity of labor, and the enjoyment, by every man, of the fruits of his work; but, an organization like UNESCO must arm man for his fight against prejudice and error.

The very existence of UNESCO, therefore, supposes a pluralism of philosophies, but one which possesses a positive meaning, that is to say, UNESCO implies a clarification of the principles of practical philosophy which allow of the coexistence in the same world (and action in the cause of progress) of different societies and individual men having different philosophical beliefs, it implies a frank comparison of these philosophies in the light of the practical ideas mentioned above. This means that UNESCO has indeed a philosophy, but only in the sense that it must prove that a theoretical pluralism can form a basis of common action.

One last question—it may be said that all this is on the plane of moral speculation. But is such a program possible in practice? Can it be carried out?

Let it first be said that, if it could not be carried out, there would be grounds for despair since, as we have tried to show, it is indissolubly bound up with the problem of the *de facto* coexistence in the present day world of men and of human societies.

Furthermore, in this case, we must prove movement by walking, as did Diogenes. UNESCO's live activity must prove that this attitude abounds in positive results.

Among the projects to be carried out during the first year of this activity, mention should be made of a discussion by philosophers (conducted partly by correspondence and partly at a meeting) regarding the philosophical principles which may form the bases of a worldwide declaration of the Rights of Man, which the United Nations mean to publish. This is a burning question, if ever there was one, and a question over which the most widely differing philosophies are in violent conflict.

It is a most encouraging fact, and one which surprised even the philosophers who took part in the discussion, that a very wide measure of agreement appeared, not on vague principles but on practical working rules and constructive definitions. Without anyone giving up his own theories, the attitude of each was made clearer to his opponents, and a general agreement was recorded in favor of action which could be approved by all, for different reasons, of course, but for reasons that became definite, clear, and humanly understandable.

Nothing could be more encouraging than this experience to the philosophical activity of UNESCO. Nothing could show better that joint action can be approved without any sacrifice of the originality of a philosophical standpoint, that a frank discussion of points of view is desirable and constructive, in short, that what might be called UNESCO's pluralistic philosophy is founded on human facts.

4. UNESCO and the Social Sciences

By CHARLES S. JOHNSON

President, Fisk University



Discussions of UNESCO assume a basic concern for building a world which does not have to rely upon force for sheer survival. This contemplates a greater revolution in men's thinking than we realize. It means not merely the passing of critical judgment on other people's shortcomings, but an examination of our own motives, institutions, social attitudes, and common social practices. If the slant of men's minds is to be altered and the defenses of peace built into their minds through education, the beginning must be made in the way men live and justify or rationalize these ways.

The first real problem was encountered by UNESCO in its own organization. When UNESCO was born, there was scarcely more than a faint ripple of interest in the press of the world. It has been almost everywhere evident that men have had least faith in the consummation of the very hopes that they most cherished. There have been few proposals of international action that could be separated from political considerations in a world not yet redeemed from international anarchy. There were at the outset some very formidable handicaps. It was a first conference, and procedures had to be worked out. There were blocks to communication in language differences. There were problems of semantics, even with the use of a common language medium. Even more important were certain basic ideological differences, such as, for example, were given expression by the delegate from Yugoslavia who, presumably, spoke for Russia also. One of the most important world powers, the Soviet Union, was still withholding its membership. However, there was in the end surprising unanimity on the basic major issues, even though this accord was accompanied by frequent and sharp differences on details.

The Social Sciences are regarded as occupying a central position in the program of UNESCO and as being in a strong position to assist in providing a suitable climate within which to carry on cooperative interna-

tional relations and promote democratic ideals and freedoms. Thus it would seem essential early to identify and analyze, with a view to action through all the means available for the spread of education, the principal obstacles to mutual understanding and peaceful relations among the peoples of the world.

There is a disposition in some quarters to speak disparagingly of the Social Sciences and the deliberate methods employed in sifting fact from fancy, sentiment from sentimentality, and reason from emotion. It is a part of the earlier vogue of popular ridicule of the absent minded professor during the New Deal by the self-made man on the street, the press, and the practical business man. That is, until these plodding, incomprehensible scholars revealed that they could, by touching off a gadget, blow up an entire city. Within the space of five years, they have ushered in a completely new age. Nobody scoffs any longer at these quiet, plodding men, who observe nature for its secrets, wearing no buttons or plumes, shouting no slogans. No one thinks of taking a popular vote on how to split the atom or find a substitute for uranium.

The unbelievable reality of this fact carries over to the Social Science field. The rule of thumb, wasteful and futile trial and error method of changing the basis of men's attitudes toward one another, belongs to the era that is passed. Business and industry, though some of its leaders still play upon the old prejudices for political advantage, have recognized the value of the deliberate scientific approach to problems that are psychological and emotional. A few years ago when the Department of Agriculture was greatly concerned about widespread malnutrition in the midst of plenty, it stimulated conferences, attended by a wide range of advisers. The speeches in Congress on the subject revealed little light. The real insight came from the experiences of the Meat Institute working with specialists who knew food values and the mores of special areas. The Meat Institute had revised custom and belief regarding the value of neglected parts of an animal and made the least desirable the best.

The scientific studies back of the public health campaigns have revolutionized men's thinking about disease and lengthened the span of life by ten years within a generation.

It is no less true of the social attitudes that have been playing such an important part in maintaining the myths and legends that divide mankind and keep all men insecure and fearful. When someone scoffs at survey research as static and pedantic, it is simply short-sightedness or

ignorance of the methods of effective modern dealing with the question of human relations

What is the most effective content of materials for instructions in this area? To what basic motives are the appeals best directed? How well can the appeals be understood through vested prejudices and personal interests? The truth is that there is very little dependable knowledge, and it must be sought and found within measurable limits in order that it may be deliberately applied in the future. That is why social scientists are needed in the vital work of UNESCO.

Fortunately the social scientists are awakening to this responsibility, whether with or without popular support. (Even Congress is still shy of the Social Sciences. The sudden terror and respect inspired by the physical scientists prompted the introduction of a legislative measure to provide national scholarships for bright young men in science, and the social sciences have been in and out of the bill almost as often as it has been up. At present they are out.)

There are, at present, few international organizations in the Social Science field. In this respect, there is a considerable difference between the social and physical sciences which speak a more nearly universal language. A considerable division exists between Eastern countries, despite the fact that the problems of these areas are vastly more social than physical. The exchange of scholars, students, research materials, and books; the pooling of source data, the preparation of glossaries of technical terms, the preparation of international reference books—are all aspects of this broadening and exchange of knowledge and experience.

In collaboration with other fields UNESCO plans international study centers. However, there must first be people who can direct them, and effective content to be passed on, not only through the study centers but through all the modern devices for mass communication.

The United Nations Economic and Social Council has set up already a demographic commission. In the work of this Commission, UNESCO will necessarily be called upon to deal with questions of education, science, and culture, in relation to population problems. The project in the large will involve the identification and analysis of those areas in the world in which there have been migrations. It will concern itself with tensions created among racial or cultural or religious groups within national groups, and in the dependent areas of the world, with the cultural status of displaced populations, the cultural effects of restricting or stimu-

lating the large scale movement of peoples; the problems arising from conflicting customs, standards, values, and ideologies of populations in contact and competition under new territorial, economic, and political circumstances.

The concept of tensions also includes in the proposal of UNESCO under the Social Science Division the whole complex of social and international problems involved in modern technological development, the impact of these developments upon social life and institutions generally, and more particularly upon the manner in which such developments might lead to the production of tensions, both national and international. If the airplane industry, for example, considers it important to set experts to work studying the effect of aviation upon modern life, in order to prepare peoples for the growth of aviation and anticipate the needs of an age of aviation, how much more important is it that the broader range of technological development, which reaches the limit of atomic power, should be given the same intensive study as a basis for new world living.

An inquiry concerning the problem of mechanization was begun by the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, an outgrowth of the old League of Nations. This inquiry is now to be enlarged, made more precise, and directed toward the formulation of practical social recommendations. It is obvious that this program has a bearing even upon the natural sciences. In an address prepared the day before his death, President Roosevelt wrote: "Today, we are faced with the pre-eminent fact that, if civilization is to survive, we must cultivate the science of human relationships, the ability of all peoples of all kinds to live together and work together at peace."

UNESCO's program of "fundamental education" places emphasis on the backward areas of the world and those countries in which economic levels have been so low as to handicap large sectors of the population in literacy and the various skills essential for living in this new age. It was obvious that "the present educational inequality represents a danger to the peace of the world which cannot become one if half of it remains illiterate." As Doctor Julian Huxley, the present Director-General of UNESCO, wrote, "Literacy is a prerequisite for scientific and technical advance and for . . . better health, more effective agriculture and more productive industry, for full intellectual awareness and mental development, for democratic and national progress, and for international awareness and knowledge of other nations." Doctor Huxley and those who

are now joining in planning this part of UNESCO's program, recognize also that incomplete and distorted information may be a more potent source of international illwill than illiteracy itself. The project in fundamental education will take into account, therefore, where dangers lie and how plans can be made to avoid them

What was said by the Editorial Committee for Education carries the same meaning for the Social Sciences, generally "If UNESCO can encourage both demand and response; if it can provide means and materials for leadership which might otherwise be lacking; if it can spur enthusiasm when it begins to lag, whether because problems have multiplied or because funds are inadequate or because political interests bar progress, or for any other reason, if it can spread the news of successful efforts and arrange personal contacts through which the contagion of first purpose may be caught, if, finally, it can meet some of the harder technical issues by means of its own studies or experiments—then UNESCO will have played its proper role in fundamental education, as an act in the drama of human evolution "

The touchstone which UNESCO attempts to apply to every item in the program is whether it would serve to promote, with the aid of all those resources which education, sciences, and culture could bring to the task, the greater happiness, security, and well being of the peoples of the world. In adopting such a program, UNESCO recognizes the truth that up to now "education in its traditional form has failed to save us from the scourge of war or to promote social progress in larger freedom " Nevertheless, the organization is fired by the vision of what education might do when directed not by selfish national purposes, but by those universal purposes which lie in the hearts of people everywhere and which might find reflection in an international organization which could commend the collaboration and resources of men and women around the world

These grandiose words, which may easily arouse skepticism, will seem less visionary if the program of UNESCO is thought of as a process rather than a goal. Each step will require the voluntary participation of individuals and agencies representing many nations, races, and creeds. It is a demonstrated truth that understanding between different groups and individuals grows most strongly and speedily when they work together on a practical project with a common interest and a common purpose. The United Nations has a glorious purpose, but in the political

field, immediate practical ends of nations are too often far apart. In the projects and purposes of UNESCO, to get at the sources of misunderstanding, and the programs for better health and better living, men of divided political ideologies and different planes can work together and by so doing enlarge the sense of community across the barriers of race and nation.

5. Internationalism of Scholarship and Learning

By I L KANDEL

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A great volume of literature has been published and widespread discussions have taken place on the economic interdependence of the world. Little attention has been devoted, however, to the international interdependence of scholarship and learning. In the period between the two wars, international intellectual cooperation was not ignored. Nevertheless the work of the International Committee for Intellectual Cooperation in Geneva and of the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation in Paris, which was more extensive in scope than is usually realized, did not stir popular imagination as much as other activities of the League of Nations. For this there were two reasons. The first was the fear lest an international organization would encroach on the sovereign right of each nation to determine its educational concerns in its own way. The second reason is an ill founded tradition that scholarship and learning are the special preserves of an intellectual élite.

Ortega y Gasset, in the *Revolt of the Masses*, and Thoman Mann in a letter, published in the *Entretiens on La Formation de l'Homme Moderne*, held under the auspices of the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation, might deplore the superficiality and a certain pseudo-knowledge on the part of the common man. The fault, however, lies with the scholars who have failed to interpret learning in such ways as to help the common man to understand their contributions to the progress of humanity.

The Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization holds out a great promise that the errors of the past will be corrected. The preamble includes the following statements:

That the wide diffusion of culture, and the education of humanity for justice and liberty and peace are indispensable to the dignity of man and constitute a sacred duty which all nations must fulfil in a spirit of mutual assistance and concern, That a peace based exclusively upon the political

and economic arrangements of governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous, lasting, and sincere support of the peoples of the world, and that the peace must therefore be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind

Here is a challenge which cannot be evaded; the dissemination of knowledge and culture is a responsibility of scholars which transcends their immediate concern for their own increasingly specialized interests. As Sir Alfred Zimmern pointed out in his *Learning and Leadership*, a teacher must not only be acquainted with the work of foreign scholars but must also have an international outlook and experience.⁸ Those who have a responsibility for the advancement of learning cannot live in isolation nor can they evade all responsibility for the influence that their contributions may exercise on the progress of humanity.

The significance of international cooperation in the advancement of knowledge was clearly brought out in the years before and during the war. The Nazi burning of books was symbolic of more than race hatred; it represented an attempt to introduce the idea of national self-sufficiency in intellectual life. The war produced what Raymond B. Fosdick, president of the Rockefeller Foundation, referred to as "The Isolation of Silence"

War not only destroys, it isolates, and isolation means intellectual stagnation. The flow of ideas across boundary lines, the free exchange of periodicals and books, the cross-fertilization of minds working in the same scientific and cultural fields—these are among the tragic losses of war. "Speech is civilization itself," says Thomas Mann. "The word, even the most contradictory word, preserves contact—it is silence which isolates."⁹

On the internationalism of scholarship one striking example may be cited:

As an illustration of the international exchange of mathematical knowledge, this mention of Bonfils, also known as Immanuel ben Jacob, has

⁸Comment by Stewart G. Cole.

I think that this is a trenchant statement worthy of discussion. Under what circumstances does a scholar acquire an international outlook? Can he achieve it through academic endeavor only, or is travel and exchange of specific experience with persons from elsewhere in the world necessary? To what degree must a scholar yield the emotional aspects of his personality to the idealism of one world, and how can this experience reinforce his ideas about one world which jointly are essential to his living on an international level of behavior?

⁹The Rockefeller Foundation, *A Review for 1946*, p. 7.

recently been communicated to me by Doctor Solomon Gandz, a native of Austria, now living in America, who, with Doctor Sarton, found it in a Hebrew manuscript in the *Bibliothèque Nationale* in Paris. Doctor Gandz is publishing an article upon it in *Isis*, an international journal edited by Doctor Sarton of Harvard University but printed in Belgium. This article will relate to the mathematics in various Babylonian and Sumerian inscriptions, and also to a work in Dutch printed in 1585. All but two of the mathematical statements are easily readable by any scholar, and, aside from the difficulty of handwriting, these two can be deciphered by the aid of a work by Doctor Neugebauer, recently of Göttingen but now, for political reasons, in Copenhagen, Denmark. This work on Immanuel Bonfils was reported at the International Mathematical Congress at Oslo, Norway, this year. Thus at least ten countries are bound together by an interest in a single fact concerning decimals, a subject that concerns every civilized part of the world.²

If the cross-fertilization of ideas is more apparent in the sciences than in the other areas of intellectual activities, it is due in the main to a tendency to look upon literature, art, music, and other cultural activities as solely the products of the "national" minds and a certain desire to enhance national pride. Cross-fertilization, however, has always been at work, even when external influences have been denied.

It is true that scholars, writers, and creative artists cannot wholly escape the influences of their particular national environments. Differences in national ethos and national character may in fact have the great advantage of preventing uniformity and standardization in the intellectual life of the world. They may result in the world becoming a great experimental laboratory, each nation, because of its peculiar characteristics, attacking problems common to the world in its own way. National character, as defined by Señor Madariaga, is "a combination of qualities and defects," "the color, the scent, the shape" of national acts.

These differences in methods of attack on the problems of life have operated in a field—in science—which is generally assumed to be the most objective of intellectual activities and in which national differences would least make themselves felt. Thus J. D. Beinal in his *Social Function of Science* notes differences in the methods of approach in scientific research. In England, he writes, "Imagination is concrete and visual . . .

²David Eugene Smith, "Mathematics: Its General Character," in the Thirty-Sixth Yearbook, Part II, *International Understanding through the Public School Curriculum*, National Society for the Study of Education, Bloomington, Illinois, 1937, p. 75.

The great question for the English scientist is 'How does it work?' German science suffered both the advantages and disadvantages of official support. The advantages came from the prestige of State sponsorship; the disadvantages were "firstly the traditions of patient and somewhat pedantic scholarship, the multiplication of recorded facts and commentaries on them, and secondly the greater difficulties suffered by men of originality and unorthodox genius" French science, though limited by bureaucratic narrowness and parsimony, "never lost its distinguishing characteristics—the extreme lucidity and beauty of its presentations." Americans, writes Bernal, "possessed the English empirical character with far more scope and more incentive for practical activity. The inventiveness of the Americans is no doubt closely connected with their great natural resources, coupled with the shortage of labor."³ De Tocqueville, a century before Bernal, had already noted the same American characteristic. The Hylean project undertaken by UNESCO, in which scientists of different national origins will cooperate on a common problem, should provide an excellent opportunity to observe these differences in approach.

The idea of international cooperation in the field of scholarship and learning is not new. Scholarship was international in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. It was not until the principle, *cujus regio, ejus religio*, led to the creation of local universities in the interests of the state religion, that a breach occurred. The seventeenth century, torn by continued religious conflicts and the rise of new political and economic theories but buoyed up by the promise of the new learning, saw proposals to pool the knowledge of the world in the interests of peace. Thus Leibnitz suggested "the establishment of a universal republic of letters, a network of scholarly societies and academies for the spread of civilization." Such a *societas eruditorum* would, in his opinion, also lead to a reunion of all religions.⁴ At about the same time John Amos Comenius proposed the creation of a Pansophic College with its object

to spread the light of wisdom throughout the human race . . . For unless we desire to remain ever in the same position, or even to go back, we must take care that our successful beginnings lead on to further advances

³J. D. Bernal, *The Social Function of Science*, copyright, 1939 by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission. Pp. 196ff. On "National Mentalities and International Cooperation," see I. L. Kandel, *Intellectual Cooperation, National and International*, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, 1944, pp. 17ff.

⁴Hans Kohn, *Idea of Nationalism*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1945, p. 343.

For this no individual, and no single generation sufficeth, and it is therefore essential that the work should be carried on by many persons, working in concert and using as a starting point the researches of their predecessors. This Universal College would bear the same relation to other schools that the belly bears to other members of the body, that of a living laboratory supplying sap, vitality and strength to all.

The idea of international cooperation in promoting knowledge was revived by H. G. Wells who proposed "a new social organ, a new institution—which for a time I will call *World Encyclopaedia* . . . what is really a scheme for the reorganization and reorientation of education and information throughout the world." In this worldwide organization intellectuals and specialists would be knit together "into a more and more conscious cooperating unity and a growing sense of their own dignity."

The organization for intellectual cooperation under the League of Nations was created to carry out the spirit of the ideas proposed by Leibnitz, Comenius, and Wells. If it failed, it was because of inadequate financial support and lack of popular interest. UNESCO, definitely recognized as a specialized auxiliary agency of the United Nations, has started with an appeal to the imagination of the public everywhere. Its great opportunity lies in the fact that it combines the interests of scholars and the educational interests of the masses. International organizations to promote cooperation between specialists will, and should, continue to exist. Through UNESCO the opportunity has been created of emphasizing the importance of an international outlook and the contribution of the scholar to human progress.

6. UNESCO in an Anxious World

By JAMES MARSHALL

Member, United States National Commission for UNESCO



There is a time bomb in the cellar. Perhaps it will go off. While it ticks away we leisurely collect things that we would like to save. We have a home to save, a home with a great tradition, a place that has been alive; but we are cluttered and bemused by our bric-a-brac. We gather our shotguns for protection in the dark night, we lovingly look over our collections of stamps and old match boxes; we place in a bag a book of sermons, a stock certificate, some Copenhagen statuettes that belonged to Aunt Jane, and the copy of Shakespeare that grandfather won as a boy in a spelling bee; we must also take a pot of jam and pictures of Lauren Bacall and Robert Taylor. Meanwhile the bomb ticks on. There is an argument as to who shall decide whether we shall leave the home and when. And to quiet us Mother reads the *Christmas Carol* aloud, all about pathetic Tiny Tim and the regeneration of old Scrooge. The bomb continues to tick; it may blow us to kingdom come, but at all costs we must lavish our love on the past, on what we have hoarded on other occasions to soften the cruel impact of reality.

UNESCO is founded on several sound principles for one important purpose. It faces two major dangers (aside from those of administration and organization) and has a great opportunity if it is oriented to deal with man's fundamental problem, that is, himself.

UNESCO Principles

The constitution of UNESCO opens with a statement that "since wars begin in the minds of men it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed." It goes on to state that "ignorance of each other's ways and lives has been a common cause, throughout the history of mankind, of that suspicion and mistrust between the peoples of the world through which their differences have all too often broken into

war." And the preamble concludes with the idea that "a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments would not be a peace that could secure the unanimous, lasting, and sincere support of the peoples of the world "

The constitution of UNESCO is a unique document. It is the first international recognition of the fact that it is men's ideas, their attitudes of mind, their intentions, which create wars. The primary idea behind UNESCO is that people must talk to people, that through their educational, scientific, and cultural interests they can get some understanding of one another; that they can find moral solidarity and common purpose in the maintenance of peace, however they may differ on matters of metaphysics and political or economic organization.

UNESCO Purpose

The purpose of the organization is "to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture, in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by the charter of the United Nations "

There is only one purpose really set forth in the constitution of UNESCO. Therefore all activity of the organization must be measured against that purpose. What contribution can the activity make to peace and security by promoting collaboration through education, science, and culture, through furthering universal respect for justice, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms?

UNESCO Program

Essentially UNESCO must address itself to breaking down barriers of ignorance, suspicion, and mistrust. It must expand the frontiers of the mind so that they can encompass greater knowledge of the ways of others, develop trust in others, and bring about an acceptance of differences between peoples and nations.

This is no simple problem. It is nothing that can be accomplished in a year or a decade or probably even in a generation. Nevertheless for

the first time in history more than thirty nations—and it is hoped in the near future, all of the United Nations—join in an international institution to bridge the gulf between peoples. We have in the past devoted too much attention to the metaphysics and the ideologies which have divided people. We have spent too little effort in an analysis of those emotional factors and patterns of thought expressive of ideas, hopes, aims, and fears. It is these which need to be understood if ignorance, suspicion, and mistrust are to be reduced to a minimum.

No institution on earth, either political, economic, or cultural, can bring about peace or understanding unless there is the will to peace and understanding. But UNESCO offers to the world a forum in which people with the will for peace and the desire for understanding can get together. Anything that can reduce the tension and the critical power conflict in the world is worthwhile. This can in part be done by transferring the realm of conflict from that of arms and economic competition to the realm of facts and ideas. The psychiatrists call this sublimation. This is what occurs in every civilization where we substitute discussion and law and study for arbitrary action, violence, and demagoguery.

The approach that UNESCO has taken so far treats the minds of men as if they were free to act as intelligent instruments, as if there were in fact a will to peace and understanding, as if any interchange of knowledge and persons would break down barriers. This attitude is to a point wholesome but to a degree naive.

UNESCO would rebuild schools, replenish libraries, exchange persons, increase knowledge, interchange cultural experiences, stimulate the arts, and facilitate communication, with the expectation that these things will construct the mental, fundamental defenses of peace. But prior to 1914 there were schools and libraries throughout the Western world, persons passed freely from nation to nation, censorship was almost unknown, international conferences of scientists and scholars occurred annually, and power politics and its repercussions were not daily front page news. Since 1914 peoples have grown more insecure and nations more fearful, social scientists and philosophers have become more bitter, the great masses of the people more uncertain, the media of mass communication less free, artists, intellectuals, and teachers more subject to state control. The elements of individual and mass neuroses have been multiplied and intensified. Politicians and scholars nevertheless retain

for the most part an almost unbroken block to the psychological sciences, possibly because the neurotic content of political power struggles and the escape to scholarly minutiae set up unconscious resistances.

The program adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO in the fall of 1946 and revised by the secretariat and the executive board touches many aspects of education, science, and culture, sometimes with just a quick kiss of recognition, sometimes with a word of longing, and sometimes with a vague stare. The important projects can be grouped as follows:

1. A campaign to aid in educational, scientific, and cultural reconstruction in war devastated areas
2. The study and stimulation of fundamental education—that is, an attack on ignorance through increasing literacy
3. An internationally organized study of the Hylean Amazon Valley from the point of view of various special sciences.
4. A study of education for international understanding

This last project is far less than it sounds. It is a far cry, too, from the proposal as originally projected, possibly because the secretariat on education has been sadly neglected by the UNESCO administration. As to this project, the secretariat talks of making "an initial inquiry into the teaching in schools located in member-states, regarding international co-operation, with particular reference to the United Nations and its auxiliary organizations." There are also other sub-projects.

There is a project in the social studies to study tensions crucial to peace such as tensions between drives for nationalism and internationalism, those involved in problems of population, and those brought about by the attempts of man to adjust to modern technological developments. It is interesting to note that the European delegates and the secretariat evidently do not know what this is all about and have asked for a study to clarify the meaning and that the study of social tensions "be linked with a survey on international aspects of philosophy."¹

In mass communication, which was emphasized by the Americans, no one can criticize the program for technical development and the free flow of information. But it is disturbing to find unthinking silence in

¹An excellent analysis of the tensions project has been prepared for UNESCO by Professor Edward A. Shils and consultation was had with experts in the fields of psychiatry, anthropology, etc. A reformulation of the project was made at the Mexico City Conference of UNESCO and at this time, December, 1947, efforts are being made to obtain a staff to execute this program.

connection with the purposes and attitudes involved in communication. It is not sufficient to tell the world the facts, what is right and wrong, how one nation and people can accept another nation and people to their mutual advantage. Words and pictures will not necessarily relieve men and women in high positions or in the mass from those emotional strains which develop into aggressive action. In fact, the very glibness of mass media, their facility, their flexibility, have made them the darlings of those who have desired to drug intellects. On this point Hitler's *Mein Kampf* is the basic text. The problem with respect to the media of mass communication, as in more formal education, is the method of harnessing mass media to a more positive and creative service to the cause of international understanding and peace.

We can readily find illustrations of what this means. A greater proportion of headlines and statements of news commentators will be found to be such as are calculated to rouse excitement and feelings of aggression or counter-aggression. While radio and press were highlighting the clashes at Paris, the disagreements on Trieste, and the troubles in Iran, Palestine, and Greece, they had little or nothing to say about the meeting of the United States National Commission for UNESCO—except to report the eulogies on mass media given at that conference. Paying slight attention to this constructive effort, headlines enticed the public with words of fear and fight. Phrases like “slams door,” “imperil peace,” “seize,” “political storm,” “ultimatum,” “sharp note,” “fight,” covered the front pages. *The New York Herald Tribune*, for example, said, “Army to Take Fourth of Meat Supply,” whereas the story was not one of *taking* but of the *need* of the Army. Again that same week the *Herald Tribune* talked in its headlines of “Delicatessen Closing Tonight in Meat Famine.” Surely the word “famine” was one tending to arouse illwill or fear. On September 24th, *The Christian Science Monitor* headed a story, “Gromyko Turns Big Guns on Yanks in China.” The article itself was an aggressive article. What it referred to, however, was not anything to do with turning guns on American soldiers but objecting to the presence of American troops in China and elsewhere.

In the headlines and statements of radio commentators, far more time and space are given to items arousing anxiety and anger than to items dealing with goodwill. Anyone who has any doubt should himself analyze his favorite newspaper or check news broadcasts for a few days.

The present project of UNESCO for education for international

understanding is inadequate and unreal. The project in the mass media and the project in the social science field fail to treat of the primary tensions leading to wars.

The problem is essentially and eternally one of aggressions. It requires that we study and address ourselves to those frustrations, anxieties, and the sense of guilt which lead to aggression. Not all of these, of course, lead to war. They may lead to cuddling up to a mother, father, or prostitute, seeking protection in the shadow of an idol or an autocrat. They may lead to escapism in alcohol, moving picture houses, words, and phrases. They may on the other hand lead to the building of dams and levees against the floods of great rivers.

We know, too, that there have been primitive societies that have not been warlike but have lived in peace until they have been civilized by Western European expansion. We can recall Sweden as one of the most aggressive nations in Europe under Gustavus Adolphus and we can see how a once aggressive culture has been refined and revitalized into one of the most hopeful in the world. The study of frustrations is of primary importance, for example, the frustration of the Germans who regarded as a criterion of success the domination of other people. It might be well to study the frustrations in the United States revolving around the dollar as a criterion of success. We should study, too, the frustrations of the Russians. Does the lack of civil liberties reflect itself in external aggressive action? We should make a study of the scapegoat in international terms—the Jews in Germany, the colored peoples in the United States, foreign capitalists to Russia.

It would seem to the writer that the program of UNESCO might well be treated in these terms: first, a study by psychiatrists and dynamic psychologists of the program of UNESCO and its relationship to the psychological elements that make for war and peace;^a secondly, a study by anthropologists and sociologists of what brings about satisfaction in several cultural settings and what will cause contrary results. For we must recognize that what may bring a sense of security to one people may stimulate anxiety in another because of the varying cultural heritages.^b

^aComment by G. H. Stevenson

It seems to me we need to give thought to the combination of forces within the World Health Organization and UNESCO, so that the efforts of the two organizations would be complementary rather than operating in separate channels. Writings on the same subject have been prepared for the WHO meeting in 1948.

^bComment by Harry B. Fuldgood

Mr. Marshall has driven to the heart of the problem of war. It is heartening to note that

After these foundation studies have been made by psychiatrists, psychologists, anthropologists, and sociologists, the next step should be for the economists and political scientists to study those mechanisms for organizing economic, social, and political life which will enable people to find satisfactions and to avoid frustrations, anxieties, and guilt. Then it will be for the educators, the churches, and the people in the fields of the mass media to train people to use this machinery

Dangers

UNESCO faces alternative dangers equally serious. Its achievement of success measured by its expressed purpose of contributing to peace and security is periled by the grim reality of eternally prehensile power politics and also by the nostalgic fantasy of scholarship that ever so small a reconstruction of the past will place mankind at the gates of Utopia if not of the city of God.

We dare not be blind to the barriers which have increased in the past few decades, cutting off people from people through quota systems, restraints on trade, censorship, visa restrictions, and aggressive propaganda. The iron curtains of the mind, the Maginot Lines barring cultural intercommunication, have been worn away under the impact of ideas and strength of spirit. But the most successful assaults on such barriers have been over the trails and roads and sea lanes opened up by commerce. Until we resume a freer interchange of goods and peoples, the way to the intercommunication of ideas and ideals will be difficult.

The supersonic airplane and the rocket which have made us all neighbors have also destroyed national sovereignty. If national sovereignty was ever more than home rule in a world of power conflict, fast flying missiles loaded with fissionable plutonium—or possibly with organisms to spread epidemic disease—ridicule the traditional concept of sovereignty. No nation is now free to act as it will within its borders. Its needs and its risks and its security are shared in common. Capitalist and communist, dictator and democrat, white man and colored, the strong and

the present program of UNESCO may be supplemented by psychodynamic and socio-anthropological studies of the elements *within* man and his culture that engender aggression. I am impressed particularly by Mr. Marshall's statement that satisfaction of the psychological needs and strivings of one culture may create tensions and anxieties in another, because of varying cultural heritages. This is a factor around which one must orient any psychodynamic approach to the problem of aggression and its amelioration.

the feeble, are alike subject to extinction by high explosive, high temperatures, gamma rays, and diseases

One of the greatest functions that UNESCO can perform is to tell the world of the unreality of the old concept of national sovereignty in the world today.^c To do so it must continually fight the attempts of men to use it as an instrument in that mad schizophrenia which plays the power politics of the Middle Ages in a world of modern technological developments

Orientation and Opportunity

As a race we suffer from a major neurosis. We have complex multiple choices to make today, but we try to decide from among the simpler choices of the other days. There follow frustration, anxiety, hate, and aggression—aggression against ourselves—mankind. We cannot face the magnitude of our failures or the ineffectiveness of the supports and drugs we have devised against our fears. We dare not confront ourselves with the evidence of the impotence of our devices and our soothsaying to control our destructive drives.

^cComment by Stewart G. Cole

We have learned much better how to cultivate our thinking powers as human beings than we have learned how to marshal our emotions for effective and cooperative endeavor.

The problem is to mature the emotional aspect of personality of man so that his behavior is dependable and stable, even amid the shockingly unstable conditions of the present world. Among other things, do we not need a symbolism of universal human values to which loyalties can be tied and which, in turn, can judge our functional loyalties, and thus make them the ally of thought and action in the pursuit of one world? What is UNESCO doing to provide mankind with both an ideological and a social symbolism which will command the confidence and support of persons of whatever race, creed, or nationality they may happen to be members?

Mr. Marshall's reply

It seems to me that the answer to the question, is to be found in the UNESCO Constitution and UNESCO as an organization. Certainly there is a fine ideology in the preamble to the UNESCO Constitution. There is a social symbolism in the fact that nations have expressed themselves as believing that the maintenance of peace requires attention to things of the mind and spirit as well as to economic and political arrangements. Moreover, if an institution such as UNESCO can get the support of large and influential groups of people it will in itself become a social symbol. It is true that some of the effectiveness of this symbol will depend in part upon the establishment of the United Nations as an effective symbol but the two institutions need not sink or swim together. I doubt whether enduring symbols are created over night. It will take some years yet to determine whether the ideological and social symbolism of UNESCO will be as effective as those of us who worked for the establishment of UNESCO have hoped.

If we fail to solve our self-destructiveness, it will be a major biological failure. It will be the inability of our race to adjust itself to its environment. This incapacity will be likely to prove as serious as were the failures of the mammoth and the great reptiles.

We are a sick race. But we have minds capable of applying to our affairs the triumphant methods of experimental science. And we have, too, a great capacity to love—and a need for love. In these lies our hope for survival. If now—not a generation from today, but now—we acknowledge our perilous sickness and apply scientifically the rapidly growing knowledge in the realm of dynamic psychology, we can release our pent up intellect and set our capacity for love against our anxiety ridden destructiveness. It is not in ivory towers or in atomic pilot plants or in council rooms of smoky air that the prescription for man's recovery will be written. If it is to come at all, it must come from the laboratories of those sciences that deal with the study and development of man himself. What the psychological sciences show us must then be translated into attitudes and behavior patterns, first of all in the home, then in the schools, then through the churches, the media of mass communication, industrial relations, and political institutions.

This is the track UNESCO must follow. Herein lies the great opportunity of UNESCO to lead mankind to its salvation.^d

^dComment by Richard P. McKeon

An organization designed to promote peace through understanding must clarify its purpose through the means used to accomplish it. Operating methods, in the process of attaining the end, define it more precisely. Discussions concerning UNESCO, even when they turn on differences in the interpretation of its purpose or estimates of its accomplishments, tend to concentrate, as a consequence, on its program rather than on a general formulation of its purpose. James Marshall's paper is, in this sense, less a criticism of UNESCO than a contribution to the accomplishment of its program, and I find myself in complete agreement with the framework of his argument. He has stated the principles of UNESCO, its purposes and its dangers clearly and, I think, correctly. In particular, the two dangers which he describes should be constantly in the minds of those who plan and execute the program of UNESCO, for UNESCO will make only small and accidental contributions to peace if it becomes either a platform for the development of the verbal maneuvers of power politics or in academy for the encouragement and assistance of scholars and scientists. The oppositions of ideologies must doubtless be resolved and the advance of knowledge in all fields will contribute to the solidarity, comforts, and amenities of a better world, but the institution described in the preamble of UNESCO, which is to make use of the instruments of education, science, and culture for the purposes of peace, is not well suited to resolve questions by forensic debate or to be the operating agency for promoting international research. The points on which I differ from the position stated by Mr. Marshall, consequently, have to do with the program of UNESCO. There I differ with him on theory and on fact.

Mr Marshall is convinced, so far as theory is concerned, that "we have in the past devoted too much attention to the metaphysics and the ideologies which have divided people," and that we should therefore turn to psychology and psychiatry for "an analysis of those emotional factors and those patterns of ideas, hopes, aims, and fears." To my mind Mr Marshall has loaded the opposition: metaphysics is not a purely intellectual discipline which neglects all problems of change and passion, and the study of ideologies is concerned precisely with the devices of communication which induce the emotions which Mr. Marshall would study. In a word, my difference with Mr Marshall is metaphysical. One of the best descriptions of metaphysics is that it is a science of first principles, and the organization and interrelations of the sciences is one of the fundamental metaphysical questions. Mr Marshall lays down a hierarchy of the sciences for UNESCO with which few experts (except psychologists and their advocates) would agree. According to his scheme, the program of UNESCO should be treated first by psychiatrists and dynamic psychologists, second, by anthropologists and sociologists, third, by economists and political scientists, and finally, by educators, religious leaders, and experts in mass communication. I realize, without prompting from a psychiatrist, that a philosopher who reacts adversely to such an order is in a weak position, since philosophy appears nowhere in this fourfold organization. My answer, philosophically sound whatever psychological motivation may be found for it, is that this organization of the sciences is itself the expression of a philosophy, and I disagree with that philosophy. If I were arranging the sequence of the sciences for the UNESCO of Plato's *Republic*, I should want to put philosophy and dialectic in the place occupied in Mr Marshall's list by psychology and psychiatry. And in this anxious world I should feel happier if my psychiatrist had the scope of Socrates. These, however, are differences which should fit within the framework of UNESCO, and my objection to Mr Marshall's position is an objection against any dogmatically established priority among the disciplines as the framework of UNESCO. In particular projects or in particular stages of projects, there must be such sequential organization, but such organization is possible only if the case for any of the disciplines as basis for specific studies or activities is not prejudged.

My second difference with Mr Marshall is on a question of fact. If insufficient effort had been made by the Executive Board and the Secretariat to secure the cooperation of psychologists and psychiatrists in the execution of the program of UNESCO, I should agree with Mr Marshall that an important instrument by which to achieve the end of UNESCO had been neglected. But internal evidence indicates that the last information considered by Mr Marshall concerning the progress of work on the program of UNESCO is the report of the Executive Board of April, 1947. UNESCO was four months old at that time, and the formulation of the program in practicable terms was finally approved by the Executive Board only at that April meeting. Since that time, strenuous efforts have been made to find a director for the social science section and for the study of tensions crucial to peace. The outstanding candidate for the latter post at the present moment (September, 1947) is a psychologist. Moreover, it is proposed to grant a subsidy to the International Congress on Mental Health on the understanding that the study of tensions will form an important part of its program. In view of the difficulties faced in launching international projects, the importance of psychology and psychiatry for UNESCO does not seem to me to be in danger of being neglected.

I should therefore agree with Mr Marshall in recognizing the importance of psychology and psychiatry to UNESCO while dissenting from the metaphysical ardor which leads him to make it the foundation stone of the program, and the record of the efforts to fit these sciences into the operation of the program discounts the pessimism and alarm with which he views the progress of the past few months.

7. *Problems of UNESCO*

By HOWARD E. WILSON

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UNESCO has many achievements to its credit. It has weathered some of the diseases of infancy and gained a popular support far greater than ever given its precursor organizations, such as the Institute of Intellectual Cooperation. It has breadth of scope and potential effectiveness of the most challenging character. Certain of its meritorious projects have been launched. Progress has been made in establishing its structural relationship to the United Nations and to international voluntary associations. These achievements and the promises of further growth deserve strong support. The topic assigned for this paper, however, deals with the problems of UNESCO, and its development must be somewhat critical in character. The problems, however, are only a part of the record. And they are here reviewed as a basis for constructive and remedial action.

An organization necessarily encounters many problems as it begins to function. Such problems are enlarged and intensified for an international organization launched in a highly nationalistic world at a moment in history when all of society is bewildered by postwar uncertainties and by a cultural crisis. Current deterioration in the world's economic and political condition intensifies cultural conflicts inherent in UNESCO's affairs. And it is also to be feared that UNESCO, in the short months of its existence, has not operated in a manner likely to make its path easier.

When one talks with members of the Secretariat or of the committees of UNESCO about the problems of the Organization, the conversation invariably deals with budgetary inadequacies, with the irritations of an exasperating red tape and bureaucratic maneuvering, and with the "political" limitations on UNESCO's action. One hears, too, of the problem of "winning support" by means of information and propaganda. These,

however, are largely surface problems. To be sure, UNESCO has severe financial restrictions: \$6,000,000 for 1947 cannot cover the cost of all the projects approved by the First General Conference or cherished by UNESCO's staff and friends—to say nothing of its "camp followers." Yet the basic question is first that of spending the available funds in such fashion as to warrant an increased budget. Routine administrative arrangements and a bureaucratic atmosphere are also surface irritations, although they are in one sense responsible for more basic difficulties, in that UNESCO staff officers have to spend so much time and energy on forms and procedures that consideration of basic purposes and program possibilities is neglected. The rapid recruitment of staff from all over the world (there are now upwards of five hundred persons on UNESCO's payroll), the ardent wooing of new States-members for UNESCO, and the conflicts inherited from the First General Conference, increase the political sensibilities and spirit of UNESCO. But again, these problems are only surface manifestations of deeper difficulties.

The truth is that at the moment UNESCO has no sense of central direction or focus. It is like the warrior who mounted horse and rode off in all directions. UNESCO is in danger of becoming "all things to all men." It reflects, without clarifying, the confusions and conflicts and philosophical uncertainties of our era. The basic necessity for UNESCO is a clearer, more precise formulation of its role and purpose, not only in ultimate and general terms but in immediate and specific terms.

Quite rightly the statements of purpose in UNESCO's Constitution are general. Quite rightly, too, UNESCO's actual program has to be built of specific enterprises. Probably each project on which UNESCO is engaged or proposes to engage can be related directly to the broad statements of purpose, a "case" can be made for each. But the establishment of priority ratings for specific enterprises and the efficient patterning of the enterprises, depend upon the formulation of intermediate purposes and principles—intermediate between the broad statements of the Constitution and the specific elements of a feasible, ongoing, cumulative program directed toward its general goals.

There is too much reliance in UNESCO on the generalities of the Constitution or in sweeping phrases. For illustration, much is said in UNESCO about "education for international understanding." Is international understanding necessarily conducive to "peace and security," and if so under what conditions? Does "understanding" involve good-

will—as in the case of an understanding friend—or does it involve a bargain agreed upon—as in the case of an understanding among allies—or is it a purely rational, informational process, or some combination of the three? The UNESCO Constitution can be quoted at length without revealing answers. The UNESCO program, which includes a sort of omnibus enterprise hailed as “education for international understanding,” likewise presents no answers.^a

The same is true of many other phases of UNESCO's program. What is the direct relationship between scientific research in the Amazon Valley and the attainment of “peace and security”? Or the furnishing of small libraries for use in four “work-project camps” in Europe during the summer of 1947? Or the distribution of news releases about the activities of the UNESCO staff at international conferences? Or the sponsorship of an exhibit of modern art? Or the grant of funds to individual scientists to enable them to attend international congresses? Or the accumulation of a library at UNESCO House? These probably are worthy enterprises. What is criticized is the unexplained connection they bear to UNESCO's ultimate aims, and the looseness of their terms of reference.

In the general propositions of UNESCO's Constitution there are not only uncertainties, there are also, in the absence of agreed upon interpretations, contradictions. In a recent address the Deputy Director General of UNESCO suggested that the UNESCO Constitution states purposes “so clear and simple that no human being can question them.” That such is not the case was immediately evidenced by the questions from his audience. Constitutional phrases about freedom of communication, about the origins of war “in the minds of men,” about the nature of security, and the extent of interdependence, are violently controversial in the ideological context of our times. One of the questions frequently

^aComment by Mark Starr

I suppose UNESCO shares in the inevitable let down which follows war. It seems to me that your criticisms are constructive. I am sure you have in mind the additional educational idea of concentrating upon adults who, after all, elect the politicians who, we hope, will give more than a miserly six million dollars to build peace in the minds of men. I know that there is a suggestion to set up a world group to coordinate and strengthen the various adult education agencies. However, I think more emphasis should be placed on this. Why should not UNESCO also pay more attention to the exchange of men and women who are not professional students and teachers? I understand that some seventeen thousand teachers and students are now being exchanged between the various countries but too often this is on a professional academic level which certainly does not have the influence in labor unions particularly and in community organizations generally which is necessary.

raised about UNESCO is whether it is an agency of cultural imperialism. The question is particularly addressed to Americans (sometimes hopefully and sometimes critically), who are often assumed to conceive UNESCO as one agency for remaking the world in their own image, but it can be directed with at least equal force to the British and the French. Probably UNESCO is not so regarded by any of these powers, but no convincing answer can be given until some of the generalities of the Constitution are reduced to subsidiary principles and definitions. UNESCO's difficulties exist in part because men are not sure whether it is based upon a concept of "one world" or "two worlds." That issue troubles every government, and accentuates many of UNESCO's problems. Only as a clarification of the Constitution in its relation to the conflicting issues of modern life is forthcoming from the Secretariat, as a basis for planning a program, and from the Executive Board and the General Conference, as a basis for political decisions, can the fate of UNESCO be determined.

Obviously the final decision on these political questions rests with emerging world events. Only the future can reveal whether we have one world or two worlds or no world at all. Apologists may argue that UNESCO can only drift with the tide. Drifting may be the proper policy of strategy, but it is not a policy by which UNESCO may influence the course of human events.

The Director General has written a stimulating document on the philosophy and aims of UNESCO, but the statement was rejected by the Preparatory Commission and ignored by the First General Conference. It has since been published commercially as an individual expression of one man's views, its status as the personal view of the administrative head of UNESCO, however, only adds to the confusion. The difficulty lies not in the fact that such a statement has been made, but more pointedly in the fact that other such statements have not been made, and especially in the fact that no such statements have been pushed and revised to the point of general acceptance.

The basic difficulty of UNESCO, then, is lack of refinement and precision in purpose, inevitably reflected in its program. Why does UNESCO reject a well formulated project for the development of statistical reporting in education which is basic to educational analysis on a global scale but accept a project for a summer seminar for teachers? Why does it develop an elaborate prospectus for growing ground nuts in Tanganyika

but fail to deal directly with the social implications of scientific achievements in the industrialized nations? Why does it call into being an International Institute of the Theatre, but fail to press forward an agreement sponsored by the First General Conference for freer exchange of documentary films among nations? There is too much of whim or chance or external pressure in the scattered elements of the UNESCO program. The yardstick for their measurement, for establishing priorities among them has not been constructed.

A second and related problem is an organizational inconsistency. To describe it requires a certain measure of historical background. During the period of the Preparatory Commission, the UNESCO program was developed in the framework of six substantive fields—education, mass communication, libraries and museums, the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the creative arts. The Secretariat was organized in sections corresponding to these fields. At the time of the First General Conference (which marked the transition from preparatory to permanent UNESCO) there was considerable criticism of this organization. Certain fields, such as philosophy and the humanistic studies, quite justifiably felt that they had not been accorded adequate attention. Of more far-reaching consequence, there was criticism of any organizational structure based on subject or professional fields. Undue compartmentalization was feared. There was demand for development of the program in “UNESCO-wide” projects, and for organization of the Secretariat in a series of “task forces,” drawn from many disciplines. The General Conference tended to favor the latter concept of action and organization. It was assumed by many that the permanent Secretariat would be organized on these more functional lines.

In the reorganization which followed the General Conference, however, the old organization was retained and the new one piled on top. The program is stated in terms of UNESCO-wide enterprises, but the implementing organization is on another basis. Projects tend to float from administrative unit to administrative unit; there is endless duplication of effort and jockeying for position or control, some specific enterprises fall between the complex administrative units or are so split up as to be ineffective.

Take, for example, UNESCO's widely heralded program in “fundamental education.” That project, as was recognized from its inception, involves many subject fields—science, medicine, education, technology,

agriculture, mass communications, libraries. Originally the project was set up as an enterprise administratively anchored in the Education Section, with those staff members working on it responsible for maintaining the closest liaison with all other pertinent fields. Under the present administrative organization, the Education Section continues to exist as a presumably unified department, and the Fundamental Education project is set up as a new and additional administrative unit. The only result is that the Fundamental Education staff has now to cross one more set of departmental boundary lines to maintain liaison. Under the new organization there are more sections or bureaus or administrative units than before, the problems of correlation and cohesion are more serious. To have an Education Section and a Fundamental Education Section and a Section on Education for International Understanding, is to be neither flesh nor fowl, administratively speaking.

In routine matters UNESCO is far healthier now than ever before. But in the creation of an administrative structure conducive to a dynamic and correlated program, UNESCO is in a bad way. Its secretarial organization reflects and accentuates the inconsistencies, duplications, and makeshifts of its program.

These two problems—a clearer formulation of aims in increasingly specific terms, and a secretarial organization conducive to development of program—underlie many of the difficulties UNESCO is encountering. Yet, as was said at the outset, the problems and difficulties are only a part of the total record. UNESCO's potentiality is unimpaired and is impressive. The Organization is functioning, is started on its path. It is not to be evaluated in terms of its shortcomings alone, but also in terms of the achievements which have been made, and which are reported elsewhere.^b

^bComment by Richard P. McKeon

Doctor Howard Wilson's statement of the "Problems of UNESCO" reflects the long experience he has had with the evolving program and organization of UNESCO, as well as the depth of reflection he has been able to give to turns of its history which few remember or, indeed, ever knew. Not only for these reasons, but also because no one could question his fundamental contention that the great problems of UNESCO lie in the further clarification of its program and in the establishment of an organization suited to carry out the program efficiently, there is some danger that his specific points of criticism or recommended remedies may be accepted uncritically. I find myself in the position of wanting to emphasize the same problems as Mr. Wilson, but differing from him on many specific points. It is highly probable that such differences among men who have worked at various stages and in various capacities for UNESCO are an important part of its problems.

With respect to the problem of the program, I should want to formulate both the general problem of clarifying the program and the specific problem of justifying individual projects differently than Doctor Wilson. It seems to me that considerable progress has been made during the nine months of UNESCO's existence in clarifying its basic philosophy. M. Havet's essay in this symposium is a symptom of the progress Doctor Huxley had early, and correctly, recognized that UNESCO's program and operation must be based on a fundamental philosophy. His effort to state a single and, as he hoped, neutral philosophy, in which all men might cooperate, met with the difficulty that no one philosophy can be neutral enough to win universal coherence. The representatives of several delegations, including the United States delegation, recommended therefore that the basic philosophic problem of UNESCO be sought in the problem of how men of differing philosophic, economic, and political convictions can come to agreement in the pursuit of a common end—the peace and welfare of mankind. The development of UNESCO during the past few months, no less than M. Havet's essay, are evidence that cooperation has been undertaken (often with considerable success, as in the case of the Committee on the Philosophic Bases of Human Rights) in that direction. Since that is the case, there is no doubt that UNESCO, in its whole conception and in all its objectives, is committed to the faith in "one world," but its chief problem will nonetheless continue to be opposition to the forces that tend toward "two worlds."

If the basic philosophy of UNESCO is to consist in a fruitful cooperation and pluralism of philosophies, there is little prospect that the various projects approved in the program will soon have the logical consistency and indubitable relation to the purposes of UNESCO that Doctor Wilson seeks. The various disciplines and sciences will doubtless continue to justify their projects by relating them to the purposes of UNESCO on different and even incommensurable grounds, which in turn will depend on different interpretations of the purpose. Since the program is judged and approved by the Annual Sessions of the General Conference, there is little prospect that delegations from widely separated nations and from divergent disciplines will in the few weeks of their annual meeting understand the program as a whole or agree on a single complex rationale of its projects. Indeed the problem lies precisely at the other extreme. It is extremely difficult at the General Conference to defeat any project, however dubious its relation to the purpose of UNESCO, if it is strongly supported by a few delegations. These facts, however, do not seem to me to be a ground for pessimism, but rather to suggest that Doctor Wilson's objective, which is essential to the success of UNESCO, must be achieved by other means. Instead of seeking first to secure agreement on a rationale of projects, it would be better tactics to carry further the effort to reduce the number of projects undertaken in the program of UNESCO and to relate them strictly to budget allocations. In a highly restricted list of projects it is more probable that those given first priority will have indubitable and immediate relation to the ends of UNESCO, and the successful pursuit of such a program will serve in the course of years to elucidate the pattern of UNESCO's action and furnish criteria for the selection of other projects.

With respect to the problem of organization, I am again in agreement with Doctor Wilson's desire for a clearer organizational chart than now exists, but the organization I should prefer is neither the present organization nor the organization recommended by Doctor Wilson. The problem takes a concrete form since I am afraid that I am among the majority which voted, at the July meeting of the Executive Board of UNESCO, against just such a union of the Education Section, the Fundamental Education Section, and the Education for International Understanding Section, as is advocated by Doctor Wilson. My reasons for opposing that change in organization were based on the purposes of the latter two projects and their effective bearing on the objective of UNESCO.

intrusions into the other fellow's business are, or at least may be, good. Specialization like everything else has an optimum limit, beyond which it threatens the whole quality of the thought of the specialist.

It is for these reasons, I suppose, that the trend is toward a wider base in treatment of intellectual problems. I suppose also that the optimum width of the base will vary greatly with the subject under discussion. If one is considering a matter of pure mathematics, such as the product of 3×3 , the teachers of music, geology, law, and theology presumably would not be able to contribute much to the solution. And yet one cannot be sure. The inquiry might involve the question what 3 is; and a theologian, a physicist, a philosopher, and many others might have some valuable observations. The practical fellow would not, probably. But he would, I believe, if the question were, what is the shortest distance between two points for a straight line, to a practical military man, is not the shortest distance between two points either in strategic operations or in the scientific theory on which the manufacture of atomic weapons is based.

In other areas of thought, the need for a wide base is more evident. Much of philosophy deals with the relationship of man to man, man to society, and man to God. Here the base of useful disciplines is large. The theologian, the expert in government, the psychologist, the sociologist, clearly qualify; and certainly the archaeologist, the student of the arts, and the medical man would be worth hearing from, to name only a few. History, too, is an obvious case for a wide base. Some old and several new historical writings show that there is almost no limit to the areas of learning which can contribute to the panorama of the study of the past.

The revolt against specialization in the disciplines, then, is under way. But as yet the practical man has not been brought in. By practical man I mean the fellow who deals with the products of the various disciplines, who ministers to the congregations, writes the ads, sues in courts, manufactures the gadgets, makes the laws, organizes the workers, answers the cables from embassies—and the like. Why are these ignored when it comes to formulating thought? Is it because their problems have nothing to do with the subjects with which the thinker is concerned? Is it because their observations are not considered worth listening to? Or is it because the thinkers have just not got around to establishing contact with them?

It must be the last. The academic disciplines are certainly concerned

with the subjects with which the practical man deals Roscoe Pound's theories of law relate immediately to the problems of the practicing lawyer F. S. C. Northrop is concerned with the same issues which preoccupy the State Department in its daily work Arnold Toynbee considers the training of horses as a discipline from which one can learn about the nature of the growths of civilizations And the products of pure science bid fair to destroy the whole material and spiritual civilization we are talking about It cannot be then that the practical men are disqualified because of the subjects with which the academic men deal

The second possibility is more serious Thinking and the business of imparting one's thinking to others require the highest skills The practical man is apt to underestimate the task And his perspective is likely to be very bad indeed The practitioner is concerned with the minutiae of operations to such an extent as to make his generalities often of little value; and this is a grievous defect for the pursuit of generalities, even though they be not worth a damn when you achieve them, as Justice Holmes believed, is, as far as I can make out, the main strategy of thinking The practical man is therefore apt to contribute almost nothing directly to the main immediate purpose of the thinker

The lack of knowledge and inability of the practical man to generalize maturely therefore bore the scholar and lead him to turn the practical man out with the suggestion that he go to grammar school But the scholar who dismisses the practical man makes a mistake The practical man could help in sharpening up the scholar's generalities And the scholar could give vitality to the practical man's way of handling his practical affairs The two of them would make a good team

The practical man has some acquaintance with the scholar's work He may have it as an avocation, and he cannot help having it in his vocation, for there is almost no practical activity into which the ideas of the scholar have not penetrated The ideas which the scholars shoot into the world of affairs are powerful weapons They cannot help having an influence which in the long run is more powerful than any force the practical man has at his disposal

A French thinker has lectured his confrères for leaving their intellectual fastnesses and coming down into the market place, but the truth is they cannot help it They cannot lock up their ideas Indeed, one distinguished American philosopher has told us that there is no such thing as pure ideas or pure reason and that every living thought "represents

a gesture made toward the world, an attitude taken to some practical situation in which we are implicated" This surprises me But there are certainly a great number of practical situations with which the thinker deals, or to which he makes his gestures As to them the practical man asserts the right to an interest merely because it deals with his business

Granted then the right of the practical man to have an interest in the work of the scholar, how should this interest be applied?

Mainly, I think, by greater use of the practical man's empirical knowledge of the matters to which the scholar's thinking is directed Let us examine some examples, taken at random

One category would be those cases in which the thought of the scholar, although purporting to relate to some practical situation, is esoteric to the point of unintelligibility Obscurantism of this kind is to be expected in a world of the division of labor Some lawyers, for example, try to mystify their own profession by asserting that their specialty is very special indeed and is not to be understood by those who have not spent their lives within its narrow confines The mystification usually takes the form of specialized language. A mumbo-jumbo comes out which discourages outsiders from coming into the trade, and makes people believe that he who uses the mumbo-jumbo is a very great specialist indeed This same technique of mystification seems also to exist in the academic disciplines Whenever it is found, it would be good to subject it to a good empirical checking Then the generalities would have to make themselves reasonably clear and stand or fall on their intrinsic validity.

A more important category consists of those *a priori* statements which seem to lead intentionally to conclusions the thinker wanted to get to before he started his line of thought The practical man considers this intellectually dishonest. And he is led to believe that this often happens with *a priori* thinking because some philosophers tell him so It is a philosopher who counsels him not to be overawed by the impression a fellow philosopher may give "Look a little closer, and you perceive that this magnificence of demcanoi is a mask This terrifying apparatus conceals a preference for a certain conclusion You may even find that the systems throw more light upon the preferences of the philosophers who construct them than upon the matters they discuss There never yet was a philosopher, no, nor man of science, whose conclusions ran counter to the dearest wishes of his heart, who summed up against them, or condemned his hopes to death" This is an eye opener to the practical man,

especially to the lawyer who is so apt to be impressed by citations put in print. So the philosophers, and even the men of science, have their major inarticulate premises, just as judges do. If these premises are no more infallible than those of the judges, he may talk with these men.

But even when ideas are put forward with complete intellectual honesty, a proper balance must be earnestly sought between the *a priori* element and the empirical element. Or as Einstein has said in a logically uniform system of thought, "experiences must be correlated with the theoretic structure in such a way that the resulting coordination is complete and convincing." In any particular case there is a heavy responsibility on anyone who sends an idea into the market place to see to it that to the best of his ability he has made the best mixture of the two methods. And this responsibility is especially heavy as to an idea which has been born in the *a priori* area, for these are the inflammable ones.

Granted then that it is a good thing to check *a priori* ideas empirically, who is better qualified to do the checking than the man who deals with facts in his daily business? A sociologist with theories as to the use of leisure time by the people of New York would do well to subject his ideas to criticism by Mr. Robert Moses who has had years of experience in combining the ideal with the possible in these matters. Or, taking an example in the past, it surely would have been better if Montesquieu had checked his description of the British government with some one familiar with British institutions, for Montesquieu described a government which never did or could exist. For to this day the United States is hampered in meeting the great tasks before it because this eighteenth century Frenchman wrote a fairy tale about the British Constitution of his time.

Or, taking a recent and more contentious example, I believe that more empirical checking would have led Doctor Reinhold Niebuhr to qualify his statement that a world rule of law is impossible with the present state of the world community. In a recent article in *The Nation*, Doctor Niebuhr, starting from the proposition that government comes out of the consensus of the society, moves on to the conclusion that because of the present weakness of the world community no rule of worldwide law is possible. Now this is a serious blow to those who are hoping that society can save itself from a suicidal war; for any idea put forward by Doctor Niebuhr is listened to with high respect. But was this devastating idea checked adequately? Perhaps it was, but if so the evidence of the

checking has not been made public. And such a check would be a complicated business. It is likely, for example, that an empirical study would find enough consensus to support a world law for the regulation of postal matters, it is not likely that such a study would find that there is enough community to support a world state with the powers which, say, the government of Great Britain has. But in any case the first thing an empiricist would do would be to insist that the extent of the law in question be defined. The second thing would be to try to find out how much community of belief would be necessary to support such a quantum of law. The third would be to analyze how the actual state of world community compared with the required minimum. Perhaps all this would be so complicated that no conclusion could be reached, but this would not necessarily be unfortunate. That of itself would be an addition to knowledge. The empirical check would have tempered the *a priori* notion and would have taken the dynamite out of it.

The practical man knows how dangerous ideas are, especially when they have a high and unchecked deductive content. As John Dewey has said, "Empirical matters are subject to revision . . . But an *a priori* conception is not open to adverse evidence. There is no court having jurisdiction. If, then, an unfortunate mortal should happen to be imposed upon so that he was led to regard a prejudice or predilection as an *a priori* truth, contrary experience would have a tendency to make him the more obstinate in his belief. History proves what a dangerous thing it has been for men, when they try to impose their will upon other men, to think of themselves as special instruments and organs of Deity. The danger is equally great when an *a priori* Reason is substituted for a Divine Providence. Empirically grounded truths do not have a wide scope, they do not inspire such violent loyalty to themselves as ideas supposed to proceed directly from reason itself. But they are discussable, they have a humane and social quality, while truths of pure reason have a paradoxical way, in the end, of escaping from the arbitrament of reasoning. They evade the logic of experience, only to become, in the phrase of a recent writer, the spoil of a 'logic of fanaticism.' Weapons forged in the smithy of the Absolute become brutal and cruel when confronted by merely human resistance."

Some *a priori*-ism has done tremendous damage. The German combination of extraordinary industry and skill in applied science, of over-developed affection for uncontrolled theory, and of fondness for premises

which are abhorrent—such as the unique mission of the German race, the morality of war, and the high role of the State—has proved itself a disaster for Western society. It may be that this philosophy was a product and not a cause. On the other hand, it may be that this is a case where philosophy has been as important in practical matters as is sometimes claimed. The nineteenth century Germans may not have been philosophers after the political fact as Locke was, but the inspiration of the political men and the people they led to disaster. There is reason to believe the latter; for Kant and the nineteenth century Germans preceded the political events which were the ultimate conclusion of their theories. Only Spengler came in after the political damage had been largely done.

Similarly with the other great disruptive force of the present phase of society—Russia. For all his work in the British Museum, Marx was at his most effective when he threw *a priori* ideas into the market place of the Industrial Revolution. And what power they packed! Nor is the power of the doctrine of the proletarian dictatorship in any way weakened by the fact that the three stages of Communist development as postulated by Marx—the revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the final emergence of the classless society in which the State would no longer be necessary—cannot stand up against the most elementary empirical checking. The most primitive study of past societies and of political man would have shown that the notion of the classless society within the imaginable future was pure twaddle.

But I am not concerned here with the merits of these particular theories. I am trying only to make the point that ideas with great *a priori* content are dangerous far out of proper relationship to their validity. No one will object to a dangerous idea if it has passed certain tests—that its proponent has integrity and high purpose, and has subjected it to adequate deductive and empirical checking. But one may properly object to the reckless use of inflammable slogans—for that is the level to which many of these unchecked *a priori*-isms descend.

There is also the reverse of the medal. Contact between the scholars and the practical men already exists to a considerable extent. American industry could never have done what it has without the help of pure scientists. Applied medicine and law owe much to the theoreticians. The academic economists have substantially influenced the practical operations of commerce. And so on. But the fact remains that the scholar, and above all the deductive method are not held in sufficiently high respect

and are not used as much as they should be by the practical men. The reason, I believe, is lack of contact—the segregation of the disciplines which is the penalty of the division of labor.

One trade, for example, which could do with less pragmatism and with more theory is government. Trial and error, that is, the empirical method, in government is all very well when the government is properly geared to the tasks of the moment. But when, as now, burdens of an extravagant kind are put on the state, the method of trial and error is too rooted in the past and is too slow in expanding, unless it is supplemented by the more venturesome *a priori* approach. In any complex governmental policy there are various stages of immediacy. Immediate Purpose has much less principle in it than Long Term Purpose, but Immediate Purpose should be consistent with and in aid of Long Term Purpose. While what has to be done today may be based on immediate and untheoretical necessity, theory (necessarily built mainly by *a priori* methods) should have its influence—perhaps only as a beacon and perhaps with diluted light—but still as a beacon. And to have this influence it must exist otherwise all policy is unprincipled. Perhaps it is for this reason that the Oxford Dictionary defines empiricism, as a medical term, as “ignorant and unscientific practice; quackery.”

The problem, in all these cases, is how to get the right mixture of practical inductive thought and theoretical deductive thought. If a person has come to the end of his development, whether he be an operator or a theorist, and is resigned to being static, then he can specialize to his heart's content, without bothering to try to move a bit nearer to perfection. But if he is alive, must he not constantly seek improvement, and therefore breadth? And to get it must he not always seek the finest mixture of methods he can achieve?

2. *Must We Climb Steeples?*

By HARLOW SHAPLEY

Director, Harvard College Observatory



During the past twenty years, more than two hundred thoughtful Americans have publicly insisted that serious defects exist in our system of higher education. Dozens have written books amply demonstrating the defects. The teachers, it is insisted, are improperly trained, the curriculum is a mess, the students are allergic to study, the ideals are perverted, the future is black.

No one proposes the obvious step that we should give up education altogether and restore the happiness that frequently goes with total ignorance, no one advocates that we diminish the worry that accompanies wisdom. Such advocacy is certainly a temptation. If I had not learned to read or write, I should have been spared much weary labor, much distressing worry, and you also would have been spared your current distress. You would have been spared my panacea, which, like the two hundred others of recent years, is aimed at the salvage of the decadent educational system.

Not so long ago, in terms of geological time scales, higher education was practiced for the advantage of the clergy. It would perhaps enrich sermons. It was a desperate device to diminish the deadly dullness. History records that it did not help much. But the social prestige of book learning was useful. The prestige also accrued to the laymen who sought advanced education in the restricted curriculum of those primitive days. The clergy and laymen both enjoyed practical gain through education, and advantage over other men and other beasts, although such acquired knowledge then, as now, availed little against time, death, and the galaxies.

While the curriculums of the institutions of higher learning have swung back and forth from static to fluid, from general education to high specialization for a practical life, the social prestige of higher education has continued to veneer the participants. Presently many began to

see that the veneer was essentially all there is to the higher educational structure. The termites of sports and social activities have gnawed away the body of the building. Education has become largely a superficial device for concealing the ignorance within. But, I ask, is not veneer better than nothing? With the modern techniques, they make excellent veneer these days.

As I say, the professional educators have devoted much time since the beginning of the century to writing books at each other about curricular and educational policies at the college level. Some good has undoubtedly come therefrom. Experiments are being tried here and there. The current trend is to curb the presumed evils of specialization in our institutions of mass education through the introduction, especially in the early years of college, of "general educational courses." The Chicago system,¹ the Columbia system, the Colgate system (not to get out of the C's) have drawn some commendation and much criticism. The criticism has come especially from those educators who have not yet adopted a comparable cure of the presumed evils, or from those who are already riding the pendulum back to (as they put it) "sound training in chosen special fields and consequent escape from scattered dilettantism" (Aren't words wonderful!)

My limited observations and experience have been mostly with students who are candidates for the Master's or Doctor's degrees in astronomy. They happen to be not as distressing as students are likely to be in many other fields, because the undergraduate offerings in astronomy in American colleges are so few that the student in search of credits has not been able to restrict himself closely to the constellations and to the narrow confines of celestial activity. Because of the thinness of the undergraduate offerings in astronomy, he has, in spite of himself, been generally somewhat exposed to languages and the social sciences, to other physical sciences and the arts. Even so, he is not prepared adequately for citizenship among scholars.

But we must, of course, not think only of the higher education that leads to professionalism. A would-be professional scholar, half educated under our prevailing system, has many years after the Doctorate in which to carry out corrective measures. Eventually he can, if he will, educate himself broadly. But the non-professional, who stops formal

¹Chicago University's bold reforms were indeed in part responsible, through their merits and limitations, for inciting some of the following arguments

education abruptly with his Bachelor's degree and his athletic letters, must live out a long life based intellectually on the nutrition provided by four or more years of undergraduate experience. Is a physics major, for instance, ready for the long pose of being an educated man? Or is the botany or history major fully prepared by his education to honor his teachers and his college? Or have they all merely climbed small tapering steeples with no place to go but down?

The one who concentrated on botany cannot talk pleasantly any more, he says, with those benighted colleagues who concentrated on mathematics, or with those who got their diploma credit in finance. The more advanced the botany major becomes, the narrower his steeple, the smaller his discussion group, the fewer his appreciators. Elementary biology is pretty widely interesting and can provide communal conversation and even friendly or solitary thinking, and the second course, economic botany, still provides two or three thought provoking arguments with, shall we say, engineers. But the interested engineers become few when cryptogams enter the picture. And they pass on the other side of the street with averted faces when the botany major, in his senior year, is filling up with Pteridophyta. The botanical steeple jack has isolated himself, and since he does not go on to professionalism, he naturally feels lonely and frustrated, and hopes to heaven that the vaunted mental training will somehow help him when and if thinking is later required.

Once he is out of college, our botanical major is so baffled by his steeple isolation that he crawls down to the roof level, where he was at the end of high school, there he talks baseball, price levels, crops, and politics. He has had, perhaps, a healthy four years, but confesses to the alumni secretary that he really got nothing out of college except good times and the chance to meet some swell guys in the fraternity and the gym. "Why don't they train people," he complains, "train them in some useful way?" Or why don't they educate them broadly?"—or why this, or that.

There is no answer to those who aspire highly and lazily and then uncover sadly their own limitations. And my heart is touched by those blobs perched wonderingly and uselessly on the steeples. My therapy would be to eliminate steeples from the college curriculum, and permit such structures to be erected or climbed only by experienced students who are launching out on professional careers, probably not until the postgraduate period.

The epidemic of general education courses arises from recognition of the need for foundation education. Since this is a free country, where laymen can criticize the professional élite, I question the efficacy and adequacy of that movement. It falls short in coverage, in both space and time. The general education courses usually provide simply a little heavier foundation for sharper, more fragile steeples, built and climbed by amateur craftsmen in junior and senior years. Occasionally, to be sure, an amateur's steeple stands, even grows, in alumni years, we are proud, and we overpublicize the rarity, forgetting the nine tenths whose parents pay for a fruitless gesture.

Stretching the architectural analogy, let us question whether the vertical structure is sound in a burgeoning world society that of late has greatly increased its special fields of useful knowledge, its geographical mobility, and its responsibilities for the enlightened continuation of the human species. A structure composed of neighboring columns has basic instability. An occasional cross-tie helps but does not cure the defect in design. Why not introduce, deliberately, more horizontal members? Why not devote the whole of the four year liberal arts college to horizontal structures which will serve as a capping for the secondary education and at the same time provide an exceedingly firm flooring for the erection of vertical members, if competently designed, in the graduate school and later?

Reading, writing, and arithmetic are foundations built in the primary schools. The secondary schools provide sturdy columns of history, mathematics, language, elementary science (natural and social). These are tools for the students who go further, and give intellectual experience and practical equipment to those who do not. They are vertical structures, and—the analogy is good—they are separate, they go from the base upwards during the early student years, and they support what comes later.

Now here is where you will not follow me or bear with me, for various reasons, especially if you are a professional college teacher. For I suggest that physics, government, economics, chemistry, biology, languages, and the other usual discrete subjects, be not taught as such in college. As subjects they are proper for the secondary school student, who is building tools for action, and then again, with a different intensity and content they are proper for the narrow steeple climbing specialist in the post-graduate years, although, even there, his success often depends largely on the horizontal tie ups he makes with neighboring specialties. My

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proposal, or rather exploratory question, is Should not all education-defeating vertical columns be eliminated from the college?

We have in America now something more than two million undergraduate college students. A very small fraction go on to higher general education. What the college does to our millions is naturally important. They will get no more, and they forget fast.

The undergraduates have been living integrated lives, and must continue to do so daily. They do not live as political scientists, or as students of French literature, or as medieval historians, or as biologists; they are citizens, mostly engaged in private enterprise of one sort or another. Why not integrated education rather than disparate education? Why not a parallelism, in college and out, of the techniques of problem approach? The ex-student meets daily with problems that could be resolved, and tensions that scholarship might alleviate, if it had the capacity and did not suffer too much from the handicap of being columnarily specialized and uncomprehending.

What would take the place of the usual courses in this plateau curriculum that is constructed across the usual vertical lines? That should be a question for the professional educator. He might find a partial answer in the courses I am about to recommend which certainly tend to illustrate the unity of knowledge and the attraction, if not the practicality, of the integrative approach. The courses I suggest might be inherently difficult, not only to present but to study and absorb, but skillful instructors could alleviate the pain through careful organization. There need be no fear of superficiality, unless the instructors are superficial, the subjects are deep enough.

Course 1 *Societies*—At first blush, one might think that this most important of subjects for the current struggling civilization would fall wholly in the field of social relations, or perhaps the field of cultural anthropology, or both. But further contemplation reveals that *Societies* should draw heavily also from political science, philosophy, demography, entomology, engineering, psychology, ethics, psychiatry, and other areas. It is a great subject, worthy of two or three course years of undergraduate study. It should be oriented three ways—toward the past, the wide present, and the future.

Course 2 *Growth and Decay*—The importance of this subject is concealed and perverted by any attack through one discipline. Materials for its exploitation and presentation come from the physical and social

sciences and from the humanities, as well as from biology, because growth and decay operate on galaxies, interstellar dust, and comets; crystals, ideas, biological individuals; on societies and social movements. It is more than evolution. The materials for the course come from philosophy, chemistry, cosmogony, geology, literature, all aspects of biology, statistics, calculus, and history.

Course 3. *Communications*—A basic discipline in the lives of modern individuals, this course would draw from folkways, linguistics in many phases, biology, political science, electronics, psychology, cryptology, philosophy, music, mechanical engineering, journalism, navigation, solar astronomy, and ionospherics. An elementary phase of Course 1 would be an obvious prerequisite.

Course 4. *The Past*—From philosophy, geology, cosmogony, physiography, paleontology, anthropology, ethnology, mathematics, comparative neurology, meteorology, and so on. Here wide integration is the essential key.

Course 5. *Science*—From human psychology, cultural anthropology, logic, mathematics, cosmogony, political science, and, of course, biology, physics, astronomy, chemistry, and so on. In a civilization increasingly based on science and technology it would be well to examine, at the college level, the meaning and nature of science, its operation, and its promise. One can study science and its complications without being an embryonic professional physicist, biologist, or chemist. President Conant has especially emphasized the high significance of science, in the sense here indicated, as a part of a liberal education.

Course 6. *Religion*—From human psychology, history, social anthropology, literature, economics, cosmogony, government, military strategy, and, of course, philosophy.

Course 7. *Money and Barter*—From folkways, economics, mineralogy, chemistry, international law, sociology, statistics, history, labor, and politics.

Course 8. *Art Forms*—From biology, psychology, cultural anthropology, craftsmanship, music, literature, architecture, fine arts and mechanics, and mathematics.

Course 9. *Industry*—From geography, economics, folkways, political science, statistics, geology, chemistry, physics, politics, and many phases of craftsmanship and engineering science.

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Finally, I list a group of courses that might be called Chronological Analyses. Here and there, under titles such as "Civilizations" or "This-or-That Century's Thought," we have already in our colleges widened history a little, and it has been found profitable—a tempting gambit. I would go further and richer. An example follows.

Course 10 *The Eighteenth Century*—Here would be involved the history and interpretation of the creations and contributions by scholars, scientists, artists, merchants, and social and religious leaders, as well as the conventional recording of political and military developments. Professional historians of politics, and of international political and military maneuvers, probably should have little to do with this presentation and interpretation of the eighteenth century as a segment of the current world civilization. They appear to be badly besteepled. We should remember continuously the work of Shakespeare, Kant, Laplace, Verdi, and Pavlov, when we interpret past ages, and should minimize the doings of the prime ministers and military strategists of those various times.

Similarly, there could be across the board courses for other convenient time segments, in each of which routine history would be enriched, and perhaps almost submerged, by the contributions from other fields. For instance, the atomic age, beginning about 1897, should not be treated by a nuclear physicist alone, or a sociologist, or an economist. The atoms have invaded literature; they have, at least through measuring, affected psychological knowledge; they have transformed cosmogony, they have created new mathematics.

One who thus leans of segments of civilization across the fields of arts and science might easily live his own segment in a broader way. But the most remarkable of the chronological courses could be "Twentieth Century, Second Half." It would involve Utopias (new and old), social threats like atomic war, TVA-ing the planet, world population planning, and dreams. In all probability it would be too hot to handle in the sobriety of the academic groves. (Perhaps we must try out the education I visualize off the campus, where educators are braver and closer to their subjects and goals, or in University Extension, where we do not nurse our rules so tendrily.)

There are, in addition to those just named, several important multi-disciplined fields for a college curriculum—for example, Transportation, Machines, The Mind, Dwellings, Substances, Civilization, The Renaissance.

sance, and *The Gaseous Envelope*. All are thought provoking. Exploratory educators could find diversion and perhaps profit in outlining the contents of these and the foregoing courses

In a sense I am simply proposing education on the basis of studies of major general problems rather than studies in traditional specialties—problems rather than subjects, if one defines those concepts suitably

The loudest protests against horizontalism would be those from vested interests. They always oppose change. The professional university geologist, for instance, might be loath to accept the principle that the serious training of geologists should begin at the graduate level. Frequently he and his like have sought to make the liberal arts college a trade school. If he, and his brothers from physics, astronomy, economics, literature, government, and philosophy, were confronted with such a horizontal curriculum, how would they personally fit into the enterprise, especially in colleges where graduate students are relatively scarce? They would not fit. Theirs would therefore be a justifiable, self-interested protest. In colleges, of course, one should not change or progress, if circumstances make it unnecessary.

But there are new social situations that are rapidly affecting our whole educational business. Industrial machinery and increased efficiency in production are on the way toward creating unemployment on a vast scale, the economists tell us, unless new industries are discovered or old ones vastly expanded. How about the old industry of education? How about educating people for a longer time? On its own merits, education is supposed to be worth pursuing, and if at the same time it can, a decade or two from now, keep several more millions of Americans off the labor market, it may contribute to the stability of our society.

I have oversimplified the situation, but the starting of specialized education a few years later than is now customary, on a much stronger intellectual foundation, on a much broader contact with the fundamentals, is worth serious contemplation.

To round out my comments on the horizontal curriculum, I should admit, of course, that some of the trade schools of engineering, agriculture, dentistry, and the like, must go on non-educating students and training them excellently for early specialization in the respective crafts and trades. The premedical requirements, for example, would demand of some students certain vertical undergraduate components in the other-

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wise horizontal schedule, unless the specialized professional training in medicine be prolonged still farther toward middle life. And, doubtless, a case can be made for introducing the horizontal capping and flooring, not at the end of high school but somewhat later, for example, by extending the preliminary vertical structure up through the ordinary freshman year in order to provide better tools (to mix the metaphor) for successfully undertaking the horizontal activities. Possibly, mathematics and a foreign language must thrust upward through some of the college years, and the nearly inevitable English A would likely appear in Freshman year, as a reminder of the apathetic attitude of American secondary school administrators toward the use of their native tongue. But these concessions should not be necessary if the secondary schools are good enough and the college curriculum skillfully devised.

My concluding comment on this particular exploration by a skeptical steeple jack is that we should recognize the fact that the atomic age has opened a new world for educators. We should worry about stabilities and equilibria and continue to ask if it is an intelligent policy to promote intellectual isolationism through the early climbing of poorly grounded steeples.

I took higher education and its steeples for my first tilt. Let us now take scientific societies, but without going into such laborious detail. Both the large scientific conventions and the ordinary meetings of most of the technical scientific societies are places where steeple jacks often exhibit themselves to no good end except that of exhibitionism.

The ordinary "meeting for papers" of the technical scientific societies are really diabolical in their toleration of steeppling. This condition probably holds to a lesser degree in meetings of philosophers, but probably less among historians, educators, and others who generally keep more remote from mathematics and the technologies. I have sat through dozens of scientific meetings where I understood less than half of what was going on. I was lost, from the beginning to the too distant end. Often it was not important that I did not understand. The greater part of the audience was in my condition, or even worse off. It was only vaguely interested in the parade of technical minutiae or complicated reasoning. But still the listeners sat, lost in daydreaming, or just sitting, or frequently frankly sleeping.

Why do scientists, otherwise intelligent, endure these specialized

papers that are imposed on fifty to five hundred people, when only two or three similar specialists are really interested and profiting? Their endurance is, I suppose, in part a gesture of timid good manners; in part a bluff, in part a heroic expression of personal goodwill toward the performer. But what a waste! If all those who do not really understand, or do not care to hear the indifferent presentation of some technical work, would only walk out of the scientific meetings, it would result in immediate reform, possibly revolution. The synthetic dullness of most meetings drives many a self-respecting man into seclusion at times of meetings and keeps him out of contact with his fellow workers. He seeks and uses shallow excuses for absence.

There are remedies. One is to omit most papers from programs. Another remedy that is often applied is that of discouraging the narrowly technical in making up programs of meetings, and of emphasizing the symposium and the crossfield conferences. Also, the occasional give-and-take round table alleviates the situation. As we get braver, bolder, and more aware of the disadvantage of steeping in public, the wasteful and rather stupid technical exhibitions will lose appeal.

I should not want to be misunderstood about concentrated specialization. I am all for it, and definitely averse to popularization in technical company. But since our brains are limited and rather weary, let us practice mental economy and, as scholars, go running up our chosen steeples only when occasion demands.

It is remarkable how much one can do with technical reporting on the level, in plain English, and with simple concepts. I could illustrate that point simply, if there were time. Naturally I would first appall or annoy you, with a technical title such as "The Heitzspriung Effect in Ten-Day Cepheids," and show you magnitude curves of variable stars in the Small Magellanic Cloud. As you start to leave the room (following my suggestion of a few minutes ago), I would drop the hint that perhaps Omnipotence had made an uneven distribution of hydrogen, boron, and iron throughout the universe—that perhaps the great Sower of the Grains of matter had done a spotty job and ignored the Uniformity-of-Nature law that we in cosmogony like so much—need so much. We need it desperately because, if the laws of gravitation, radiation, and atomic structure differ from place to place, from time to time, or are spasmodic in operation, what can we poor mortals do? We depend on order and the existence of uniform rules throughout metagalactic space (I throw in

that word *metagalaxy* to reestablish myself as an astronomer—I was beginning to sound ethical!) Uniform laws we need, Chaos defeats us. But now just look again at this series of light curves—tracings, they are, of the variations in the light of pulsing giant stars, in that separate southern galaxy known as the Small Magellanic Cloud. In these light curves you will notice that when the period, which is the interval from one maximum of light to the next maximum of light, is about seven or eight days, the curves are smooth with typical Cepheid asymmetry, like that of the prototype star Delta in the constellation Cepheus. That is, there is a characteristic quick rise to a single maximum and a slower falling away to minimum light. That holds for periods around eight days, and also for periods around twelve or thirteen days—a typical Cepheid form. But between, around ten days' period, the curves show double maxima.

What of it? you ask. And why five years' work, with ten thousand photometric measures and weeks of mathematical analysis? It is because of the cosmic importance of this suggestion of non-uniformity, for when we look at the Cepheid variable stars of our own galaxy—such stars as Delta Cephei and the North Pole star—and carry through for them similar photometry and statistical analysis, we find (as Heitzsprung pointed out) that the double-maxima stars have periods around eight days. For such periods in the Small Cloud the curves have single maxima. We find, therefore, a difference in response to internal pulsation. We try out another, nearby galaxy—the Large Cloud of Magellan; its pulsing stars simulate those of the Small Cloud, with the periods of double-maxima Cepheids between nine and eleven days.

A trivial matter? Yes, in a sense it is rather routine to one who works on variable stars as variable stars. But to the cosmogonist, to whom essential uniformity is a basic assumption, it is only as trivial as the structure of the universe is trivial. It is indeed one evidence that there is a deviation from cosmic uniformity in a basic phenomenon of stars. Such deviations give us a little glimpse into the operations at Creation, or, perhaps, a hint of galactic destinies.

In some billions of years, our own galaxy and the Magellanic Clouds may have come into agreement in this Cepheid detail, as they appear to be in agreement in so many others, but, for the time being, disagreement exists among their Cepheids. In substantiation of this discovery that Cepheids may reveal nonuniform cosmic conditions, there is further evi-

dence that our much trusted "uniformity assumption" may have to yield a little to the sweating technicians who penetrate deeply into little things. For, try as I will, I find scarcely a single pulsing star with a period between one and two days in the Large Magellanic Cloud, although hundreds of its Cepheids with longer periods are known. On the other hand, in the Small Cloud, only ten kiloparsecs away (again for face saving I register my technical language—I do not want to be too understandable)—whereas, I was saying, only ten kiloparsecs, that is, two hundred thousand trillion miles, away, in the Small Magellanic Cloud, there are scores of these quick pulsers, with periods between one and two days. Do different gods, or different sets of rules, or different abundances of chemical elements prevail in the two clouds of Magellan? They look much alike, they are near each other in the sky, they have similar stellar content, similar name (They were both discovered by Pigafetta, the historian of Magellan's magnificent circumnavigation four centuries ago, and were named, by the eminent notable—if I appear slightly sarcastic, it is only deliberately.) But still there is this difference of behavior in the Cepheid populations where we would not expect it—a true cosmogonic puzzle. We must look further into the theory of gaseous pulsations and the mechanism of the release of the atomic energy inside the Cepheids, for it is by atomic synthesis and atomic splitting that these stars maintain their pulsations. And we must look further into the observations of the Cepheids of our own galaxy.

Well, there you have in brief my paper "The Heitzspriung Effect in Ten Day Cepheids." Thanks for not walking out. I believe I did not ascend the steeple. I tried to stay under, or on top of, the cathedral roof, with the clergy and philosophers. In fact, I tried to raise the roof a little.

It seems to me that the worst abuses by scientific specialists in public come at the time of the annual meetings of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. The opportunity on that occasion for constructive synthesis and widespread cooperation is outstanding, but because of the unwieldy growth of this most populous of all associations of scientists, and because in a hundred years its original function has been largely replaced by the large specialized societies, it now pretty well muffs its opportunity and responsibility. It is avowedly devoted to the *advancement* of science. If steeppling at the annual meetings were less prevalent, the advancement would be better served.

We are going to try another plan. This year I happen to be the Presi-

dent, and next year the Chairman of the Executive Board. My plan of mild reform in the nature of the meetings is generally accepted by the Executive Committee. It will be an anti-sleeping program. The forthcoming meeting at Christmas time in Chicago will, however, be of the usual "cattle fair" type. Thousands of scientists will gather in the hotels and into the technical sessions, and get very little contact with the men of other fields, and not hear and take part in general integrating discussions. There will, to be sure, as in recent years, be some interfield discussion and some joint symposia. But most of the work will be of the sort that could be better done if the various scientific societies met separately and elsewhere, out of the crowds and confusion.

But a year from now, according to our plan, we shall have our centennial celebration in Washington, and the nature, plan, spirit, and slogan of the Association's meetings on that occasion will be Integration. Practically no technical open sessions will be on the program. (There may be some small highly concentrated conferences by a few specialists, and some interfield symposia.) The score or more of forums and addresses will be aimed to present and guide science as a whole, with emphasis on the interfield work, on the crossies, on the multiple-disciplines problems—in fact, with emphasis on the major questions for which scientists, as specially trained agents of this worried civilization, should be responsible.

Our experiment a year from now may not succeed completely, because of inertia, or resistance to change, or because integration is not now or yet as strong an element in the needed reform as I believe it to be.

We shall, however, involve government officials in our centennial celebration. The President of the United States will have an opportunity to open the meetings. Perhaps Cabinet ministers, a Supreme Court Justice, and some Bureau chiefs will preside at particular sessions, as they would in India, Mexico, or Russia. By radio and press, the public can, if it will, learn from competent interpreters in many fields, of the "One World of Science," which is probably to be the central theme for the centennial. We in science seek to prolong the atomic age—the terrific and dangerous atomic age—in which you philosophers, snug in irrelevant history, seem to be sweetly complacent.

But even if this type of general scientific meeting is not so satisfying as we hope, it should at least emphasize some of the evils of isolation. We

may be tempted to recommend our approach to operators in other areas, suggesting that elsewhere there also may be too strong a tendency to climb the steeples in public, for doubtless the steeping tendency exists in religious dogma, in the application of social therapies, and in the grasping at straws of international understanding and worldwide peace

The possibility of getting out of our narrow specialties when working for worldwide peace and other social problems, finally leads me, in my closing sentence, to state that the thesis of my remarks is that scholarship may best be able to contribute to the amelioration of international tensions by keeping out of the ivory steeples, and by integrating its operations over the horizontal surfaces where both diplomats and common men live and work and misbehave.

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PAUL A SCHILPP	LOUIS WIRTH
HERBERT W SCHNEIDER	CLARK WISSLER*
ALPHONSE S SCHWITALLA, S J	QUINCY WRIGHT
ROY W SELLARS	

at

The American Philosophical Society

*One Hundred and Four South Fifth Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania*

*on Sunday, Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday
September 7, 8, 9 and 10, 1947*

**Deceased*

HOW CAN SCHOLARSHIP CONTRIBUTE TO THE RELIEF OF INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS?

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 7th

3 00 p m

Meeting of the Board of Directors and Plans Committee
(Discussion is to continue through dinner and into the evening)

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 8th

8 30 a m

Breakfast meeting of Chairman and Co chairmen
(Coral Grill, Benjamin Franklin Hotel)

To help integrate the Conference discussion, Professor R. M. MacIver will
serve as chairman at each session, with a co-chairman

10 00 a m

F ERNEST JOHNSON, Teachers College, Columbia University, *Co-chairman*
Discussion of¹

THE RELIGIOUS CONTRIBUTION

based on papers by

SWAMI AKHILANANDA, *Ramakrishna Vedanta Society*

BEN ZION BOKSER, *Forest Hills Jewish Center*

NELS F S FERRÉ, *Andover Newton Theological School*

BUELL G GALLAGHER, *Pacific School of Religion*

SWAMI NIKHILANANDA, *Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Center of New
York*

GUSTAVE E VON GRUNEBaum, *University of Chicago*

LOUIS WIRTH, *University of Chicago*²

Prepared discussants

KARL W DEUTSCH, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

RALPH T FLEWELLING, *University of Southern California*

SIMON GREENBERG, *Jewish Theological Seminary of America*

CHARLES HARTSHORNE, *University of Chicago*

2 30 p m

GERALD B. PHELAN, *University of Notre Dame, Co-chairman*
Discussion of¹

THE EDUCATIONAL CONTRIBUTION

based on papers by

EDWARD L. BERNAYS²
STEWART G. COLL, *Pacific Coast Council on Intercultural Education*
WESNER FALLAW, *Andover Newton Theological School*
HARRY B. FRIEDGOOD, *University of California, Los Angeles*
SIMON GREENBERG, *Jewish Theological Seminary of America*
GEORGE B. DE HUSZAR, *Nelson's Encyclopedia*
F. ERNEST JOHNSON, *Teachers College, Columbia University*
ALFRED C. LANE, *Tufts College*
ELMO ROPER³
JULIAN L. WOODWARD³

Prepared discussants

DAVID BIDNEY, *The Viking Fund*
IRVING LORGE, *Teachers College, Columbia University*
RUTH STRANG, *Teachers College, Columbia University*

8 30 p m

EDWIN E. AUBREY, *Crozer Theological Seminary, Co-chairman*
Discussion of¹

THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTRIBUTION, TOGETHER WITH CONSIDERATION OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF ART, MUSIC AND LETTERS

based on papers by

RUDOLF ALLERS, *Catholic University of America*
DAVID BAUMGARDT, *Library of Congress*
BAKER BROWNELL, *Northwestern University*
RALPH T. FLEWELLING, *University of Southern California*
A. CAMPBELL GARNETT, *University of Wisconsin*
PAUL KECSKEMETI, *United States War Department, Reorientation*
Branch
GEORGE KUBLER, *Yale University (for the New York art seminar)*
HARRY A. OVERSTREET, *College of the City of New York*

LINCOLN REIS, *Bard College*

PAUL A. SCHILPP, *Northwestern University*

ROY W. SELLARS, *University of Michigan*

Prepared discussants

THOMAS D. ELIOT, *Northwestern University*

HARRY B. FRIDGOOD, *University of California, Los Angeles*

PHILIPP FRANK, *Harvard University*

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 9th

8 30 a m

Breakfast business meeting (Coral Grill, Benjamin Franklin Hotel)
of the members of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion,
to transact necessary business of the corporation, including election of
officers and new members

10 00 a m.

(Discussion may be continued during the afternoon)

WILLIAM F. ALBRIGHT, *Johns Hopkins University, Co-chairman*

Discussion of¹

THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NATURAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

based on papers by

ROBERT C. ANGELL, *University of Michigan*

DAVID BIDNLY, *The Viking Fund*

QUIRINUS BREEN, *University of Oregon*

EDMUND DE S. BRUNNER, *Teachers College, Columbia University*

GOTTFRIED SALOMON DELATOUR, *Columbia University*

KARL W. DEUTSCH, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

THOMAS D. ELIOT, *Northwestern University*

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MARK GRAUBARD, *University of Chicago*

CARYL P. HASKINS, *Union College*²

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ROBERT W. KING, *Bell Telephone Laboratories*

ALEXANDER H. LEIGHTON, *John Simon Guggenheim Memorial
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 STUART MUDD, *University of Pennsylvania*
 GERALD B PHILLAN, *University of Notre Dame*
 STUART A RICE, *United States Bureau of the Budget*^{2 3}
 PITIRIM A SOROKIN, *Harvard University*
 RUTH STRANG, *Teachers College, Columbia University*
 QUINCY WRIGHT, *University of Chicago*

Prepared discussants

NELS F S FERRÉ, *Andover Newton Theological School*
 BUELL G GALLAGHER, *Pacific School of Religion*
 PAUL A SCHILPP, *Northwestern University*

2 30 p m

OWEN J ROBERTS, *Co-chairman*

Discussion of¹

THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE SCIENCES OF ECONOMICS,
 INDUSTRY, LAW AND GOVERNMENT

based on papers by

HERMAN FINER, *University of Chicago*
 ELI GINZBERG, *Columbia University*
 ROBERT A GRAHAM, S J, "*America*"
 MALCOLM ROSS, *University of Miami*
 DONALD C STONE, *United States Bureau of the Budget*

Prepared discussants

GOTTFRIED SALOMON DELATOUR, *Columbia University*
 CARYL P HASKINS, *Union College*

8 30 p m

THOMAS S GATES, *University of Pennsylvania, presiding*
 Public Meeting

HOW CAN SCHOLARS MEET THE CURRENT
 CHALLENGE?

Learning and World Peace

Addresses by THOMAS K. FINLETTER
and

HARLOW SHAPLEY, *Harvard University*

Comment by R. M. MACIVER, *Columbia University*
(at the University of Pennsylvania Museum, 33rd and Spruce Streets)

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10th

10 00 a.m.

ALAIN L. LOCKE, *Howard University*, Co-chairman

Discussion of¹

THE PROBLEMS OF THE UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL,
SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION

based on papers by

W. G. CONSTABLE, *Museum of Fine Arts, Boston*

JACQUES HAVET, UNESCO, *Section on Philosophy and the Humanities*

I. L. KANDEL, *Teachers College, Columbia University*

JAMES MARSHALL, *United States National Commission for UNESCO*

HOWARD E. WILSON, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*

Prepared discussants

ROBERT C. ANGELL, *University of Michigan*

PHILIPP FRANK, *Harvard University*

CHRISTIAN GAUSS, *Princeton University*

MALCOLM ROSS, *University of Miami*

1.00 p.m.

Luncheon Meeting (to be continued through the afternoon)

CRITIQUE OF THE CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY
AND RELIGION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE
EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING

Discussion by

WILLIAM F. ALBRIGHT, *Johns Hopkins University*

LOUIS FINKELSTEIN, *Jewish Theological Seminary of America*

F. ERNEST JOHNSON, *Teachers College, Columbia University*

ALAIN L LOCKE, *Howard University*
 ROBERT H LOWIE, *University of California*
 R M MACIVER, *Columbia University*
 GERALD B PHELAN, *University of Notre Dame*
 ROY W SELLARS, *University of Michigan*

PARTICIPANTS IN PROGRAM*

Mehmet Aga-Oglu
 Swami Akhilananda, *Ramakrishna Vedanta Society*
 William F Albright, *Johns Hopkins University*
 Rudolf Alleis, *Catholic University of America*
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 Ananda K Coomaraswamy, *Museum of Fine Arts, Boston*
 Karl K Darrow, *Bell Telephone Laboratories*
 Moshe Davis, *Jewish Theological Seminary of America*
 Gottfried Salomon Delatour, *Columbia University*

*Papers and written discussion available in mimeographed form. All oral discussion off the record.

*Text not received before program in press.

*In collaboration.

- W Edwards Dunning, *United States Bureau of the Budget*
 Karl W Deutseh, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*
 L Harold DeWolf, *Boston University*
 Henry L Drake
 Arnold Dresden, *Swarthmore College*
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 Thomas D Eliot, *Northwestern University*
 Friedrich Engel-Janosi, *Catholic University of America*
 Martin Eshleman, *Carleton College*
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 Paul J. Tillich, *Union Theological Seminary*
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Howard E Wilson, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*

M L Wilson, *United States Department of Agriculture*

Louis Wirth, *University of Chicago*

Anton Wojcicki, *UNESCO*

Bryce Wood, *Rockefeller Foundation*

Julian L Woodward

Quincy Wright, *University of Chicago*

Swami Yatiswarananda

*Writers of papers and comments, and those expected to attend, as of August 27th

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